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Foreword
Amsterdam is undergoing a process of gradual but profound urban transformation.
As an important node of national and international culture and trade, Amster-
dam’s inner city is arguably the most urban of Dutch city centers. This area contained
the highest concentrations of specialized professional skills and economic expertise,
was the leading center of culture and education, and the cradle of multicultural cos-
mopolitanism in the Netherlands. Although this convergence of urban qualities can
still be found in the inner city (i.e. it has retained its vitality), the actual meaning of ur-
banism or “urbanity” no longer coincides with this particular area. Over the past twen-
ty years, many offices and specialized economic activities moved to new functional
centers on the urban periphery (or even further). In addition, urban residences are
spreading outwards and becoming more differentiated at the regional or metropoli-
tan level of scale. Many other urban activities have decentralized as well. Meanwhile,
the inner city is adapting itself to a more niche market by focusing on, for example, cul-
ture and particular segments of the housing market. The familiar “inner-city urban-
ism” is transforming into a sort of metropolitan “network urbanism.”
This transformation is not unique to Amsterdam. Most of the major conurbations in
Europe and North America are coping with similar challenges. But the historic condi-
tions, the paths of dependency and the particular conditions are different everywhere.
This book examines how the urban/metropolitan transformation is taking shape un-
der the particular conditions of the Amsterdam conurbation. How do economic, social
and cultural processes affect this new metropolitan configuration of space and insti-
tutions? Naturally, this book also addresses the intriguing question what new urban
identities might develop in such changing historical conditions of space and place.
The issue of metropolitan transformation currently lies at the heart of internation-
al research on urban and regional development and governance, and the internation-
al comparative perspective is reflected in the contributions to this book. International
comparisons, however, usually focus on particular aspects of urban growth. By focus-
ing this collection on one particular region, we sought to cover a wider range of per-
spectives on metropolitan dynamics. The book deals with both the spatial and eco-
nomic aspects and the cultural, political, and institutional potentials of development.
We are proud to say that all of the contributions were written by senior researchers at
9
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the Amsterdam study centre for the Metropolitan Environment (AME). The AME is the
research institute for urban development and spatial planning at the Universiteit van
Amsterdam. The AME brings together more than seventy researchers from a variety of
scientific disciplines to study urban issues in social and economic geography, urban
history, urban and regional planning, sociology, and political science. With our ex-
plicitly eclectic and comprehensive approach, we hope to enrich the current scientific
and political debates on the metropolitan laboratory.
The editors thank all persons that assisted in the achievement of the book, in partic-
ular Annemarie Maarse who closely inspected all chapters.
Amsterdam, January 2003
The editors
10 SAKO MUSTERD AND WILLEM SALET
Adam.HumanCapital  06-03-2003  16:50  Pagina 10
1. INTRODUCTION
Adam.HumanCapital  06-03-2003  16:50  Pagina 11
Adam.HumanCapital  06-03-2003  16:50  Pagina 12
he Emergence of the Regional City
Spatial Configuration and Institutional Dynamics
Sako Musterd and  Willem Salet
The Core Theme: From City to Urban Region
During its long history Amsterdam has developed into a city on a human scale, whose
dynamism and vitality are due to the various colors of its inhabitants and those pass-
ing through. Given the make-up of its population and its cultural diversity it is more
accurate to describe Amsterdam as an international center of “subculture” than a cen-
ter of “distinction.” Remarkably, the historic city center, which with its extensive sys-
tem of canals is going to be nominated as one of the major inner-city “monuments of
cultural heritage” on UNESCO’s world list, has somehow never been turned into a mu-
seum. The city center remains the scene where a variety of activities jostle for position,
and where a great deal of cultural and economic intercourse takes place alongside a
striking amount of residential use. This latter feature in particular (just under 100,000
people live in the historic center, ranging from students and Bohemians to, of course,
the affluent and the exclusive occupants of canal-side residences) guarantees the au-
thenticity and innovative drive of the activities in this highly-frequented area. The old
city center has avoided being taken over entirely by the people who pass through it, al-
though they do of course leave their mark.
The ratio of jobs to resident workforce in the center is about one to one, a unique
phenomenon internationally. Usually far more of the urban core is set aside for busi-
nesses, offices and shops, but people actually live in Amsterdam’s center. It goes with-
out saying that these rough figures conceal a good deal of dynamics, but they do un-
derscore the liveability of its center. The foundation for this unusual demographic
pattern was in fact laid down during the Golden Age of the seventeenth century, when
the commercial elite decided to set up shop in the heart of the city, thus giving the pat-
tern of urban development a mixed residential and commercial character for a long
time to come. On the European continent, this preference on the part of the bourgeois
elite for living in inner cities was not uncommon – e.g. in thirteenth-century Italy (see
Benevolo 1993); later on, in the middle of the nineteenth century, Haussmann’s re-
structuring of Paris gave a fresh international impetus to making inner cities suitable
inter alia for bourgeois living – but rarely did one find the ratio of workforce to jobs
mentioned above. The contrary, on the other hand, is by no means exceptional inter-
nationally. The urban history of Britain and the United States provides striking exam-
ples of the historical tendency of the urban elites to turn their backs on the noise of the
13
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city and live in safe residential areas in rural surroundings (Thompson 1982; Fishman
1987). The centers of these cities are entirely dominated by commercial functions; liv-
ing there has traditionally been a marginal activity. Amsterdam does not fall into this
category, and the few modest historical attempts to push it in that direction were all
aborted at a fairly early stage. Five centuries after the creation of the canal city, central
Amsterdam is still an example par excellence of a counterbalance to the Central Busi-
ness District.
In recent decades the long-term evolution of the major centers, in which the urban
core was taken for granted as the focal point for international contacts and day-to-day
activities in the region, has taken on a brand new dimension. There is a lot of new ur-
ban development on the edge of the traditional city, and the original city is no longer
the exclusive focus of urban activity. On a smaller scale, there has long been a trend to-
wards urban development outside the central city, but in the last two decades the
process has accelerated enormously. The question is, what new identities will develop
in such changing historical conditions of space and place (Gunn and Morris 2002). In
international terms, Amsterdam is not alone here: like most other traditional major
centers in Europe it is struggling with the question of how the present-day disjointed
city can develop fresh cohesion and identity (Ascher 1995; Marcuse and Van Kempen
2000). This question is the central theme of this book. What does the transition from a
major historical center to a new urban formation at a regional or metropolitan level in-
volve? The rise of the regional city is a complex process, in which multifarious aspects
of content, urban form, and function play major roles. It is not so much an enlarge-
ment of an old photograph as the formation of a substantially different urban constel-
lation in which new relationships have to grow between diverse and highly change-
able functional networks of land use and the new territorial concentration of the
regional city. Many spatial innovations are appearing, both in the nature of urban ex-
pansion and in the changes of the functional relationships between urban activities.
The transitions are usually not smooth, however. This undoubtedly has something
to do with the institutionalization of social and cultural values in the past, which can
produce inertia in an era of change, as well as physical limitations. The question, then,
is not only how the physical patterns of urbanism change (infrastructure, the siting of
new residential and working areas, etc.) but also how ideas on the significance of “ur-
ban space” evolve. There can be inertia factors here, not only social and cultural but al-
so economic or administrative, and the fascinating question is how such institutional
conditions can change (Salet 2002). Currently, many new cities are functioning far
from optimally in their new regional constellation, and this is certainly true of Am-
sterdam as well. Although the urban laboratory is moving on all sides, people seem to
have difficulty adjusting communications and networks to the new situation. The gen-
eral public and the politicians are not sufficiently aware of the fresh opportunities and
challenges at the various geographical levels of scale. It is also evidently a complicated
business getting to know the new opportunities of local positions and interpreting
them in today’s global society. What existing qualities can we use and strengthen in
the competitive area to tie new economic activity to the region, and how can we link
14 SAKO MUSTERD AND WILLEM SALET
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these goals with other regional needs? Whereas people used to identify strongly with
their cities and other local communities, the question now is, are there new regional
identities developing, and if so, what are they? What new socio-geographical patterns
are forming at the regional level; who are the winners and who are the losers? Is it even
possible to develop new regional visions that can serve as a common framework for
plans and other public and private initiatives, or is the institutional fragmentation of
value systems and interests too great? What specifically ties people and organizations
to their regions if the considerations that motivate them are increasingly less purely
territorial?
This book focuses on these themes and questions, based on an examination of the
development of Amsterdam into a regional city. We would stress that, although the
book is a case study of Amsterdam and thus talks a lot about that city, the context is an
international one. The reflections on urban trends in practice are illustrated by exam-
ples from the knowledge acquired in the international research programmes of the
Amsterdam study centre for the Metropolitan Environment (AME). The book can thus
also be seen as a discussion of a number of relevant themes at the heart of the present-
day literature on urban dynamics, e.g. the development of new urban forms and func-
tions; the significance of structures that have grown historically to the current urban
development; the conditions for attracting new urban economies; the new manifesta-
tions of socio-geographical inequality; and the changing political and administrative
territorial landscapes, and the opportunities afforded by metropolitan governance.
The discussions of these themes are organized from two perspectives. The first is the
temporal angle. The city is first examined retrospectively; the second part of the book
considers a number of contemporary issues affecting the city; the last part looks at the
urbanism of the future. The second angle is intertwined with the first, it accentuates
certain themes: economy, infrastructure and environment; social issues in a geo-
graphical setting; and political and institutional dilemmas regarding the regional
transformation of spatial patterns mentioned above. Taken together, the essays pro-
vide an understanding of how the functioning of Amsterdam as a regional city is devel-
oping and of the main urban development processes. The book concludes in an ex-
ploratory mood, with some possible scenarios for the future of regional Amsterdam
and an epilogue that sums up the main dilemmas of regional Amsterdam.
Below, we briefly describe the main themes of the book, followed by a brief impres-
sion of the content of each essay.
From City to Urban Region
The present-day city by no means has the same territorially confined form that it had a
hundred years ago. Few will dispute that the focus of urban activities nowadays needs
to be defined at a regional level. It is here that we see the contours of the urban region,
strongly influenced, of course, by its past. The quality of the city depends partly on
what has been developed there in the past. The present transition from city to regional
city does not usually take place in a controlled manner, according to a predetermined
THE EMERGENCE OF THE REGIONAL CITY 15
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plan; rather the emergent region is the geographical expression of more or less self-
contained social and economic processes, such as those taking place in housing, labor,
transport and various other markets. It is no easy matter marking out the territorial
boundaries of the new urban region. What we have, in effect, is a variety of functional
spatial networks working at different scale levels, giving rise to new agglomerations or
concentrations. Despite the capricious nature of this geographical restructuring and
the international content of geographical relationships in various markets, the transi-
tion to new regional forms is unmistakable. This is not only a transition in terms of
form (an expanding urban area with the associated communications); effectively what
we have is, above all, a genuinely expanded functional cohesion in the larger territo-
ries. Housing markets are actually operating at the level of the city region, as are the la-
bor markets. Also, “urban facilities such as health care, education, and culture” and
“recreational markets” have seen their reach increasing.
Nevertheless, behind all these tendencies towards increasing scale there lurks a
multiplicity of geographical selections. Amsterdam has seen a regionalization of its
housing market, for instance, but the results at present in the subsidized rented sector
are completely different from those in the owner-occupied sector. The geography of
the rented sector is still largely concentrated in the city of Amsterdam, whereas the
owner-occupied sector is spread throughout the region. Similarly, the labor market
has become entirely regionalized, with the result that people changing jobs within
the region do not generally see this as a reason to move, as the demand for accessibility
has also become regionalized. The geographical distribution of types of employment
and levels of education within the region, however, is again very uneven. The process of
regionalization entails a large number of geographical selections, sometimes promot-
ed in a considered, deliberate manner, but in most cases based on unintentional and
more or less coincidental results of the play of forces within the geographical domain
in question. Without fostering the illusion that regional development should take
place according to a predetermined plan, or even subscribing to the desirability of this,
the current form regionalization is taking raises a host of questions that require a bet-
ter balance between developments.
In most economic markets the geographical effect of decisions can sometimes be diffi-
cult to trace and influence at a regional level. Economic decisions on the geographical
behavior of businesses (decisions on the location of new offices, or decisions to expand
or merge) are not taken within the framework of regional area policy but in industry
within the margins of conditions in international markets. Nor are these companies
or chains of companies indifferent to differences in regional characteristics and re-
gional institutions: these are important frameworks of orientation for international
companies. It is here, at the interface of territorial qualities and functional spatial net-
works, that the main challenges and opportunities for the development of new re-
gional cities lie. Are the new city regions in a position to take advantage of the meeting
points of territorial and functional land use as catalysts for innovation, or do retarding
factors that currently hamper such synergies have the upper hand?
16 SAKO MUSTERD AND WILLEM SALET
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It is very important to the functioning of urban regions, and to those involved in
this, to realize that the rise of the urban region does not simply imply the enlargement
of the old city or urban district. It is no longer a question of further expansion of the
monocentric city or the monocentric urban district, in which the hierarchy of places is
strictly indicated, the largest core also being the entity with the most urban functions
and having the highest level of each function. This pattern fits in with classic hierar-
chical urban models which, in effect, date from the time when agriculture was still the
dominant economic sector. Today’s regional city is much more of a polycentric whole.
The cores are less hierarchically related to one another than they used to be. The pat-
terns of interaction in the two models differ considerably: whereas the monocentric
city had a mainly radial pattern of interaction, with the main and densest flows to and
from the core city, in the non-hierarchical polycentric model we find far more criss-
cross movements between the local centers of the urban region. Even in Amsterdam,
with its radial history par excellence, the dominance of the central core is currently di-
minishing rapidly, if indeed there is now any such dominance (see e.g. Bontje 2001).
The new urban region has thus far not grown into an enormous “urban field” of
scattered “individual points” as Friedmann and Miller noted in the spirit of Frank
Lloyd Wright in the middle of the suburbanizing sixties in the United States (Wright
1958; Friedmann and Miller 1965). The majority of interactions between parts of urban
areas still takes place within relatively compact urban regions. As regards the relation-
ships between urban activities, e.g. movement from residential to working areas, the
scale level of the “Randstad” (the western conurbation that includes Amsterdam,
Utrecht, Rotterdam, and The Hague), or more recently the “Delta Metropolis”, these
are at present more fiction than reality, whatever such metaphors may suggest. We are
seeing more criss-cross relationships springing up within the urban regions, however,
and the boundaries of the region are not “cast in stone” but, on the contrary, are per-
meable: what seems to be developing are overlapping functional regions that are at
present relatively compact, with permeable boundaries.
Infrastructure
It goes without saying that the change in urban structure and functional relationships
calls for a modified transport infrastructure, but this is easier said than done. A proper
response in the area of communications in fact requires a full understanding of, and
consensus on, the nature of the urban dynamic, and above all a realistic estimation of
the opportunities for development in the years to come. Transport infrastructure does
not merely accommodate the growth that has already taken place but also provides an
important jumping-off point for the possible planning of future geographical devel-
opments. Particularly important is the question of how the developing pattern of mul-
ti-centered urban nodes relates to the planning of the infrastructure. The strategic
planning dilemmas relate to whether new multi-centered hierarchies of urban nodes
will evolve in the current competition between developing sub-centers, or whether
planning will tend, American-style, towards a continuing spread without many new
THE EMERGENCE OF THE REGIONAL CITY 17
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urban concentrations. In these strategic considerations, infrastructure is not just a
tool, it can also play a guiding role in conjunction with places that are undergoing rap-
id development. Public transport in particular, through its network of international,
national, and supraregional communications, creates new hierarchical transport po-
sitions which in theory could correspond to the new evolving pattern of urban nodes.
In practice, however, this relationship is not yet particularly well developed.
Also, regarding the dominance, indeed over-dominance, of road traffic in intrare-
gional movements, there are opportunities in theory for the hierarchization of traffic
movements through the construction of new parkways, toll roads, and motorways,
thus providing fresh opportunities for regional planning. The present structure of the
road network, however, is already so intricate and fragmented that it is much more dif-
ficult to organize a new spatial structure and combat the tendency towards further ge-
ographical spread in this way (Le Clercq 1996). Nonetheless here too we see fascinating
challenges. For regional Amsterdam the question is whether such strategic questions
of planning and infrastructure can be studied as they relate to one another: this is not
the case at present. The reality would even seem to be lagging behind the spatial dy-
namics that have already taken effect at a regional level. It sometimes seems as if the re-
gional planners and the transport operators are not making enough effort to find out
about the changes taking place in urban areas; this impression may, however, also be
due to the fact that many links are very difficult to change by their very nature. The
dominant public transport system is in any event still mainly radial, whereas the new
jobs tend to be concentrated in office developments on the urban periphery.
Two themes emphatically require more discussion. Firstly, the current strategic pol-
icy debate on prioritizing investments in road infrastructure and public transport is
not backed up by a sufficient understanding of actual movement patterns. There is a
tendency to assign the highest priority to interregional links, whereas the main de-
mand is within these regions. Given the regional nature of the current urbanization
processes, the main demand is at the intraregional level of the North Wing of the Rand-
stad, and at the level of the South Wing, but the strategic planning debate in the
Netherlands seems to be neglecting this level, apparently preferring to optimize the
transport infrastructure at the level of the Randstad as a whole. As already indicated,
this scale level is oversized as regards the movements of day-to-day commuter traffic
(the majority of movements). The occupation patterns of urbanization and the associ-
ated movements that take place over relatively short distances in threaded chains of
urbanization. The majority of commuter movements still take place over relatively
short distances. The tailbacks on the trunk roads are thus caused not by the flow of
traffic from one urban region to another but in reality consist of short, threaded flows
between cores in the polycentric urban region. An investment strategy geared to an in-
tricate system of public transport within the urban region is therefore probably a bet-
ter option.
The same regional reality is also the input to a debate on the business philosophy of
public transport operators. This too needs to be oriented much more towards the ur-
ban regions. The National Railways give absolute priority to intercity services, neglect-
18 SAKO MUSTERD AND WILLEM SALET
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ing urban regional transport, while 85% of commuter movements take place within
the regional city. Urban regional services could have a far higher frequency and occu-
pancy if they were geared toward actual needs. Where reliable (because frequent) pub-
lic transport is available, far more people use it, as is now being realized within the
boundaries of the City of Amsterdam. An important question is whether a much more
efficient organization of public transport at the urban regional level should not be put
in place, as has been done in other countries. In effect, both themes (road traffic and
public transport) imply that a stricter separation will be needed between (a) infrastruc-
ture to accommodate through traffic efficiently (with few stops/stations) and (b) a fre-
quent, fine mazed infrastructure to meet the intraregional needs. Strategic dilemmas
of this kind in the transport sector suggest the possible reintroduction of hierarchy in
the transport sector. It goes without saying that, as already indicated, the strategic
planning questions (the development of new urban nodes, housing, and office devel-
opments and the creation of green nature and recreation areas) are inextricably linked
with this.
The Economic Conditions for the Regional City
The literature on planning economics over the past fifteen years has devoted a good
deal of attention to the significance of the concept of economic functional space. Eco-
nomic behavior cannot be properly understood as manifestations of urban or regional
activity but need to be understood primarily as a “space of flows,” as an expression of
functional networks (Castells 1996). In an era of internationalization, globalization,
and telecommunication the flows between businesses and cities (especially informa-
tion flows) are far more important, it is said, than the geographical decisions made
within territorial regions. The attention to economic flows and functional networks
has certainly produced a lot of relevant insights: particularly striking is the under-
standing of the creation of new hierarchical relationships in the various international
networks. Interestingly, the restructuring of the global economy would seem to be
placing some regions in a very favorable position, while others are falling outside the
new hierarchical networks. Within the regions as well, the restructuring of the inter-
national economy is leaving selective traces of development (see e.g. “splintering ur-
banism” Graham and Marvin 2001; and Swyngedouw and Baeten 2001). Particularly
crucial for regional Amsterdam is its relatively favorable position at the international
sub-top level of the financial and business network economy, its international role in
aviation and the striking position of its subculture in the international networks of
the “creative economy.” The importance of being sited in economic networks of this
kind is grossly exaggerated, however, if this would be to suggest that businesses no
longer should have any regional ties, that they should have become footloose enter-
prises, indifferent to specific regional qualities. The qualities of the regional city have
considerable significance for the development of residents and companies. The reval-
uation of the importance of regional qualities is amply confirmed in the recent litera-
ture on institutional economics (Storper 1997). In reality the importance of place in
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the development of companies and individual households is becoming more impor-
tant, not less important. If some qualities, such as ICT infrastructure, are available in
virtually all of the urban regions, other qualities take on more distinguishing power
(the availability of specially trained skilled workers, refined supply and delivery net-
works, and traditional economic experience in certain areas).
The key question is how this functional position and these territorial qualities can
strengthen one another and bring about synergy in the new regional city. What typi-
fies the position of regional Amsterdam is the fact that the characteristics of the
“hard” economy and the “soft” cultural aspects are producing an interesting cross-fer-
tilization: a climate that is attractive to creative knowledge workers (youthful talent) is
probably the decisive factor in the development of ICT, for instance. If international
companies are to locate their headquarters in a particular place it is important that fi-
nancial and marketing expertise are available as well as cultural economies. This
draws the hard economy closer to the soft social and cultural sectors: suddenly stock
exchanges begin having more to do with breeding grounds than we might have
thought. So if the regional economy is to develop well it is not enough to develop a good
physical infrastructure and accommodate new office developments in a well-consid-
ered manner; it is also important that the creative economy is able to flourish in an ur-
ban climate. What seems to be particularly important in the current economic and
cultural era is for cities to be able to show identities that attract youthful and creative
talent. Factors such as culture and social climate, tolerance, diversity and “urban cli-
mate” are thus becoming increasingly important.
International research shows that urban areas that have an international climate
and provide space for creativity, that are tolerant and ethnically and socially diverse,
are among the fastest-growing cities in economic terms. They are the ones able to at-
tract a lot of talent by virtue of these very qualities. Indicative of these cities is the large
proportion of homosexuals, a large Bohemian population (artists, writers, directors,
painters, etc.), a large proportion of immigrants and general “diversity.” In the US and
Canada, cities like San Francisco, Boston, New York, and Toronto have profiles of this
kind, and they enjoy sharp growth in their cultural economies. While in Europe, Am-
sterdam, Barcelona, Copenhagen, Prague, and Rome are among the creative cities. It is
there that we find ethnic and social diversity, large numbers of Bohemians and many
higher education courses. This type of urban environment contains ideal places for the
economic laboratory and for knowledge-intensive companies such as Shell Laborato-
ries, Philips, and Cisco, (see also Zukin 1995; Florida and Gates 2001; and Stedenbouw
en Ruimtelijke Ordening 2002). A strong creative economy creates not only favorable
conditions for other economic sectors, it also has a growing economic importance of its
own. Many products and services are “constructs” or even “imaginations,” but a shared
“imaginations” can become a reality for those who respond to them. Here we should
consider not only such things as fashion, media (cinema, music, games), or culture in
the narrow sense but as entire constructed lifestyles (Bridget Jones, Sex and the City or
Friends). These lifestyles, which touch all areas of life and production, are to a large ex-
tent brought to life by art, culture, and the media. Regional cities that have the best cre-
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dentials in this sector again are the “creative cities,” with their populations who are
able to generate creative ventures and have the organizations that are able to pick up on
the creative vehicles, develop them, and market them worldwide.
Until recently the desirable qualities of urbanism and population diversity (many
tolerant, innovation-minded inhabitants, who are considered creative and come from
a wide variety of backgrounds were mostly found in the core city of the urban region.
Nowadays, we have to look at the regional city as a whole. In the case of Amsterdam, for
instance, the city center and the nineteenth-century belt around it are rapidly losing
their breeding-ground character. The pressure on the central city is so great that “mar-
ginal activities” are being pushed out, with the result that a lot of breeding grounds
and alternative start-up areas are moving to other cities (for instance The Hague and
Rotterdam). One of the key points in regional economic policy, then, is to allow new
breeding grounds to develop, scattered throughout the urban region: there are still a
few antiquated industrial areas that lend themselves to this kind of development, as
well as some outdated office terrains and new “residual areas.” The question is
whether new urban nodes such as those developing at new hierarchical public trans-
port and road network interfaces can respond fully to the requirements of the creative
economy; so far the new urban nodes have largely experienced monofunctional devel-
opment, and there is a considerable scope for the quality of varied urbanism to become
more significant at these nodes.
Contrasting Identities and the Issue of Regional Governance
The rise of the polycentric urban region is producing a situation where not all of the
relevant interaction takes place within the biggest city; other cores in the region can
develop their own strong positions. We are also seeing old traditional central cores
that no longer consist of a single entity with one predominant center. Here specializa-
tion and differentiation have occurred within the old cores. Many old core cities have
developed various important economic and cultural centers, and they are no longer so-
cially homogeneous. New development which can be described as urban is now taking
place under its own steam outside the cities, and this tendency has been very pro-
nounced in the Amsterdam region. Various new internationally-oriented economic fo-
cal points are developing around the economic magnet of Schiphol Airport. Flower ex-
ports are concentrated around the international auctions in Aalsmeer; the media
industry is no longer confined to its traditional home in Hilversum but has recently
spread to Almere and the center of Amsterdam. The financial sector has regrouped
along Amsterdam’s South Axis. The various urban residential areas too are now highly
scattered throughout the region, the largest and most striking example being the new
town of Almere, which is set to grow into a town with a population of 400,000 over the
next thirty years.
On closer inspection of these many cores in the new urban region we find that indi-
vidual identities are being developed to some extent, but this process is only happen-
ing in dribs and drabs. There is as yet no truly regional philosophy or complementarity
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developing, by which the collection of cores could together form a strong region. In-
stead we find competition for the same functions, and most cores with an ambition to
grow are displaying mainly copycat behavior. In the field of economics, there is very lit-
tle specialization and only in some areas, plus there have only been a few attempts to
embed them culturally, socially, and physically. The capital’s cosmopolitan cultural
elite is internationally oriented but not that closely involved within the region. Cul-
tural development in the region is still remarkably monocentric, while the city’s social
and physical tissue has also changed. At this stage of urban transformation there is no
tangible evidence that an urban regional identity is evolving.
If we are to develop a coherent vision of the future of the regional city, however, we
need to know what identities we want to develop and where. This calls for a good un-
derstanding of our territorial strengths and a willingness to take advantage of them. It
also requires patience. The stratification that has developed historically, that has
made cities and in the long run the new regions so interesting, simply takes time to
grow, it cannot be forced. Young cores in the urban region are lagging behind the old
cores in this respect, though they can make up for this with other qualities, such as
more space and new facilities, or the ability unhampered by history to develop entirely
new development concepts. Is there then, perhaps, the scope here for brand new cul-
tural landscapes? Or should we just continue to look for these mainly in the old, famil-
iar centers of the old core cities?
It is important to note that the institutional normative structure if anything dis-
plays even more inertia than the physical structure. Established norms of urbanism
and positions that have been won are not easily relinquished, partly because of identi-
ties that have evolved but also because of political and administrative relationships
that have developed here. There is no administrative structure to respond actively to
the new metropolitan dynamics, so new urban realities may have to deal with outdat-
ed administrative structures and local bodies for some time to come. But here too it is
essential to pursue dynamic change. This does not necessarily mean that the tradition-
al administrative territories have to be enlarged through administrative reform, or
that all the administrative entities need to be turned upside down. We do, however,
need to create the right conditions, through “metropolitan governance,” for a new ur-
ban-region development vision to develop. The initiative need not necessarily come
from the municipal or provincial authorities; the main thing, it would seem, is for re-
gional attention to be consolidated in such a way that individual communities are no
longer able to define their positions in terms of purely local interests.
Amsterdam Human Capital: Contents
We return to the themes outlined here in the ensuing chapters. After this introductory
section, the book is comprised of the following three sections: 
1. Amsterdam in Retrospect;
2. The Current State: Dilemmas and Perspectives;
3. Prospects of Urbanity: New Cultural Identities.
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Finally, an epilogue by the editors will conclude the book. The sections are described
below.
Amsterdam in Retrospect
The next section describes the historical high points and major changes in urban life
that give depth to Amsterdam’s current existence. Geert Mak discusses five historic
episodes illustrating the most ambitious utopias of the ambitious bourgeoisie in the
struggle with water, mud, and social decay. The dikes in the fourteenth century
marked the first victory over water, providing the conditions the city needed to be-
come a trading center. The second episode, in the seventeenth century, produced the
entire ring of canals. In the next stage, urban expansion was expressed in terms of
grand residences, demarcating the canals and the surrounding districts. The city ex-
ploded at the end of the nineteenth century: on the one hand the bourgeois ideal was
extended into grand suburbs (for the happy few), on the other, the housing shortage
gave rise to such “revolutionary districts” as the Pijp and the Kinkerbuurt. The expan-
sion plan in the early 1930s then laid the foundation for Berlage’s Amsterdam South, a
successful district for the middle and upper classes. The final sizeable intervention
Mak discusses is the 1960s modern high-rise district, the Bijlmermeer, and the ideals
behind its development. In the next essay, Michiel Wagenaar concentrates on the social
changes that occurred around 1919 when the liberal period finally ended and gave
way to a period of public housing that was to last until well after the Second World War.
The liberal period was at its height between 1880 and 1920. Private enterprise was dom-
inant and many prestigious edifices were completed: the big hotels, the theatres and
museums, Central Station, the stock exchange and some grand residential districts
such as the one around the Plantage. After that, the role of government increased con-
siderably and a good deal of attention was devoted to the shortage of public housing.
This was the period when the municipal housing authority, joined gradually by the
housing corporations, left an increasingly strong mark on urban Amsterdam, with
striking, but sometimes onesidedly residential districts. The historic change that oc-
curred around 1920 marked an important political and cultural dilemma that cur-
rently has the city in its grasp again, as Rob van Engelsdorp Gastelaars argues towards
the end of the book. Henk Schmal continues the historical analysis with a study of the
first developments of suburbanization in the area around Amsterdam in 1850. At that
time, and until well into the twentieth century, suburban living was restricted to the
happy few. And yet, it was in this period that highly characteristic areas on the edge of
and outside the city were built, in particular in the Gooi and the dunes, which have
their own special significance as striking urban landscapes in today’s metropolitan en-
vironment. Schmal also considers the part played by public transport in the early peri-
od of suburban development. Pieter Terhorst and Jacques van de Ven, meanwhile, look at
the restructuring of the economy of central Amsterdam in two post-war phases from
the point of view of a “regime analysis.” The first phase was the development of a typi-
cal Central Business District: interestingly, in Amsterdam this trend took shape within
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the framework of the historic buildings. In the second phase, starting at the end of the
sixties, the economic function of the old city center was increasingly geared to the cul-
tural economy: tourism, shopping, leisure, and specific services. In conjunction with
the increased construction of housing, this has set the city center of Amsterdam on a
completely new course.
The Current State: Dilemmas and Perspectives
The following section gives an integrated diagnosis of the current transformation
process, from traditional territorial city to burgeoning metropolitan urbanism. The
first group of authors discuss the dilemmas in the economic, infrastructural, and en-
vironmental development of the metropolis; while the second group consider the so-
cial aspects of segregation, migration and residential areas, including the position of
the homeless. This section concludes with a discussion of the political (electoral) and
institutional developments and options.
A. Economy, Infrastructure and Environment
The metropolitan economy is now so intertwined with the region as a whole that mu-
nicipal boundaries have completely lost their significance in this context, notes Pieter
Tordoir at the beginning of his discussion of the development of the city economy. Tor-
doir regards the metropolitan economy as a highly diversified complex of specialized
activity clusters whereby the combined influence of external scale, scope, and net-
work economies enables a spatial-economic equilibrium at a high level of local re-
source costs. In its rich historical period, Amsterdam rose high up on the ladder of the
world’s metropolitan economies, but nowadays an urban economy at the scale of the
Randstad can only reach the sub-top level in the international arena. The most impor-
tant and internationally most substantial complex is the distribution complex, with
the Randstad’s main ports of Schiphol Airport and Rotterdam Seaport. The manageri-
al complex, with its international headquarters in the service economy, is relatively
highly developed in the Amsterdam region, and this also applies to the third complex,
the consumption-oriented cultural economy. The main challenge for the metropoli-
tan economy is to optimize the subtle interrelationships. Luca Bertolini, Loek Kapoen and
Frank le Clercq, meanwhile, deal with the spatial concepts of transport and land use,
again at a regional level. The focuses of mobility have moved from the city, with its tra-
ditional radial transport patterns, to a regional network in which new tangential links
are planned. The main challenge is to develop transport concepts capable of linking
the concentrated residential and working areas throughout the region efficiently.
This is not just a question of mobility but also of the new spatial structuring of region-
al settlements in a multi-centred constellation. Maarten Wolsink analyses the current
developments in some urban economic facilities in the light of recent trends towards
the liberalization and privatization of public utilities. As examples of strategic spatial
and environmental infrastructures, he discusses the liberalization of the waste man-
agement and electricity sectors. There is now very little public control over the elec-
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tricity supply, and recently the authorities have lost their familiar tools for influenc-
ing economic conditions and environmental policy. When it comes to waste manage-
ment, however, local authorities could gain possible new means of control via the de-
mand side of the market. As a counterbalance to the economic processes, Marijke van
Schendelen discusses the development of green areas in the Amsterdam region, while al-
so looking at how policies concerning water, green areas and recreation are institu-
tionally embedded. Interestingly, the Municipality of Amsterdam and the Province of
North Holland have entered into numerous contractual arrangements with other ad-
ministrative bodies and the private sector.
B. Segregation, Social Mobility and the Social Profile of Amsterdam and the Region
The second group of authors consider the social development of Amsterdam and its
suburban environs. Sako Musterd and Wim Ostendorf probe the degree of segregation,
both at the level of the districts within the city of Amsterdam and by comparing Am-
sterdam with the surrounding region. Based on a brief international comparison,
there is relatively little income-based segregation at either of these levels. In this re-
spect the social structure of Amsterdam and its environs is more balanced than that of
the urban areas of many other countries, mainly because of the levelling tendency of
the Dutch welfare state. There is more segregation based on ethnic background, how-
ever, and this has slightly increased during the past ten years (unlike income-based seg-
regation, which has decreased). Segregation is then examined in terms of various de-
mographic parameters. Cees Cortie looks at the social mobility of various groups of
immigrants in Amsterdam and environs. People from Surinam and the Antilles dis-
play their process of migration to the city and how they climb the housing ladder to
the public sections of the suburbs. People from Morocco and Turkey, who come from
less skilled backgrounds, do not yet have this mobility in the housing market. Among
immigrant sections of the population there is both a tendency towards suburbaniza-
tion and a tendency towards gentrification in districts of the city. Lia Karsten examines
the specific qualities of public areas for a category of city dwellers who are under-rep-
resented in terms of research and municipal policy, the city’s over 100,000 children.
She finds that children live scattered selectively throughout the city and region. Public
areas and recreational facilities in the day-to-day environment are such that urban
children remain dependent on guidance in many respects for longer than children
elsewhere (the “back seat generation”). Leon Deben, closes this section by charting the
developments relating to a specific group at the bottom of the housing market, the
homeless population. He carried out a number of systematic censuses and also looked
at the use of public areas. Homelessness is currently concentrated in the city center, al-
though recently some forms of homelessness have arisen in the young urban centers of
Bijlmermeer and even Schiphol and Almere.
C. Political and Electoral Developments and Institutional Dilemmas
Rinus Deurloo, Sjoerd de Vos and Herman van der Wusten begin this section by examining po-
litical participation by the Amsterdam region electorate by comparing voting patterns
THE EMERGENCE OF THE REGIONAL CITY 25
Adam.HumanCapital  06-03-2003  16:50  Pagina 25
in Amsterdam with those in Almere. We are struck by the fact that the division be-
tween the urban left and the more moderate and right-wing votes in the suburbs, often
noted in American geographical research, is now beginning to manifest itself in Dutch
urban areas. The researchers also show the trends in voting patterns in communities
where large numbers of immigrants live. Willem Salet and Martin de Jong explore possi-
ble paths that strategic regional planning could take by using methods of regional gov-
ernance, following the administrative failure to create city provinces. They first
analyse the tendencies towards geographical disengagement and the mismatches be-
tween administrative boundaries and the scale on which the dynamics of spatial de-
velopment take place. According to the authors there is no point in trying to match so-
cial dynamics through administrative reform. They explore various options for
forming flexible coalitions based on strengthening the pillars of domestic administra-
tion (the municipalities and provinces), discussing the opportunities afforded here by
regional governance.
Prospects of Urbanity: New Cultural Identities
The next section opens with an essay by Rob van Engelsdorp Gastelaars that was men-
tioned earlier. He explores the possible “landscapes of power” in the political and cul-
tural climate of the capital and its environs. He notes that the architecture of those in
power has to a large extent moved away from Amsterdam during the past century. Tak-
ing historical analyses as a starting point, much prestigious architecture was devel-
oped by private enterprise in Amsterdam’s inner city during the liberal period from
1880 to 1920; after this the emphasis was on public housing and compact develop-
ments. From the beginning of the last century the better-off sections of the population,
or some of them, gradually moved to the suburbs. Van Engelsdorp Gastelaars explores
possible scenarios for the future on the scale of a regional Amsterdam inspired again
by a liberal culture. Robert Kloosterman explores the position of immigrants in Amster-
dam’s multicultural society. Particularly striking are the increased business opportu-
nities for immigrants. Whereas immigrants traditionally directed their entrepreneur-
ship toward catering and retailing sectors, which have been stagnant since 1994, the
sharpest increase is now in the post-industrial sectors of production and personnel
services. The general change in the economy and position of Amsterdam provides a
brand new opportunity structure for immigrant entrepreneurship. Gertjan Dijkink and
Virginie Mamadouh explore the legitimacy of government that is faced with increasing
indifference and disinterest on the part of the populace. The attempts at government
reorganization are far removed from ordinary people, and referendums in particular
reveal the populace’s discontent. On the other hand, there are new movements that
seem to support the identification of the population with their place of residence.
Dijkink and Mamadouh explore the possible influences of the digital city, urban plan-
ning focus groups, the regional media, and campaign groups on the development of
regional identity.
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The book concludes with an epilogue by the editors which touches upon a number of
major dilemmas and contentious issues regarding the development of regional Am-
sterdam. They also indicate what kind of contribution the essays make to the current
debate.
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2. AMSTERDAM IN RETROSPECT
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2.1• Amsterdam as the “Compleat Citie”
A City Plan Read in Five Episodes
Geert Mak
The Battle Against the Mud: The First Fortifications
Amsterdam is an eternal battle between man and nature. Not the nature of spectacular
rock formations, wild rivers or the furious sea, but the dullest nature there is: sucking,
sopping mud. In fact, Amsterdam was built, and still stands, in the middle of a peat
bog. In the Middle Ages, its people were repeatedly able to put off building a city wall
because the treachery of the surrounding land plus a couple of cannons along the sup-
ply routes were regarded as a sufficient deterrent against any attack. To this day, civil
engineers are constrained in their ability to realize their plans. They must still consid-
er the proto-IJ, for example, which is a deep, muddy trough in which no solid bed is en-
countered for dozens of metres below the surface. And the ground is constantly shift-
ing. Whenever an underground car park or metro tunnel is built in Amsterdam,
unexpected subterranean movements can occur far away from the actual work.
Amsterdam has therefore long been dominated not by the “polder model,” but by
the “mud model.” During excavations of the remains of a 13th-century smithy on the
Nieuwendijk, it was possible to trace in the strata how the artisan’s family had to raise
its floors almost every couple of years as they kept sinking into the saturated bog. In
those days, Amsterdam consisted of little more than a row of simple huts along the
Nieuwendijk and what is now the Kalverstraat – a dike village along the broad Amstel
River, less than 25 meters wide and intersected by a dam.
Expansion occurred quite rapidly. Sections of the Amstel were constantly being re-
claimed and new houses built on them. And so the dike became a street – although its
original profile can still be discerned, for example in the passageway under the C&A
building between the Nieuwendijk and the Damrak. Whilst the foundations for a com-
mercial building on Rokin were being laid, part of the original riverbank was discov-
ered. This clearly reveals how the early pioneers accomplished the first expansions of
the city: with mud, turf, and lots and lots of the rubbish discarded by the earliest in-
habitants themselves. Until well into the 14th century, Amsterdam was no more than
five minutes wide and a quarter of an hour long, from what is now the Oudezijds Voor-
burgwal to the Nieuwezijds Voorburgwal, and from the Victoria Hotel to the Spui and
the Grimburgwal.
The first systematic expansion took place in approximately 1380. Two new “ram-
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part” canals were dug along the eastern and western flanks of the city: the Oudezijds
Achterburgwal and the Nieuwezijds Achterburgwal, now the Spuistraat. At the same
time, the stretches of marshland between them were stabilized and raised using tens
of thousands of cubic metres of clay. Further expansion followed. In 1425, a new canal
was carved out to the east – what would eventually become the Geldersekade and the
Kloveniersburgwal. In 1450, the Singel followed on the western side.
It must have been a grim battle against the mud during that first great sprawling
expansion of the nascent city, especially with the primitive means then available. In
those days, with at most 4000 inhabitants, Amsterdam was no more than a large vil-
lage. From the map we can clearly see the strategy of those early Amsterdammers. Orig-
inally, they simply made the most of the natural features available to them: the river,
the dam, the natural harbor it created at the mouth of the river, the raised riverbanks
which became dikes. But gradually the work began to take on an impetus of its own,
work worthy of a city: the first quays and manmade canals, the first sluices to control
water levels. But the framework of the city remained, as the urban planners Casper van
der Hoeven and Jos Louwe once put it, “casually laid over the natural features” (Van der
Hoeve and Louwe 1985, 156). Even important public buildings receive little extra space
or special prominence on the medieval street plan. The town hall stands unpreten-
tiously between the merchants’ houses on “die Plaetse,” on the Dam. The Oude Kerk
and Nieuwe Kerk rise from a tangle of tiny streets, huge edifices which the city barely
seemed able to support. Even here in the Low Countries, the planned city is still a long
way off.
The Ring of Canals
There survives an Amsterdam cityscape from just over a century later. In the autumn of
1564, a group of dissatisfied burghers had petitioned the Spanish regent in Brussels,
Margaret of Parma, about complaints that included flooding and the “foul stink” of
the burgwal canals. On 12 June, the lawyers Christiaan de Waert, member of the Great
Council of Mechlin, and Arnoud Sasbout, member of the Provincial Council of Hol-
land, made an inspection tour of the city on behalf of the regent. Their findings were
meticulously noted.
Virtually all of the shoring was missing from the southern ends of the Oudezijds
Voorburgwal and Oudezijds Achterburgwal. The mean houses and monasteries there
stood close to water level on the sodden land. The inspectors also noted increasing
crowding in the city. Rents and land prices were constantly being forced up: “Inflation
and increases in prices,” according to the petition, “are caused by the smallness of the
space and the intensive building within the city boundaries, and by the great numbers
of all sorts of people who come from foreign lands to live here, to carry on trade or in
other ways to conduct a business.” Many of the newcomers therefore resorted to “the
making of dwellings” outside the city walls. According to the complainants, these in-
cluded, “Many laborers, who are there in great numbers and who are not in a position
to pay the high rents for the houses within the city.”
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What the complainants and the inspectors were observing were the first repercus-
sions of the sudden expansion of the Dutch cities at the end of the 16th century.
Enkhuizen tripled in area, and Rotterdam doubled. In size Amsterdam was not much
bigger in 1570 than it had been in 1450, but its population had increased sevenfold to
some 30,000. By 1600, the figure had reached 50,000. In 1620, it was more than 88,000
and in 1640, 139,000. The city’s population had tripled within a single generation.
Many of the immigrants came from the overpopulated countryside, particularly from
Gelderland and Friesland. Others, especially those from the Southern Netherlands,
were seeking a safe haven after years of war and persecution.
From the end of the 16th century, Amsterdam’s city fathers were therefore con-
stantly busy with expansion projects, large and small. Between 1578 and 1586, a new
fortification was dug around the city, from the IJ to the Amstel along the line of what is
now the Herengracht. Between 1592 and 1610, a number of islands were created on the
eastern side of the city, primarily for the shipbuilding industry: Kattenburg, Uilen-
burg, Marken and Rapenburg in the IJ, and Vlooienburg – the area now occupied by the
Stopera complex – in the Amstel.
But for a long time the city did not dare to attempt large-scale expansion. This reluc-
tance, which also occurred in other Dutch cities, was all due to the high cost of land in
this marshy region. Expansion projects required gigantic amounts of investment and
entailed huge risks. Then there was the influence of the rapacious landlords and the
land speculators – not a few of whom were magistrates. They had every interest in
maintaining the prevailing housing shortage for as long as possible (Taverne 1918:
115).
It was not until 1610 that Amsterdam’s city government first began to study an expan-
sion plan befitting the scale and wealth of the young metropolis. From the outset, city
carpenter Hendrick Jacobszoon Staets envisaged extensive growth in every direction,
with the whole project surrounded by impressive fortifications. Three “working” is-
lands would be created in the western IJ: Bickerseiland, Realeneiland and Prinsenei-
land. Adjacent to them would come a large new district that would house workers,
craftsmen, and small traders – what would later become known as the Jordaan.
The most spectacular part of the plan was the so-called grachtengordel, the belt of
canals which would give Amsterdam its distinctive “half-moon” layout. The broad
canals were originally intended as transportation arteries in this city dominated by
water. The markets and warehouses along them would always be within easy reach of
the port by barge and lighter. Streets were narrow, few and far between, and totally sub-
ordinate to the waterways. In short, in the words of contemporary city historian,
Michiel Wagenaar, the canal belt was “the best conceivable infrastructure for making
the city a perfect circulation machine.”
But there was more. The earliest of the Amsterdam canals were former defensive
works which had been transformed into residential canals as the city expanded be-
yond them. In the new plan, several canals were designed specifically to be lived along.
The plots beside them were generously proportioned; their tone would be set by the
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nouveaux riches of the Dutch Golden Age. The good life was assured along the Heren-
gracht and Keizersgracht by a profusion of by-laws: noisy and smelly businesses were
prohibited, gardens were protected, new buildings were subject to all kinds of regula-
tions. Conveniently, the new plan also provided a perfect excuse to sweep away the
clutter of shacks, workshops, kitchen gardens, pigsties, tanneries, mills, and sheds
around the edge of the city. No longer was development limited by natural conditions,
as it had been in 1380. Here nature was bent entirely to the will of the city carpenter,
the military engineer, and the surveyor – the first true urban planners.
The canal system was built in phases, starting in 1613, and swept like a giant wind-
shield wiper from west to east. Originally only the stretches between the Brouwers-
gracht and the Leidsegracht were developed. Once all the plots along these had been
developed, it was decided in 1657 to extend the canals to the Amstel. Finally, in 1675,
the sections to the east of the Amstel were dug. Because the city’s economy had by then
slumped, few private merchants’ homes were built here. Instead, a couple of large
charitable institutions were built, with the rest of the area within the city wall becom-
ing a sort of pleasure garden, the Plantage.
Today, the canal belt forms a unified entity of great architectural beauty, one of the
finest monuments in Europe. But some scholars question whether the original plan-
ners of 1613 had such a visionary idea in mind. After extensive archival research and
comparison with practices elsewhere in the Republic, Ed Taverne even concluded that
there was barely any overall architectural concept at all behind the construction of the
canal belt. “In a sense,” he wrote, “it is amazing that Amsterdam in the 17th century ac-
tually never had a fully-fledged expansion plan.” Many other authors, Dutch and for-
eign, have echoed him in this opinion (Taverne 1978, 147 et seq.).
The original 1613 plans for the expansion have been lost, so we can only guess at the
intentions of Staets and his colleagues. This we must do utilizing only a handful of city
maps, the city government’s resolutions in the four years of planning, and sketchy re-
ports of the debates preceding those decisions. Taverne concludes that between 1609
and 1613 only a fortification plan was discussed, following the standard rules of the
day for such works. This is not illogical. The Dutch Republic was involved in an on-off
war with Spain at the time, and its military commander, Prince Maurice, had a signifi-
cant say in the plans. This was also standard practice in the case of other city expan-
sions of the day in the Republic. Until the summer of 1613, only the fortification plan
had been decided upon. The rest of the new area, with its canals, streets, squares and
residential properties, still had to be designed.
Ed Taverne and others argue that the shape of the canal belt was determined largely
by practical considerations. Its semicircular shape best suited military requirements
and, moreover, gave the city a natural connection to the IJ. Meanwhile, the then regent-
merchants were mainly concerned with creating an attractive residential area for
themselves and their descendants. Despite its size, the new district for the ordinary
folk, the Jordaan, was treated as an afterthought. It was simply “tacked on” to the canal
belt, with its streets and canals following the original pattern of the drainage ditches
in the polder on which it was built. This, incidentally, explains the unusually sharp
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street corners where the Jordaan and the grachtengordel meet along the Prinsengracht.
However extensive the new collective project, Taverne claims it did not represent a
reorganization of the entire city. “The orderly, mathematical cohesion of the roads and
canal system in the canal belt, with the extremely generous proportions of its water-
ways, quays, streets and plots of land, contrasts sharply with the method of straighten-
ing and widening existing paths and ditches used elsewhere” (Taverne 1978, 173).
Also striking is the absence of grand squares and edifices comparable with those be-
ing built in other European cities. Despite the immense wealth of the city, it confined
itself to basic facilities with but a few embellishments: a handful of churches, a couple
of marketplaces. Everything must have its use, because a merchant never squanders
his capital. Jacob van Campen’s grandiose Town Hall on the Dam was tolerated as the
exception which proved the rule. But even that building was packed with implicit and
explicit exhortations against pride and ostentation.
The Ideal City?
Has anyone in Amsterdam ever dared to strive for a “compleat citie”? The answer to that
question is crucial to the three remaining episodes in this concise history.
Amsterdam, wrote David Olsen, “is sooner the last great medieval city than the first
great modern city: sooner the successor to Venice and Florence than the precursor of
Manchester and Chicago.” In the Greco-Roman tradition, the city served as the model
of order, of what really counted in life. During the Middle Ages, cities were first and
foremost a response to practical military and economic necessities. “The appearance
of the medieval city reflected the need for defence and the need to earn money” Olsen
notes. A town hall and a couple of churches provided some civic prestige, but the stan-
dard building was the tall private house devoted to commerce and manufacturing.
According to Olsen, the new belt of canals was already an anachronism when it was
built in the 17th century. To him it highlights the conservatism of the Amsterdam mer-
chants, who rarely started anything new. In a certain sense he is right. The Amsterdam
canal house, for example, does indeed date from the Middle Ages but was still very
much the order of the day in the 18th century. The way the city was governed – by a cor-
poration whose members were recruited from the leading mercantile families – had
also changed little since the 14th century. Nor was its renowned tolerance based upon
modern ideas – it was primarily driven by the pragmatic necessities of trade.
But in his analysis, Olsen underestimates the modernity of 17th-century Amster-
dam – a modernity which in fact went hand in hand with the conservatism he rightly
mentions, and which to this day confuses visitors. The problem with Dutch history, as
the British historian, J.L. Price correctly states, is that the nation reached its zenith vir-
tually as soon as it was created. The anticlimax arrived just a few decades later, and ever
since it has clouded people’s views of the so-called Golden Age.
The history of the Netherlands, and that of Amsterdam in particular, reminds us
then of the life of a writer who produces his best book in his youth. Everything that
comes after is overshadowed by that huge, one-off success, which actually leaves people
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at a complete loss. The Amsterdam regent-merchants may have been cautious in some
respects, but within a few years they transformed their city into a highly efficient com-
mercial machine, one unprecedented in the world up until then. This, in turn, made it
possible to carry out unprecedented projects, ranging from the creation of the Dutch
East India Company – the world’s first multinational – to the pumping mills used to
drain the Beemster polder, another technology in which Holland was ahead of its time.
The Netherlands of the 17th century was, according to Price, a small advance outpost of
capitalism in a Europe which remained, for the most part, essentially medieval.
Take a look some time at the group portraits of prosperous Amsterdam burghers in
the Schuttersgalerij, the Militia Gallery, of the Amsterdam Historical Museum. The old-
est painting, from 1533, shows militia squadron H: seventeen rustic men all dressed in
the same black clothing, their hair cut short, a kind of wide French beret on each head,
pious denizens of city, neighborhood and family. Residents, indeed, of a medieval Am-
sterdam.
But then look at the portraits of their great-grandchildren, the men responsible for
the expansion of 1613: self-assured, colorfully and flamboyantly dressed in extrava-
gant ruffles and hats, individualistic, focused entirely upon the fare bella figura of the
Italian Renaissance. Their view of the world, their global trading system, their litera-
ture, their interest in science, their ideal of the mercator sapiens, whatever their own
mentality, it was definitely not medieval. The euphoria would pass within a few
decades, certainly, but everything indicates that the prevailing spirit in the Amster-
dam of 1613 was extremely dynamic, unorthodox even, and certainly not “conserva-
tive, if not reactionary” as Olsen supposes.
For some, in fact, the open and relatively tolerant Amsterdam of the late Middle
Ages was already a dream, a utopia, a window on a brighter future. Everyone projected
their ideas onto it. In 1535, having taken power in Münster, the Anabaptists also tried
to proclaim their thousand-year Kingdom of Zion in Amsterdam. For persecuted Jews,
the city was the Jerusalem of the North. And the Dutch Calvinists made the same com-
parison – they liked to call themselves “children of Israel,” the lost tribe of Abraham,
creators of the new promised land.
It seems almost impossible that such dreams did not play a role in the city designs of
the Golden Age. Unlike Taverne and Olsen, the city historian, Boudewijn Bakker, there-
fore claims that the beauty and order of the Amsterdam canals did not happen by
chance. Clearly, there were some masterful hands at work; men who had an ideal city
in mind for Amsterdam, a “compleat citie” as the classics called it, one based upon the
divine harmony which was reflected in the dimensions of man and nature.
Once again, nothing survives of the deliberations surrounding the 1610 plan. But
Bakker’s arguments are strong. In the first place, Amsterdam’s military engineers and
surveyors were perfectly aware of Renaissance ideas regarding the shape of the ideal
city. Countless designs for such a città ideale were published in Italy between 1450 and
1650, all of which harked back to the writings of the Roman architect Vitruvius. His
aesthetics of the circle and the square were combined with the new techniques being
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introduced by the builders of fortifications, who, beginning in the 16th century, had
to find an answer to the development of gunpowder artillery. Instead of walls and tow-
ers, protection was now sought in carefully measured ramparts and bastions.
People were busy drawing up such plans across Europe. Amsterdam was no excep-
tion. As early as 1542-43, the Italian Donato de’ Boni Pellizuoli drew a plan for the forti-
fication of the city. Nothing ever came of it. The writer of the standard work Della ar-
chitettura militare (“On Military Architecture” 1599), Francesco de Marchi, also visited
Amsterdam. This is apparent from one of his maps. And his book also contains a
schematic drawing of an “ideal” radial city on a river, which shows clear traits of Am-
sterdam’s later expansion.
Bakker, moreover, points out that these ideas fell on fertile ground in the Nether-
lands. There was a long-established tradition here of draining polders and building
new towns following geometrical patterns. See, for example, the layouts of the new
polder landscapes in the Beemster (1610) and Watergraafsmeer (1629). The first treatise
on town planning in the Dutch language, Van de oirdeningh der steden (“On the Ordering
of Cities” 1600) by Simon Stevin, combined the work of the Italian theoreticians with
this home-grown tradition (Taverne 1978: 35 et seq.; Bakker 1995: 86 et seq.).
One crucial feature in all these designs was the notion of symmetry, or “equilateral-
ness” as Stevin called it. This symmetry, writes Bakker, must have fascinated the de-
signers and builders of the Renaissance, from the aesthetic point of view as much as
anything. “It goes against my heart,” Prince Maurice once told Stevin when he was
forced to deviate from “equilateralness” in the building of a fortress – although the
Prince had no explanation for this emotional response.
Bakker illustrates his article with several little-known preliminary designs for the
1610 expansion of Amsterdam. When these are placed next to the ideal plans produced
by Vitruvius, De Marchi, and others, the similarities are remarkable. According to
Bakker, the main canals are clearly modelled on the system of broken concentric rings
in the Vitruvian radial city. So not only was accessibility important, aesthetic aspects
as well. Contemporary sources speak of the canals being constructed at enormous cost
“for the amenity of the ships and the ornamentation of this city.” In September 1614,
just before construction of the Keizersgracht was to begin, a plan was discussed to
scrap it and instead build an attractive, tree-lined boulevard along the lines of the
Voorhout in The Hague. Here again, symmetry played an important part.
The same maps also show that already in 1610 the conditions were consciously and
far-sightedly being created for the later expansions of the city, in 1657 and 1675. These
were seamless extensions of the earlier works. To take just one example, this is the only
way to explain the remarkable break in the ramparts near the Leidsegracht which fea-
tures on city maps between 1620 and 1664. For years this flagrant breach of the sym-
metrical ideal – it must have broken Prince Maurice’s heart – made the city difficult to
defend. It can never have been intended as a permanent solution. On the contrary, the
city authorities probably expected to be able to extend the ramparts very quickly, oth-
erwise they would never have dared to take such a huge military risk. The Council of
Amsterdam was no suicide squad.
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From the succession of plans alone, it becomes crystal clear that we are looking at a
single concept, formulated between 1610 and 1612 and then carried out during the
Golden Age. There can be no question of a medieval chaos, as Taverne and Olsen sug-
gest.
The Jordaan remained the Jordaan, because reconstruction of the whole district
would have been too costly and time-consuming due to the complicated pattern of
property ownership. But even here the canals and their side streets are not laid out ran-
domly but in seven parallel rows, at fixed distances from one another and following a
clear mathematical pattern. “With much deliberation and despite the enormous
problems presented by an expansion of the city on this scale, city carpenter Staets, city
surveyor Sinck and the Board of Administrators succeeded in creating a harmonious
layout,” concludes Boudewijn Bakker. The belt of canals they were building refers to
both the organically-developed medieval city center and the Renaissance model of the
radial city. The Jordaan, on the other hand, is laid out on a grid pattern drawn straight
from native Dutch tradition. In addition, the designers relied upon mathematically
derived 16th-century military design practice. “From these three elements,” says
Bakker, “an entirely new, coherent and harmonious city was constructed, which in lay-
out terms meant that Amsterdam would remain the most modern city in Europe until
well into the 19th century.”
We can therefore only do real justice to the design of the canal belt if we view it in the
political and social context of the Netherlands, and in particular Amsterdam, com-
pared with the rest of Europe. Price compares the stories told by foreigners who had vis-
ited the young Dutch Republic with those of modern-day Europeans seeing America
for the first time. Everything is familiar, and yet strangely different, disorienting even:
the political debate, the “abhorrent” level of religious tolerance, the unprecedented
degree of urbanization, and the new humanism in a Europe which at the time re-
mained conservative through and through.
It was in this atmosphere of instant wealth and style, mixed with Dutch obstinacy,
that the design of the canal belt was conceived. Amsterdam had to become a modern
city, but still everything remained encircled by that old enemy, mud. Elsewhere in Eu-
rope, the baroque city was in the ascendant, with its straight boulevards and clear
lines of sight. Here a peculiar variation on the theme was created.
In most European cities, traffic increased steadily from the 16th century thanks to
the mass introduction of the spoked wheel. Amsterdam, as has been mentioned, re-
mained a typical water-dominated city. Coaches and carriages often had a hard time
negotiating the muddy Dutch roads, but there existed an excellent and comfortable
waterborne transportation system consisting of regular ferries and horse-drawn barge
services. There was little military need for broad, straight avenues in this unmilitaris-
tic nation. Nor were kings, big palaces and clear lines of sight popular in this hotbed of
republicanism.
So Amsterdam built boulevards of its own devising, along which the bourgeoisie
could parade. Avenues of water which, instead of running in straight lines, made a gen-
tle curve so that new vistas and tableaux constantly appeared. At its heart, 17th-centu-
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ry Amsterdam remained a combination of a dike city and a canal city, two familiar phe-
nomena in the Low Countries. But here the canal city developed into a monument in
its own right. One without a single great palace, but instead a collection of many hun-
dreds of little palaces. A “compleat citie” indeed, yet one not for a monarch or a royal
court but for a thoroughly republican bourgeoisie.
The Early Urban Expansion
A normal city lives in several periods at once. Anyone standing on the Campo di Fiori
in Rome can see them all: fragments of ancient Roman columns, medieval walls,
Renaissance façades, the corner of a baroque boulevard, in the distance the 20th-cen-
tury breaking through. All reasserting this kind of a city’s will to survive through the
ages.
In Amsterdam, though, there is virtually nowhere where you will see such a view.
Here there exists a constant tension between the vitality of the city and the museum
piece that is its old center. Down through the centuries, the half-visionary and half-
cautious, half-progressive and half-miserly nature of Amsterdam has left its traces.
Never did an absolute monarch wield the power and money here to impose his own vi-
sion, to smash through the established property and power structures, to force
through an undiluted plan. Consensus ruled here. So the entire old city is full of vi-
sions destroyed in committee, of glories made banal by economy, of brilliant ideas and
ghastly concessions.
The increasing anger of former-mayor, Pieter Corneliszoon Hooft, about the han-
dling of the 1613 plan speaks volumes. Hooft, a famous Dutch poet and writer, was a Re-
naissance man par excellence, and he must have been consumed with sorrow at the
many missed opportunities. In 1615, he observed, “My lords have thus far proceeded
with this work as if in a labyrinth, without being able to arrive at any result” (Taverne
1978: 157).
He denounced the way in which speculation and uncontrolled construction were
tolerated, but his resistance was not solely of a technical nature. For him these were
just as importantly symptoms of the cliques being formed amongst the regents, who
were primarily out for money and sinecures.
History repeated itself during the next great wave of expansion, two and a half cen-
turies later. Once again immigration and population growth forced the city into ac-
tion. After years of stagnation, between 1850 and 1900 the number of people living in
the city more than doubled, from 221,000 to 511,000. Again there was an uncontrolled
proliferation of homes, small businesses, and speculative property outside the city.
Again, initially there was great hesitation about doing anything. When city engineer
J.G. van Niftrik advised the mayor and aldermen in 1864 to “devise a plan for the en-
largement of the city,” they responded with a shrug of the shoulders. Property inter-
ests remained sacred, so that the implementation of any plan would inevitably en-
counter huge legal as well as physical problems. Or, as one city councillor put it: “It
remains puzzling how the Corporation can proceed so long as it cannot behave like a
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Prefect of the Seine” – a reference to Baron Haussmann, who had been given virtual
carte blanche by Emperor Napoleon III to sweep away medieval Paris.
Originally, new development was mainly confined to the “reserve space” still avail-
able to the city, along the line of the old, now demolished city walls – the Marnixstraat
and Weteringschans – and in the Plantage. Artis Zoo is the last remnant of the much
larger recreation park which once dominated this area. For the elite, a district of spa-
cious villas was built adjacent to the new Vondelpark.
For the average Amsterdammer, however, more ambitious measures were needed.
The pressure imposed by the population explosion was becoming too much – at one
point the Jordaan became the most densely populated district in Europe. Moreover,
the whole nature of the transportation system changed during the 19th century. The
role of the barge and sailing ship was taken over by the railways. Even in the Nether-
lands, more and more passengers and freight were being transported over land. If Am-
sterdam was not to be left behind, it would have to transform from a city of water into
one of land. When municipal tolls were abolished in 1866, the last reason for a clear,
physical city boundary disappeared with them. Amsterdam could at last break out of
its 17th-century walls.
The first plan was already on the table. One of the most visionary Amsterdammers of
the time was the Jewish doctor, Samuel Sarphati, founder of the Amstel Hotel and ini-
tiator of the Paleis voor Volksvlijt (Palace of People’s Industry), a sort of Crystal Palace
which stood on what is now the site of the Nederlandsche Bank until it was destroyed by
fire in 1929. Sarphati wanted to build two extensive villa developments on either side of
the Amstel, with grand parks, gardens and boulevards in the Parisian style. Behind
them he planned spacious middle-class and working-class districts. The whole would
create a magnificent entry to the city from the Amstel side. In 1862, Sarphati was grant-
ed a concession to develop the area, but in 1865 the project foundered due to lack of
funds. Sarphati died in 1866.
In the same year city engineer Van Niftrik was given permission to design a large-
scale city expansion project. He drew inspiration from 17th-century Amsterdam, from
Haussmann’s boulevards, from the English suburbs and from German industrial and
housing belts. The result was a 19th-century version of the “compleat citie.”
“It can only be called remarkable that a handful of administrators and officials suc-
ceeded, despite all the complications, setbacks and obstructions, in bringing such an
ambitious, costly, and lengthy project to such a convincing conclusion,” wrote
Boudewijn Bakker of the plan implemented by Staets and his colleagues. Two hundred
and fifty years later, the “complications, setbacks, and obstructions” would prove too
much for Van Niftrik. His plan was voted down by the City Council. This time, the
utopia remained just that. Ten years later came a new plan, this one jointly from the
hands of Van Niftrik and the new Director of Public Works, J. Kalff. This time the pair
stuck carefully to the main outline of the existing land divisions. “Narrow building
plots, narrow streets, little public open space,” is how Michiel Wagenaar (1990, 252)
sums up this “free-market plan” (today the Pijp). “The term ‘compulsory purchase’ did
not feature in it.” Moreover, the developers were regularly granted dispensations if the
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line of a street or depth of a plot did not suit them. “The proposed street plan was no
more than a guideline.”1 Sometimes the builders did not even bother to take the trou-
ble to raise the boggy ground with a layer of sand. They built directly on the polder sur-
face – which is why here and there one suddenly experiences a drop of half a meter.
Elsewhere, jobs were botched using wood which was too thin and cement which was
too sandy. There was hardly any money for public gardens. “People’s love of pennies is
greater than their love of parks,” argued mayor Den Tex to the City Council in 1877.
The result was a series of interminable streets which looked sad and dilapidated
within just a few years. “What do you feel?” asked the Amsterdamsche Studentenalmanak
in 1882 about these new districts. “You want to turn on your heel, don’t you, and run
away?”
The modern map of the city still betrays how the planners and city councillors of the
time were running around “as if in a labyrinth.” Look at an aerial photograph of the
Pijp, for example, and you can see how various plans and ideas – spacious, visionary,
cheap – collide with one another like crashing ice floes, with the Albert Cuypstraat
and Gerard Doustraat as conspicuous fault lines through the whole (Van der Hoeve
and Louwe 1985, 95). On the Oosteinde and Westeinde, as well as immediately off the
Amstel, remnants of Sarphati’s grand plan remain discernible. To the north of the
Albert Cuypstraat survives a portion of Van Niftrik’s original, ambitious plan. To the
south, around the Sarphatipark, we see the cramped plots of the Kalff Plan. The
Museumplein, finally – where two sections of the city hinge, as it were, around the
canal belt – is one big, creaking compromise: a strange space which never acquired the
personality of a public square. The town-planning problem encountered here was not
solved but simply passed down to future generations. And they have never really suc-
ceeded in solving it either.
Strikingly, all these operations left the 17th-century city center virtually un-
touched. Some buildings were demolished and canals filled in, but that was about all.
Whereas the centers of other European cities – Brussels, Vienna, Paris, London – were
given a comprehensive makeover, the Staets Plan remained intact. That is very much
due to a bit of luck: the salvation of 17th-century Amsterdam lay in part in the fact that
19th-century Amsterdam was as poor as a church mouse. It simply did not have the
cash for large-scale demolition and rebuilding.
But there was also the fact that the elite remained loyal to the area. They appreciat-
ed the harmony, and even at this time, they were proud of it. Filling in the main canals
never seriously occurred to anybody – especially once the water quality improved con-
siderably at the end of the 19th century and one of the main drawbacks of the canal
belt, the summer stink, was eliminated. Moreover, around the turn of the century a
powerful middle-class lobby emerged which was largely able to prevent any further de-
struction of the old city.
The fact that Amsterdam was not a true capital city undoubtedly contributed to the
survival of the old center, too. There was no huge government apparatus to stamp its
mark upon it, and no Haussmann was given an opportunity to sweep away the lot.
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The Face of Modernity
In his standard work, Good City Form, Kevin Lynch identifies three value systems which
at different times have shaped the history of urban planning: the cosmic, in which the
city mirrors the order of a higher universe; the mechanistic, in which the city is viewed
as a machine, an assembly of interchangeable components; and the organic, in which
the city is regarded as an ecosystem, a system of balances, a dynamic chaos. All three
value systems can be seen, in successive periods, on the 20th-century map of Amster-
dam.
The city brought its boggy surroundings reasonably under control after the turn of
the century – although a considerable section of an area built in the 1920s, the Indi-
sche Buurt, had to be demolished in about 1990 because the buildings were being
sucked into the sinking ground. The problems of property rights, old land divisions
and cynical speculation had been brought to end when the 1902 Housing Act made it
much easier to make compulsory purchases of undeveloped land.
Making plans even became compulsory in the Netherlands: every local authority
with more than 10,000 residents had to have an enlargement plan. Moreover, in 1896,
the City of Amsterdam bought up as much land as it could, which it then leased out.
The power of government to control new development in the city was thus consider-
ably increased.
Our city map shows the consequences. During and immediately after the First
World War, social housing was built on a fairly large scale in Amsterdam-Noord and
Watergraafsmeer, based upon Ebenezer Howard’s “garden city” principle. These were
urban neighborhoods with a rural character: low-rise housing, curved streets, gardens
and lots of greenery. Betondorp – the “concrete village” in Watergraafsmeer – served as
a laboratory for research into new, efficient forms of construction.
One striking point about these developments is their distance from the city center.
Thanks to the coming of the bicycle and the tram, working-class districts no longer had
to be within walking distance of work. The greater distances which the average Am-
sterdammer could now travel enabled the urban planners to break free from the con-
straints of the old city.
The greatest expansion plan was devised for the south side of the city. Its designer
was Hendrik Petrus Berlage, who had previously designed the Koopmansbeurs, the
commodities exchange on the Damrak which today bears his name. As a socialist, his
visionary architecture was a means to an end. His new city would give shape to a future,
communal culture of citizens and workers.
At the same time he strived for monumentalism, which he valued as much as at-
tractiveness. “Most foreigners can proudly show the stranger their ‘new city’,” he had
written in 1883. “In Amsterdam, it is better not to take them beyond the former encir-
cling canal [the boundary of the old city – GM].” By this he meant that at least the old
center of Amsterdam possessed a picturesque charm. But in his view, monumentalism
was a quality of a higher order, the “product of the study of the laws of beauty.”
In some ways Berlage thought like a Renaissance master builder. He wanted to em-
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body the “powerful social ethos” of his time, as city historian Richter Roegholt calls it,
in an ambitious residential environment. In so doing, everything had to submit to the
Plan of the Master Builder, the mediator between the higher values and dimensions of
the universe and the reality of streets and buildings.
His first plan, from 1905, looked rather park-like, with plenty of water, greenery and
attractive footpaths. It was rejected by the State for technical reasons. His second plan
in 1917 was largely implemented. It stands out immediately on any city map: an inde-
pendent system of streets and boulevards devised separately from the concentric form
of the rest of the city, based upon a triangle starting from the Victorieplein and two
pentagons centering around the Beethovenstraat and the Olympiaplein.
The plan was intended as a mirror image of the canals of old Amsterdam, which
were, wrote Berlage, “monumental in their construction, picturesque in their detail.”
Both aspects played a major part in his city plans, too – although the accent in 1905 was
placed more upon the picturesque, while in 1917 it was more upon the monumental.
Berlage dismissed the confinement and cosiness of the old Dutch cities out of hand.
According to him, these often lacked any form of monumentalism. And for Berlage
their picturesque qualities were only acceptable when combined with monumental-
ism. In the past that had arisen out of religious ideals, modern monumentalism
should express the ideal of the equality of all men.
According to some authors, including Francis Freankel (1976, 49), Berlage was clear-
ly influenced by the concept of la città ideale, the cosmic city. He placed the emphasis in
his design upon straight lines and geometrical relationships. With this mathematical
order, he wanted to create a new unity, something which had been lost with the rise of
free, “bourgeois” forms. He repeated the pattern of concentric rings from the old city
in his new plan, but this time in the form of regular polygons.
He planned for large public squares at all the intersections, with prominent build-
ings acting as markers. He wanted to create several centers, so that his city would not
close in around a single focus. And his plan had a clear third dimension: he was con-
stantly playing with the height of his streets and monuments. He also sought new cen-
ters. The new Amsterdam-Zuid station was supposed to play an important part in this,
as a “reflection” of Centraal Station.
Little came of this last ambition. The Minervalaan was intended as a broad and busy
shopping boulevard, the link between the new station and a square at the junction of
the Apollolaan, where Berlage planned a huge Academy of Arts. That site is now occu-
pied by the Hilton Amsterdam hotel. The Minervalaan has become an avenue for elder-
ly ladies, and where the great railway station should have stood there is now a small
public garden, a motorway viaduct and a chaotic bicycle shed.
“The City of Amsterdam demonstrates an avant-gardist ‘patricide’ in the shape of
her ‘enlargement,’ the process of her modernization and expansion in three rough
phases,” wrote the cultural philosopher, René Boomkens, at the end of the 20th centu-
ry. Around 1920, the city’s expansion plans became more and more dominated by, in
Boomkens’ words, an “adolescent modernism which wanted to break radically with
the city of its fathers.”
AMSTERDAM AS THE “COMPLEAT CITIE” 43
Adam.HumanCapital  06-03-2003  16:50  Pagina 43
The Berlage Plan was still of “the fathers,” focusing as it did upon quasi-religious
monuments and mirroring historical precedents. In practice, however, it was actually
built by the young, imaginative architects of the Amsterdam School. This was a gener-
ation inspired by expressionism and art deco, and it rather rejected the “cultivated car-
penter” Berlage. Their designs were presented to the Municipal Planning Committee
which, thanks to the leasing policy, wielded great power. Housing developers were on-
ly allowed to work with renowned architects. For the first time, these developers de-
signed entire street frontages as a single unit rather than a collection of individual
façades. The result was the exact opposite of the crumbling, barely habitable Pijp. This
was the neighborhood of the new age.
Amsterdam-Zuid was a success from the outset, and it remains so to this day. But lit-
tle came of Berlage’s hopes of a mixed population. Instead it became a real middle-
class, and above all elite, district. This was undoubtedly due to its location: via the Mu-
seumplein, one arrived almost immediately in the “best” part of the canal belt. Unlike
on the eastern and western sides of the city, there was no working-class district like the
Jordaan between the new Zuid and the old center (Taverne 1978, 281). Berlage’s plan
was also ready for a new era. He had begun to realize that he was designing for the 20th
century and so, for example, totally bore in mind the explosive growth of a new mode
of transport, the car. And finally, his plan was quite simply a good one: well thought-
out in every aspect, and pleasant to live in. It was no longer based upon Vitruvian lines,
but it was imbued with a similar feeling for order and harmony. And, like Staets,
Berlage had the bureaucratic tide in his favor: the “complications, setbacks and ob-
structions” were surmountable this time.
Even whilst Berlage’s Zuid was still under construction, a new school began to
emerge in town planning. Berlage’s notions, and those of the Amsterdam School, were
increasingly being questioned. Neither effort nor money were spared to produce at-
tractive street frontages and façades – but, as one critic wrote, these homes were not
built to fulfil their function: to be lived in. A generation began to appear which no
longer regarded architectural style as the most important factor, but rather the pur-
pose of the buildings (Bolte et al 1981, 87). It was influenced by the young Le Corbusier
in France and by Das Bauhaus in Germany. In the Netherlands, a similar avant-garde
movement appeared, De Stijl, which included artists like Mondriaan, Van der Leck and
Van Doesburg, who were driven by the idea that the divided world of capitalism and so-
cialism could literally be rebuilt, reconstructed. Their creed was soberness and func-
tionalism, their ideal of beauty lay in the clear forms of the technique itself (Boomkens
1998, 140).
These architects and designers were soon given their chance. In 1921, the area ad-
ministered by the City of Amsterdam was quadrupled, from 4,395 to 17,455 hectares.
In the same year, a city council dominated by Social Democrats came to power. And in
1928, it took the plunge. It was decided to produce the ultimate plan for the future of
the city right up to the year 2000. As far as possible, forecasts were made of future
needs. (For example, it was believed that the exact size of the average Amsterdam fami-
ly in 1961 would be 3.43 persons. The city’s population in 2000 was estimated at be-
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tween 900,000 and 1.1 million.) After Berlage’s cultural socialism, scientific socialism
was now setting the tone.
The General Expansion Plan (Algemeen Uitbreidingsplan, AUP) was presented in
1934. It soon acquired international fame, because never before had such a plan been
compiled so systematically and based upon so much research. Its creator, Cornelis van
Eesteren, had a scale model of the entire city built in the attic of the City Hall. Here, on
an overhead walkway, he would spend entire days with his visitors, philosophizing
about the urban tissue beneath their feet (Roegholt 2001). He no longer viewed the
“compleat citie” as an aesthetic composition. Rather, for him it was a complicated ma-
chine for living and working in, a system of functions, three of which were critical: liv-
ing, working, and leisure. A fourth, transport, linked the first three. The functions
were strictly separated from one another. Residential districts were situated some dis-
tance from the centers of work, with leisure areas between them. Also new was the con-
struction in so-called “strips” of – again functional – housing blocks, sleek structures of
iron, concrete, glass and light. Living was prioritized throughout; in the interiors of
the blocks, in the light in the living rooms, in the functionalism of the kitchens.
At the same time, new phenomena like “holidays” and “free time” were beginning
to enter the consciousness of Amsterdammers. So the compilers of the AUP took the
concept of recreation extremely seriously for the first time. An entirely new “forest
park,” the Amsterdamse Bos, was included in the plan. At the heart of the new residen-
tial districts was to be an artificial lake, what would later become the Sloterplas; at the
same time, this would also act as a cheap source of the vast quantities of sand needed to
tame the mud.
Nothing came of all this forecasting, however. First, the Second World War broke
out, and after that, the massive housing shortage led to the hasty construction of many
low-quality homes. Nevertheless, the AUP remained the main guiding force for the
planners right up to the creation of the suburb of Buitenveldert in the 1960s.
So, the mark left by Van Eesteren and his colleagues on the map of Amsterdam is al-
so not an inconsiderable one. His great residential areas, consisting largely of box-like
blocks of flats, are clearly visible. Interesting in this respect is their relationship with
the green belt surrounding the city. In the AUP, nature is no longer swept away like an
enemy but instead once again readmitted to the city. This it does in the form of a sort of
enormous wedge. In 1915, in his book Cities in Evolution, Patrick Geddes had called for an
expansion of the overlap between the urban and the rural using a city model in which
the countryside could continue to encroach into the developed area; the “finger city”
or “lobe city” in other words. The AUP applied this theory consistently in practice, as a
result of which the polder landscape remains within easy reach of most city-dwellers.
In Amsterdam, even now, you do not have to cycle far to reach nature ( Emeis 1983, 115;
Van der Hoeven and Louwe 1985, 195).
To use Kevin Lynch’s terminology, the planners behind the AUP clearly took a mech-
anistic view of the city. The zenith of this vision – and at the same time its Waterloo –
was the Bijlmer, designed in the 1960s. Unhindered by labyrinths, complications and
obstructions, the city at last felt free to create the ultimate utopia; the “city of future,”
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as it was quite literally described. Amsterdam had acquired new land on an old polder,
the Bijlmermeer. Here it planned to crown the tradition of urban design, from Staets to
Berlage to Van Eesteren, which had brought it international renown. Following the ex-
ample of Le Corbusier, it would create here the perfect compensation for the unnatural
existence of the city-dweller: spacious, sunny high-rise homes for a happy family life
amidst a green, park-like landscape in which to relax and play. Here, at last, was Marx-
ist socialism at work.
On the scale models, the honeycomb pattern of ten-storey ribbons looked wonder-
ful and futuristic, as it also does on the map of Amsterdam. But on the ground, the “city
of the future” turned out very differently. From the completion of the very first blocks,
in 1970, there were problems. In part this was due to the fact that a city sometimes
changes faster than its planners could have foreseen. For example, very different
groups moved in than had been envisaged. Those who came were mainly immigrants,
with very few people from the old working-class districts, while a high percentage of
the new inhabitants were the poor and unemployed. The parking garages and the
long, spartan walkways designed in the relatively safe 1960s had by the turn of the
decade turned into breeding grounds for crime.
But the scheme also soon displayed serious problems which could have been fore-
seen. The Amsterdam planners had been hypnotized by their own past successes. As a
result, to quote Richter Roegholt, a city for the 1980s was designed “based upon ideas
dating from the 1920s” (Roegholt 1993, 271). Nobody ever considered the fact that
most people no longer wanted to live in highrises. There was never any serious research
into the wishes of the potential inhabitants. Those for whom the district was original-
ly intended instead migrated en masse to the affordable suburban family homes being
built in large numbers at the same time.
In short, the Bijlmer was a serious case of “groupthink”: the product of a small
group of modern regents who considered themselves all-powerful. According to the
urban planner Maarten Menzel, who has since reconstructed the decision-making
process surrounding the Bijlmer scheme, the Amsterdam planners – mainly senior of-
ficials in the Department of Public Works – formed a “closed circuit of professionals,”
people “who were only willing to consider information from outside if it squared with
their own ideas” and who were driven by an “illusion of consensus and invulnerabili-
ty.”
Within ten years of the district’s completion, many of its homes were empty. After
just 25 years the first blocks of flats would be demolished to make way for large-scale re-
development. Thus did nature prove stronger than mechanics, man more complex
than the map.
At the end of the 20th century, Amsterdam began a new phase in her struggle
against the encircling mud. Once again, land was to be wrested from the water. In the
IJsselmeer, beyond the IJ, a number of large, artificial islands were to be ingeniously
raised. In planning this IJburg development, a new course was charted – one in which
Kevin Lynch might well recognize his “organic” value system. And on the banks of the
IJ itself, east of the center, an authentic piece of city proper – complete with streets and
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canals – would be created for the first time since Berlage. It seemed as if a way was being
sought back to the city as a city, to that unpredictable concentration of human dynam-
ics at which one can only keep wondering.
NOTE
1. Van der Valk (pp. 472 et seq.) also acknowledges that “virtually no street was built in ac-
cordance with the original plan.” But he believes that the plan worked very satisfactorily
for 30 years as a guideline in day-to-day decisionmaking. And that was precisely the in-
tention of the then councillors. They wanted no more. They were not yet ready for the
type of plans which form a precise blueprint of the final situation. 
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In the second half of the nineteenth century, Paris became the role model for Euro-
pean capitals. Many cities followed its example. Amsterdammers – who were equally
impressed by the monumental townscape of the French capital – did not succeed in
emulating Paris, mainly because of political, legal, and financial reasons. Laissez-faire
politics and the consequent absence of public interventions in its townscape were
compensated for by an outburst of civic pride between 1870 and 1914, providing Am-
sterdam with the facilities that still ensure its leading role as a cultural and intellec-
tual center. In 1918, Amsterdam and the Netherlands adopted a collectivist approach
to society. Health care, education, and solving the city’s housing problems began play-
ing dominant roles in the “welfare capital.” In this egalitarian climate, there was no
room for monumental townscapes.
Lost Glory
In the nineteenth century, Amsterdam faced unprecedented losses of both power and
prestige. Its economic position, which once enabled it to control the Republic of the
United Provinces, was shattered. The Napoleonic years had dealt a second blow with
the introduction of direct rule, which transformed the Republic, with its near-au-
tonomous cities, into a centralized kingdom and reduced Amsterdam to the ranks of a
mere municipality. The House of Orange, now elevated to royal status, decided to es-
tablish both the governmental functions and the royal court in The Hague. Their pres-
ence, in addition to the chiefs of staff, foreign diplomats and the high courts of justice,
saw The Hague grow at a faster rate than anywhere else in the Netherlands. Its concen-
tration of private fortunes attracted a great number of servants, artisans, shopkeepers,
and artists. 
That Amsterdam was given the title of statutory capital was poor recompense. The
city lacked almost every asset usually considered a capital’s natural prerogative. It
lacked the consuming power of wealthy residents that helped to make The Hague into
an elegant, attractive community. It was denied the preferential treatment that was
instrumental in transforming Paris and Brussels into the role models for the modern
capital. “Amsterdam has to provide its own means of support,” bemoaned a local ob-
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server in 1877, “whereas the nation demands it to play the role of largest city, of nation-
al center, while denying her the seat of government and court residence” (Wagenaar
1998, 149). 
In those years, Amsterdam underwent a strong economic recovery. The opening of
the North Sea Canal (1876) finally unlocked its port, which for decades had been inac-
cessible to large vessels. This new sea link, itself a response to the opening of the Suez
Canal in 1869, proved vital for trade with the Dutch East Indies. No other city in the
Netherlands benefited from this colony as much as Amsterdam.
The first signs of recovery became evident in the 1860s, when Amsterdam’s popula-
tion passed the peak level of 1795. Citizens who wanted to see the upgrading of this
sleepy, anachronistic city that compared so unfavorably with other European capitals,
greeted the recovery with enthusiasm. The time had finally come to transform Amster-
dam into the peer of such European capitals as Brussels and Budapest, which eagerly
followed the example set by Paris, where Baron Georges-Eugène Haussmann radically
intervened in the urban fabric. During the 17 years of his rule (1853-1870), the French
capital was subject to the largest urban renewal project Europe had ever experienced.
The Mother of All Capitals
To relieve the late-medieval core from crippling traffic congestion, Haussmann cut
new arteries through the dense urban fabric. Below their surface the Prefect of the
Seine created a modern sanitary infrastructure, including running water and an effi-
cient sewage system. The wide-scale introduction of gas light brought Paris the hon-
orary title of cité lumière. The creation of new arteries was instrumental in the clearance
of slums. Haussmann carefully projected the new streets to destroy as many over-
crowded ilôts insalubres as possible.
He thus succeeded in removing both slums and their underclass residents from the
center of Paris. They were banned to the banlieue, where they were invisible to the ad-
mirers of Paris who rarely paid a visit to the dreary landscape outside the ramparts. It
was part of the embellishment scheme which together with road improvement and
civic engineering turned Paris into the role model for all capitals. Almost every new
boulevard was conceived as an axis, guiding the eyes of the visitor to monuments of
prestige and grandeur. Thus, the Avenue des Champs Elysées opened a magnificent
vista on the Arc de Triomphe, hitherto an isolated testimony to the Napoleonic wars of
the early nineteenth century that stood utterly lost in space. By creating Place d’Etoile,
Haussmann highlighted the Arch by creating a panorama visible from several direc-
tions (for a more elaborate version of Haussmann’s interventions, see Wagenaar 2000a,
9-13).
A visit to the French capital was a stunning experience. Foreigners were impressed
not just by the city’s overwhelming monumentality, however. What contributed to the
effect was that Haussmann had adapted the spatial ingredients that hitherto had been
the prerogatives of the court, clergy, and aristocracy to a thoroughly bourgeois envi-
ronment. His boulevards, squares and parks served as a stage for the display of bour-
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geois opulence. The f laneur and boulevardier took possession of the elegant new streets.
The café terrace was introduced as a result of Haussmann’s interventions, as Richard
Sennett observes (1976, 216).
Dutch and British visitors were equally impressed by this awe-inspiring townscape
that offered both monumental panoramas and an elegant stage for leisure and display.
The contrast with their own capital cities could not be more dramatic. London – nerve
centre of the world’s leading industrial and financial economy and seat of the largest
colonial empire ever – failed to impress as a capital city. Its townscape was a cacophony
of architectural styles, building volumes and heights, resulting from an utter lack of
coordination and planning control. Although plagued by traffic congestion worse
than Paris when Haussmann came to power, interventions in the infrastructure re-
mained modest and insufficient. They were thwarted by the nation’s dominant liber-
al, laissez-faire ideology.
London was denied the preferential treatment that on the Continent was often seen
as the natural prerogative of the national capital. As a contemporary observed, such
might be usual “… in a highly centralized country, like France, where, in fact, Paris is
everything and the rest of the nation is nothing in comparison with it – it would hard-
ly be tolerated in England, where we pride ourselves on making every place pay for its
own improvements” (quoted in Dyos 1982, 85-86). And thus, infrastructural interven-
tions or urban embellishment were dependent on the consent of local rate payers, who
at the same time formed the local constituency and elected the local council.
As a result, the local budget was modest. Haussmann spent four times as much on
improvement schemes during his 17-year rule than the Metropolitan Board of Works
did during its 34 years of operation (Sutcliffe 1979, 71-88). What finally obstructed the
Board’s work was the liberal’s reticent attitude towards compulsory purchase. Street
improvements which involved the clearance of private properties were thus seriously
hampered. Each expropriation involved long legal procedures, while indemnities
were based on market prices. In the case of London, these prices could be astronomical.
As a result, London failed to use traffic improvement as a tool for slum clearance. By
1900 its center was surrounded by a horseshoe of overcrowded tenements. “It has
spread three-quarters round London: soon the two arms it has thrust towards the West
will snap together like a vice: a ring ... will completely encircle the Imperial City,”
Charles Masterman wrote in The Heart of Empire (1901) (quoted in Wagenaar 1998, 130). 
Masterman’s pessimistic prophecy seemed realistic now that middle-class house-
holds massively abandoned the central areas for the quiet, safe, and green suburban
havens on London’s fringe. A dense network of local railway lines brought commuting
within reach of both office workers and skilled laborers with a regular job. Slum land-
lords took over their once decent properties to rent them to the underclass of migrants
and the destitute poor that flooded this dynamic city. One family per room was not an
unusual situation.
At first sight, Amsterdam presented a completely different image. Its slow recovery
from decades of stagnation and decline was in sharp contrast to London’s dynamic
economy. There was no lack of slums in Amsterdam, however. Working-class housing
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in mews and courts, built when Amsterdam was one of Europe’s most prosperous and
largest cities (in 1750, it ranked fourth after London, Paris and Naples), was now in a
state of serious decay. Landlords vainly seeking tenants eventually abandoned their
property or demolished it, in order to avoid having to pay property taxes. The city’s nu-
merous bridges and quays were in a bad state of repair. Its canals were reduced to stag-
nant cesspools, producing an almost unbearable odor during the summer months
(Diederiks, 1982).
The signs of economic progress were almost completely lacking. Foreigners looked
in vain for any modern industry with its smoking chimneys. Instead, they were sur-
prised to see the hundreds of windmills on Amsterdam’s city walls, offering a view of
times gone by (Wagenaar 1990, 133 ff.).
In the 1860s, many hoped that Amsterdam would finally awake from its century-
long sleep. Nearby Brussels had demonstrated how an age-old city center could be re-
modelled to become a petit Paris. At the same time, however, few continental European
nations were as dedicated to classical laissez-faire liberalism as the Netherlands.
Would Amsterdam encounter similar political obstacles to urban reform as London
was facing?
The Search for a Representative Capital
It was not only the convincing image that Paris offered; there were other reasons to em-
ulate the grands travaux as well. Amsterdam’s inner city suffered from increasing traffic
congestion. The problem would grow worse, contemporaries feared, when the new
Central Station opened. Its location at the edge of the urban core attracted offices,
banks, and insurance companies. Hotels, restaurants, and department stores compet-
ed for a location close to the new station, anticipating a massive increase in the num-
ber of visitors to Amsterdam. Added to this, the revival of Amsterdam’s port with the
opening of the North Sea Canal generated even more traffic.
Amsterdam, many opinion leaders stated, would have to cut new arteries and boule-
vards through its historic center. From the 1860s onwards, a cascade of private plans
suggested numerous cuttings. Although all of these plans first noted the necessity of
traffic improvement, many continued to underline that these cuttings would also be
instrumental in demolishing as many slums as possible, and thus make way for the
construction of impressive facades. As in Paris, only a tiny minority opposed the de-
struction of historic buildings.
However impressive some of the sketches might look and however widely accepted the
need to intervene in the inadequate road system, none of the private plans were real-
ized. The main reason for their failure was the lack of funding.
As traffic congestion worsened and the center suffered from decreasing accessibili-
ty from the newly developed fringe areas, pressure mounted on the local council to in-
tervene. But politicians were hesitant to act. A few minor cuttings in the 1870s proved
to be excessively expensive. When the council finally agreed to cut a major new artery
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to the western urban fringe, it took almost ten years to complete – and the costs were as-
tronomical. And although the new artery (Raadhuisstraat) proved effective in reduc-
ing congestion, as a new boulevard it could not compare with Haussmann’s creations.
The facades facing the new artery were a far cry from the strict neo-classical monu-
mentality that made Paris so impressive. Poor Amsterdam lacked both the funds and
the legal tools to realize such embellishment schemes.
Meanwhile, pressure on the local housing market increased as Amsterdam’s eco-
nomic revival attracted a growing number of migrants. Once again, private developers
came up with extension schemes that promised modern, elegant urban quarters out-
side the city walls. Ambitious plans for a new southern quarter were proposed by
Samuel Sarphati, one of the progressive citizens who were bent on restoring the city’s
leading role in the nation. Its design was clearly inspired by the Ecole des Beaux Arts style.
Axiality and proportion dominated the plans, offering broad views of prestigious new
buildings such as his local version of London’s famous Crystal Palace. This “Palais de
l’Industrie” was actually realized (1863), as were the two housing blocks facing it, with
their symmetrical, classicist facades. At the opening ceremony, Amsterdam’s mayor
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Figure 1.  The 1866 plan of C. Outshoorn and J.L. Kuinders to widen Halssteeg, clear the old Jewish
Quarter (one of the city’s worst slums) and create a new boulevard from Dam Square to the
eastern urban fringe. After widening the street and cutting the new artery, the authors suggest-
ed constructing a glass-domed passage to accommodate prestigious shops, cafes, and brasseries.
They thought this would allow the new artery to compete with the Rue de Rivoli in Paris and
similar streets in Brussels. Lack of funding and problems with the compulsory purchase of
bordering properties caused the plan to be abandoned (adapted from Wagenaar, 1998).
Adam.HumanCapital  06-03-2003  16:50  Pagina 53
stated that this new development might eventually lead to a street to equal the Rue de
Rivoli in Paris.
Many shared his hope. Sarphati succeeded in building Amsterdam’s first modern
hotel on the banks of the Amstel river. Private builders bought land opposite the hotel,
an area which showed the promise to develop into a prestigious residential district.
Sarphati’s most ambitious plans lay outside the old fortifications. Two exclusive up-
per-class areas were planned for both banks of the Amstel. Their layout – a place d’étoile –
was clearly influenced by French classicist urban design. This also applied to the mid-
dle-class and working-class districts.
But these ambitious plans ended in utter failure. Sarphati needed amounts of funding
not only to purchase the land, but also to maintain its status as long as it was vacant.
Sarphati hoped that upper-class Amsterdammers would leave their homes along the
canals now that commercial developers in the historic core were turning residences
into banks, hotels, and offices. But the formation of the central business district pro-
gressed at a much slower place than he expected. Also, due to a total lack of planning
and coordination, there were other up-market properties developed in other parts of
the city, seriously competing with Sarphati’s plans. Thus, Sarphati miscalculated the
demand for his expensive projects on Amsterdam’s southern fringe.
After his death in 1866, Sarphati’s land company abandoned the prestigious design.
In its place came high-density housing blocks with small, straight streets. This area –
nicknamed de Pijp (the Pipe) – became the exclusive domain of speculative developers.
They catered to the needs of private landlords, who preferred to invest in lower-middle-
class housing, for which there was an overwhelming demand. Their aim was to enjoy a
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Figure 2. Samuel Sarphati’s 1862 plan for a southern extension of Amsterdam (with the bottom
of the map facing north)
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constant source of income. This sector of the housing market knew no vacancies.
Within a few years, the Pijp was characterized by speculative building, monotonous
streets and merciless landlords, increasingly demonized by Amsterdam’s opinion
leaders. Soon, almost the whole of the nineteenth-century belt was called the “funeral
wreath” that threatened to suffocate Amsterdam’s famous canal belt, which had clear-
ly been the result of superior urban planning.
However, although devoted to the principles of free market property development,
members of Amsterdam’s local council began to feel uneasy about the total lack of
planning control on the city’s fringes. They foresaw that this chaos would in time pres-
ent a formidable obstacle to the construction of an adequate road network, while the
ramshackle quality of residential development here posed a sanitary threat and thus a
health hazard.
A majority of councillors ordered the city architect, J.G. van Niftrik, to prepare an
all-encompassing town plan that would put an end to the building chaos. In 1867, he
presented his plan. Its aesthetic qualities were praised. Once again, the design clearly
showed the imprint of French beaux arts town planning, with a grand radiating place
d’étoile at its heart, destined for upper-class villas, and surrounded by geometrically
laid-out middle-class neighborhoods. They acted as buffers for working-class areas at
both ends of the belt. The rigid residential segregation proposed by Van Niftrik was
seen as another attractive feature of the plan. But soon after this wave of enthusiasm,
the first critical debates in the city council revealed the major obstacles to town plan-
ning and urban interventions in this period
How, one councillor asked, was this plan to be imposed on private landowners? How
could the city force them to accept both parcelling and the strict zoning as proposed by
van Niftrik?
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Figure 3. 
J.G. van Niftrik’s
1867 extension plan 
for Amsterdam
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Several politicians pointed out that this plan could be realized only if the city of Am-
sterdam were to own the land on which it was projected.
To achieve that aim it had to apply for permission to carry out mass expropriation.
Just as in the United Kingdom, however, compulsory purchase in the Netherlands was
no easy affair. The Law on Compulsory Purchase required that both Houses of Parlia-
ment test each proposal on whether it unequivocally served the common good. Only
then could it take the form of an act of Parliament. It seemed unlikely that Parliament
would pass such an act. But even if it had honored the appeal, it would have cost the
city a fortune. The Law on Compulsory Purchase clearly stated that compensation had
to correspond to market prices. Amsterdam, with the highest debts of all cities in the
Netherlands, could not afford to pay that price.
One councillor aptly summarized the difference between the Netherlands and
France, remarking that “… it remains a mystery how local administration must oper-
ate to enforce this plan as long as it cannot act as a certain Prefect of the Seine” (Wage-
naar 1990, 251). He did not need to mention Haussmann’s name. Everybody under-
stood perfectly well that he was referring to the man who had been given almost
plenipotentiary powers by his master, Emperor Napoleon III. At Haussmann’s request
the French laws on compulsory purchase were given an extremely relaxed interpre-
tation. Sometimes the Emperor resorted to imperial decrees if matters took too long.
Just as important, the French capital was given a kind of preferential treatment that
Amsterdam could only dream of. The grands travaux cost a fortune. Without adequate
funding, Haussmann could never have realized his program in such a short period of
time. 
Such preferential treatment was unheard of in the Netherlands. Just as in the Unit-
ed Kingdom, every town or city had to pay for its own improvements. The electoral sys-
tem required that a member of parliament put the interests of his constituency before
anything else. Extra funding for the capital would have met with fierce opposition. Not
even The Hague was granted extra money to embellish the city in a manner appropri-
ate for a seat of government and royal residence. Thus, local politicians, opinion lead-
ers, and architects had to bow their heads to the harsh reality of laissez-faire specula-
tive development. Van Niftrik’s proposal was rejected. 
In 1877, a new, “realistic” town plan, produced by Van Niftrik’s superior, J. Kalff, was
accepted. It provided no more than global indications of main streets and circular
roads. The word “expropriation” was not mentioned, while embellishment schemes
were avoided. It was meant as an instrument to negotiate with the powerful land com-
panies. Often, at their request, extra streets were permitted in order to realize higher
building densities. Open spaces within housing blocks were reduced to a minimum
(Van der Valk 1989). 
The result was a free market townscape that gave little reason for enthusiasm. Up-
grading Amsterdam to a model European capital was out of the question. But that did
not exclude piecemeal improvements. From the 1870s onwards, civic pride increasing-
ly aimed at paying tribute to the arts and sciences, compensating, as it were, for the
lack of a convincing monumental townscape.
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The Republic of Amsterdam
One of the most successful manifestations of civic pride was the creation of a new park
(the Vondelpark) on the city’s western fringe. The initiators all belonged to the finan-
cial and commercial elite. United in the “Park Committee”, they launched their first
appeal for donations in 1864. In their manifesto they took advantage of the prevalent
feelings of wounded local pride. It opened with: “It is only within her walls that Am-
sterdam may be called one of Europe’s most attractive and picturesque cities. But the
surrounding area does not deserve such praise. It cannot compare with other cities,
even in our own country. The Hague and Haarlem boast elegant parks. Compared to
them, Amsterdam has nothing to offer.”
The first request for gifts was successful. What certainly helped was that the Park
Committee also appealed to the dominant laissez-faire political outlook of the time.
They concluded their first manifesto with a remarkable tribute to liberalism. “On the
Continent, many States spend vast amounts of public money to embellish their cities.
In England, as a rule, everything that serves the public is paid for by the public itself.
The Netherlands follows the English example, where citizens, keen on their freedom,
often create major improvements on their own, without calling upon State support.”
(Wagenaar 1990, 269)
What proved most instrumental in the completion of the Vondelpark was the fi-
nancial strategy followed by the members of the Committee. They had bought much
more land than was needed for the park and, as it reached completion, they sold bor-
dering properties at a substantial profit as residential building plots. 
Buyers had to agree to strict building codes. The construction of working-class hous-
ing was forbidden. Contractors were compelled to install modern equipment, such as
state-of-the-art sewage and drainage systems. Workshops, warehouses, and factories
were, of course, ruled out. Despite all these rules and restrictions, the sale of building
plots proved very profitable. The Vondelpark was opened in 1877, and is a lasting mon-
ument to the public spirit. The bordering quarters became the only fashionable area
outside old Amsterdam.
This bourgeois residential enclave hosted many more civic initiatives, which in
their turn further enhanced the attraction of the new neighborhood. The new nation-
al gallery (the Rijksmuseum), which was financed with gifts from all over the country,
opened in 1885. Its gateway offered a wide view of the new residential area and the
work on the new Concertgebouw (Concert Hall). In 1888, the Concert Hall opened its
doors. Again, financial and commercial circles in the capital took the initiative. Both
the Concertgebouw and its orchestra were financed without a penny of taxpayer’s mon-
ey. Soon after its opening it succeeded in becoming one of Europe’s leading temples of
music. Several times, contemporary composers like Gustav Mahler and Richard
Strauss chose the Concertgebouw for the first public performance of their work. 
In 1894 the new Municipal Museum (the Stedelijk Museum) opened. The name is mis-
leading. Although the city council did contribute to the building costs, the museum
could not have been realized without substantial private donations. Just as important-
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ly, its collection was furnished by wealthy patrons of the arts. They felt that leading
painters such as Van Gogh and Breitner were out of place in the Rijksmuseum. Thus, the
Stedelijk Museum developed a reputation as the Netherlands’ leading modern art gallery
– a reputation it has maintained ever since.
During its “Second Golden Age,” Amsterdam saw many more demonstrations of
civic dedication to the arts (Bank 2000, 237-262). But science was not left out. Many felt
that a self-respecting capital should manifest its devotion to scientific progress.
Prominent citizens lobbied the central government to allow the capital to have its
own university. In 1877, after fierce rows in parliament, they got their way. But Amster-
dam had to finance its university out of its own pocket. As well as financial support, the
council donated the venerable City Library. Its impressive collection of rare books and
maps, once the pride of the mercator sapiens (learned merchant), now received the title
of University Library. The Botanical Gardens, founded in the seventeenth century to
provide medicinal herbs and to cultivate tropical plants, was also elevated to an aca-
demic level.
But the greatest rewards were reaped from its investment in new laboratories. The
costs were staggering. Critics, both in the local press and on the city council, remarked
that Amsterdam could hardly bear the burden of its own university and should apply
for state funding. (De Rooy 1992, 9 ff.). The city remained loyal to its university, how-
ever, and to science as well. Some 25 years later Amsterdam had its finest hour. In 1902,
Pieter Zeeman became the Nobel laureate for physics, followed in 1910 by his colleague
Van der Waals. 
In 1927, the University of Amsterdam celebrated its fiftieth anniversary. In his open-
ing speech, the Dean looked back on 50 successful years. One of the dignitaries present
was the Minister of Education, whose office had defended the University’s peculiar po-
sition in the past. “I express our gratitude for that support,” the Dean said. “Amster-
dam is not used to being treated generously by the national government and the hous-
es of parliament” (Van Athenaeum etc. 1927, 165).
With these words, the Dean aptly summarized the feelings of many fellow citizens.
That Amsterdam had regained a prominent position as a dynamic capital, with a
booming economy, a flourishing cultural life and an internationally valued university
was, so they felt, very much the result of their own efforts. Unlike London, Amsterdam
rarely enjoyed royal patronage of the arts and sciences. More often than not, govern-
ment and Parliament alike rejected requests for state support. The press in the rest of
the country gladly responded to deep-seated feelings of fear and disgust for the capital,
with its allegedly arrogant attitude resulting from its age-old domination over the
Dutch Republic. 
From Private to Public Amenities
By the turn of the century, the almost 25 years of  “civic pride” had produced impres-
sive results. Amsterdam had firmly established its position as a center of the arts and
sciences, one unmatched by any other city – including The Hague. But unlike Paris,
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Brussels, and Budapest, it lacked the means to highlight the temples of arts and science
in a monumental urban scenography. 
As a result of its revival, Amsterdam’s urban landscape had changed profoundly.
Old canals had been filled in to facilitate the circulation of the ever-increasing traffic.
It proved an inexpensive alternative to the cutting of new boulevards through the ur-
ban fabric. The new arteries, particularly those emanating from Central Station, had a
magnetic attraction to commercial land users. Walking from Central Station to Dam
Square, visitors were welcomed by a collage of new buildings. On their way, their eyes
were drawn to Berlage’s new Municipal Exchange, which was soon joined by the new
Stock Exchange. A little further on, the shop windows of the huge department stores
tempted the visitor. The first cinemas appeared along this axis, along with modern
cafés and restaurants. One after another, stately seventeenth- and eighteenth-century
premises were demolished to make way for commercial property development. Be-
tween 1870 and 1925, the central area lost 30 percent of its residential dwellings (Wa-
genaar 2000b, 23). No new building resembled any other building. Their facades dis-
played a cacophony of styles. The new hotels and department stores occupied large
sites. Their volume and height paid no respect to the small, steep, traditional town-
houses they bordered. Dam Square, the heart of the city, became a battlefield of styles
and building volumes.
Amsterdam’s dynamic economy increasingly transformed its once picturesque in-
ner city into a free market townscape, pockmarked with slums. Even its famous canal
belt was under attack from commercial developers. 
For those who sought refuge from its increasingly unattractive residential environ-
ment, the nineteenth-century belt had little to offer. The Vondelpark area certainly
was an exception to the poor quality of the new neighborhoods. But quality housing
was not only rare, it was also extremely expensive, as was the city as a whole. Amster-
dam had the nation’s highest tax burden, which forced up wages and prices.
The suburban communities in Gooi and Kennemerland were the only real alterna-
tives to Amsterdam, as an increasing number of its citizens discovered. Both areas of-
fered natural beauty along with low land prices, low taxes and cheap labor costs in the
building trades. Now that both of these regions were linked to Amsterdam by a dense
rail and tram network, their attraction increased considerably.
As yet, suburbanization in both areas remained modest, as Henk Schmal’s contri-
bution to this book makes clear. The communities surrounding Amsterdam attracted
far greater numbers. They changed from agrarian villages into middle-class tax
havens, increasingly eroding Amsterdam’s fiscal base. Two successive annexations (in
1896 and 1921) put an end to this tax evasion strategy. Gooi and Kennemerland were
out of reach, however. During the twentieth century they continued to skim off Am-
sterdam’s wealth.
On the eve of the First World War, Amsterdam clearly showed the imprint of some 60
years of liberal, laissez-faire rule. Neither national government nor the municipality
played a significant role in the provision of housing, in town planning, architecture or
heritage conservation. Although opinion leaders bemoaned the loss of so many an-
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cient premises in the old center, and criticized the freedom that commercial develop-
ers enjoyed to extract maximum profits from their property, there was no legal tool to
stop them. The right of the owner to do with his property as he saw fit remained sacro-
sanct. As a consequence, there was no barrier to the transformation of Amsterdam’s
city center into a central business district.
The provision of housing was essentially left to the free market. There were no
significant restrictions on speculative builders. The nineteenth-century belt saw an
explosive growth of new housing. It strengthened liberal politicians in their belief in
the blessings of the “trickling-down” mechanism. In due time, working-class families
would leave the overcrowded slums in the old city and settle on the fringes, where
housing of a higher standard would become available.
Although many deplored the aesthetic results of laissez-faire urban growth, the
planned city was seen as a luxury, provided by private developers as an extra attraction
to upper-class residential areas. Amsterdam’s Vondelpark and Willemspark aptly illus-
trate this vision.
Improving one’s housing conditions was seen as a private affair, as was social im-
provement in general. But this vision came under attack as the results of the free mar-
ket increasingly disappointed contemporary critics. In Amsterdam, the “radical” liber-
als, who came to power in the 1890s, municipalized the private utilities. Thus, the
privately owned water company, gas and electricity works and transport company
were all brought into municipal hands. “Shareholder value” was seen as incompatible
with the public good.
The introduction of collective provisions for private needs on the local level was fol-
lowed by a similar process on the national level. The 1901 Housing Act heralded the ad-
vent of the welfare state. With it, Parliament accepted that a free housing market was
unable to provide decent dwellings for the lower classes. What made the Act truly re-
markable, however, was that it provided communities such as Amsterdam with the le-
gal instruments to realize properly planned extension areas. If such a plan was ap-
proved, it allowed the city to expropriate the expansion area, although it had to pay the
market value of the properties expropriated. Therefore, many communities were re-
luctant to use this instrument. But Amsterdam, with no more than two socialist repre-
sentatives on its local council, almost immediately commissioned the nation’s leading
progressive architect, Hendrik Petrus Berlage, to develop an urban design for its south-
ern extension area.
Although it took until 1917 before Berlage’s final plan was accepted, it marked the
arrival of the local welfare state as few other events had. From 1918 onwards, after a
landslide socialist victory at the local elections, Amsterdam became the nation’s lead-
ing laboratory for the collectivist approach. Coalitions between socialists and corpo-
ratist confessional parties were to dominate the local political arena for the next 75
years.
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The Welfare Capital
While socializing the means of production – including banks and insurance compa-
nies – took a prominent place in socialist rhetoric, everyday politics aimed at the pro-
vision of collective consumption. Revolutionary aldermen like Monne de Miranda de-
veloped plans for the complete socialization of the retail sector. Shopkeepers would
become extinct, he said, meeting the same inevitable historical fate as feudal nobility
(De Liagre Böhl 2000). These and similar plans all failed. But the provision of housing in
carefully planned new extension areas proved a great success. 
The key to that success lay in Amsterdam’s resolute implementation of the new
Housing Act. After approval of Berlage’s plan for the southern extension area, the city
applied for its complete expropriation, despite the staggering compensation costs.
Thus, Amsterdam could impose Berlage’s impressive design on the newly acquired
land. What was more, it could now exercise complete control over the building
process. As a ground landlord, it could dictate dwelling plans, building volume and
the quality of amenities, and thus influence the social composition of the new quarter.
For financial reasons it had to accept the fact that most contractors were working for
private developers.
But irrespective of tenure, both private landlords and public housing associations
were subject to very strict building regulations. This became dramatically visible in
the facades along the new streets. Unlike in the past, the official Aesthetics Board now
demanded that building developers integrate their design as part of a street facade.
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Figure 4. H.P. Berlage’s second version of Amsterdam’s southern extension plan (1917)
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They were obliged to conform to the architecture of the Amsterdam School, an exuber-
antly expressionist movement that broke away from the eclectic tradition of the previ-
ous century. It was remarkable that even public housing associations – working-class
cooperatives to which the ruling socialists felt sympathetic – were repeatedly denied
the right to contract their preferred architect if he did not accept the canon of the Am-
sterdam School.
Thus the distinction between expensive, privately rented apartments and low-budg-
et public housing was made invisible. Whereas in the nineteenth century an abun-
dance of ornament was a clear statement of a building’s status and as a result indicated
the high income of its tenants, such distinctions were absent in the new neighbor-
hoods. Even differences in location – which during the nineteenth century had been
instrumental in producing high- or low-quality housing – were levelled. Plots facing
parks or located on the Amstel river or other waterways benefited from a broader
panorama in this densely built city, which almost always automatically triggered the
speculative contractor to build upper-class housing. However, this mechanism was
ruled out in these collectivist urban designs.
The visual results were remarkable. The southern extension area, with its monu-
mental, un-Dutch layout, displayed an unprecedented unity of style, building height
and construction materials. Architects no longer designed individual houses but
housing blocks, of which apartments were but a constituent part. Order and regulari-
ty were dominant features. During the nineteenth century, speculative builders often
included commercial space on the ground level to maximize rents for the private land-
lord. As a result, streets in the nineteenth century belt were literally scattered with re-
tail outlets, cafés, and workshops. With the almost unlimited and unregulated open-
ing hours, all this helped to produce a very busy street life.
But planners and officials saw this as yet another undesirable outcome of laissez-
faire urban development. In the new quarters, all neighborhood facilities were con-
centrated in squares or at the corners of a housing block. The new southern areas
demonstrated an almost religious dedication to total planning control. From new
bridges to mail boxes, electrical distribution equipment and litter bins, everything
down to the smallest detail was designed according to the Amsterdam School’s aes-
thetic criteria. Thus, the new quarter truly deserved the title of Gesamtkunstwerk.
The contrast with the past could not be more dramatic. Even in the city’s famous
seventeenth-century canal belt area, one of the rare examples of expropriation to cre-
ate an attractive urban environment, building developers were free to choose the fa-
cade of their choice. Each house differed from its neighbor in building volume and
iconographic programme. Individualism reigned supreme. The results were, at best,
picturesque – a qualification Berlage reserved for the Canal Belt, while vehemently
denying the aesthetic value of the nineteenth-century belt. But monumentality, the
architect stated, is the highest form of art, to which the layout of the southern exten-
sion contributed in no small way.
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The Triumph of Modernism 
However much the city fathers and a growing number of visitors admired this area,
there was increasing criticism of the rigidity of supervision maintained by the Aes-
thetics Board. Liberal politicians questioned the municipality’s right to judge in mat-
ters of taste, which they saw as an individual and thus subjective preference.
The dictate of the Amsterdam School met with vociferous criticism from profes-
sional architects as well. The modernist movement in particular, with its devotion to
“form follows function,” ridiculed the exuberant and costly facades, to which the
dwelling plan was subservient, resulting in bizarre and impractical residences. It was
an outrage – complained one of the leading modernist architects, J.J.P. Oud – that a
Labor-controlled municipality wasted public money on an urban design and architec-
ture that served no other purpose than visual beauty (for an exhaustive essay on the
Amsterdam School, see Stieber 1998). They increasingly convinced local politicians
that it was time for a change. It came in 1928, when the city established the new Plan-
ning Department. Its program was utterly functionalist, claiming that scientific plan-
ning and modernist architecture were far superior to Berlage’s “city beautiful.”
A thorough analysis of the four main urban functions (residential, economic, recre-
ational, transport) was to produce Amsterdam’s new master plan. Isolated expansion
schemes were seen as useless now that positivist, empirical research had finally un-
veiled the functioning of the city as a whole.
The result, the General Extension Plan, was approved by the local council in 1935. It
encompassed most of the areas annexed in 1921. Rigid separation of functions created
vast residential areas in the west and south of Amsterdam, while port-related manu-
facturing and warehousing were exclusively located along the North Sea Canal. Busi-
ness was to expand unhampered in the city center. The resulting loss of residential
space was to be compensated for in the building program.
Although essentially a town plan, it was clear from the start that its architectural
implementation would be uncompromisingly modernist. The traditional housing
block, enclosing private or common gardens, was seen as inferior to upper-deck-access
flats, which guaranteed optimal daylight and fresh air to every single dwelling. Aes-
thetics, implying ornamentation, were seen as irrelevant. Gabled roofs were avoided.
The flat roof – the ultimate symbol of modernist architecture – was rationally superior.
Realization of this ambitious scheme had to wait till the end of the war. After 1945,
rebuilding the devastated economy took top priority. But from the 1950s onwards,
Amsterdam triggered an unprecedented building boom. In the western garden cities (a
misleading name compared to their British counterparts, given the prevalence of mul-
ti-storey estates and occasional tower blocks), public housing led the way. Whereas in
the years between the two wars private housing had accounted for almost 70 percent of
all new construction, the situation was now completely reversed. Even in well-off
Buitenveldert (on the southern fringe), the share of public housing amounted to 38
percent.
Few other Western European capitals matched these figures, with Stockholm being
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one of the few exceptions. No one foresaw that 30 to 40 years later, when the Nether-
lands returned to a more market-oriented economy, these well-planned, publicly
owned residential areas would become the single most formidable challenge to urban
renewal and regeneration.
The Unimposing Capital
Although embedded in socialist politics, Berlage’s design for the southern extension
plan was Amsterdam’s last attempt at monumentality. Admittedly, it lacked refer-
ences to state power and grandeur, and was aesthetics pur sang. Yet it gave Amsterdam
the only impressive urban area in the Netherlands.
After 1945, such artistic design was traded in for Modernism, which better suited
the city’s role as “welfare capital,” and aesthetic values were considered as totally irrel-
evant. Town planning and architecture of the “Grand Manner” were ridiculed as old-
fashioned and un-Dutch. Modernism seemed ideally suited as the architectural carrier
for Amsterdam’s collectivist housing strategy.
From an international perspective, the switch to such a housing strategy (with Mod-
ernism as its natural ally) was not unique. Stockholm opted for a similar course. Like
Amsterdam, it gave up any attempt to impress as Sweden’s capital, although unlike the
Dutch capital it at least could boast an awe-inspiring royal and military complex dat-
ing from its absolutist eighteenth-century past (Andersson 1998). Stockholm’s metro,
which linked its satellite communities would in due time become the “inspiring” ex-
ample on which was based the Bijlmermeer – Amsterdam’s ultimate functionalist
public housing area from the late 1960s.
London followed a similar course. The arrival of the welfare state led to massive
clearing of Victorian terraces in the “horseshoe of poverty” that surrounded the city.
High-rise estates and upper-deck-access flats replaced the nineteenth-century “slums”.
As in Stockholm, Labour governments in the UK made massive use of satellite towns as
an additional solution to housing needs. And like Stockholm and Amsterdam, it
seemed as though they had given up any attempt to turn London into a monumental
capital. Quite the opposite. Both the City and the West End increasingly showed a “free
market townscape,” with a cacophony of building styles, building heights and build-
ing volumes. The destruction of both the Georgian and the Victorian legacy continued
unimpeded (Olsen 1979).
Paris, however, continued its role as the nation’s showcase, even after France finally
opted for the welfare state in the 1960s. Remarkably enough, embellishment of the
capital continued irrespective of the political orientation of the president. Right-wing
presidents felt just as obliged to add to its glory as their socialist counterparts, as Fran-
çois Mitterand demonstrated during his term in office. However dedicated to the col-
lectivist strategy he might have been, he adorned the capital with more new parks (as
well as a new arch and opera) than all his post-war predecessors put together.
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During the second half of the 19th century, urban activities became ever more inde-
pendent from the urban area and became dispersed over a large, traditionally rural
area surrounding the city. The acceleration in the development of the residential ele-
ments of this process is usually attributed to factors such as a poor quality of life in the
cities, rising affluence and substantially improved transportation connections. In Am-
sterdam, the affluent were the first group in a position to leave the city and did so in ris-
ing numbers that were disconcerting to municipal authorities. City council member
and President of the Amsterdamsche Bank, F.S. van Nierop, for example, calculated
that the taxable income of the taxpayers that moved away between 1885 and 1891 ex-
ceeded 12.5 million guilders, while that of newcomers amounted to a mere 7.5 million.
“The city’s loss of 5 million in taxable income over the past six years is an ominous
sign,” remarked Van Nierop (1893, 209).
Many were to reiterate the city council member’s laments over time. This process of
the rich fleeing that he mentioned was long considered a characteristic of the city.
Even nowadays, those entering the city tend to be younger, less educated and less afflu-
ent, while each year the older, better educated and more affluent leave. After all, the
city and its wealth of facilities foster development. Or, as Van Nierop stated: “The indi-
gent wash up during high tide, and the affluent are washed away during low tide”
(1905, 216).
This remark also correlates with the general impression of residential suburbaniza-
tion, which is usually depicted as an ecological process involving migration by the af-
fluent from the urban centers to the more scenic parts of the surrounding country-
side. Advances in transport technology brought about the exodus of the affluent, who
could settle in picturesque country estates without having to sever their professional
ties with the city. The question remains, however, as to whether the time-space and
cost-space convergences – according to the chrono-geographic terminology of Janelle,
Parkes, and Thrift – may be considered adequate for spatial expansion of the daily ur-
ban system. The term “daily urban system” denotes the central city and the surround-
ing area, where many residents work in the city every day. All kinds of restrictions that
do not directly concern the actual means of transport and those inherent in affluence
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may impede coherent development of the means of transport and the spatial expan-
sion of the daily urban system (De Pater and Schmal 1982).
This contribution reviews the development of Amsterdam’s daily urban system be-
tween 1880 and 1940 and examines how important trains and trams were in this
process.
In the first section I will briefly discuss expectations among contemporaries in the
Netherlands and abroad around 1900 regarding the potential of trains and trams with
respect to urban development. Afterwards, I will describe the expansion of the daily
urban system by examining whether and in what measure the new means of transport
could be and were indeed used.
Trains and Trams as Solutions to the Urban Crisis
Although streets in city centers during the 19th century were filled with horses and
carriages, most people reached their destinations on foot. Lack of adequate public
transport limited the range of virtually all regular activities. Only once new means of
transport were introduced and existing ones improved did dispersal across a larger
area become possible for the rapidly growing population. At the time, suburbaniza-
tion opportunities were frequently noted but used locally in several different ways. In
many places citification seriously complicated life in the city centers. Moreover, hous-
ing needs rose substantially, because of closely related demographic and economic
growth. The spatial proximity required for many activities was conducive to greater
densification. The quality of life deteriorated rapidly in many cities. Many local and na-
tional reports in the Netherlands and abroad mentioned that the majority of the pop-
ulation lived in dilapidated, unsanitary accommodations. The quest for a solution in-
cluded repeated attempts to benefit from the opportunities provided by various
modes of transport. Their use was expected to help resolve the crisis afflicting many
cities. Rising mobility might make the difference in overcoming the existing urban
spatial network with its drawbacks and creating new conditions for generating other
attributes. Max Weber (1899) regarded a good communications network as “one of the
most and perhaps the most important means for providing the urban population with
affordable and more comfortable living arrangements in the modern city” (Nieboer
1908, 38, op. cit.). The potential benefits of a good tram and/or railway network for the
city were widely acknowledged. The Electrical Engineer of 1894 also indicated that Euro-
pean cities were overpopulated, unhealthy and relatively expensive, especially for the
working classes. It suggested “… spreading out the population into the older and newer
suburbs with their pure air and their wholesome surroundings” (Mckay 1976, 207, op.
cit.).
Well before 1900, efforts were made around London to interest people in living in
the outlying areas, at least by making transportation as inexpensive as possible. In
1864, special rates for workers were introduced on a few lines to encourage them to
travel and thus to fulfill a necessary condition for suburbanization. Nevertheless, such
measures were exceptional. Measures to accommodate short trips and rush-hour con-
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gestion were deemed unprofitable. Objections were even based on the argument that
the lines with “penny fares” would become unsuitable for “regular” passenger traffic.
Later proposals to introduce “workmen’s passes” were rejected on the grounds that al-
lowing the lower classes to penetrate everywhere would be dangerous. In fact, the rail-
way companies and people in a position to influence them showed hardly any interest
in transport for the ordinary man. The result was that the working class still had to live
near the place where the jobs were located (Kellett 1979, pp. 376-382).
Around 1900, when electric trams replaced the slow and costly horse-drawn trolleys
and revolutionized public transport, far more efforts were made to benefit from the
opportunities provided by this means of transport for living on the outskirts or in the
suburbs. “Cheap and rapid transit is the only cure for the working-class housing prob-
lem,” reported the Sanitary Committee in England in 1904 (Kellett 1979, 359, op. cit.).
The tram became a popular means of transport. In many places the number of passen-
gers transported rose spectacularly within a few years, networks expanded rapidly,
and the means of transport proved conducive to the spatial development of major
cities and their surroundings (Mckay 1976, 173-184; 216-219, Jackson 1973, 25-32).
“Electric tramways did indeed open up large areas for new residential construction
and thereby greatly facilitate socially desirable decentralization” (Mckay 1976, 219).
“We are unanimous to the effect that congested districts have been relieved and that
tramways have promoted the development of outlying areas for workmen’s and mid-
dle-class houses” (Sellon 1905, 968).
In Belgium workers travelled at reduced rates along the dense network of national
and local railways at the end of the 19th century. According to Vandervelde (1910, 151-
155), the measure provided workers with greater freedom to decide where they lived.
“By enabling workers and servants to live 20 or 30 kilometers from where they work, lo-
cal railways have helped reduce the pressure on the cities, provide labour and lower its
cost. They have also been conducive to populating rural areas and have led to better
housing conditions, an inexpensive food supply, and good health and moral standards
among the working class.” “Every morning and evening the local lines transport thou-
sands of workers from and to the countryside at such low rates that a worker’s railway
pass for a distance of 25 kilometers reduces the cost of each journey to a quarter of the
normal rate.” This description reflected the situation on the eve of World War I (Buurt-
spoorwegen 1934, 45).
In addition to being able to travel at low rates, Belgian workers were eligible to ob-
tain mortgages fairly easily. From 1889 onward, the Rijksspaarbanken (state savings
banks) were involved in the effort to encourage residential construction for workers
(Drucker 1898, 458).
Thanks largely to the low rates on the railways and local trains with their extensive
networks (Belgium had the densest railway network in the world at that time), few ob-
stacles remained to building houses along the periphery, where inexpensive building
sites were in ample supply. Accordingly, the expansion of the daily urban system
around a few major cities in Belgium predated World War I.
The opportunities that trains and trams provided for urban development in the
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overcrowded cities in countries neighboring the Netherlands were widely recognized
and used in some cases before the turn of the century.
In the Netherlands, the opportunities of trains and trams for urban development
elicited widespread interest as well. By 1883, Sanders (1883, 7) noted the potential of a
regional tramway network: “… Generally, trams make the countryside more attractive
for habitation. They are particularly useful near major cities, however, as their highly
decentralizing effect will have a major impact both on planning and construction of
the cities and on the customs of the inhabitants. A broad range of residents will be able
to move from their expensive homes in Amsterdam to inexpensive cottages outside the
city thanks to the construction of outbound tramways; small businessmen and civil
servants unable to afford a train pass will be able to move to Haarlem, Hilversum or
Bussum without quitting their jobs in the city thanks to the cheaper tram passes; al-
though riding the tram remains beyond the means of workers, this will change over
time, and they, too, will be able to move out of the city.” In 1893, a pamphlet was pub-
lished that advocated the establishment of a residential community (Tetterode 1893)
in the Gooi, connected to the city by railway for workers employed in Amsterdam. This
early version of a suburb never materialized. A decade later, a report appeared in De
Locomotief (1904, 1-2) about the 13th general meeting of the Union internationale de
tramways et chemins de fer d’intérêt local (international league of tramways and local
railways), which convened in Vienna and addressed “the close link between a good traf-
fic system and the housing issue (since the low rates and rapid speed of displacement
have all but eliminated distances); the coincidental public health; the expansion of
the major cities, which averts congestion at certain points”. Contemporaries such as
Drucker (1898) and Nieboer noted the opportunities provided by trams and trains as
well. Nieboer advocated a dense network of inexpensive trams “… to minimize the loss
of time and money associated with the increasingly necessary separation between the
population’s places of home and work. But trams are also powerful instruments for im-
proving housing conditions. Especially because they promote the development of the
inner cities [and] bring people out of the congested inner cities toward the periphery”
(Nieboer 1908, 41). Minister C. Lely also noted the opportunities that the new means of
transport provided for urban development, when he stated before the Lower House in
1907 that it would “enable both industrial expansion to the countryside and settle-
ment of the more and less affluent in the countryside and consequently reduce the
massive arrival of new inhabitants in the cities” (quoted in Van Hulzen 1983, 53-54).
Basically, around 1900 many people in the Netherlands and abroad invoked the op-
portunities that the new means of transport offered all city dwellers to escape the
crowded city and find new accommodations amid scenic, healthy surroundings.
1900: Suburbanization Without Commuting
The temporary or permanent departure of a considerable number of Amsterdam’s res-
idents in the 19th century was not a new phenomenon. In the 17th and 18th centuries
many affluent Amsterdam families spent the summer months outside the city in ac-
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commodations ranging from farmsteads with a few simple adjustments to elegant
country estates. Obviously, only the very wealthy could afford such country resi-
dences. They often owned a place outside the city along the Amstel, the Vecht or in ’s-
Graveland. In the second half of the 18th century people became disenchanted with
the flat areas full of waterways and sought out hilly regions, where the different alti-
tudes made for a more varied landscape. This change in taste led to a mass exodus from
the riverside resorts. Elsewhere, existing country estates were transformed, such as
’s-Graveland. Following the economic recession under the Napoleonic occupation,
Kennemerland, the Gooi, the Utrechtse Heuvelrug and the Veluwezoom (including
Arnhem) became popular settlement sites for the Amsterdam elite. Accessibility was
one of the factors determining the location of new country estates. In the second quar-
ter of the 19th century many country estates arose on the Heuvelrug along the newly
paved road from De Bilt to Arnhem, and the Stichtse Lustwarande was established
there. Country estates were also built between ’s- Graveland and Hilversum along the
road paved in 1826.
After 1860, the construction of a comprehensive railway network made paved roads
less important for reaching many places outside Amsterdam. Henceforth, the loca-
tions of new estates depended largely on railway stations. The opening of the Ooster-
spoorlijn from Amsterdam to Amersfoort in 1874 made an enormous difference.
Prince Henry, the son of King William II, who had inherited Soestdijk Palace and the
adjacent grounds, had willingly ceded land for the construction of the railway, on the
condition that a station be built in Baarn, and that most trains stop there on their way
to and from Amsterdam. Although spending the summer in the countryside was al-
ready popular before 1874, the opening of the railway line greatly promoted addition-
al development. Speculators perceived the towns along the railway that had stations
(e.g. Bussum, Hilversum and Baarn) as major development opportunities. They took
the same view of those on the other side of Amsterdam, from where railway lines were
built toward Heemstede, Zandvoort and Bloemendaal. Obtaining approval for con-
struction sites, however, was a very gradual process. Often, the same owners had man-
aged the properties for centuries and refused to sell their land. In Baarn, for example,
speculators began to acquire substantial numbers of construction sites only in 1879,
when Prince Henry’s heirs sold large sections of the property following his death. Nor
did the sale of lots for building cottages proceed smoothly in all cases, especially not on
sites further away from the railway.
Het Spiegel: A Residential Area in the Gooi
Until well into the nineteenth century,Het Spiegel was part of the Bussumer eng, the common fields of
the community of Bussum, where construction lots alternated with oak timberlands. In the early nine-
teenth century, many wealthy people purchased land there, probably because of the opportunities for
dredging sand. Following the construction of the railway and the opening of the station at Naarden-Bus-
sum,Het Spiegel became a suitable location for building cottages. In 1876,the Amsterdam project devel-
oper P.J. Loman and J.H. Biegel of Bussum established the Nieuw Bussum building company,which built
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many of the cottages in Het Spiegel,a residential neighborhood behind the station. The board members
and many of the shareholders were from Amsterdam. Upon allocating construction lots, the firm pro-
hibited the building of cafés, factories, or workers’ homes or other premises or structures that might
mar the surroundings.
One of the first projects was a hotel. Potential buyers stayed at this deluxe resort hotel to stake
out the area, contemplate purchases and move in while their cottage was under construction. In addi-
tion to accommodating prospective buyers, the hotel served as a community center for residents of
Het Spiegel.The choral society met at the hotel, and the adjacent reception hall hosted theater per-
formances.The hotel was also the headquarters of the Onder Ons Society.
Others managed the lots in the neighborhood as well. Around 1870, for example,G.A.Gritter from
Amsterdam purchased a large tract of land,where he cleared a country road and lined it with elms and
pines and built spacious mansions alongside it. The project was so successful that he had a second road
built in 1875 where he intended to put up residences as well. Speculation and land management thrived
in Het Spiegel. Within a few years the price of land skyrocketed from NLG 0.25 to NLG 2.25 per square
meter.
Since various parties owned the land, and several construction firms operated virtually independ-
ently of each other here, the plans developed for Het Spiegel were less than synchronized. The opera-
tors quickly understood that the lack of cohesion would complicate successful management. In 1879,
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Figure 1.  Design Gooiland, building scheme of “Oud-Bussum” in the northern part of Het
Spiegel, designed by L. H. Koolhoven, ca. 1900 
Source: Library of the Wageningen University, Department of Special Collections. 
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J.H.Biegel tried to solve the problem by establishing the Vereeniging tot verfraaiing der Gemeente Bus-
sum,which was dedicated to “improving public roads belonging to the town of Bussum,beautifying pub-
lic squares and sites in the village and even the surroundings,planting groups of trees,sections of shrubs,
placing flower beds and other ornaments,making pergolas and paths through the woodlands (subject to
permission from the owners), setting up children’s playgrounds, placing benches and small tents at sce-
nic spots,etc.” One of the association’s first tasks was to improve the road system in Het Spiegel. A few
main roads were built, along which the operators involved in the association put up several cottages to
attract new developers.
Het Spiegel was intended as an attractive residential area that could hold a candle to any of those in the
surroundings or the city. Efforts to make residential areas more appealing increased in the final quarter
of the nineteenth century. Major competition arose, both between speculators working in the same
community and between different communities.
Most of the residences built before 1900 in Het Spiegel are spacious and are located on large lots. Af-
ter the turn of the century, considerably more modest homes were built on smaller lots. Until 1935
most of the construction in Het Spiegel consisted of new residences.Toward the end of this period,
many were two-family cottages on small lots. After 1935 land redistribution and densification were the
main construction operations in Het Spiegel. Many homes were torn down between 1955 and 1965.
Deluxe apartment blocks were built in their place. In the 1970s and 80s,the demolition operations con-
tinued. Lots were reallocated in many cases and filled with bungalows and contemporary cottages.
Around 1880, several communities in the Gooi and Kennemerland started to expand.
At first their growth was only partially attributable to suburbanization of people em-
ployed in Amsterdam. Communities such as Baarn and Bloemendaal became popular
holiday and recreation sites in the final decades of the 19th century. In addition to day
visitors, both communities accommodated extended summer guests, including a sub-
stantial share from the Dutch capital. A few Amsterdam residents even settled perma-
nently in the attractive towns on the sand. Local servants from elsewhere accounted
for the overwhelming majority of the immigrants (Schmal 1983, 101). The occupations
of the well-to-do inhabitants of the estates reveal that most did not necessarily have fre-
quent ties with the city. Most of those residing on the estates in a village like Baarn had
come from Amsterdam: 49 of the 86 listed in the local register between 1874 and 1880
and at least 56 of the 110 listed for 1889 (Hoekveld 1964, 214, 217). Remarkably, many of
those arriving in Baarn had been born in Amsterdam but had moved to communities
in Gelderland (Arnhem, Rheden) or the southern part of the Heuvelrug (Driebergen,
Zeist), and then moved again from these communities to Baarn. Apparently, quite a
few people from Amsterdam who previously owned country estates far away from the
city decided to spend their summers in Baarn (which was considerably closer to the
city) once the railway to Amersfoort opened. The inhabitants of estates in Baarn (as well
as in Bloemendaal) included many businessmen (stockbrokers, bankers, and mer-
chants), professors, judges, officers, lawyers, and engineers. Several others had no oc-
cupation, including many widows and persons of independent means (Hoekveld 1964,
109; Venema-Wildeboer 1982, 43 ff.). The occupations and ages of the inhabitants of es-
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tates reveal that the appeal of the countryside was not just limited to people of inde-
pendent means in the 19th century.
Examining the connections to the capital proves that the growth of the communi-
ties in the Gooi and Kennemerland did not give rise to much commuting. Rail and
tramways hardly catered to commuters, as manifested by railway pass sales, though
they thrived in many other countries, they remained low in the Netherlands and were
not encouraged by the state before 1900. Demand for railway passes appears to have
been low. Moreover, travel time was fairly long, trains ran infrequently, and their de-
parture and arrival times were often highly inconvenient for commuters (Van Nierop
1905, 201, 202; Wagenaar 1982, 346). For these reasons, residents of the more distant
growing suburban communities rarely commuted to Amsterdam.
The attractive sandy areas drew the Amsterdam elite only during the summer
months. Residents visited each other, organized private balls and garden parties,
viewed each other’s greenhouses, arranged music recitals and lectures in the
evenings, and met at private societies. They did everything possible to continue the life
they had led in Amsterdam in the countryside. In the winter, the country estates and
residential areas were a desolate sight. The accommodations stood empty, and the win-
dows were covered with straw mats. Most residents returned to their city houses. At the
end of the 19th century, lifestyles were more like those in the 18th century than in the
modern era. Thus, the daily urban system hardly extended beyond the urban area ad-
jacent to Amsterdam.
Even though only a small share of Amsterdam’s well-to-do residents moved to the
countryside, the municipality found this trend unfortunate and disconcerting. The
authorities took various measures to stem the exodus of the affluent.
Curtailing the Exodus
The temporary and permanent departure of wealthy Amsterdam residents to the
countryside was sufficient in size to concern local politicians before 1900. As noted
above, some asserted that the trend reduced tax revenues considerably. Various efforts
were made to compensate for this loss and offset the differences in local taxes. One
measure was annexation: many inhabitants of Nieuwer-Amstel and Sloten, who
resided just across the city limits in premises constructed over the previous decades
thus had their status as full-fledged Amsterdam residents restored in 1896. In 1921, an-
other large surrounding area was added to Amsterdam as well.
Another measure concerned the commuter tax, which was introduced in 1897.
Commuters were subject to municipal income tax where they “were present for over
ninety days at an office, place of work, or other permanent institution or place of em-
ployment” (Van Assendelft de Coningh 1897, 80). They were required to pay one third of
the municipal income tax due in their town of employment. This assessment applied
in the towns where the commuters worked, and the amount depended on the rates in
these communities. In their communities of residence, commuters simply paid the lo-
cal assessment due. This system underwent thorough revision in 1929. Municipal in-
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come taxes were replaced by state income taxes, which were allocated to the commu-
nities according to a distribution code. As a result, the commuter tax was discontinued
as well. By the 1920s, the number of commuters in Amsterdam, which had been less
than a thousand before 1900 according to local income tax statistics, exceeded ten
thousand. Although the information available does not enable a collective compari-
son of communities, local tax rates varied considerably between communities. In
many cases, decisions to migrate must have been based in part on the different tax
rates. On 22 November 1902, the Handelsblad published calculations indicating that
despite the local taxes due in Baarn, Bloemendaal and Bussum, the commuter tax for
Amsterdam and the cost of a railway pass, commuters paid less than Amsterdam resi-
dents did. In the 1920s, efforts to curtail the tax benefits of living in bedroom suburbs
had yet to achieve their objective, and the savings continued to be touted to lure poten-
tial migrants (Wagenaar 1982, 346). Local tax differences caused problems in commu-
nities outside the Amsterdam region as well (Visser 1925, 129).
Other measures intended to dissuade affluent Amsterdam residents from leaving
included initiatives to provide the capital with the same attributes available to the
communities on the sand. In his plan of 1905, Berlage repeatedly highlighted the sig-
nificance of greenery, arguing that if Amsterdam “featured picturesque scenes and
fine walks, it would not only retain its population but would attract new residents as
well.”
Others were more cautious about the changes. Van Nierop submitted that “even if
Berlage’s Amsterdamsche Woud approximates the Haarlemmer Hout or the Haagsche
Bosch, the well-to-do will not settle in the capital en masse, nor will the exodus of afflu-
ent commuters diminish substantially. Amsterdam lacks the scenic surroundings
that might promote such settlement” (Van Nierop 1905, 209, 210).
Amsterdam’s efforts were only moderately successful. Rising affluence, improve-
ment of the existing means of transport, and the introduction of new ones (e.g. bicycles
and automobiles) increasingly enabled people to escape the city, which they did in ever
greater numbers over the decades that followed.
Spatial Expansion and Public Transport
In what measure did the local authorities use the opportunities that trams and trains
offered to resolve the urban housing crisis around 1900? While they appear to have tak-
en some measures to this effect locally, they did not do so regionally.
During the final decades of the 19th century, when the horse-drawn trolley was in
use, this rather slow and primitive means of transport did not benefit all citizens. Man-
aged by the private Amsterdamsche Omnibus Maatschappij (AOM), its fares of 12 and
later 10 cents were simply too expensive. Sanders asserted that “… traffic has peaked
with the current tramlines and rates” (Sanders 1890, 7). The passengers consisted pri-
marily of the “upper ten thousand,” as was apparent from the tramlines: most ran in
and to the districts where the more affluent citizens were overrepresented. The time of
the first morning departures was yet another sign that the working class did not ride
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horse-drawn trolleys. In the 1880s and 90s, the first trolleys departed at eight o’clock in
the morning on weekdays (Van Santen 1905), which was much too late for workers,
who almost all started work between 6 and 8 a.m. The idea was that by reducing the
rates, expanding the trolley network, and introducing inexpensive “early-bird” rides it
would make trolleys affordable and practical for all of Amsterdam’s citizens.
Trams were democratized as a means of public transport after the City of Amster-
dam took over the local tram firm. The municipal authorities were highly critical of
the private tram operator. Local officials believed that the AOM was not adding tram-
lines fast enough to keep pace with urban expansion. The firm was loath to jeopardize
its excellent profits by risky investments. In 1900, the AOM lost its concession, and the
tram firm became subject to municipal control. Within a few years the routes were
electrified and extended, fares were reduced, and “early-bird” rides were introduced at
special low rates on a few of the lines. These measures increased the capacity and speed
of public transport, while the low fares made the system affordable to a substantial por-
tion of the population. As a result, trams were a means of mass displacement well be-
fore World War I. Workers could move to the outskirts and work anywhere in the city.
This opportunity was not available supra-locally, since city trams did not run be-
yond the city limits. There, the network’s construction and operation remained in pri-
vate hands. The Amsterdam municipal authorities refused to allow regional tramlines
into the city center. Because of their policy, access to the city center did not improve
much for those coming from outside the city. Their position also discouraged people
employed in the inner city from moving outside.
Some firms operating inter-local trams, however, responded to more than simply
the increased demand for transport. The first inter-local tram connections were in-
tended largely for recreational transport and improved access to the countryside.
Their recreational function continued to figure prominently in subsequent exten-
sions. Moreover, myriad initiatives during the 1900s were intended to expand the po-
tential urban and suburban area through the construction of tramlines. The construc-
tion of the tramline between Amsterdam and Haarlem illustrates this practice: the
first concessionaires covered a considerably larger area in the neighboring communi-
ty of Sloten between the city limits and Sloterdijk than was necessary to build a tram-
line. The mission statement of the Electrische Spoorweg Maatschappij (ESM), which re-
sulted from the initiatives of the original concessionaires in 1903, revealed that the
ESM aimed to operate the tramline, as well as manage and sell properties located near
the line. But most of the profits were made by the concessionaires. In 1902 they bought
a number of “farmland” parcels and in 1903 they sold most of their parcels as “build-
ing” parcels to the ESM (Schmal 1982, 7). Of course for a much higher price.
In 1898, two Haarlem architects drew up plans for a tramway in Kennemerland and
applied for permission to build an electric tramline from Amsterdam via Aerdenhout
to Zandvoort. Upon obtaining the concession, however, they transferred it to the Eerste
Electrische Tramwegmaatschappij (ENET). Both architects subsequently invested all
their energies into constructing residences along the site where the tramway was
planned (Venema-Wildeboer 1982, 74).
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The endeavour, however, was not successful. The Crailoo Maatschappij tot Ex-
ploitatie van Bouwterreinen in the Gooi, for example, tried to connect Crailoo (where
the firm intended to build a residential area) to the Naarden-Bussum station. On 28 Oc-
tober 1904 the Centrale Tramweg Maatschappij was established for this purpose. Pur-
chasing sites around the Naarden-Bussum station proved so complicated that none of
the various routes planned ever materialized. Interest in their construction dwindled.
By 1911, the society informed the Ministry of Public Works and Water Management
that it had decided not to run or operate these lines and was withdrawing its applica-
tion for a concession.
The regional tramline from Amsterdam to the Gooi was not yet suitable for com-
muter traffic. Shortly after 1900, the trip was still far too time-consuming. The Laren-
Naarden-Amsterdam journey took over two hours in 1905 (Van Santen 1905). The tram-
line continued to transport recreational travellers. Nonetheless, construction of the
regional tramline coincided with the urban development and population growth at
the edge of the city. Watergraafsmeer, the first community where the Gooische Stoom-
tram stopped after Amsterdam, started growing rapidly in 1901. The village of Sloten,
where the tram to Haarlem stopped, began really growing in 1907. The zones along the
two tramways were especially popular sites for residential construction just outside
the city. The efforts to derive maximum benefit from the advantageous location of the
sites relative to Amsterdam culminated in the middle-class dwellings built alongside
the two tramways. The migration figures and the opening of local services first along
the line between Sloterdijk and Amsterdam and then between Diemerbrug and Am-
sterdam to relieve the pressure on through traffic indicate that many commuters set-
tled here (Engel 1972, 14; Schmal 1982, 14).
Outward bound: A Selective Trend
In the early decades of the twentieth century, extensive use appears to have been made
of the opportunities provided by trams and trains. Sales of permanent and weekly pass-
es for the HIJSM increased. Migration to selected suburbs was high, as it also was to a
few towns in the Gooi and Kennemerland. This trend, combined with the spectacular
rise in the number of people subject to the Amsterdam commuter tax, suggests a mass
exodus from the city in the 1920s.
After 1900, the towns on the sand expanded into so-called villadoms. Increasingly,
country estates changed from temporary summer abodes (their main purpose before
1900) into permanent residences. These towns became ever more middle class, espe-
cially after World War I. The change is apparent from the decline in per capita income
among the residents of these communities. In addition, the homes built during these
decades were clearly less lavish.
Besides the towns of Baarn, Hilversum, and Bussum in the Gooi and Bloemendaal
and Heemstede in Kennemerland (which were already growing rapidly before 1900),
places such as Laren, Blaricum, and Huizen and the villages of Badhoevedorp and
Diemen closer to Amsterdam became bedroom suburbs. The average for net annual de-
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partures to bedroom suburbs, which was less than 1,000 in the period 1900-1920, rose
to 2,000 in the 1920s and to 2,500 to 3,000 in the 1930s. Amsterdam’s municipal au-
thorities remained concerned about the exodus of the largely well-to-do residents.
Their departure deprived local businesses of a public with a great deal of purchasing
power and deprived the city of many residents who were involved in various social
causes. In 1938, in an effort to reverse the trend, a new advertising campaign empha-
sized that Amsterdam was not expensive and had much to offer culture-loving urban-
ites. The initiative is not believed to have had a significant impact on the exodus from
the city. Most of those who left were less interested in reducing their cost of living than
in purchasing a single-family home in a scenic setting, which almost by definition re-
quired moving to a surrounding area. The overwhelming majority of the new houses
in Amsterdam were flats. The few single-family homes built were beyond the means of
most residents.
In the Gooi and Kennemerland private entrepreneurs built residences for the well-
to-do rather than for the working class. The original owners of the sites designated for
construction – frequently the proprietors of vast country estates – did their best to have
an influence on the types of homes to be built. They tried to “keep out the riffraff”
through easements at the time they sold the land. The practice was intended to main-
tain the value of the remainder of the country estate.
Many local authorities prohibited the construction of new homes for working class
people. They, too, benefited from excluding workers, especially those employed in oth-
er towns. The Housing Act of 1901 increased the tendency of building homes for the
working class to meet local needs. Local authorities were the only parties entitled to in-
tervene in the process of residential construction. During the first few decades of the
Housing Act, the municipal trend was consistently regarded as a local problem (Bakker
Schut 1944, 103).
Finally, residential construction developers favored building homes for the more af-
fluent, as such homes were the most profitable. The result consisted of rather homoge-
neous residential areas that accommodated the wealthier population groups around
or in immediate proximity to various suburban stations and alongside a few tramlines. 
This situation obviously doomed plans to build suburbs for Amsterdam’s working
class further outside the city. In 1905, for example, the Gooi was proposed as the site for
a suburb for Amsterdam residents. This area was selected both because of the excellent
and inexpensive opportunities for residential construction on the sandy soil and be-
cause of the fresh air in the forest and on the heath (Bruinwold Riedel 1906). But it was
only in the 1920s, however, that suburbs began to figure in the expansion plans for Am-
sterdam. Alderman of Public Housing, S.R. de Miranda, was a particularly strong advo-
cate of this new form of residential construction. He and his top official, the director of
the Housing Service, A. Keppler, believed that suburbs would enable the working class
to live in single-family homes. The activities of the suburbs committee formed in 1923
culminated in a final report listing several suitable locations for developing suburbs,
mostly at some distance from the city. In a minority report De Miranda recommended
a suburb in the Gooi, equidistant from the centers of Hilversum, Bussum, and Laren.
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This Gooistad would have a population of 50,000 and was to consist entirely of low-rise
accommodations with a density of about forty homes per hectare. Representatives of
the Gooi communities took an instant dislike to this idea. They declined to serve on the
suburbs committee to avoid giving the impression that they approved of this kind of
construction. The communities formed the Centrale schoonheidscommissie voor het
Gooi (central beautification committee for the Gooi), which argued unanimously that
the amount of space required rendered a suburb undesirable in the Gooi and would
jeopardize the natural beauty of the area. The suburbs committee was divided as well.
The Depression eventually prevented the implementation of the plans. In the Amster-
dams Uitbreidingsplan (Amsterdam expansion plan, AUP 1934), urban expansion was
based on the idea of a central city. According to the AUP report, the multitude of close-
ly related groups of businesses complicated decentralized expansion. Plus decentral-
ization was not even deemed as necessary, considering the modest projections for pop-
ulation growth. Thus the idea of building satellite towns and suburbs far away from
the city to accommodate the urban expansion was dismissed. Residential develop-
ments arose within Amsterdam’s city limits. Settlements built far from the inner city
(by the prevailing standards of the time) and therefore on inexpensive sites, such as
Oostzaan and Watergraafsmeer, were immensely popular.
Nonetheless, the substantial rise in the number of railway passes and workmen’s
cards issued by the HIJSM in the early decades of the 20th century suggests that the
working class joined the suburbanizing drive. The availability of inexpensive trans-
port passes did indeed open up a considerable area around Amsterdam to the working
class, albeit subject to various restrictions. Examining the Third Class workmen’s
cards issued by the HIJSM reveals that far more were sold to individuals commuting
from Amsterdam to suburban destinations than vice versa (Schmal 1983, 106). This
was attributable in part to the residential construction activities in selected towns in
the Gooi during this period, which employed many casual workers. Moreover, many
Amsterdam shopkeepers opened branches in the suburbs, which also gave rise to –
temporarily – commutes to the Gooi.
The housekeeping staff of well-to-do former residents of Amsterdam also accounted
for the surplus of outward bound workmen’s cards issued. In some cases these servants
continued to live in the capital. In addition, many inexpensive passes were issued for
early-morning trains to the industrial areas in the Zaanstreek and IJmond. The railway
company thus enabled workers to follow employment opportunities throughout the
region. Rather than moving each time they changed jobs, they were able to continue
living in the city. This did not suburbanize their domicile by any means. Clustering
homes for the working class in the city and arranging easy access to jobs throughout
the region actually promoted the further concentration of working-class habitation
during this period.
Only after 1960, with the “exodus” to other communities in full swing, did the work-
ing class follow suit and join the mass trek out of Amsterdam. But they had already dis-
covered the Gooi’s areas of natural beauty in the wake of their elite predecessors. From
the 1920s onward, when bicycles became the universal means of transport, many resi-
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dents of the densely populated city districts went on nature hikes through the Gooi. In-
creasingly, they spent the weekend in these natural surroundings. They soon replaced
their primitive tents of earlier years with tent homes, like those at the Fransche Kamp
near Bussum. By 1925, there were commuter camps (Mulder 1974, 16). Breadwinners
commuted back and forth to the city, while their families lived at the campground as
well as on weekends, bank holidays and vacations. Camping on the grounds of the Gooi
nature reserve – which now accommodates the third generation of holiday goers – be-
came a new lifestyle in the countryside.
After the elite settled permanently in the towns outside the city on the attractive
sandy soil shortly after 1900, a large middle-class contingent followed suit during the
1920s and 30s. The result was a considerable expansion of the daily urban system for a
selective cross-section of Amsterdam’s population. Simultaneously, however, the
trend heightened the contrast between Amsterdam and the surrounding area with re-
spect to the social-economic status of the residents.
Conclusion
Advances in transportation technology and the ways that people benefited from op-
portunities were long the cause for contradictory spatial developments in the residen-
tial patterns of different social-economic groups.
Notwithstanding all the needs and opportunities mentioned, the suburbanization
of people working in the city remained socially selective in the first half of the 20th
century. A different pattern prevailed in Belgium, where suburbanization was already
widespread among all segments of the population prior to World War I. Private resi-
dential construction initiatives and the Housing Act designed to accommodate local
authorities greatly influenced spatial development in the urban district of Amster-
dam. Shortly after 1900, the introduction of inexpensive workmen’s cards consider-
ably expanded the geographic range of the employment market for the city’s working-
class residents but did not substantially suburbanize their domicile. No significant
amount of new housing was available for this group until after 1910 and then exclu-
sively inside the city. Otherwise, they had to purchase homes previously inhabited by
others. Improved access to transportation was therefore more likely to promote the
concentration of the working class.
Conversely, considerable suburban residential areas became available to the more
affluent after 1900. Private residential construction initiatives largely reflected the
opportunities provided by the existing rail infrastructure. Most transport companies
were virtually indifferent toward residential construction: their main purpose was to
satisfy established transport needs. In some very rare instances, private entrepreneurs
actually built railways themselves to benefit directly from the value added to the adja-
cent tracts of land. Private entrepreneurs and local authorities dedicated their resi-
dential construction efforts exclusively to the more affluent classes. As a consequence,
homogeneous districts were built surrounding selected suburban stations and along-
side a few regional tramlines.
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During the first half of the 20th century, the cultural threshold of suburbanization
dropped exceedingly slowly. The means of adequate and reasonably-priced public
transport for coping with the crisis identified in the city at the end of the 19th century
were few and far between. Only locally did policy – in conjunction with the provisions
of the Housing Act – reflect any specific orientation. The spatial development de-
scribed for Amsterdam thus deviated from the general trend in neighboring countries.
There, massive numbers crossed the city limits before World War I, thanks in part to
supra-local tramway systems. Because of the extended focus of much of Amsterdam’s
housing development program on the city’s less affluent population groups, the share
of owner-occupied and free-market rental homes remains below the national average
even among the current housing stock. Correcting this imbalance will be difficult and
will require the overhaul of the current housing stock. Moreover, individuals and local
authorities in the region will need to abandon their ongoing requirements for aspir-
ing suburbanites with respect to economic ties and income.
Expanding the daily urban system certainly makes sense based on chronologicy and
cost convergences gathered from chrono-geography studies (De Pater and Schmal
1982). To some extent, however, natural certainties explain the countless variations in
spatial development revealed by comparing cities. Moreover, the study of Amsterdam
reveals that careful analysis of the major actors is needed to fully understand local
trends.
Amsterdam’s daily urban system has grown substantially over the past 150 years. In
1850, it extended to the area just outside the city walls. Nowadays, the city’s sphere of
influence comprises towns in the Veluwe and throughout the Randstad. Initially, only
the well-to-do could afford to expand their horizon beyond the city. Over the years resi-
dences outside the city became affordable for the less affluent. Development of new
means of transport, ranging from trams and trains to bicycles, buses, and cars, and im-
proved transport performance made it possible for people to live outside the city
where they worked. Over time, most of these means of transport became affordable to
a larger share of the population. Changes in the region’s relative location with respect
to Amsterdam enabled a new spatial structure. The potential that remains for expand-
ing Amsterdam’s daily urban system is questionable. Further expansion would entail
greater distances and would consequently increase commuting times and fuel con-
sumption. The more dispersed and decompressed the city becomes, the greater the de-
pendence on the means of transport the city will become. Coexistence based on urban
deconcentration will not work optimally if traffic congestion and exorbitant petrol
prices restrict mobility. This situation will irrevocably instigate a search for alternative
means of transport, changes in place of employment or residence, recreational activi-
ties in one’s immediate surroundings, inhibition of suburbanization, additional dis-
persal of employment and rehabilitation and denser habitation of the old inner city. In
short, the result may very well be adapted and possibly even reduced daily urban sys-
tems.
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2.4 •The Economic Restructuring of the
Historic City Center
Pieter Terhorst and Jacques van de Ven
Introduction
Since the end of World War II Amsterdam’s historic city center has undergone two
distinct rounds of urban restructuring. First came the decline in population, manu-
facturing industries, trade and transportation, which was accompanied by the
growth of producer and consumer services that are associated with a classic central
business district (CBD). Partly this process involved a restructuring of the built envi-
ronment and partly it came about within the existing building stock. The second, on-
going round, which started during the late 1960s, saw the decline of traditional pro-
ducer services while the tourism and leisure industries, specialized shops, and the
general population have grown. It has largely taken place in a more or less fixed built
environment. 
We aim to show that the restructuring of Amsterdam’s historic city center is an out-
come of an integral economic process that includes economic as well extra-economic
forces. Also, we hope to show how the restructuring of the historic city center has been
shaped and mediated by successive local institutional regimes in and through which
the two rounds of restructuring have taken place. 
A local institutional regime is made up of various institutional spaces. By an institu-
tional space we mean the specific geographical area over which an institution is con-
stituted and has effective reach or influence (Martin 2000, 87). We can define a hierar-
chy of institutional spaces ranging from supra-national institutional spaces (e.g.
internationally agreed-upon rules concerning competition, trade, and monetary rela-
tions) through national institutional spaces (electoral systems, tax systems, welfare
states, etc.) to local institutional spaces (local state structures, locally specific legal
arrangements and other local social or economic traditions and conventions). These
institutional spaces are nested, which means that their combination, interaction, and
mode of articulation vary from place to place and from period to period (Boyer and
Rogers Hollingsworth 1997). Thus, as we move from one area or one period to another,
not only may the specifics of institutional nestedness change, but so too may the inter-
actions within that ensemble. This is why local institutional regimes are historically
and geographically specific. 
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Two Rounds of Restructuring the Historic City Center 
When Amsterdam’s urban-industrial growth took off in around 1870, the city was still
contained within the present-day historic city center. About 225,000 inhabitants lived
and worked in this area, which covers just eight square kilometres. Ever since then,
Amsterdam’s historic city center has been involved in a continuous process of restruc-
turing. The first round, which started in the late nineteenth century, was very similar
to that of most other Western cities. It involved a relative (and later, absolute) decline in
population, manufacturing industries, crafts, wholesale, and storage on the one
hand, and a growth of producer and consumer services that are associated with a clas-
sical CBD on the other hand (e.g. department stores, shops, banks, business services,
public administration, and hotels). The second, ongoing round, which started in the
late 1960s, sounds somewhat less familiar. The majority of traditional producer servic-
es have declined, and the tourism and leisure industries, specialized shops and the
population have grown. Population growth is partly the result of public-housing ur-
ban renewal that mainly occurred in the 1980s and is partly the outcome of the con-
version of offices, lofts, and warehouses into condominiums for a gentrifying class.
And with the exception of financial services, universities, public administration and
culture, the general scale of all of the firms has declined. As in-depth research shows,
the latter trend indicates a growing diversification. Thus, Amsterdam’s historic city
center has become not only a consuming place, but also a more diversified one (see
Bergh and Keers 1981; Van Duren 1995). 
Urban restructuring often involves a restructuring of buildings and street patterns;
that is, a change of economic functions is accompanied by the replacement of old
buildings and street patterns with new ones. The built environment is, so to speak,
adapted to the pressure of land-use change. It usually takes a long time before old
buildings are replaced by new ones because the capital invested in the buildings pre-
vents the realization of potential ground rents and provokes a gap between actual and
potential ground rents (see Smith 1979; 1982). How long it takes before old buildings
are replaced by new ones depends on the speed at which potential ground rents rise
and the value of buildings depreciates. Old buildings will not be demolished until the
potential ground rent is high enough to compensate for the amortization of the not
fully depreciated value of the buildings and the costs of demolishing them. Thus, the
faster the value of buildings depreciates and the more rapidly potential ground rents
rise, the sooner old buildings can be demolished. 
Urban restructuring can, of course, also take place within existing buildings and
street patterns. In the short term, this happens more often than not. Buildings can, af-
ter all, be used in a variety of ways, with various adaptations. If adaptations are neces-
sary, buildings can be used to serve other functions if the total price of the land and the
buildings exceeds the old price by at least the building cost of adaptation. In the ex-
treme case that buildings and street patterns are designated as landmarks, the built
environment remains frozen. Buildings cannot be demolished and only minor adap-
tations will be permitted. In that case, the process of urban restructuring has to adapt
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itself to the fixity of the built environment instead of the other way around. This
means that the demand for land in preservation districts cannot be fully realized, as a
result of which demand has to be shifted elsewhere. This will equalize actual and po-
tential land rents in those places, and provoke a relative decline of actual land rents,
the more so because their accessibility will decline over the course of time because the
existing infrastructure is also frozen. This does not necessarily mean that real estate
prices will decline in preservation districts because, after all, real estate prices are
made up of land prices and building prices. And whereas land prices will show relative
declines, building prices will show sharp increases in preservation districts because
monuments are “positional goods,” which cannot be reproduced elsewhere (Hirsch
1977). 
The First Round of Urban Restructuring and the Restructuring-Generated Crisis
(1945-1974)
The first round of restructuring came about partly within the existing building stock
and partly involved a restructuring of the built environment. A significant part of the
building stock in Amsterdam’s historic city center was constructed in the period 1850-
1940, either after older structures had been demolished or on empty plots or on land
reclaimed from the water (as occurred in the case of the construction of Amsterdam’s
Central Station and Berlage’s Stock Exchange). Moreover, in the nineteenth and the
early twentieth century, a number of canals were filled in so they could be used for traf-
fic arteries and, in some cases, to improve public health (see, for a detailed analysis, Wa-
genaar 1990). And since World War II, a number of areas have been reconstructed.1
Despite these changes, Amsterdam’s historic city center has largely survived the
pressure of modernization. Although it may now seem obvious to preserve such a his-
toric place, this is contrary to expectations because in capitalist property markets, de-
velopers and land and buildings owners are not very sensitive to the argument that old
buildings are a valuable cultural heritage, certainly not in an era of modernism. And in
this era of modernism, politicians and planners were much less concerned with histo-
ry than they are nowadays. In the nineteenth and the first half of the twentieth centu-
ry, the demolition of buildings that we would now consider of “historical interest” was
welcomed rather than regretted because it was seen as “progress” or “moderniza-
tion.”2
Why has Amsterdam’s historic city center largely survived the pressure of modern-
ization? First of all, Amsterdam was a stagnating city during most of the nineteenth
century. For a long time it followed the dead-end path of trade capitalism, and indus-
trialization only took off around 1870 (the same applies to the Netherlands in general).
And although Amsterdam is the largest city in the Netherlands, it has never had a pri-
mate city status like London and Paris. The pattern of Dutch urban growth has been dif-
fused rather than concentrated in one or a few cities, which is why the size of the other
Dutch cities has been much more similar than might be expected on the basis of the
rank size rule. Moreover, the size of Amsterdam’s historic city center is relatively large
for a medium-sized city, too large to be completely filled up with a “modern” CBD be-
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fore the Great Depression. And during the Great Depression and World War II the
growth of Amsterdam’s CBD stagnated altogether. In addition, the size of Dutch firms
was relatively small in the pre-Fordist era and thus could easily be accommodated in
historic buildings. For all these reasons, the pressure on Amsterdam’s property market
in the historic city center was only moderate until World War II. Real estate rents and
prices were remarkably stable in the period 1877-1940 (Wagenaar 1990, 180-184; Kruyt
1974, 161-198), which is why dwellings were not completely replaced by offices and
shops before World War II. 
In the post-war period, however, the pressure on the historic city center increased
greatly and property prices rose sharply. But even during that period, the variety of
property prices was very large. Buildings along the main arteries and the main canals
were much more expensive than those in the side streets and alleys (Kruyt 1974, 161-
198). All this suggests that the CBD has never been able to “colonize” the historic city
center as a whole, and that there was already a highly varied land-use mix at the onset
of the second round of restructuring. 
The first round of restructuring was not the outcome of “pure,” self-regulating mar-
ket forces. On the contrary. It was a highly socially regulated process, even during the
nineteenth century (which is left out of consideration here; see Terhorst and Van de
Ven 1997, 230-263). The first round of restructuring was the outcome of a capital-labor
accord at the local level that was formalized in the so-called General Extension Plan of
1935, a plan that was a blueprint for the city’s spatial development till the year 2000.
The major point of that accord was that the Social Democratic party (which has been
the largest party in Amsterdam ever since the introduction of general suffrage, al-
though it has never had an absolute majority) was allowed to realize social, low-density
rental housing in garden-like environments, and capital was offered industrial sites,
port areas and infrastructure on the city’s territory as well as ample room to maneuver
in the historic city center. It was implicitly agreed that the 1896 municipal leasehold
land policy would be continued. All this facilitated a planned deconcentration of pop-
ulation and a migration of goods-processing industries out of the historic city center.
The forging of the pre-war capital-labor accord at the local level was facilitated by the
city’s large territorial size (which had increased by 400 percent since the annexation of
1921) and by the large-scale reform of the central-local financial relations in 1929. Am-
sterdam’s territory was large enough to accommodate industrial sites, port areas and
infrastructure for future economic growth as well as low-density housing. And, in
combination with more fiscal centralization after 1929, it made the city less vulnera-
ble to suburban competition.
The economic crisis of the 1930s followed by World War II meant that realization of
the General Extension Plan had to be postponed. After the War, however, the local cap-
ital-labor accord was strengthened by a national capital-labor accord. Its main point
was a policy of low wages to which the labor unions agreed in exchange for extending
the welfare state. Given the situation of an enormous housing shortage, wages could
only be kept low by a policy of tight rent control that was accompanied with subsidies
for new housing construction (in the 1940s and 1950s, 80 percent of all Dutch housing
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construction was public housing; in Amsterdam, this figure was as high as 95 percent).
An extended system of rent control and allocation of vacant dwellings according to
need (“queuing”) paralleled these measures. New construction was rationed by the
central state among municipalities (roughly according to their size). These policies en-
abled the Amsterdam Social Democrats to fully realize their social housing policy on
leasehold land. Large numbers of social-rental dwellings were constructed on green
field sites that had been acquired after the annexation of 1921. This hardly changed
the composition of the population, however, because suburbanization was strongly
curbed until 1964.3 Moreover, the decision to fight the housing shortage with all the
available means, limited capital’s room to maneuver in the effort to transform Am-
sterdam’s historic city center into a CBD. Evicting tenants, converting dwellings into
offices or shops, and demolishing dwellings for urban reconstruction were all strong-
ly contested politically. 
In the 1960s, the rate of economic growth accelerated and the labor market tight-
ened. This meant the end of the capital-labor accords at the national as well local level.
Real wages rose rapidly, which fuelled housing demand and induced mass motoriza-
tion, whereas Amsterdam’s territory was increasingly being built over. The scarcity of
large building sites posed a serious threat to its housing policy. Although the housing
shortage was greater than ever, it was no longer possible to contain the process of ur-
ban restructuring within the city’s boundaries (despite another annexation, that of
the Bijlmermeer area in 1966). Moreover, the pressure on the historic city center had
become so great that proposals to transform parts of it into an “American-style” CBD
were given serious consideration. Some canals were to be filled-in and converted into
streets while the Jordaan – today a picturesque, gentrified neighborhood with many
restaurants and small shops – was to be demolished to make room for large-scale office
construction. All this would have reduced the housing stock, but both proposals were
rejected as “too drastic.” So, a few years later, the city of Amsterdam drew up a new,
comprehensive plan for the metropolitan region as a whole. The historic city center
would become Amsterdam’s “real” CBD while surrounding inner-city neighborhoods
would be thinned out and upgraded. Evicted households would have to move to new
towns that were to be connected to the CBD by metro lines. This plan received wide
support from the city council but, unexpectedly, generated enormous mass protests
and violent riots in the early 1970s. The driving force behind the resistance was the ba-
by-boom generation, which had aligned itself with the various urban social move-
ments, which were struggling for a “liveable” city on a “human scale” (see, for an elab-
orate analysis, Mamadouh 1992). Although the preservation of Dutch culture was not
their main argument, the struggle by the urban social movements to preserve histori-
cal street patterns played a strategic role in their effort to ban cars and office construc-
tion from their neighborhoods. Narrow streets were perceived as more suitable for
pedestrians and bicyclists than cars and thus unsuitable for offices. In the end, the ur-
ban social activists won the intense political struggle for Amsterdam’s historic city
center. All the reconstruction plans were withdrawn and replaced by a social policy of
urban renewal (no displacement). Upon completion of the first metro line, further ex-
THE ECONOMIC RESTRUCTURING OF THE HISTORIC CITY CENTER 89
Adam.HumanCapital  06-03-2003  16:50  Pagina 89
tensions were cancelled. The destruction of the character of the Nieuwmarkt area was
mitigated by a careful and expensive restoration with lots of public housing and small
shops that fit in well with the city’s historic landscape. 
These deep conflicts marked the end of the first round of restructuring and led to
the acceleration of the second one. Although the protests and riots happened during
the oil crisis of 1973, they should be interpreted as a restructuring-generated crisis
rather than as a crisis-generated restructuring (see, for both concepts, Soja 2000).
Meanwhile, Amsterdam’s crisis-generated restructuring began in earnest in the 1980s.
The Second Round of Urban Restructuring 
The second round of urban restructuring began in 1974 and mostly took place in a
more or less fixed built environment, and was combined with the urban renewal of so-
cial housing (in 2000, 35 percent of the housing stock in the historic city center was so-
cial-rental housing and 45 percent was private rental housing; the remaining 20 per-
cent was owner-occupied).
The preservation of the built environment has been crucially important to the de-
velopment of Amsterdam’s historic city center. It has provoked large-scale gentrifica-
tion and the development of large leisure and tourism industries. Amsterdam now has
7,600 official monuments, that is, buildings that may not be demolished and are sub-
ject to government control regarding physical changes as well as their use. Besides
some lofts, churches, bridges, and a palace, the overwhelming majority of the monu-
ments were originally built as dwellings. Most of the buildings along the canals were
constructed as spacious homes for the ruling merchant class during the country’s
Golden Age. Over 10 percent of all buildings in Amsterdam’s historic city center are
monuments. This is in itself a large proportion, but the impact of these monuments on
the built environment as a whole is even larger than that figure suggests. Monuments
are scattered throughout the historic city center, and nearly every block has a few. It is
therefore no wonder that land-use plans and zoning ordinances have been very con-
servative regarding the overall appearance of the historic urban landscape, including
non-listed buildings and street patterns. Recently, Amsterdam’s historic city center
was listed as a Historical Preservation District. This means that non-listed buildings
and the public domain have become subject to even stricter forms of political control
than before. Amsterdam’s policy to preserve the historic character of non-listed build-
ings is now equally important as those concerning listed monuments. Many buildings
constructed before World War II fit well into the historic urban landscape, and most
people, whether they be locals or tourists, generally see only the overall appearance of
Amsterdam’s urban landscape. 
As a result of all these preservation policies, the built environment of Amsterdam’s
historic city center – streets and canals included – is more or less frozen. We say “more
or less” because the city has often been flexible in making compromises on adaptations
of monuments as long as the original appearance of the facades is maintained (and
many new structures have been built behind old facades). The frozen built environ-
ment has had a major impact on the area’s land-use mix. First, historic buildings are of-
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ten too small for large offices and shops, and the fragmented ownership structure
makes it hard to combine two or more buildings. In addition, the center’s historic street
patterns make them nearly inaccessible by car. This is why Amsterdam’s historic center
has become an attractive place for small-scale activities insensitive to time pressure,
like leisure and “fun” shopping. Secondly, the fact that the buildings in the historic city
center vary widely as regards size, quality, and location (main streets versus side streets
and alleys) is contrary to the notions of a homogenized land use and has provoked vari-
ety. Thirdly, a historic city landscape offers good opportunities for higher-class house-
holds to distinguish themselves from others and to accumulate “cultural capital”
(Bourdieu 1979). The same applies to specialized firms, like antique shops, second-
hand bookshops, haute cuisine restaurants and other niche-market firms that are very
sensitive to an exclusive built environment. Fourthly, the preservation policy has se-
verely limited maneuverability of land-use zoning in the historic city center. As a result,
the market has largely shaped land-use changes there. This sounds somewhat paradox-
ical, especially because Amsterdam is one of the most planned cities in the world. 
For a better understanding, it is helpful to make an analytical distinction between
two types of land-use planning. The first aims to preserve historic buildings and street
patterns, whereas the second aims to protect or to stimulate a specific sort of land use
at a specific density in a territorially bounded area that cannot be realized in a “free”
market. To put it simply, offices in area A, housing in area B, shops in area C, leisure in
area D, etc. This implies that land and building markets are territorially segmented. As
in all segmented markets, each segment of the property market works more or less in-
dependently of the others. If, for instance, demand for offices in area A rises, rents will
go up, without affecting housing rents in area B. But the preservation of the built envi-
ronment (the first type of planning) conflicts with a territorial segmentation of the
property market (the second type of planning) in a dynamic urban economy. For in-
stance, if offices are only allowed in one sector and there are many vacancies, prices
have to decline leading to the establishment of less profitable office-based firms. But
less profitable firms are seldom able to pay for the high costs of maintaining monu-
ments. In the long run, this may lead to their falling into disrepair. Thus, a strict terri-
torial segmentation of the property market eventually leads to buildings that should
be preserved from falling into disrepair. 
Given the political priority of physical preservation over strict zoning ordinances,
most types of land use have been accepted in the historic city center on condition that
the buildings’ exteriors are respected. It is thus the interplay between the freezing of
the built environment and market dynamics that has resulted in an attractive milieu
for small firms and an extremely varied land-use mix. Paradoxically, the freezing of the
built environment has unintentionally stimulated the rise of a flexible leisure econo-
my in Amsterdam’s historic city center. 
One zoning ordinance of the 1980s in particular has had a great impact on the sec-
ond round of urban restructuring. Due to the housing shortage, it is permitted to con-
vert buildings into housing units, but not the other way around. Thus, there is a uni-
lateral relationship between the housing market and all other real estate sub-markets
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in the historic city center, in that residents can outbid offices, shops, etc. but not vice
versa. This means that the booming housing market in the historic city center has
dominated all the other real estate sub-markets for the last 20 years. Consequently,
housing prices have governed the real estate market in the area. Ever since the 1980s,
lofts and offices have been displaced by owner-occupied apartments, and only in some
exceptional cases by private rental and public housing (the Entrepôtdok is a good ex-
ample of the latter). Why is it that owner-occupiers have been able to outbid offices?
First, the freezing of the built environment has meant that Amsterdam’s historic city
center has lost its attractiveness for most office-based companies. To prevent firms
from leaving the city altogether, the municipality developed alternative sites for mod-
ern office parks with excellent motorway access within the city limits. Secondly, the
City of Amsterdam has pursued a large scale public housing policy. In the period 1945-
1985, 90 percent of all new construction was public housing. As a result, aspiring
homeowners had little choice: they could either move to suburbia or resort to the in-
tricate process of loft or office conversion in the historic city center. Thirdly, the fact
that owner-occupiers are entitled to generous tax credits in the Netherlands has great-
ly contributed to the residents outbidding companies for the offices and lofts. This has
further stimulated the process of condo conversion (see Van de Ven et al 1991). This
mechanism has been particularly intense in the historic city center because monu-
ments are “positional goods,” which means that their supply elasticity is zero. On the
other hand, the conversion of low-income rental housing into owner-occupied hous-
ing was illegal as long as the system of rent control was in place – which is why there are
still a lot of low-income households in Amsterdam’s historic city center, despite the
high speed of the gentrification process. But, as already mentioned, most gentrifiers
live in converted lofts or offices. It is characteristic of Amsterdam’s historic city center
that widespread gentrification did not cause large-scale displacement. Gentrification
and social housing construction went hand in hand and, even more remarkably, often
on the same street or block. It is thus no wonder that foreign observers notice the egali-
tarian character of Amsterdam (Fainstein 2000).
Explaining the Restructuring-Generated Crisis and the Switch to the
Second Round
Why was there a restructuring-generated crisis, and why was there a switch to this sec-
ond round of restructuring? Or, more precisely, how did the urban social movements
manage to succeed in blocking the first round of restructuring, which led, in turn, to
the second round? First of all, well-educated young baby boomers were the driving
force behind this struggle. Therefore, this struggle for a more human and liveable city
was intimately interwoven with the battle against authoritarianism, with the
women’s liberation movement, with the environmental movement and more freedom
concerning the issues of sex and drugs. Thus, the urban social movements were strug-
gling for a post-materialist culture and more collective consumption (at the very least
because the majority of them still belonged to the lowest income households). This cul-
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tural shift was actually occurring in all other Western countries, but most intensely in
the Netherlands. The Netherlands made the second fastest shift from a materialist to a
post-materialist culture after Sweden (see Inglehart 1977). It was during a relatively
short period of time that the very conformist and traditional Dutch society evolved in-
to a modern and open one. But the process involved fierce intergenerational conflicts.
The power of the urban social movements was first and foremost the unintended
outcome of pillarization and depillarization. For a very long time, Dutch Protestants
and Catholics (along with social democrats and liberals) were organized in “pillars.”
These were self-contained non-territorial communities. Each camp had its own parties,
unions, mass media, sport clubs, and controlled its “own” semi-private organizations
(schools, hospitals, public housing corporations) that provided public goods that were
financed by the central state. In the 1960s, however, a process of depillarization set in.
Church attendance and religion-based voting declined, Catholic and Protestant associ-
ations and parties disappeared or merged, the ties between interest groups and parties
loosened, and elite control over society and within the various associations became di-
minished. Depillarization fueled a further outgrowth of the welfare state because it
had altered the former cooperative relationship between the leaders of the pillars into
a more competitive one. And, more importantly, the leaders of the pillars (including
the socialist one) could no longer control the rank and file, who demanded a radical
democratization of industrial relations and more welfare state services. All this fueled
the rise of the urban social movements. And although they took the lead in the depil-
larization process, their power was paradoxically based on pillarization itself. First,
like all the religious groups of old, baby boomers claimed the right to live their own
lives and enjoy “their own” public goods and services as financed by the central state
(Zahn 1989). Secondly, the power of urban social movements can, in part, be attributed
to the sheer size of the Dutch baby-boom generation, which was larger here than in
most other European countries because religious groups were involved in a fierce
“birth rate competition” until the early 1960s (Van Heek 1954; Verduin 1977, 23-24).
There is no doubt that these processes were stronger in Amsterdam than in the
country as a whole. Because of rising subsidies for higher education, a growing num-
ber of baby boomers moved to the city. Amsterdam is the largest center for higher edu-
cation in the Netherlands. Thus, it became the primary battleground where the young
intellectual avant-garde collided head-on with the authoritarian representatives of lo-
cal politics. The avant-garde demanded the right to perform social experiments in a
wide range of issues. In this context, Dutch drug policy is a case in point. The baby-
boom generation managed to broker a semi-legal compromise on the use and sale of
soft drugs in the mid-1970s. 
After a while, the expansion of the young generation in Amsterdam found its own
momentum. It stimulated the rise of all kinds of amenities in which a youth culture
could flourish: music clubs, cafés and – last but not least – “coffee shops” where one
could freely purchase hash and marihuana. All this greatly reinforced the worldwide
image of Amsterdam as a center of the youth counterculture. And the more suburban-
ization progressed on, the more the oldest parts of Amsterdam’s housing stock with its
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small and cheap dwellings were opened up to younger households. When inner-city
renewal began, a new type of subsidized social housing was created for young single
persons.
The political power of the urban social movements was largely dependent on the
specific structure of the Dutch state. On the one hand, pillarization fueled functional
fragmentation. But on the other hand, it stimulated territorial consolidation4 and a
rather extreme fiscal centralization (see, for an elaborate analysis, Terhorst and Van de
Ven 1997, 2001). As we have already mentioned, the territorial size of the city of Am-
sterdam is relatively largely due to the various annexations, and central-local financial
relations became ever more centralized during the period 1929–1989. During the hey-
day of Dutch fiscal centralization (the 1980s), local taxes made up only 6 percent of the
revenues of Dutch municipalities, while general and specific grants comprised 32 per-
cent and 62 percent, respectively. The dependence of Dutch municipalities on grants
from the central state applies a fortiori to the city of Amsterdam, which had a special
status (a so-called Article 12 status) in the late 1960s and the first half of the 1970s. 
The specific structure of the Dutch state is of crucial importance in explaining the
transition from the first to the second round. It also helps explain how leftist local
politicians forged a non-growth alliance concerning the historic city center and real-
ized their political aims. A more liveable and humane historic city center coupled with
social-housing urban renewal was to have very little adverse affect on the local tax
base. The prioritizing of a local distributional policy to an urban growth policy was aid-
ed by the fact that the post-war national capital-labor accord was over by the late 1960s,
early 1970s. Dutch corporatism had grown fairly “immobile” during the economic cri-
sis of the 1970s (see Visser and Hemerijck 1997). There was a great deal of “concertation
without consensus” and labor unions became ever more militant in their struggle for
a radical democratization of industrial relations and more redistributional policies.
The latter favored a big city like Amsterdam because general and specific grants (and
tax deductions for renovating monuments) had increased in the 1970s. All this strong-
ly favored the switch from the first to the second round of restructuring. 
In addition, Dutch capital is mostly organized along sectoral (neo-corporatist) lines
at the national level rather than along territorial lines, which is why local businesses
were too weak to prevent the switch to the second round of restructuring. There are no
American-like urban growth coalitions in the Netherlands (Terhorst and Van de Ven
1995). The fact that offices were de facto excluded from Amsterdam’s historic city cen-
ter was not an insurmountable problem for the growth of the city’s service sector.
Thanks to its large size, the city was able to offer excellent alternatives to offices along
its ring roads. 
The Crisis-Generated Restructuring of Amsterdam’s Historic City Center
In the mid-1970s (i.e. right after the commencement of the second round), the process
of restructuring slowed down and the historic city center found itself facing a crisis.
The “old” CBD service industries were on the decline and the growth rates of the “new”
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industries such as tourism and leisure had dropped. The gentrification process also fal-
tered during this period because of a stagnation of wage increases and extremely high
interest rates on mortgages. Only social-housing urban renewal managed to find its
stride in the early 1980s. Things began to change, however, around the mid-1980s
when gentrification began to expand again. Gentrification acted as a trigger for the
tourism and leisure industries that have boomed till the economic recession of 2002.
As we shall argue below, the evolution of the crisis-generated restructuring has been
the outcome of the interaction of political-economic processes at various spatial
scales: local, urban, national, and international. This applies not only to the evolution
of tourism and leisure, but also to gentrification. 
The growth of Amsterdam’s tourism industry in the 1960s was largely based on a
booming global economy and the city’s development into a youth center. Amsterdam
became a hippie center, like Copenhagen, Berlin, and San Francisco. A growing num-
ber of backpackers traveled to Amsterdam and many of them slept in cheap hostels,
“sleep-ins” and – until the early 1970s – under the stars (in the “magical” Vondelpark).
The unofficial legalization (toleration) of the use and sale of soft drugs led to a dramat-
ic increase in drug tourism, particularly from Britain and Germany. The growth of
backpackers and drug tourists turned out to be a disadvantage for Amsterdam’s tourist
industry in the late 1970s and the 1980s. First, backpackers were not, generally speak-
ing, big spenders and they demanded cheap tourist facilities. Secondly, many baby
boomers who had first visited Amsterdam in the late 1960s or early 1970s and then re-
turned to the city 10 years later for a sentimental journey, were disappointed because
the hippie atmosphere had gone. Thirdly, backpackers, drugs tourists and the growing
army of drug addicts crowded out middle-class and higher-class tourists. As a result,
Amsterdam ended up in a crisis of representation. No wonder the Amsterdam Tourist
Board (VVV) – an umbrella organization of 1,200 Amsterdam tourist firms – com-
plained loudly about the city’s bad image. 
However, the growing number of low-budget tourists was not the real cause of the
stagnating tourism and leisure industries; it had more to do with a stagnating world
economy5 and with the fact that Amsterdam was a city in crisis with a declining popu-
lation, large-scale unemployment, a sky-rocketing number of people on welfare, grow-
ing crime rates associated with drug dealing, and cutbacks in the public infrastruc-
ture. In addition, the privately owned buildings along the main canals were poorly
maintained, graffiti was everywhere and dirty streets were the rule rather than the ex-
ception. And last but not least, the tourism and leisure industries suffered from “Bau-
mol’s disease,” which means that, if wages rise at a similar rate in all economic sectors
(as happened in the Netherlands), then prices rise faster in sectors that show a lower
than average growth of labor productivity (Baumol 1967). Moreover, the high Dutch
taxes and social security contributions as well as the way the latter were levied left the
tourism and leisure industries at a distinct disadvantage economically.
These arguments suggest that the crisis of Amsterdam’s historic city center was, in
fact, the result not only of an urban crisis but also of the national economic crisis of the
late 1970s, which hit the Netherlands more severely than most other European coun-
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tries. The country suffered from the “Dutch disease,” meaning that a national econo-
my is locked into a specific development path that increasingly causes economic prob-
lems from which it is difficult to escape (see Auty 1993). In the 1970s and early 1980s,
the Netherlands had a structural trade surplus thanks to the export of natural gas. As a
semi-OPEC country, the Dutch guilder appreciated as a result of which the profits in
other export sectors eroded significantly. This state of affairs was sustainable in the
short term because the social consequences of increasing unemployment could be fi-
nanced from the generous revenues of state royalties on gas. In the long term, however,
the level of unemployment became so high that the already high social security con-
tributions had to be raised even further. This contributed strongly to the decreasing
profitability of the various export industries, in particular Amsterdam’s tourism and
leisure industries. 
In the early 1980s, a growing consensus among capital, labor, and the state agreed
that the high social security contributions and taxes were the Achilles heel of the
Dutch economy. Dutch corporatism – which had become “immobile” – was then revi-
talized and transformed into “responsive corporatism,” largely allowing the “social
partners” and the state to follow a coherent strategy of flexible crisis adjustment
(Hemerijck and Visser 1997). Capital and labor reached an accord “in the shadow of the
state” (the Wassenaar Accord of 1982). With the central state in the background, labor
unions agreed to refrain from making wage demands (high unemployment forced
their card) in exchange for modest job redistribution efforts. Although welfare-state
reforms were seen as inevitable, there was a broad consensus that the welfare state
should not be demolished Thatcher-style. National policy encouraged spending cuts
on public consumption and the salaries of state employees. And to invigorate the mar-
ket sector, the processes of deregulation, privatization of state-owned companies, and
administrative decentralization were launched. Moreover, the labor market gained
flexibility. All this resulted in declining budgetary deficits, lower social security con-
tributions and taxes, and a moderate rate of economic growth in the 1980s. 
The aforementioned national economic growth policy was strongly interwoven
with an urban growth policy that was based on a strong cooperation between the cen-
tral state and the large cities. In the 1980s, local finances were adversely affected by the
reduction of state grants. Dutch cities were forced to start a process of crisis-generated
restructuring, that is, to make a modest switch from a welfare-state city policy to an ur-
ban pro-growth policy (even though they are still more inclined to keep the welfare
state alive than those in many other European countries). As Rotterdam had done ear-
lier, Amsterdam could no longer consent to the central state’s new towns policy and
tried to stop population overspill by a policy of densification within the city’s borders
(the compact city). A few years later, the central state joined these initiatives and began
to pursue a national urban pro-growth policy (for more, see Terhorst and Van de Ven,
1995). Population decline had to be reversed at all costs and more room was given to the
construction of expensive, private-rental and owner-occupied housing. All this was ac-
companied by the politics of local boosterism and city marketing. Amsterdam, for in-
stance, lobbied for the 1992 Olympic Games and started PR campaigns to change its
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bad image as an unsafe, dirty city. It also began to support private initiatives to organ-
ize festivals and events, the majority of which are held in the historic city center. The
growing number of festivals and events has greatly strengthened the position of Am-
sterdam’s historic city center as a consuming place. 
In the late 1980s, Amsterdam’s economy recovered slowly, but unemployment re-
mained very high in many parts of the city. Coupled with the rapid rise of well-educat-
ed, young double-income households, the freezing of welfare payments had produced
a situation described as the “dual city.” As the process of gentrification reached full
speed in the historic city center, a number of newer neighborhoods were rapidly be-
coming impoverished. Since gentrification in the historic city center happened main-
ly through the conversion of lofts and offices, its population not only became more af-
fluent but also increased in size. This caused a rapid increase in services that are
associated with gentrification, that is, all kinds of conspicuous consumption includ-
ing restaurants, trendy bars, exclusive shops, antique dealers, and art galleries. As a re-
sult, these gentrified areas became ever more attractive to middle-class tourists and
day trippers, which has stimulated the further growth of cultural, leisure, and shop-
ping facilities which, in turn, have made the historic city center an even more attrac-
tive place to live, and so on. Consequently, gentrification and the growing number of
festivals have been the main triggers of the historic city center’s transformation into a
“place for fun” (Student Research Group 1998).
The rise of consumer services in the historic city center has also been stimulated by
the national policy of wage moderation and labor-market flexibilization. Relatively
cheap, part-time labor can nowadays be hired and fired more easily than in the 1970s
and the 1980s. The large student population of Amsterdam has functioned not only as
a reservoir of cheap and flexible labor, but also as a workforce that has a good cultural
feeling for the demands of foreign tourists.
Since the early 1990s, the Netherlands has reaped the benefits of its national eco-
nomic growth policy. Budgetary deficits declined to zero in the late 1990s, the tax bur-
den has been significantly reduced, the growth of wages has been modest, and the la-
bor market has become much more flexible. All this has enabled the country to benefit
from a booming world economy. Since the early 1990s, Dutch economic growth rates
have been much higher than those in the rest of the EU. And because the Netherlands
has begun to follow a labor-intensive growth path, the Dutch job machine has been
running at a higher speed than in most other European countries. Within a relatively
short period of time, the traditional situation of families with one breadwinner be-
came one of double-income households. Given rising real household incomes and the
generous system of tax credits for homeowners in combination with relatively low real
mortgage rates, the Dutch owner-occupied housing market is booming and thus fur-
ther stimulating the gentrification of Amsterdam’s historic city center. Housing prices
in the historic city center have increased at a faster rate than elsewhere in the Nether-
lands (Middelhoven 2000). Consequently, real estate agents and housing developers
can now more easily outbid office firms than they could before. 
The mix of national economic growth policies and urban growth policies has re-
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sulted in a high rate of economic growth in the Amsterdam region (i.e. the city of Am-
sterdam and adjacent municipalities). In fact, the growth rate of the Amsterdam re-
gion has been higher than that of the Netherlands since 1995. And, even more surpris-
ingly, the city’s rate of economic growth has been higher than that of adjacent
municipalities for the last two years (SEO 2000). All this has boosted the demand for
consumer services in the historic city center. Since the mid-1990s, the historic city cen-
tre has strengthened its position vis-à-vis regional centers.6
The development of Amsterdam’s historic city center into a consuming place has
been driven not only by increasing expenditures of the growing local population,
but also by those of tourists and day trippers. The increase in demand for consumer
services by tourists and day trippers was significantly higher than that of the local
population in the 1990s (Van der Vegt et al 2000, 29). Large-scale gentrification has un-
doubtedly improved the bad image of Amsterdam. Since the late 1980s, middle-class
and higher-class tourists and day trippers have rediscovered the city. This does not
mean necessarily that they are only interested in “high” culture and higher-class
amenities. Their activity patterns are much more varied. Many of them, for instance,
visit a coffee shop. The same applies to young backpackers who still visit the city in
great numbers. These upscale visitors not only go to coffee shops, but also to museums
and other cultural facilities. Moreover, not all young backpackers are low-budget
tourists as was the case in the 1960s. Many are fairly affluent and consider a backpack
merely a lifestyle symbol. Thus the activity patterns of various kinds of tourists overlap
much more than is often assumed (Student Research Group 1999). The fact that Am-
sterdam has become an attractive tourist destination for extremely diverse groups is
certainly associated with its wide mix of leisure facilities. The “city of culture” is also
the place “to let it hang all out.” Drugs, sex, and fun are offered next to Rembrandt,
Golden Age architecture, and cultural events.
Conclusion
In the foregoing discussion we have argued that the evolution of the economic land-
scape of Amsterdam’s historic city center can only be understood by paying due atten-
tion to the various social institutions on which its economic activities depend and
through which they are shaped. Urban restructuring cannot be explained by referring
only to purely economic theories, but has to be understood as being enmeshed in
wider structures of social, economic and political rules, procedures and conventions.
In other words, the restructuring of Amsterdam’s historic city center has been a highly
socially regulated economic process.
Processes of social regulation are not only the intended result of a deliberate strate-
gy, but also the product of unintended consequences of intentional action. In this pa-
per we have shown that unintended consequences of intentional action played an im-
portant role in the second round of restructuring. The development of Amsterdam’s
historic city center into a place of leisure and tourism has hardly anything to do with a
coherent pro-tourist strategy. The preservation of Amsterdam’s cultural heritage and
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Dutch libertarian soft-drugs policies have been pursued for reasons other than to stim-
ulate leisure and tourism in the historic center. The city also allowed the conversion of
lofts, offices and other buildings into housing units. But since this was largely done in
the private sector, it opened the historic center up to gentrifiers even though gentrifi-
cation was not an explicit goal of city center policies in the 1980s and early 1990s. On
the contrary, the city itself was engaged in a social housing policy that was interested
in a renewal of the old housing stock without subsequent displacement. All this has
unintentionally resulted in a unique mix of people and functions in the historic city
center that is widely appreciated by visitors. 
The processes of social regulation that have shaped the restructuring of Amster-
dam’s historic city center have operated not only at the local level, but also at the na-
tional and international level. The specific Dutch central-local relationships have en-
abled the urban social movements to block a radical reconstruction of the historic city
center and helped the city of Amsterdam to realize its own preservation policy. Strong
fiscal centralization and Amsterdam’s large territorial size have enabled its smooth re-
structuring. We have also shown the importance of other processes of social regula-
tion on the national and international level. Wage and tax policies, the influence of
exchange rate regimes, a more flexible labor market, the state’s housing and urban
policies, Dutch libertarian drugs policies – they have all contributed to the develop-
ment of Amsterdam’s historic city center as a consuming place.
NOTES
1. The former Jewish neighborhood of Kattenburg/Uilenburg/Wittenburg, Haarlemmer
Houttuinen, Frederiksplein, and parts of Rembrandtplein.
2. Protests were only raised by the “Bond van Heemschut,” an organization that had since
its inception in the late nineteenth century focused on the protection of the Dutch cul-
tural heritage.
3. Till the mid-1960s, the average income of the Amsterdam population was higher than
the Dutch average (see CBS 1983).
4. The number of Dutch municipalities has declined by 50 percent since 1918 due to an-
nexations and mergers. Territorial consolidation has also been realized through the
new towns policy. 
5. The growth pattern of Amsterdam’s tourism industry is highly correlated to the devel-
opment of the global economy (see Muskens 1997). 
6. Only in Amsterdam are some of the stores open every Sunday.
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A. The Economic, Infrastructural and Environmental Dilemmas of Spatial Development
3.1•The Randstad:
The Creation of a Metropolitan Economy
Pieter Tordoir
Introduction 
In this chapter, I will discuss the future scenarios for the spatial and economic devel-
opment of the Randstad (the highly urbanized western part of the Netherlands). Dur-
ing the past 50 years, this region of six million inhabitants, four major urban centers
and 20 medium-sized cities within an area the size of the Ile de France evolved into an
increasingly undifferentiated patchwork of daily urban systems, structured by the
sprawl of business and new towns along highway axes. There is increasing pressure
from high economic and population growth and congestion, particularly in the
northern wing of the Randstad, which includes the two overlapping commuter fields
of Amsterdam and Utrecht. Because of land scarcity and a rising awareness of environ-
mental issues, the Dutch planning tradition of low-density urban development has be-
come increasingly irrelevant. 
The new challenge is for sustainable urban development, where the accommoda-
tion of at least a million new inhabitants and jobs in the next 25 years must be com-
bined with higher land-use intensities, a significant modal shift to public transporta-
tion, and a substantial increase in the quality and diversity of the natural environment
and the quality of life in the region.1 Some of these goals may be reached simultane-
ously by concentrating development in high-density nodes that provide a critical mass
for improved mass transit systems, rendering an alternative for car-dependent com-
muters. Furthermore, a gradual integration of the various daily urban systems may
benefit the quality and diversity of economic, social, natural, and cultural local envi-
ronments within the polynuclear urban field. The catchword for this planning ambi-
tion is the creation of a “Delta Metropolis,” which will involve a highly complex mix-
ture of private and public investment and regulation. The knowledge base for this type
of complex urban planning and development is growing, but a cornerstone for the suc-
cess of the new planning policy has been altogether neglected: the economic base. This
base is the subject of this chapter, which regards the past, present, and possible futures
of the Randstad region economy and the possible support it may provide for the spatial
development ambitions discussed above. 
The thesis put forward here is that the planning objectives for the Randstad can on-
ly be achieved if the economic structure gains a truly and internationally competitive
105
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metropolitan character, where the high costs of sustainable, high-density and high-
quality urban development are matched by high productivity and the value added by
the urban economy. This should involve spiralling agglomeration economies, widen-
ing and diversifying markets, subsequent increases in quality, the specialization of
productive resources and business activities, and the reinvestment of resulting profits
in the capacity and quality of local resources. 
Is such a “metropolitanization” scenario viable for the Randstad economy?2 There
are many uncertainties. The Randstad can only partially be characterized as a metro-
politan-style economy. It is unknown whether such an economy can be “made” by
policy. Even if the spatial economy starts to take the desired turns, the road will con-
tain numerous pitfalls. Excessive costs of advanced transportation links might
impede any further investment along the way. More generally, an imbalance
between investment costs and benefits will cause a downward spiral of price infla-
tion, investment failures and, eventually, stagnation. Cities can easily tip the fine
balance between agglomeration economies and agglomeration diseconomies the
wrong way. Price, density, and congestion levels and average commuting times com-
mon for cities like London and Paris may be socially unacceptable to the Dutch. The
accommodation of economic and spatial market growth without transport conges-
tion will be difficult, and will require a doubling of public transport capacity in the
next 25 years. And, finally, the market for a metropolitan-style economy may be a
zero-sum game in Western Europe, in which case the Randstad will have to win its
market share in high value-added activities from London and other nearby competi-
tors. 
Nonetheless, because of the sharply increasing scarcity of land, the congestion,
the ageing population and the rising demand for a higher quality of life and a better
environment, the Randstad has no option but to develop an economy that can bear the
ensuing financial burden. In order to keep inflation at bay and international competi-
tiveness above par, productivity levels, which have for a decade been at a standstill in
the Netherlands,3 have to find a structural growth path in the coming decades. Pro-
ductivity can basically be stimulated in three ways: by innovation, by firm-internal
economies of scale, and by external economies. The first two are traditionally the focus
of economic development policy, and the third should become a new focus for eco-
nomic policy. Spatial structure and limitations should become levers for external
economies and productivity growth, and not a burden. This, in a nutshell, is the eco-
nomic challenge for the Randstad. 
In this chapter, the conditions for a metropolitan-style economic and spatial devel-
opment plan in the Randstad are discussed on the basis of urban and spatial economic
theory on the one hand and historical and contemporary evidence on the other. The
next section presents a concise overview of the economic history and current develop-
ment issues of the conurbation, put in the wider geopolitical context of economic net-
works and urban structures in Western Europe. In a subsequent section, a discussion of
mainstream agglomeration theory is followed by new theoretical concepts for ad-
vanced metropolitan functions and economies. After a crude assessment of the Rand-
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stad economy in these terms, I conclude with preliminary policy recommendations
and suggestions for further research.
Lessons from Economic History 
The origins and futures of metropolitan economies must first of all be understood in
the context of geopolitical trends and the intermediation of states and trading blocks
in the formation of international trade zones. Metropolitan economies are connected
to global markets and are highly dependent on the free movement of capital, labor and
entrepreneurial talent. The metropolis harbors entrepreneurial communities from
many nations with which it maintains economic and cultural links. Metropolitan
economies are “the world in a city” – a global village avant la lettre, a local arena for the
global network economy – where trade links are forged and managed. Global and local
networks are thus juxtaposed in the metropolis,4 in which the state level has an in-
triguing role. Ever since states started to determine conditions for trade and migra-
tion, metropolitan fortunes have been related to changes in political geography. The
rise and fall of Amsterdam in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries is a telling ex-
ample. 
In Europe, the disintermediation of the state is highly significant for the European
urban system and the future of the Randstad economy. The responsibility for the spa-
tially unrestricted conditions of an open economy, such as monetary and legal sys-
tems, is gradually shifting from the national to the EU level. Many economic condi-
tions and resources are restricted to the urban and regional level, however, including
markets for land, housing and labor, basic education, local infrastructure, and the
qualities of the social, cultural, and natural environment. They therefore demand co-
ordinated development and regulation at the regional level. European integration
thus leads naturally towards a “Europe of the regions,” where everyone benefits from
the level playing field of an unrestricted market but where actual regional competi-
tiveness for investment mostly depends on the local capability of sustained area-spe-
cific productive resources. Thus, within the EU we see increasing regional divisions of
labor and resources specialization, and urban network formation at the international
level. For metropolitan economies, the opportunities can only increase. But so will the
competition. Since the local resource base is becoming less a matter of natural advan-
tages and more a result of collective human action, local and regional ingenuity will
decide economic fortunes. Efficient urban planning is a crucial element of this kind of
ingenuity. 
In the Netherlands, the international and local levels have always been closely jux-
taposed. For most economic activities, the national level is not a significant market
limitation; the Dutch economy depends greatly on localized activities with either re-
gional or international supply and demand markets. Two cornerstones of the Dutch
economy – the port of Rotterdam and Schiphol airport – are good examples in this re-
spect. In a way, the disintermediation of states brings the Randstad region back to the
geopolitical situations of the late Middle Ages, when economic and cultural develop-
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ment was triggered by geographically extended networks of trading cities. The juxta-
position of favorable local conditions and global trading networks created prolonged
economic growth and prosperity in the Low Countries during the late sixteenth and
the seventeenth century and made Amsterdam the second largest and wealthiest city
in the world.5 This “Golden Age” resulted from three related conditions that were skil-
fully exploited at the time: networks, local diversification, and immigration. Sea and
inland waterways connected Amsterdam with other continents and the European
mainland. Advances in shipping technology, navigation, finance, and management
all stimulated the opening up of global trading routes, where the city was the main
hub for transfer, warehousing, trade, and value adding. Local waterways formed an in-
genious urban transportation system and connected the city with a ring of urban cen-
ters within a day’s safe travel. In this way, the region could combine the fruits of an in-
ternational and a regional division of labor. Amsterdam and satellite centers such as
Haarlem and Leiden formed a diversified and integrated conurbation. But perhaps
most important of all, Amsterdam profited from the unrest and xenophobic develop-
ments in the rest of Europe. Immigrants were welcomed by the free city of Amsterdam
– provided they had the competencies and entrepreneurial spirit the economy needed.
The city became a truly cosmopolitan environment. Even by today’s standards, it had
an advanced metropolitan economy. The rise of powerful nations in Europe in the late
seventeenth and the eighteenth century hampered the further growth of the mercan-
tile network that had created the wealth of this metropolitan system. The small Dutch
nation could not supply an extensive national hinterland market for her cities as a sur-
rogate for international networks that were cut off by the rising power of neighbor
states. Thus, for centuries economic development lagged behind in Holland, until in-
ternational trading conditions improved as a result of the rise of liberalism in the late
nineteenth century. In the meantime, the capital cities in neighboring states – such as
London, Paris, and later Berlin – thrived because states provided them with extended
national hinterlands. 
Nation building started late in the Netherlands. In the mid-nineteenth century, the
Dutch state could circumvent its size and power disadvantages by adopting an indus-
trialization policy for relatively footloose manufacturing based on low labor and land
costs, and by leveraging the geographical advantage of the Rhine delta for internation-
al port activities. Ever since, this economic policy of low cost competition, internation-
al specialization, and physical infrastructure development has been the fundamental
national development regime.
Some international distribution functions were regained by the new policy regime
in the late nineteenth and the twentieth century. Amsterdam saw a revival at the turn
of the twentieth century thanks to the construction of a new canal to the North Sea
and the subsequent influx of manufacturing. The city kept a diversified service econo-
my and developed as a second-tier European center for advanced services, mainly be-
cause of the construction of a remarkably efficient airport in the early 1960s. Rotter-
dam profited fully from its position on the Rhine delta and developed a specialized
economy of bulk transportation and chemical industries, based on large-scale port de-
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velopment and extensive land reclamation. Thus, the new round of urban growth in
Holland was mainly based on distributive activities. A development of a truly large and
diversified metropolitan economy was never envisaged, however, because of the ne-
cessity of a low-cost development strategy. Nevertheless, this strategy became rather
successful. Particularly after the Second World War, when international trade and in-
vestment boomed, the policy regime – helped first by the US Marshall Plan and later by
natural gas exploitation – was the driving force behind the country’s move from a
rather backward to an advanced economic position. Congestion and resources scarcity
could be avoided by new land development and labor productivity growth. From the
1960s to the 1980s, Dutch spatial planning and regional economic policy was instru-
mental in preventing congestion in large cities and redirecting growth to less conges-
ted parts. In this respect, spatial planning followed the general Dutch development
regime, the “polder model.” At the turn of the twenty-first century, however, after a
decade of high growth levels, this regime has been exhausted. 
Because of its economic success, the Netherlands is less able to sustain a policy of
low resource costs. Labor is now in short supply, as is land for urban development.
House and office prices have skyrocketed in recent years, as has traffic congestion in
the urbanized parts of the country. The traditional policy responses of further indus-
trialization and concomitant productivity growth, and large-scale land development,
are no longer economically viable and do not fit in with the political ambition of sus-
tainable growth. Thus, the once valuable low-cost development strategy has to be re-
placed by a differentiation strategy, to the detriment of land-extensive and low-cost
economic and urban development and to the benefit of high value-added activities,
high land productivity and rents, particularly in the Randstad. This can be done by the
creation of local and regional external effects, leading towards a more metropolitan-
style economy. In this respect, the Golden Age will have to be reinvented in Holland. Let
us discuss the basic economic mechanisms involved. 
Towards a Theory of Metropolitan Economics
A metropolitan economy is not just the economy of a very large city. Not all large cities
have the wide range of highly specialized activities characteristic of a metropolitan
economy. In Western Europe, London and Paris indisputably have this character, but
the German Ruhr Area does not, notwithstanding its five million inhabitants. Nor can
the Randstad economy be characterized as metropolitan, although in some respects it
is. A metropolitan economy is a highly diversified complex of specialized activity clus-
ters where the combined influence of external scale, scope, and network economies
enables a spatial-economic equilibrium at a high level of local resource costs. 
Metropolitan agglomeration is by itself not a superior form of spatial economic
organization. If it were, all activities would tend to cluster in metropolitan agglom-
erations. The metropolitan environment is superior for a particular set of economic
functions, notably advanced managerial and financial functions, international trans-
portation, and advanced creative services. Thus, metropolitan environments are a spe-
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cific milieu in the spatial division of labor in the modern network economy.6
The mainstream theory of spatial agglomeration is only of limited use in explaining
the economic functions of metropolitan environments. Nor can it throw much light
on its spatial conditions, including the efficiency of monocentric versus polycentric
urban organization. Following a short presentation of mainstream agglomeration
theory, I will present some new perspectives that might provide better explanations
for metropolitan development policy. 
Agglomeration Economies: Localization
Until recently, spatial phenomena such as agglomeration were ignored in mainstream
economics because the underlying increasing returns to scale do not fit into the neo-
classical equilibrium models. The productivity gains of efficient spatial organization
have seldom been much of a subject for economic policy either. In the Netherlands and
elsewhere, regional economic policy has mainly been inspired by macro- and micro-
equilibrium theory. Urban structure was not part of this focus. However, this is chang-
ing with the work of Krugman and his collaborators, who have tried to fit external
economies and increasing returns to scale into equilibrium models.7 The basic theory
he uses goes back to the classical economist, Alfred Marshall, who was interested in ex-
ternal scale economies and the ensuing spatial clustering of industries.8
External scale economies benefit a firm accruing from the organization of re-
sources and activities in the firm’s local environment. The beneficiary firm is a free
rider on these environmental influences. These benefits can be classified into pools of
traded inputs and non-traded inputs, and spillovers. The classic example of a traded in-
put advantage is the large and specialized local labor pool. The pool gives both individ-
ual firms and jobseekers flexibility and a bargaining position, provided there are
many others both on the local supply and local demand side. All of the involved parties
maintain an efficient, “deep” market for special labor. Today, labor markets provide a
major reason for agglomeration. The pool mechanism is relevant for every specialized
traded input, however, from transport to ICT consulting. For non-traded inputs, the
benefits of agglomeration are even more obvious. These inputs have the character of
collective goods and services, subject to scale advantages. If usage demands spatial
proximity, agglomeration will result. An example of this is the access road needed by a
firm, but only affordable if that firm can find others to share its costs. Scale-sensitive or
indivisible specialized resources, such as ports and stock exchanges, can only be main-
tained by a concentration of specialist users. Finally, agglomeration springs from
spillover effects. The classic example is the information that “goes around” in a local
concentration of specialist firms. News, ideas, and best practices held by one firm are
often first learned by its neighbor in the same industry. To keep in close contact with
cutting edge developments in computer technology, firms should relocate to Silicon
Valley. The same holds true for finance and the City of London. For flowers, move to
Aalsmeer, south of Amsterdam. Recent theories about clustering effects in the econo-
my, ranging from Porter’s well-known “diamond” concept to sophisticated modelling
in industrial and spatial economics, are almost always an elaboration of these three
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types of external scale effects.9 When proximity plays a role, these three effects result
in localized economies. They also lead to the agglomeration of an industry in a special-
ized environment and they help explain interregional and international trade,
though they only partially explain the role of the metropolitan environment. 
The behavioral school of economic geography explored the role of information in
economic agglomeration in more depth. According to economic behavior theory, go-
ing back to Schumpeter, the efficiency of markets, innovation, and other fundamen-
tals of economic organization and growth depend on the organization and accessibili-
ty of information and knowledge. For the behavioral school, the rational nature of the
economic man, and his subsequent behavior, are bound by what he can know. The ge-
ographers Allan Pred and John Goddard, translated this principle into the role of the
local environment. They looked at the way economically valuable information circu-
lates in space, and found face-to-face contacts to be its main medium. The more valu-
able information is for economic behavior, the more important physical proximity
will be. Central business districts (CBDs) are thus an arena for linkages between lead-
ing actors in information- and knowledge-intensive services, including corporate
headquarters and advanced financial and business services. This role of the CBD has
not changed much despite recent revolutions in communication technology. Even in
the telecommunications and Internet sector, the most advanced commercial and cre-
ative activities are geographically highly clustered in just a few main centers, such as
the “Silicon Alley” business district in Lower Manhattan. Face-to-face exchanges thus
explain the concentration of advanced managerial, financial business services, but
these centers are not typical of a metropolitan environment, although they are rather
ubiquitous among large cities in general.10
Metropolitan Economies: Urbanization and Networks 
The external scale and proximity effects discussed lead mostly to localization
economies because they explain local and regional economic clustering and special-
ization. For large cities, the information linkage effect will entail some specialization
in more or less advanced office activities. The metropolitan economic environment,
however, is characterized by a wide variety of specialized activities. This diversity aris-
es from two additional types of external economies, apart from the external scale ef-
fects discussed above: external economies of scope (urbanization economies) and net-
work economies. 
Urbanization economies are the geographical pendant of economies of scope in
business organization. They arise when firms are able to change technologies, suppli-
ers, demand markets, and resources without high changeover costs, or when firms
equalize market fluctuations and maintain efficient capacity use by operating in vari-
ous and unrelated supply and demand markets.11 In this vein, firms can circumvent
the risks of scale and specialization. The trick is to combine scale with scope. This will
depend both on firm-dependent competencies and the firm’s repertoire of strategies,
and on favorable resource conditions in the regional environment. The variety of ex-
ternal resources should match the variety in the firm’s repertoire. Local markets and
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resources should not only support scale economies but also allow easy market en-
trance and exit, since low switching costs for suppliers, labor and other resources are
essential for economies of scope.12 Thus, the business environment should have a
range of efficient, “deep” input markets and other resources, which can only develop
on the basis of a range of large demand markets. This mutually reinforcing interaction
between the variety and size of demand markets and the variety and size of supply mar-
kets is one of the secrets of economic growth and innovation, by the way. Whenever
physical proximity is relevant for market information, market transactions, and
switches between markets, diversified metropolitan environments have an advan-
tage. Only this kind of an environment can cater to variety and depth in resource mar-
kets without the pitfall of oligopolistic or monopsonic conditions often found in small
markets. 
Physical proximity is a relative concept in this respect; really relevant are the costs
of physical access and of the formation and maintenance of linkages. The geographical
structure of physical networks for the transportation of people, goods and informa-
tion strongly influences the location behavior of firms and consumers. In this respect,
the third and final category of the benefits of a metropolitan environment comes to
the foreground: extensive network economies. As with scale effects, textbook econom-
ics ignores network effects since ubiquitous accessibility is a prerequisite for efficient
micro-economic equilibrium. In reality, ubiquitous access is extremely costly and inef-
ficient, since networks are subject to network economies, which increase the returns
of scale and scope.13 Most transportation lines and their points of entry, physical or vir-
tual (e.g. optical fiber broadband cables), are subject to increasing returns to capacity,
provided capacity is efficiently used. The latter demands market capture, which in
turn calls for a dendrite geographical feeder network following the geographical ex-
tension of the market. The combination of three factors – benefits of scale in main lines
and exchanges, the need for a geographical scope for feeder links, and the hierarchical
(urban) structure most markets assume – explains the hub-and-spoke structure in any
complex transportation network. This structure can be compared to the vascular sys-
tem of any large mammal, which has ring structures for high-speed and high-capacity
circulation and dendrite structures for the feeding of smaller, dispersed or eccentric
functions. Locations unlocked by high-capacity lines and exchanges – such as airport
and seaport hubs or multiple highway interchanges – benefit most from the ensuing
economies. Thus, a certain place (a business center, a demand pool) can derive a com-
parative advantage based on its relative position in a network, depending on the way in
which technical scale and scope effects work out spatially for the network involved.
But there is more. Localization and urbanization effects, and network effects, mutual-
ly reinforce each other. For example, the agglomeration of management consulting,
springing from a high local density of valuable information and leading clients, will
be reinforced if there is an airline hub with quick access to a wide range of markets.
This position widens the market for the consultants considerably, resulting in further
agglomeration.14 This further agglomeration stimulates demand for the local hub, the
advantageous position and productivity of which, subject to increasing returns to
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scale, will be further reinforced. Metropolitan environments benefit not only from a
strategic position in external linkage systems with network economies, but also from
internal grids for which the same network economies are relevant, albeit on a smaller
geographical scale. Thus, we see that metropolitan transportation grids do not have
the nuclear web structure typical of medium-sized cities, but a polycentric and vascu-
lar hub-and-spoke structure.
Mutual reinforcement of localization, urbanization, and network effects, leading
to high productivity and extensive comparative advantages, are typical of an efficient
metropolitan economy. Moreover, advantageous network positions, combined with
large transport markets, may provide a scope for competing network suppliers, result-
ing in further efficiency and flexibility advantages. Having two airports or seaports is
better than having just one. Having two seaports is often unacknowledged as an ad-
vantage for the Randstad region, for example.
The mechanisms discussed above have major implications for the specific spatial
structure of the ensuing metropolitan agglomeration. The interaction of localization,
urbanization, and network effects will always entail a polycentric structure.15 First of
all, the diversity of specialized activities demands a diversity of specialized production
and consumption environments within the metropolitan area. Congestion and other
negative external effects will prevent a crunching of these environments into one cen-
ter. Technical scale effects within metropolitan transportation grids will result in a
system of high-capacity links and feeder links. Main links enable interconnection of
dispersed specialized centers and thus allow urbanization economies in a polynuclear
structure. Polycentric development, enabled by internal network economies, allows a
metropolitan environment to evade high levels of congestion. Provided local high-
speed travel is cost-efficient, main links enable congested centers to spin off new cen-
ters elsewhere down the line. Manhattan is a fine example of this mechanism: down-
town is connected with midtown by a bundle of fast and competing subway lines. Two
geographical centers can thus function as a whole, with less congestion. Further
deconcentration along the way will eventually result in a ring structure of business
centers, such as Boulevard Peripherique in Paris, the Chicago Loop and the Amsterdam
motorway ring. 
Thus, metropolitan agglomeration results in polycentric structures, but there is no
opposite causation. The polycentric ring structure of the Randstad will by itself not
stimulate the combination of mechanisms leading to a metropolitan-style economic
structure with a high level of land productivity. Nor will large-scale investment in met-
ropolitan-style vascular infrastructure grids stimulate such a development. This fol-
lows from a comparative analysis of travel times and commuting patterns in Greater
London as well as in the Randstad region, with counterintuitive results (see Figures 1
and 2) (Tordoir and Drost forthcoming). Average travel time per mile is lower in the
Randstad region than in Greater London. An hour’s drive covers a larger market in the
Randstad. Nonetheless, London is a fully integrated labor market with commuter
links from any borough to almost any other borough, whereas the Randstad has four
separate, star-shaped commuter patterns surrounding the four main cities. Commut-
THE RANDSTAD:THE CREATION OF A METROPOLITAN ECONOMY 113
Adam.HumanCapital  06-03-2003  16:50  Pagina 113
ing over larger distances and between the main cities is rare. The labor market of the
Randstad is compartmentalized and thus less efficient than London’s unified market,
notwithstanding a better physical accessibility in the Randstad. How is this possible?
Clearly, other factors play a role. 
A Strategic Triangle: Advanced Distribution, Coordination and Creation
Earlier, I stated that the metropolitan environment is not economically superior per
se, but that it is superior for a particular set of advanced functions in the division of la-
bor. Three functions stand out in this respect: advanced distributive services, coordi-
nating activities, and creative services. Each of these functions might thrive on its own
in non-metropolitan, specialized environments such as seaports, industrial centers,
or university towns, respectively. Within the metropolitan environment, however, the
three functions are closely interconnected, provided their development level is ad-
vanced. The ensuing synergy is one of the secrets of metropolitan-style growth, high
land and labor productivity, and economic, social, and cultural innovation. 
The strategic function of distribution services – transportation of people, goods and
information, and wholesale trade – follows from the paramount role of dendritic ex-
ternal and internal networks for the metropolitan economy. Advanced distribution
services operate these complex networks and their exchanges, and coordinate and
channel flows in order to maintain optimal economies of scale and scope, and effi-
cient demand levels. Due to the technical complexity of networks and flow coordina-
tion, and to the value of scale and scope efficiencies, the distributive services con-
cerned have an advanced and specialized nature. Moreover, since transport networks
are often extensive land users and metropolitan land is dear, metropolitan distribu-
tion must achieve high land productivity. This necessitates advanced logistical con-
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cepts and a highly efficient layout and utilization level of local infrastructure. A fine
example of advanced logistics is the “just-in-time delivery” principle, invented by dis-
tributors in large Japanese cities to evade the high local land costs of stock and ware-
housing. Distributors in Japanese and other Asian large cities with high land prices,
such as Hong Kong and Singapore, apply vertical warehousing and order-picking sys-
tems. An example of this highly efficient infrastructure layout is the complex for pas-
senger transfer, leisure, and shopping at Schiphol Airport. Efficient flow coordination
and infrastructure capacity utilization can also be achieved by implementing intelli-
gent information systems such as the tracking of goods or advanced travel informa-
tion. Again, innovations in this respect often originate in high-density metropolitan
environments, notably in Southeast Asia. Sophistication in distribution services also
calls for advanced coordination competencies and creativity. In these respects, ad-
vanced distribution services may profit from advanced managerial and creative busi-
ness services in the environment. 
In the research literature on urban economic systems, particular emphasis is put on
the role of advanced managerial activities and producer services for large urban cen-
ters (Daniels 1991, Taylor and Walker 1999, Taylor and Walker 2000). In the critical lit-
erature, the role of “world cities” as controlling, dominating centers in the global
economy is emphasized.16 The sociologist Manuel Castells refers in this respect to an
arising “space of flows,” wherein the global network of highly interconnected finan-
cial and corporate centers form a globally extended, polycentric business district with
a common culture. This analysis points to the concentration of internationally coordi-
nating functions in metropolitan environments. Most relevant in this respect are top-
managerial activities, international investment and security services, economic infor-
mation processing and analysis, and collective economic and political coordination by
international professional and business associations, and intergovernmental institu-
tions. These various services are more or less interconnected, with face-to-face contacts
as the main medium. The ensuing effects on urban structure were discussed earlier.
Yet, this analysis captures only part of the role of metropolitan environments for inter-
national economic coordination. Less noticeable in the research literature, but sensed
by contemporary chroniclers like Robert Kaplan,17 is the fundamental role of the me-
tropolis as a cosmopolitan arena for the forging of economic, social, cultural and intel-
lectual links in world society. In the second section of this chapter, I propose that links
between different parts of the world are often locally forged in this arena. The world’s
metropolises are all characterized by communities from many parts of the world. New
York houses the largest community of Europeans outside Europe. The same goes for
Los Angeles with Central Americans and Southeast Asians, for London with North
Americans and people from South Asia and the Middle East, and for Paris with com-
munities from the Francophone world. It is no coincidence that New York and London
are the main business centers in the North Atlantic trade block, just as Los Angeles is
for the Pacific Basin and Paris is for trade between Europe and Africa. A cosmopolitan
environment is vital for this function. Although many European and North American
cities house migrant labor communities, it is particularly the entrepreneurial and cul-
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tural elite, responsible for coordinating activities, which finds its expatriate home in
the metropolis. This elite finds the best of preferred amenities, including internation-
al educational facilities, preferred food, clothing and restaurants, cultural and social
facilities, international bookshops, etc. in the metropolis. The cosmopolitan environ-
ment caters to social mixing and economic networking arenas such as international
business clubs, top cultural centers and top universities. The ensuing cosmopolitan at-
mosphere is far from the cold and undefined “international” environment of any large
airport or CBD. It gives the metropolis the feel of being truly a global village, giving it
special qualities for inhabitants and visitors alike. These “soft” qualities are mostly
overlooked both by research and by developers of international business centers. Their
importance is increasing, however. Both advanced corporate and financial services
and the “soft” cosmopolitan factors are strongly connected to a third strategic func-
tion in the metropolitan economy: advanced creative services.
Advanced creative services (including creative marketing and advertising services),
content providers for specialized and mass media (including the Internet), authors
and publishers of specialized knowledge and information, and industrial and fashion
designers, are highly concentrated in metropolitan environments (Scott 200). London,
New York, Los Angeles, and Milan are the world’s hotspots for these kinds of services. In
some respects, Amsterdam can be included on this list. There are two reasons why this
type of advanced services is so highly concentrated in so few global centers. First of all,
local external effects are strong for these kinds of activities, which is particularly due
to the strong information spillover effects. Creative services is all about picking up
ideas. Unlike any other industry, this spillover effect is not limited to knowledge circu-
lation within the creative services industry. A main source for information and ideas
in creative services is the local environment. The liberal and cosmopolitan big city en-
vironment is where new fashions, lifestyles, etc. tend to start, where creative entrepre-
neurs pick up their ideas from the street and where they find a market willing to try
out their ideas. There is also a strong labor pool effect, since creative services require
highly specialized labor. The creative professions are specific in character and highly
international in scope. They pool in cosmopolitan city centers. Apart from these exter-
nal effects, the market for advanced creative services is concentrated in metropolitan
environments. Corporate headquarters – particularly in the media and communica-
tion industries, specialist intermediary industries, and consumer goods and services –
supply the main market. For these industries, metropolitan environments and ad-
vanced creative services are antennae for new trends in the global village. 
The Randstad: An Assessment 
Amsterdam once had all the characteristics of a metropolitan economy, even when
measured by the modern standards and functions presented in the preceding section.
At present, some of these characteristics still exist, notably a strong international dis-
tribution network, some international financial services and some specialized cre-
ative services. During the past 100 or so years, the city has managed to keep a second-or-
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der position in the European hierarchy of urban centers. The city’s airport has devel-
oped a global hub function in the last 30 years, attracting a cluster of advanced inter-
national distributive activities. The city is clearly the main center for coordinating ac-
tivities in the country (see Map 3) and the headquarters of some of the world’s top
banks. During the past decade, the city developed a new and internationally pro-
nounced strength in content provision for the media and ICT sectors. Because of the
growth of airport-related distribution, advanced producer services and the ICT sector,
the Amsterdam region experienced high economic growth levels over the past decade.
Nonetheless, the city and urban region has not regained some of the essential metro-
politan characteristics it once lost. Most important among these is the cosmopolitan
environment that attracted entrepreneurial talent from all parts of the developed
world during the Golden Age. Although the city has maintained a cosmopolitan feel,
this is nowadays mainly thanks to the nature of its consumer services and liberal con-
sumption culture, and to the language abilities of the population. It is less based on
strategic economic activities and it does not attract the world’s top entrepreneurial
and cultural talent. Nonetheless, the city does supply the main cosmopolitan “living
room” for the Dutch economy and cultural world. 
Compared to the Amsterdam region, the Rotterdam region (The Rijnmond) has a
more specialized economic structure. The Rotterdam regional economy is highly de-
pendent on port activities and an extended complex of bulk process manufacturing.
The port hosts a range of large-scale international distribution services and some spe-
cialized coordinating activities, including insurance and trading services, which have
both operational activities and headquarters in the region. Basically, the international
competitive position of the distribution and related manufacturing complexes in the
region is strong, because the resources upon which these activities are based are natu-
ral and “deep” because capital outlays are extensive. The Rhine basin location of the
complex will not lose its relevance over the subsequent decades. Nonetheless, the Rot-
terdam region has a major problem. Heavy competition from competing port cities in
Europe is narrowing profit margins. Because of the combination of low value-added
activities and steep productivity increases, the port complex is shedding labor, which
cannot easily be absorbed by other, non-related sectors because of the specialized na-
ture of the urban and regional economy. The region lacks the benefits of diversity in
this respect. Sectors with high labor demand are mainly located in the north wing of
the Randstad. The economic structure of the nearby city of The Hague does not help
much in this respect, because The Hague also is relatively weak in services with high la-
bor demand. Like Rotterdam, The Hague has a specialization based on a “natural” re-
source: the seat of national government. Thus, the economy is highly specialized in
non-profit coordinating services, including intergovernmental functions, notably in
the legal sphere. Non-profit services are at least as of this time not a growth sector,
however. Still, the situation is not dramatic, however, because the government sector
entails some advanced commercial services, notably in the communications sector,
that do show job growth. Nonetheless, for a decade now, employment growth in the
south wing has been notably less than job growth in the north wing. This might be a re-
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sult of significant differences in unemployment figures within the Randstad region,
because the region is anything but an integrated labor market. This is one sign that the
region is not (yet) a metropolitan economic environment. Another important sign is
the lack of the high densities, land productivity and land rents common to metropoli-
tan environments. The latter sign is particularly relevant for policy since a consider-
able increase in land productivity, and urban density is now a prime goal of develop-
ment policy. 
The lack of integrated markets for labor, business facilities, housing, and consumer
facilities in the Randstad region limits market efficiencies and keeps the development
of external localization and urbanization economies at a certain level. For the most im-
portant among these markets – the labor market – comparative data do exist. Mea-
sured by commuter linkages, labor markets in the Randstad are geographically com-
partmentalized into overlapping daily urban systems in and around the four main
urban centers (Drost 2001, Bontje 2000). These markets do not come anywhere near the
market size of resources in Europe’s metropolitan regions, as a comparison of com-
muter linkages in the Randstad and London reveals (see Figures 1 and 2).
For example, the ICT sector in the northern wing relies on a labor pool of 50,000 per-
sons. In London, the ICT labor pool is ten times larger. The labor market in the north
wing is expanding, however, due to economic growth and the slowly expanding com-
muter fields. The region is gradually developing into an integrated market for 3 mil-
lion inhabitants and 1.5 million jobs. Although large by national standards, this labor
market is medium sized by European standards. 
Markets for advanced services inputs are not integrated at the Randstad level. A sur-
vey among advanced producer services shows that their market areas follow com-
muter fields, with the exception of services located in the Amsterdam region, which
serves the entire Randstad area due to the above average level of specialization of pro-
ducer services (Tordoir 1991). 
Because of spatial compartmentalization and the ensuing limits to spatial integra-
tion of resources, the diversity of economic specializations in the conurbation does
not provide a basis for extensive urbanization economies. Thus, although the Rand-
stad can be characterized as a highly diversified economy, this is of less value for indi-
vidual economic sectors than it could be if tradable and non-tradable resources were
spatially more integrated and mobile. Put differently, economic complementarities in
the region are passive, not active. Many specializations within the region have a specif-
ic local background, with little stimulation from developments in other cities within
the conurbation. The distributive sector provides exceptions to the rule, however. Ex-
ceptions to this rule are also provided by the economy of the north wing of the Rand-
stad. This wing seems to be developing some characteristics of a metropolitan environ-
ment. It is not yet the case, however, and it will not happen unless major spatial and
infrastructure obstacles are removed in the coming decades. 
To analyze the relation between urban development and specialized distribution,
coordinating and creative services, the nationwide spatial employment distribution
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and relative local specializations for each of the three clusters were recently sur-
veyed.18 The results are telling. 
Advanced and specialized distribution services are highly concentrated in the two
largest agglomerations – Amsterdam and Rotterdam – and in a network of highly spe-
cialized transportation centers in the country that is connected via the main ports of
Schiphol and Rijnmond. Thus, the Randstad is not only a diversified hub for advanced
distribution, but also part of a nationwide and internationally extensive grid of spe-
cialized distribution nodes. Distribution-related activities extend over stretched na-
tional and international corridors that follow the main highway axes. If the Randstad
area and its corridor-formed extensions has one specialized economic function at the
European scale, it is distribution.
The survey shows that coordinating activities are highly concentrated in the main
urban centers, as could be expected. Within the Randstad region, specialization in co-
ordinating services is particularly strong in Amsterdam, while much less so in Rotter-
dam and The Hague. Outside the Randstad, only a few urban centers show any special-
ization in coordinating activity. This pattern is confirmed by the distribution of
headquarters of Dutch top-100 corporations. Weighted by their total world employ-
ment size, the Amsterdam urban region accommodates half of all Dutch corporate
headquarter activities.
Table 1. Spatial distribution of headquarters,Dutch top-100 corporations (world employment)
———————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————
Amsterdam Utrecht Rotterdam The Hague Non-Randstad
———————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————
center ring center ring center ring center ring urban non-urban
Establishments 18 15 7 6 12 4 6 4 10 16
Weighted by 29 21 9 3 16 1 8 2 7 3
employment size
———————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————
Source:Compedium 2000, Het Financieele Dagblad
The national spatial distribution of advanced creative services is even more skewed.
Within the Randstad, these services are highly concentrated in the “banana” overlap-
ping Amsterdam and Utrecht. Besides these two cities, creative services also find high-
valued office environments in the wooded, upper-middle-class suburban area of the
Gooi, between these two cities. In this area, there is a high concentration of mass me-
dia enterprises, for example. The position of the southern wing is remarkably weak.
Outside the Randstad, only three other urban centers in the countryside specialize in
creative services: Den Bosch, Eindhoven, and Groningen. 
We can conclude from this analysis that the combination of specialization in ad-
vanced distribution functions, coordination, and advanced creative services is present
only in the northern wing of the Randstad. The north wing seems to harbor the vital in-
gredients required to develop a full metropolitan-style economy. Because of its eco-
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nomic structure, the north wing might reap more benefits from external effects and
might be more resistant to high land and labor market pressures than any other region
in the country. This might explain why the north wing currently shows by far the
largest increase in gross regional product and employment in the country. With in-
creasing pressure on resources, a metropolitanized economy becomes superior (Mi-
nisterie van Economische Zaken 2001). 
Some Policy Conclusions
In the Randstad, the classic Dutch policy regime of moderated resource costs and low-
density land development is reaching its limits because of the pressure of economic
growth and population increase and the rising call for sustainable growth, the conser-
vation of open land and natural values. Part of the solution to the ensuing dilemmas
lies in the development of a metropolitan-style economic structure and environment
that can combine high land productivity with international competitiveness, and can
bear high urban densities and the high costs of infrastructure provision. This requires
a new policy regime that integrates economic development with spatial and infra-
structure planning, stimulates positive external effects and generates high labor and
land productivity. This regime should principally be focused on the structure and
functioning of daily urban systems, the spatial containers that include the bulk of traf-
fic flows and markets for frequently used resources (land, labor, facilities) and services.
One aim of this policy is the efficient use of urban resources, in particular land and
physical infrastructure. Another is the gradual spatial extension of markets for land,
housing, labor, facilities, and amenities, and thus the extension of daily urban sys-
tems, since economic and spatial productivity, differentiation, and quality are mostly
determined by the extent of the markets and their ensuing systemic efficiencies and
divisions of labor.19
The transportation infrastructure, as it is related to land-use patterns and spatial
market structures, provides a key for this integrated policy. The spatial extent and effi-
ciency of daily urban systems is strongly determined by market access and thus by the
structure and capacity of infrastructure grids. Without integration with infrastruc-
ture development, land-use regulation is a weak instrument. This generic develop-
ment policy should be supplemented by specific policies that stimulate the develop-
ment of three strategic activity clusters – advanced distributive services, coordination
activities, and creative services – since these form the backbone of a high-productivity
metropolitan economy. Finally, international migration and culture policy will play a
role, aimed at the development of a cosmopolitan cultural environment and quality of
life.
Before addressing policy implementation in the case of the Randstad, we have to es-
tablish why this conurbation, and not some other spatial configuration, provides the
optimal playground for development policy. The Randstad is not an integrated urban
system, but consists of four daily urban systems that overlap mainly between Utrecht
and Amsterdam in the north and Rotterdam and The Hague in the south. In the first
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instance, these north and south wings are more logical subjects for policy than the
Randstad as a whole. If development policy does not align with the actual spatial ex-
pansion of these daily urban systems, investments in infrastructure and other urban
resources will fail due to overstretch and demand failure. On the other hand, policy
should not only follow incremental market developments but also steer the expansion
process with an eye to the pros and cons of long-term outcomes. Time, and the phasing
in of policy, is important.
The expansion of daily urban systems is a slow, evolutionary process, driven by mar-
ket forces, economic growth and technological development, but it is facilitated and
spatially conducted by the outlay of collective resources, particularly the transporta-
tion system.20 The urban system benefits from expansion in two ways. Capacity en-
largement of resources, including the labor pool and housing stock, eases inflationary
pressure on urban growth and provides more efficient markets. These are the benefits
of relatively short-term and incremental development policies. Secondly, expansion
may entail spatial inclusion of new types of resources and environments in the system,
adding to its diversity, versatility, and synergy potential. Whether the latter fruits can
be plucked depends mainly on the spatial structure and direction of the expansion
process in the longer run. This direction is strongly influenced by the evolving struc-
ture of the infrastructure grid. Apart from short-term capacity development within
and directly around a daily urban system, policymakers should therefore take a long-
term perspective on possible spatial development configurations in the wider region-
al environment of the system. There is much to say for the Randstad as an optimal re-
gional environment in this respect. 
The gradual inclusion of the various yet unrelated daily systems within this region,
each having different sets of resources and environments, will yield a level of econom-
ic synergy and productivity that cannot be achieved by any other spatial configura-
tion. Combined, the various urban systems within the Randstad provide an array of en-
vironments for each of the strategic economic clusters discussed in this paper.
Moreover, the horseshoe shape of the conurbation provides an excellent ground pat-
tern for an efficient metropolitan infrastructure network. All this calls for inward ex-
pansion and integration of the conurbation. The physical space for inward expansion
is limited, however, due to the protection of the “Green Heart” of the conurbation. Out-
ward expansion is also necessary, since not all of the necessary urban capacity increas-
es can be achieved by intensifying existing urban land use. Inward integration, land-
use intensification and outward expansion are thus three keys of the long-term
Randstad policy project. In the shorter term, the focus should be on the development
of the two wings, but policy should be implemented there with an eye to the long-term
perspective of Randstad-wide integration. The phasing in of development, and follow-
ing and ‘steering’ evolution patterns, is the key. 
I shall conclude with some remarks about policy for the north wing. This wing en-
compasses the daily urban systems of greater Amsterdam and Utrecht, which overlap
in the suburbanized areas of the Gooi and the new polder city of Almere. Greater Am-
sterdam provides an international cultural and business environment; Utrecht forms
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a national hub. Combined, the urban systems have the characteristics of a metropoli-
tan economy in its infant stage, due to the size and diversity of the wing. Its economic
value is indicated by the highest economic and employment growth levels and land
rent increases in the country. High-density spatial development will be relatively easy
to attain, since this runs parallel, and not counter, to actual market demand. Nonethe-
less, land-use intensification must be complemented by spatial expansion, since not
all urban functions can bear the costs of intensification. Most important is the expan-
sion of the labor supply. A further shift of the economic structure towards a relatively
labor-intensive advanced services economy will require 300,000 extra workers in the
coming 20 years. Extensive expansion of the north-wing labor market is only possible
in the new town of Almere. This necessitates both a considerable expansion of this city
and a significant capacity increase of its connections within the north wing. 
Much more is needed, however. Intensification of urban land use and market inte-
gration within the north wing call for changes in the capacity, modal structure, and
spatial outlay of the regional infrastructure grid in general, combined with and pro-
pelled by the development of high-density nodes. Up till now, the highway system has
been the leading facilitator of the expansion and integration of the north wing. Public
transportation is a loose collection of lines connecting mostly older, low-growth nodes
(such as inner cities), whereas the highway system connects high-growth locations
alongside urban motorway rings and expanding edge cities such as Almere and Haar-
lemmermeer. Traffic growth is most pronounced in the tangential interconnections
between these rings and edge cities. Any modal shift towards public transportation
should thus involve, first, the development of new tangential public lines intercon-
necting the growth areas, and second, the integration of public and private trans-
portation (so-called chain mobility). A new main artery for public transportation
should interconnect the Schiphol area with Almere, and Almere with Amersfoort and
Utrecht. The challenge is huge. To achieve market efficiencies and local land rents that
are comparable with those in the London area, the capacity of the mass transit grids
must be increased fivefold. Metropolitan market integration will require decades of in-
vestment. This may only be sustained by unorthodox finance and taxation systems, in
which land rents are ploughed back into infrastructure investment.21
High-capacity transit systems are a necessary but insufficient condition for the de-
velopment of an economically synergetic system of high-density urban nodes. Incre-
mental market forces will not assist in shaping a synergetic system of relatively spe-
cialized centers if planning policies within the urban network are not fully integrated
in order to avoid cost competition and the “prisoner dilemma” when developments
are non-incremental. Lack of alignment in urban planning among local authorities,
which are rather autonomous in the Netherlands, has created a patchwork urban de-
velopment pattern. 
The services employment shift and the development of high-density centers should
not distract attention from basic economic sectors that, although being extensive land
users, will nonetheless remain a foundation for the economic fortunes of the Rand-
stad. Particularly the seaport and airport functions and related activities are vital for
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the global connectivity of the regional economy. Without concomitant growth of
these land-extensive functions, land-intensive metropolitan development is futile. 
Urban development policy should concern more than just the hardware of the spa-
tial economic system and the software of advanced services and specialized labor.
Without the creation of a truly cosmopolitan environment, large cities will be unable
to attract and retain the international talent and entrepreneurship needed for metro-
politan economic functions in the world economy. Cosmopolitan environments are
particularly essential for advanced and internationally oriented coordination and cre-
ative services. At present, only some parts of Amsterdam and (arguably) The Hague
have cosmopolitan levels of local services and international (and multicultural) quali-
ties of life. Can a cosmopolitan environment be created and stimulated? I surmise that
urban culture policy plays a major role in this respect – something which is hardly ac-
knowledged by urban planners and economists. In general, the essential characteris-
tics of cosmopolitan environments should be better understood, particularly in the
Netherlands, which has little tradition in this respect. 
Finally, a question of overriding importance and complexity, which is not addressed
here, concerns the institutional framework for the policies recommended above. I am
fully aware that actual institutional conditions will impede much of the strategy dis-
cussed above. In other words, that institutional conditions will have to be realigned. To
discuss the implications would take at least another chapter, however.
NOTES
1. Ministerie van VROM (2001) Vijfde Nota over de Ruimtelijke Ordening (Fifth White Paper on
Spatial Panning) (2001).
2. Signs of spiralling cost inflation are already visible in the Randstad. Dutch price infla-
tion in 2001 exceeded 5%, the highest level in the EU. Construction costs in the Randstad
increased by 15% in that year. 
3. The “Dutch Miracle” – the high economic growth and sharp reduction of unemploy-
ment during the 1994-2001 period – was not a result of technological progress and pro-
ductivity, but mainly of capacity increases and moderated resource costs, notably for
labor (mainly due to women entering the labor market).
4. In this respect, the concept of “glocal” has been coined to indicate the close relationship
between local and global networks in the economy. See Schwyngedouw (1992) and Bren-
ner (1998).
5. See Fernand Braudel’s classic study of civilization and capitalism in the 15th to 18th cen-
turies (1984). 
6. The concept of milieux, coined by the French school of economic geography, emphasizes
the active interaction between business development and the local and regional envi-
ronment. See Aydalot 1984.
7. Krugman, (1991, 1998); Duranton and Puga (2000); Anas, Arnott, and Small (1998). 
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08. Marshall (1917). The interest in economic clusters and their geographical structure is
far from being as new as is sometimes claimed.
09. For cluster theory see Porter (1990, 1998). For agglomeration theory see Gleaser (1998)
and Quigley (1998).
10. Tordoir in Daniels (1991).
11. For the value and organization of economies of scope in industrial economics, see Teece
(1989). The value of economic diversity for urban economic growth was first indicated
by Jacobs (1968). 
12. An additional benefit of easy switching between a range of input markets is that each of
these markets will become more efficient than would be the case without switching. 
13. For the impact of networks on urban development, see Graham (2000) and Graham and
Marvin (2000). 
14. Manhattan agglomerates over a third of all US management consultants. See Tordoir
1991.
15. Comparison of mono- and polynuclear urban structures is currently an important re-
search subject. See Lambooy (1998); Kloosterman and Musterd ( 2001); Kloosterman and
Lambregts (2001); Batty (2001). 
16. Noteworthy accounts of the role of cities in global information networks include
Castells (1989, 1996) and Sassen (1991).
17. See Kaplan’s majestic description of contemporary urban America (1996).
18. The results of this survey will be published in the course of 2002 by the Vereniging
Deltametropool, Delft.
19. This is the famous principle of Adam Smith (1934/1776).
20. For a theoretical explanation of the evolution of daily urban systems, see Tordoir, 2001. 
21. In the Ile de France region, the development of a mass transit grid (the RER system) was
partly financed by a special regional tax, the Versement Transport. See Nyfer (2001).
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3.2 •Transport and Land Use Concepts
for the Emerging Urban Region
Luca Bertolini, Frank le Clercq and Loek Kapoen
Introduction
The Amsterdam region is evolving into a polycentric system, where urban functions
are distributed among several connected centers. The central question in this paper is
how can future developments in the transportation systems help lead this evolution
along the desired ‘multimodal’ and ‘multicentric’ path? First we will characterize and
interpret the emergence of a polycentric Amsterdam, particularly from the point of
view of the relationship between the development of transportation systems and the
development of urban structure. Then – after clarifying what and why we consider the
desired evolution path – we will show how certain configurations of the transporta-
tion systems could have an impact on both the urban structure and its use and percep-
tion by residents, workers and visitors.
The Development of Amsterdam’s Urban Structure in Relation to the
Development of its Transportation Systems 
A Brief Account of the Process
Historically, Amsterdam has developed in a radial manner. Its famous canals – which
once served as channels along which freight was moved to the warehouses (now the
well-known canal houses) – have given Amsterdam’s city center its characteristic belt-
type structure. From the center, canals extended into the surrounding countryside to
offer food-logistical links. The city’s first housing extensions in the industrial era were
constructed in the period 1850-1930, again in a belt-wise manner around the city core.
Radial roads from the city center to these and to neighboring cities cut through these
areas. These roads also accommodated the first mode of public transport – the tram –,
which at first was horse-drawn, but was soon thereafter electrified. 
Railway lines were constructed simultaneously. For this purpose, new rights of way
needed to be created or streets to be taken over, often with a dramatic impact on exist-
ing neighborhoods. The train system, too, was of a radial nature, as its purpose was to
link the economic center of Amsterdam to other important cities in the Netherlands
and abroad. Amsterdam’s Central Station was built very close to the city center (it is lo-
cated just half a kilometer from Dam Square – the historical heart of the city) and close
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to the harbor area. Later on, two more deliberate planning actions, accompanied by a
major railway network innovation, shaped and conditioned today’s city structure.
The first planning action was the design and acceptance of a spatial plan for the de-
velopment of Amsterdam, the AUP (Algemeen Uitbreidingsplan; General Extension
Plan) of 1935. In this plan, the ground was laid for Amsterdam’s finger- or lobe-wise ex-
pansion. What was envisaged as a way to provide space for more housing was not just
another belt of extension, but a radial type of development. Amsterdam West, in two
lobes, and Amsterdam Buitenveldert to the south were part of this original plan. Two
lobes in Amsterdam North, the extension of Buitenveldert into Amstelveen and the
southeast extension (the Bijlmermeer) were added later.
From a transport system perspective, these lobes allowed the introduction of radial
lines. The idea was to give the future residents of the new residential areas access to
both the city center and the surrounding open spaces. Access to the city center (for
working and shopping) would be by tram and bicycle, and to the surrounding green
wedges (for recreation) by foot and bicycle (the latest city extension – the Bijlmermeer,
in the southeast – also follows this philosophy, but it is instead served by a metro line,
constructed partly below and partly above ground). Finally, also as part of the AUP,
room was reserved for a freight rail line circumventing the older parts of the city in or-
der to provide access to port areas planned for the western part of the city.
The second prominent planning action was the planning of the national highway
system, the structural concept of which was established in 1966 in the Second Report
on Physical Planning in the Netherlands. The idea was to develop a grid of highways
covering the entire country with various degrees of accessibility and spacing propor-
tional to population density. Highways were no longer to be routed from city center to
city center, but around cities in order to allow traffic to bypass them. Tangential city by-
passes were thus created, forming ring roads around cities. In this way, Amsterdam’s
established radial street pattern was supplemented by very fast, high-standard high-
ways that connected the various radials at five and (as a half ring) ten kilometers from
the city center (see Figure 1). These highways were started in the late 1970s and have
now been completed, effectively supplanting the old radial road network, which in
places, however, does still survive. 
Thirdly and finally, there has been a major innovation in the structure of the rail-
way network. This was built in the nineteenth century to connect the four main cities
of the Randstad to the rest of the Netherlands, and these cities and the port of Rotter-
dam to Germany and Belgium. For a long time, the original shape remained un-
changed. More recently, with implementation starting in the late 1970s, an important
change in its configuration occurred in order to allow connection with Schiphol Air-
port, located to the west of Amsterdam. This meant building a new branch of the main
line between Amsterdam and The Hague through the airport, and connecting the air-
port with the east and north of the country via a link running along the southern edge
of Amsterdam. In the near future, a direct connection with Utrecht and the south of
the country along the same southern urban edge will be realized. For Amsterdam this
has meant that a tangential, and increasingly important rail network has been super-
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imposed on the original radial network (see Figure 1). This railway ring was already
projected in the AUP, but as a freight line giving access to the newly planned harbor ar-
eas west of the city. Crucially, virtually all the most important activity subcenters have
developed at the intersection of these national railway lines and the highway ring. In
the second half of the 1990s, a metro line running alongside the western and southern
ring was opened to mutually connect them, further consolidating this emerging de-
velopment corridor (see Figure 1). 
An Interpretation of the Process
The development process as briefly evoked at the close of the previous section seems
“natural”: a city deconcentrating to sites with good access to highways (because of the
increasing importance of the private automobile) followed by an extension of the local
public transport network there. Planning decisions, though, are not that natural and
not even that logical. Other decisions could have led to other kinds of city structures.
This can be understood, for instance, by looking at the structure of a city like Stock-
holm, which has been set up according to the same principles as Amsterdam: finger-
wise city extensions reaching out along radial public transport lines. Unlike Amster-
dam, however, Stockholm has reinforced its lobe-structure, and today the fingers
stretch out far into the region. The city center is still very strong though: the subcen-
ters are far more remote than the ones of Amsterdam, and thus less competitive with
it.
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It is thus important to acknowledge the way development has occurred. We will il-
lustrate the way Amsterdam has grown by analyzing the string of decisions which led
to the pattern of subcenters as it exists today.
Traditionally, employment was located in the very center of Amsterdam. Therefore,
expansion room for larger offices was sought close to the city center, that is, in the res-
idential belt dating from the end of the nineteenth century. The idea was to replace the
old built-up areas with new offices, while offering new housing in satellite towns out-
side Amsterdam. This was the urban renewal approach of the 1960s. The plans were
published in the second report on Amsterdam’s inner city area. They were supple-
mented by a plan for the construction of a mass transit system, that is, a metropolitan
rail network. On the edge of new metro radials and a metro ring, circumventing the
historic city, three inner city subcenters would be developed. 
These plans met with a lot of public opposition, originating from alternative views
on urban renewal, which thought that rather than relocating residents, houses
should be renovated and returned to their original function as housing in these urban
renewal areas. These opinions were strengthened by the bad experiences surrounding
the demolition of houses that were to make room for city arterials.
The second report on Amsterdam’s inner city was not approved by the city council.
The growing tertiary sector had no alternative but to look for space elsewhere. They
found it at the intersection of the radials with the new national tangential highway on
the west side of Amsterdam. One of the first sectors to move there was the fashion in-
dustry. At the end of the 1960s, the fashion industry was evicted from its premises,
which were then demolished to make room for an access road for the newly built IJ
Tunnel, close to the city center. Others followed. Only ten years later (in 1978) was this
trend of locating on the edge of the city acknowledged in the part of the structure plan
that dealt with Amsterdam’s economic development. In that plan, several locations
were designated as new sites for the rapidly expanding office sector, as there was hard-
ly any room (or permission) to build new offices in the older parts of the city. The new
sites offered particularly good access by both car and public transport. 
It was not only offices that were leaving the older and poorly accessible parts of the
inner city though; other space-consuming functions such as hospitals, the RAI exhibi-
tion and trade center, the Free University and various departments of the University of
Amsterdam were also leaving. A true migration had started gradually filling up the
subcenters between the old city and the newly planned extensions as part of the AUP.
These subcenters are more or less located in between the residential areas in the cen-
tral parts of Amsterdam and areas in its city extensions and the satellite towns and oth-
er cities outside of Amsterdam. 
The post-1978 period can be characterized by competitions between subcenters and
between subcenters and the city center. The development of and competition between
the subcenters occurred after the completion of both the highway ring (A10) and the
railway ring. The proximity to Schiphol Airport is a very important factor in this evolu-
tion.
The first subcenter was, as mentioned, the Fashion Center. It is located at the junc-
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tion of radial tramline no. 1 and the first part of the highway ring. Nearby, in Amster-
dam West, at the intersection of other radial tramlines, is another concentration of of-
fices, which includes the headquarters of Elsevier publishing and that of a major labor
union.
Three other subcenters were established in, respectively, Amsterdam Southeast,
Amsterdam South and Sloterdijk, an area near the western harbor (see Figure 1). Am-
sterdam Southeast is located on the rail line and the A2 highway connecting Amster-
dam to Utrecht. From the beginning it has had direct access to Schiphol Airport via the
second (half-)ring road (the A9). Amsterdam South only became important when a rail
link was opened to Schiphol (it was later extended to The Hague), next to the highway
ring already in place at that point. Sloterdijk became important when the rail line to
Schiphol from Amsterdam Central Station was routed via Sloterdijk. This area received
extra attention when in 1984 it became a “teleport center,” that is, a site well equipped
with facilities to run information and communication businesses.
The growth of each of the subcenters has fluctuated. Right now, Amsterdam South-
east is the most well-developed, accommodating not only offices but also a mixture of
facilities, such as a shopping mall, a stadium, a multiplex cinema, a music hall, etc. Slo-
terdijk lags behind, and Amsterdam South is seen as the new center for the headquar-
ters of major Dutch international banks (ABN AMRO, ING). It is close to Schiphol Air-
port and will become a hub at all levels of public transport.
Further enhancing this picture of far-fetched polycentrism, two other develop-
ments deserve mention: the (at least partly) failed attempt at planning a new office site
closer to the historic city center on the waterfront of the IJ river, and the booming,
spontaneous rise of employment activities near Schiphol airport.
As businesses (including such important sectors as the financial sector) continue to
leave the inner city, there are also efforts to try and stem the tide by providing space for
large-scale offices there as well. The IJ waterfront, near Central Station, has been iden-
tified as a suitable site. An attempt was made at the beginning of the 1990s to rapidly
develop this site as a public-private partnership. This failed, however, as it would have
taken about ten years to get the necessary infrastructure into place. Since then, also
the Amsterdam city government has concentrated on large-scale headquarter devel-
opments along the ring, especially in Amsterdam South. In the meantime, the area
along the IJ has been developing with a different mixture: more housing, cultural and
tourist facilities, and fewer and yet more varied sorts of businesses (i.e., no front of-
fices). 
Most of the growth in the regional employment of the last decade has occurred in or
close to Schiphol Airport, which is located in Haarlemmermeer, a municipality adja-
cent to Amsterdam. This is an area close to where highways intersect and is situated on
the rail line that runs from Amsterdam to The Hague and Rotterdam in the very heart
of the Randstad. It is thus a real nodal and hub area at all levels of transport: global via
the airport, European via the airport and high-speed train, national via train, regional
via a light transport link (which is under construction) and locally as a hub of regional
bus lines. This area – as an airport city – and Amsterdam South – as an urban site, also
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know as the ‘South Axis’ – are the main competitors in accommodating top of the mar-
ket employment growth in the Amsterdam region.
In the next section, the spatial-functional configuration of the region resulting
from these developments will be described through a series of snapshots of emerging
land-use patterns.
Centers and Subcenters in the Amsterdam Region: an Interlude in
Pictures
The distribution and intensity of land use provides some indication of the develop-
ment patterns in an urban region. Next to the places where people live and work, the
location of regional and larger local facilities follow in importance. These include
shopping centers, hospitals, and tourist attractions.
The population density of a neighborhood gives an indication of the distribution
and intensity of the residential function. Population densities in the region have been
determined on the basis of statistical data on neighborhoods (see Figure 2). The highest
densities (>100 inhabitants/ha) occur in the older districts of Amsterdam. There is a
somewhat lower density in the post-war neighborhoods of Amsterdam and in the cores
of surrounding centers. The low densities in the adjacent municipalities are partly due
to the fact that many of these areas still have an agricultural function. Major residen-
tial developments (not accounted for in the figure) are currently taking place along the
southern waterfront. 
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As far as employment is concerned the biggest concentrations are in the area within
the highway ring, in Amsterdam Southeast, Zaanstad (to the northwest of Amsterdam)
and around Schiphol Airport (see Figure 3). The areas with the highest development
dynamics are the airport, Amsterdam Southeast, and the areas around the southern
stretch of the expressway ring (the South Axis).
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Figure 4 provides an indication of the intensity of land use, as far as living and working
are concerned. The user-space index combines population and employment density. A
polycentric pattern is clearly visible, with the highest indices in the older districts of
Amsterdam, several areas within the city ring, Amsterdam Southeast, the airport and
in some parts of the surrounding municipalities.
Figure 5 provides an overview of the most important facilities in the region. The
biggest concentration of shops and tourist attractions still occurs in the historic center
of Amsterdam. Within Amsterdam there are however a number of subcenters with
supralocal significance. In Amsterdam Southeast for instance, major shopping and
leisure activity developments are presently being built in the vicinity of the already ex-
isting shopping center, the new Amsterdam ArenA stadium, and the railway station.
In the following section the developments in Amsterdam discussed so far will be set
against developments in other world cities in order to better appreciate the speci-
ficities of the transportation and spatial planning challenges facing Amsterdam.
The question of how to achieve sustainable mobility patterns, or avoid “automobile
dependency,” will be a central issue running through this discussion. This will lead
to the identification of a desired evolution path for Amsterdam and the region.
The Future Relationship between Transport and Urban Development
Cities and Transport: the International Context
In cities throughout the industrialized world, private motorized transport plays an es-
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sential and, in many respects, irreplaceable role. However, concern about its negative
effects, particularly in densely populated urban areas, is mounting, making ways to
“overcome automobile dependency” in cities (Newman and Kenworthy 1999) a key
challenge. The most promising approaches seem to be those that, although recogniz-
ing the importance of automobiles (and trucks), also incorporate effective, targeted
policies to fight their negative effects. This is also the emerging philosophy in the
Netherlands and Amsterdam (see, for example, VROMraad 1999). Central to these ap-
proaches is the fine-tuning of transport and land-use developments in order to en-
hance the specific advantages of different transport modes. In practice, this typically
means requiring urban-regional land-use policies to stimulate the use of alternatives
to the car, namely, collective transport modes and non-motorized modes.
Cervero (1998) distinguishes three ways in which collective transport and urban-re-
gional land-use patterns could reinforce each other:
1. The “adaptive city,” where a spatial structure is developed that can be optimally
served by a collective transport system. Examples cited by Cervero (1998) in Europe
include Stockholm and Copenhagen; examples in Asia include Tokyo and Singa-
pore. The examples show that the model can be successful in very different institu-
tional contexts (e.g. private-oriented Tokyo and public-oriented Singapore). An
interesting difference between the European and the Asian examples is the mor-
phology. The European examples entail a star-shaped spatial structure with a strong
central city and secondary living and working concentrations along railway corri-
dors. In the Asian examples, a radial structure is combined with a circular one (al-
ready in place in Tokyo and under development in Singapore), with urban centers of
roughly the same size consolidating at the intersections between the two (see Figure
6). It is intriguing to note that both the Stockholm and Copenhagen model are un-
der increasing pressure from continuous urban decentralization trends and the ac-
companying crisscross mobility flows, while both Tokyo and Singapore seem to pro-
vide a more resilient configuration for anchoring urban decentralization to
collective transport systems.
2. A second type is “adaptive transit,” where a collective transport system is developed
that can optimally serve a relatively diffused spatial structure. Examples in Cervero
are Karlsruhe, Adelaide and Mexico City. Each represents a quite different solution:
Karlsruhe has flexible and integrated train, tram and light-rail networks, Adelaide
has a well-performing busway (“O-bahn”) corridor, and Mexico City has highly com-
plementary public rail and private paratransit services. All show how innovative
collective transport concepts can successfully match a relatively spread-out urban
development pattern.
3. The third type – the “hybrid city” – combines characteristics of the first and the sec-
ond type. Examples discussed by Cervero are Munich, Ottawa and Curitiba. In all
cases a relatively dense core in which most jobs are concentrated is combined with a
relatively diffused, mostly residential periphery. Accordingly, linear and more or
less branched collective transport backbones are combined with lighter feeder
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and/or tangential collective transport services. Both rail-based (Munich) and bus-
based (Ottawa, Curitiba) backbone systems appear successful. Essential in all cases
is the high degree of complementarity between the different components of the
transport system, and the equally high degree of matching by land-use strategies. It
is in this respect interesting to note that, in response to continuing decentralization
trends, in both Munich and Ottawa secondary employment centers are currently
being developed at main transport interchanges outside the core.
Amsterdam as a multimodal, multicentric city
How can the historic and the current evolution of Amsterdam, as discussed in the pre-
vious sections, be positioned vis-à-vis Cervero’s (1998) conceptual framework? And
what are the implications for the challenges ahead? In many ways Amsterdam’s lobe
structure is similar to the development along radial railway corridors of such cities as
Stockholm and Copenhagen, but there are important differences. A crucial one is
the spatial scale of the lobes/corridors, which, as mentioned in the first section, is
much smaller in Amsterdam. Also, the concentration of development around stations,
with the highest densities close to the node, has not had the same emphasis in Amster-
dam. What in Stockholm and Copenhagen is a regional-scale strategy consistently pur-
sued throughout the entire second half of the twentieth century, in Amsterdam is a
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much more urban-scale strategy, with greater ambiguities in both space and time.
There are various explanations for this. Some have been discussed in the first sec-
tion. A further, important one is the fact that Amsterdam is part of a wider, polycentric
spatial system (the ‘Randstad’) in which many urban centers of comparable size are lo-
cated within relatively short distances. For instance, between the four biggest centers
of the Randstad – Amsterdam, Rotterdam, The Hague, Utrecht (each with between
250,000 and 750,000 inhabitants) – distances never exceed 80 km and are often much
shorter (e.g. the distance between Rotterdam and The Hague is about 25 km, that be-
tween Utrecht and Amsterdam about 40 km). Distances between the edges of the four
big cities or to important secondary centers (e.g. Leiden, Haarlem or Delft, each of
which has more than 100,000 inhabitants) are even shorter. This places Amsterdam in
a multicentric regional field whose functional interconnections have been continu-
ously growing, not least because distances travelled have been increasing (the national
average is now more than 30 km per day per person). This reality is visualized, albeit on
a negative note, by the daily reports of ever worsening traffic jams on highways in the
Randstad, and of increasing delays on the equally congested Randstad train network.
This picture starkly contrasts with the comparatively low and decreasing traffic pres-
sure within urban centers.
The institutional context has further reinforced the historical polycentricity of the
Randstad. In Dutch transport and land-use planning, the two main actors are the na-
tional and the municipal government. There is no strong actor at the urban-regional
level. The national government produces generic land-use guidelines for the whole
country, while municipalities have a strong degree of autonomy in interpreting them.
This is a quite different reality from that of the Stockholm and Copenhagen areas,
where – even in the absence of a formal or strong metropolitan authority – the central
city has had a decisive influence in orientating regional development choices. The
workings of a broader field of institutional forces in the Randstad, as well as the domi-
nant role of the national government in transport provision, can be also traced back in
the evolution of the main transportation networks – the highway and the railway – as
described in earlier sections. In particular, there it was shown how a largely local gov-
ernment-designed radial structure later had national government-designed tangen-
tial highway and railway structures superimposed on it.
The position of the Amsterdam highway ring road in the national highway system is
particularly important: the southern stretch in particular has direct connections with
the international airport and the rest of the Randstad and the country, much more so
than the historic city center. Intriguingly, this may be increasingly true also for acces-
sibility by rail. In particular, high-speed train links to Germany and Belgium will use
the southern railway ring and have a station on it, possibly bypassing Amsterdam’s
Central Station. The superior accessibility of the ring – and particularly of its southern,
multimodal segment – combines with another crucial factor: the relative availability
of land for development, due to the provisions for recreational, transport and other
large-scale functions made in the AUP. This combination of factors has proved, as
shown in sections one and two, explosive: areas around the southern highway and rail-
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way ring, and extending to the airport, are showing the highest transformation dy-
namics of the entire agglomeration.
The resulting picture is intriguing. Amsterdam, which is only an approximation
of the star-shaped European version of the “adaptive” city, has – uniquely on the conti-
nent – features of the Asian version of it, as found in Tokyo and Singapore. These
cities combine a radial and a tangential collective transport structure, with the main
concentrations of urban activities at the intersections between the two systems (see
Figure 6). This fact is intriguing because, as mentioned, the Asian model appears
much more capable of anchoring urban decentralization processes than the Euro-
pean one. Not surprisingly, a major challenge to European adaptive cities is to develop
a transport and land-use strategy to cope with the reality of crisscross mobility flows
(see e.g. Hall and Ward 1998; see also the discussion of the European examples in
Cervero 1998).
There is, however, an important distinction to be made with respect to the Asian,
but also other European examples. European cities, including Amsterdam, tend to be
much more car-dependent than Asian cities of comparable wealth, such as Tokyo, Sin-
gapore and Hong Kong (all the data below are from Kenworthy and Laube 1999): for in-
stance, in 1990 European cities registered an average of 4,519 private passenger vehicle
kilometers per capita against 1,487 in Asian cities. Again in 1990, European cities had
an average share of public transport in all motorized transport of 22.6 percent as op-
posed to 64.1 percent in Asian cities, and of 38.8 percent as opposed to 59.6 percent as
far as home-to-work trips are concerned. Amsterdam is no exception. Indeed, it has an
even lower share of collective transport than many other European cities (with 25 per-
cent, a European low in home-to-work trips). This, however, is not so much because of
greater car use, but because of a unique feature of the transport system in Amsterdam
and the Netherlands: the role of the bicycle. With an astonishing 35 percent, Amster-
dam is by far the city in the representative international, world-wide sample of Ken-
worthy and Laube (1999) with the highest share of commuters using non-motorized
modes, mainly thanks to the bicycle. By comparison, the European average is 8.5 per-
cent, and the average in Singapore (the Asian wealthy city with the highest share of
non-motorized modes) is 22.5 percent. 
The specificity of the mobility patterns of Amsterdam – higher car use than Asian
cities, higher share of non-motorized modes than anywhere else – means that a multi-
modal perspective (which includes both walking, the bike, the car and collective trans-
port) is needed. Such a perspective shows, for instance, how the bicycle and local col-
lective transport are competitors within Amsterdam, but also how there is a strong
complementarity between the bicycle and the regional train. A policy implication of
this is for example that in Amsterdam, any transit-oriented regional development
strategy should have as one of its central concerns the quality of the interchange and
the degree of complementarity between bike and regional railways, particularly at the
origin side of trips. A multimodal perspective also helps to explain why it is especially
the locations combining excellent accessibility by car and by train – i.e. the multi-
modal corridors in Figure 1 – that are developing the most rapidly. These locations
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would have to be central components of a transit-oriented regional development strat-
egy, particularly at the destination side of trips.
In such a multimodal strategy, which recognizes the interwovenness of different
networks and scales, next to “adaptive city” also “adaptive transit” and “hybrid city”
types of solutions as reviewed by Cervero (1998) and summed up above may have a role
(e.g. the combination of backbone collective transport infrastructure and lighter serv-
ices with a feeder function and/or park-and-ride facilities typical of hybrid cities). A cru-
cial question in this respect – and one to which a definitive answer has not been given
yet – is where to locate these interchange facilities: at the edge of the urban core, or fur-
ther away? Current, rather unsuccessful experiments are of the first kind. Perhaps lo-
cations closer to the origin of trips would be more successful. Secondly, adaptive tran-
sit systems (e.g. the light-rail in Karlsruhe) may have a role, for instance in the rapidly
but rather diffusely urbanizing areas in between the existing urban centers. One such
system – a busway called the “Zuidtangent” – has recently been opened, to connect in-
tensively developing areas south of the agglomeration and including the airport.
The multimodal perspective sketched above shows that the urban mobility issue,
certainly in Amsterdam, has no simple or single solution. Furthermore, the evolution
described in previous sections, shows that the task of accommodating mobility should
not be separated from the broader one of developing places, as transport policy can
have great impacts on land-use developments, certainly on the long term. The chal-
lenge seems that of fine-tuning accessibility and other features of each specific loca-
tion so that a variety of complementary environments for living, working and other ac-
tivities are made available to both the permanent and the temporary inhabitants of
the Amsterdam region. This will be elaborated upon in the conclusions.
Conclusions
For a long time, transport policy in Amsterdam has been characterized by the often
contradictory aims of evenly distributing accessibility across the city and –  since the
1970s – of mitigating the negative effects of car use. The paradox has been perhaps
strongest in the city center, which was to be afforded the highest accessibility from the
region and beyond, but also to be spared the growing number of moving and parked
cars. This policy was mirrored, on the land-use side, by the equally contradictory aims
of maintaining and developing high-level functions in the core while preserving its
historical urban fabric. The attitude towards decentralizing tendencies has been long
ambiguous: there have long been ad hoc reactions, but no incorporation into a new
strategy.
The emerging, diverse activity and accessibility patterns described in this chapter
suggest a new direction for transport and land-use policy in Amsterdam. Emerging dif-
ferentiation of locational conditions, particularly accessibility, should not be denied
or countered but understood and built upon. Two sorts of urban centers are develop-
ing: dynamic subcenters at nodal zones enjoying exceptional accessibility by both car
and public transport, and the old city center, where accessibility by car is lower. If its
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lower accessibility by car puts the city center (and other historic centers in the region)
at a disadvantage, at the same time it greatly contributes to creating the conditions for
the development of a unique urban environment. Certain kinds of living and working
environmentsmayprofit fromthespecific,“deviating”accessibilitymixof thecore.Ac-
tivities in the ACE (arts, culture, entertainment) cluster are for instance thriving there.
The high share of non-motorized modes can be said to be even a factor in the high de-
gree of conviviality of the public space in the city center. The greatest challenge in this
respect is perhaps to identify the level of regional accessibility, including by car (and
truck), the city center still needs in order to maintain its vitality and not become the ex-
clusivedomainoftouristsandothersortsof“city users” (followinga“Venice scenario”).
Locations along the ring road provide direct access to the region via regional/inter-
regional both public and private transportation networks. This is matched by a rela-
tive abundance of space. Accordingly, they constitute an opportunity for developers –
one that can be very competitive with existing locations, particularly those in the in-
ner city. A carefully combined development trajectory of the two sorts of locations (i.e.
in the center and along the ring) is thus required in order to avoid the cannibalization
of existing activity clusters (e.g. shopping, entertainment and education in the city
center). Secondarily, even though current developments show that areas along the
ring road can indeed be extremely useful as locations for expanding activities, espe-
cially offices, they also show that creating a full-fledged, diverse working and living en-
vironment there remains a daunting urban planning and design task. Achieving this
constitutes a related challenge. 
A third issue is how to coordinate the development of activities at specific locations
in the face of far-reaching changes in the hierarchy of the infrastructure networks.
Examples of the latter are the planned up- and downgrading of highway sections, the
development of a new regional public transportation network, the connection to the
international high-speed train network, and – in the longer term – possibly the devel-
opment of a Maglev (magnetic levitation train) interregional system or the relocation
of the airport. All these infrastructure developments will cause major shifts in the ac-
cessibility of specific locations, which will directly affect their development potential
and will need to be dealt with.
Finally, next to these different sorts of evolving urban centers, there is a “rest” where
locations also have their specific accessibility qualities. Possibly the best way to charac-
terize these places relative to the old and new urban centers is their being “slower”.
They have a lower accessibility but also less congestion, and a different pace. For many
these can be very popular places to live and work in – on one crucial condition: that
they are protected from the negative impact of the transport flows often just passing
through them.
A multiform Amsterdam is emerging, where the accessibility differentials created
by transportation networks combine with other locational features to create a diversi-
ty of urban environments. Rather than denying these differences, transport and land-
use policy should capitalize on the specific features of each location and address the
four challenges mentioned in these conclusions. By doing so, a multicentric, multi-
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modal Amsterdam can be developed, where alternatives to the car can get a chance,
while the positive contributions of the automobile are also recognized. Making this di-
versity truly accessible to the people living and working in or visiting the urban region
however, requires a radical improvement of the transport systems connecting the dif-
ferent locations. Possibly the most urgent tasks in this respect are managing mount-
ing congestion of the highway system and developing a high-quality collective system
on the urban-regional scale.
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3.3 • Utilities as Tools for Shaping the City
Waste Management and Power Supply
Maarten Wolsink
Introduction
Large, complex networks provide goods and services. Today, these networks fully cover
the industrialized countries, even though they started out as local networks in cities.
Utilities provide some of the goods and services that serve the basic needs of house-
holds and commerce. For example, electricity supply and drinking water are usually
referred to as utility sectors. In terms of economic analysis, these functions used to be
regarded as “natural monopolies” and therefore were run as public services. Besides
these natural monopolies, some other services were for a very long time also provided
by utilities. Public utilities were also found in housing, transport and communication
sectors. The authorities that managed these huge infrastructures were often public
bodies.
Nowadays, a wave of liberalization is washing over these public sectors. As a result of
developing technologies and changing management visions, crucial services are not
necessarily provided by public agencies. These developments also reflect changed vi-
sions on the purpose of utility functions and the way they can be used to manage the
city and shape society. Nevertheless, these changes are still being extensively debated.
In May 2002, for example, a referendum was held in Amsterdam on the issue of the in-
dependence of the Gemeente Vervoer Bedrijf (gvb). This public transport company
which operates the city’s tram, bus and metro network, is still a municipal agency and
66% voted against independence, probably because most voters feared that this was
one more step towards privatization.
The transformation of some utilities into private or hybrid sectors that in the past
were considered public bodies, will be described here. We will focus on two sectors in
which the municipal authorities have been dominant for about a century. The fact
that local authorities have lost part of their influence in managing the public services
is shaping some conditions for sustainable development within the city.
Economists used to distinguish certain sectors as natural monopolies, because of
the large investments needed for the physical infrastructure (Foreman-Peck and Mill-
ward 1994: 11). These sectors were supposed to serve the general interest of the citizens
and the economy, and were determined to be unprofitable for competing private com-
panies. Generally, the investments were needed to build large, expensive networks,
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like railways or the electricity grid. Competing companies operating parallel networks
would create inefficiency.
Although the economic theory considered these activities as natural monopolies –
and therefore as activities that should be public – history shows that most of them
started out as private initiatives. This applies, for example, to the US (Paul-Simon 1993),
where many utilities remain private or semi-private. In most European countries, in-
cluding the Netherlands, the utilities became publicly owned and managed compa-
nies. This first development from private to public illustrates the instrumental think-
ing regarding utility functions, as these were considered tools in shaping the city and
pushing economic development.
From Private to Public Waste Management
The urbanization of the nineteenth century was partly the result of new possibilities
for technical services, while simultaneously creating a good basis for the commercial
provision of these services (Ausubel and Herman 1988). Many utility functions
emerged in cities, long before they were extended to the rest of the country. A greater
need for these utilities was recognized within the cities, although it is debatable
whether this need was collective or rooted in private interests. According to De Swaan
(1987), compulsory structures of utility functions are the result of a process of collec-
tivization. He describes the collectivization of care-taking activities by the state as a civ-
ilizing process. Collective facilities, consisting of hardware (infrastructure) and soft-
ware (organizations), were created for the provision of collective goods such as energy
and water. His explanation for the collectivization of these goods is that they had qual-
ities that were important for the wealthy (e.g. environmental hygiene). In the cities,
pollution and malnutrition led to disease, which interfered with the availability of
workers for the production process. It also resulted in epidemics that formed a direct
threat not only to the working-class but also to the wealthy. The concentration of
poverty and the overcrowding in lower-class districts posed a threat in the form of a
lack of hygiene and safety. For this reason in particular, sewerage, waste collecting, and
drinking water became public tasks. It was public bodies, with the abilities to enforce
cooperation and to charge levies for the services, that took charge of these collective
arrangements, mostly as a result of the activities of well-organized pressure groups.
De Swaan’s vision concerning the collectivization of utility functions may be chal-
lenged, however. Systems for waste removal had already existed in several cities for cen-
turies. The tasks of removing waste and selling manure and compost were leased in
most municipalities to foundations for the poor, or occasionally to foundations set up
to provide the unemployed with work. The systematic approach to waste removal from
a general interest perspective started in the mid-nineteenth century. Amsterdam was
among the very first cities to establish a waste management system. There were private
initiatives in Amsterdam and these were mainly taken for reasons of hygiene, for ex-
ample the waste removal concession of the medical doctor, Dr. Samuel Sarphati (1847).
The increasing concentration of population created epidemics and problems of hy-
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giene, and a social movement comprised mainly of doctors – called the ”hygienists” –
emerged. In Amsterdam, this movement was linked to the crucial role of the water sup-
ply from the canals. The hygienists stressed the causal relationship between epidemics
and general living conditions. Their movement was primarily idealistic – though
based on professional knowledge – and they acted as a pressure group that tried to
force the authorities to take measures by means of influencing public opinion (Van
Zon 1986). At the time, waste consisted mainly of feces, which had economic value
when mixed with other biologically degradable components. Existing private initia-
tives concentrated on this economic value. In Amsterdam, Sarphati had to compete
with a company called Amsterdamse Landbouw- en Mestcompagnie (Amsterdam Agri-
culture and Manure Company). This private company had a license to dredge the
canals, into which much of the waste and feces were dumped. Because the supply of
water – including drinking water – came from the canals, the hygienists wanted to put
a stop to this practice. They simultaneously stressed the importance of not dumping
waste into the canals and of building a new infrastructure for drinking water supply.
Eventually, Amsterdam became the first city in the Netherlands with water mains,
which were built in 1854 with British capital and know-how. The water was collected in
a drainage canal in the sand dunes near Haarlem and transported through a pipe to
Amsterdam.
The quality of manure and compost produced from the waste was generally poor. Its
economic value was not particularly high and the manure companies were not very re-
liable. The waste removal system started by Sarphati and his companions concentrated
on removing feces in barrels. Solid waste removal concentrated on the waste lying in
the streets. In the last decades of the century, municipalities discontinued the leasing
agreements and licenses. Van Zon (1986) stresses that they were forced by the idealistic
hygienist movement to make waste removal a public and municipal task. Again for hy-
gienic reasons, municipal waste removal services started a system that was set up to
prevent people from dumping waste on streets and in canals. The next step was a gen-
eral system for solid waste removal, beyond the barrel system. Finally, the entire waste
management function in Amsterdam (in 1880) as well as in other cities became a pub-
lic service. The ideological view of hygienic conditions from a health perspective soon
broadened to a view in which waste removal was considered a natural public function
as part of shaping a livable urban environment.
From Private Investors to Public Electricity Utilities
When and by whom the first electricity in the Netherlands was supplied is unclear, but
it was not in Amsterdam. Some claim that it was the Nederlandse Electriciteits
Maatschappij (nem) that started electricity generation on 19 December 1883 in Rotter-
dam (De Goey 1991). Others say that it was an immigrant engineer with his company
named “Systeem de Kothinsky” who obtained a license in 1884 from the City of Rotter-
dam to supply electricity from a boat with generators to a construction site in the Wine
Harbor. In any case, other private companies soon followed, because generating elec-
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tricity and supplying it concentrated on places where special local demand promised
profits. A private company near Rotterdam built the first central power station in 1886.
At the time, electricity was not seen as a public good by the authorities. On the con-
trary, municipalities – which feared possible competition as gas was the current
source for lighting – openly frustrated several private initiatives to set up a public sup-
ply. The light system was based on the supply of gas, which was a very profitable activi-
ty for most municipalities, including Amsterdam. The local gas companies had been in
the hands of the municipalities from the beginning of the nineteenth century. In some
cities, private gas plants produced gas from coal and coke. In most cities, however, the
authorities supplied gas to small businesses and households. They protected this prof-
itable activity and did not hesitate to use their powers to defeat any competition (Kooy
1986).
The nem was founded by nine investors. One of them was Adolf Krasnapolsky, who
had already started to generate his own electricity for his restaurant on Warmoesstraat
in the very center of Amsterdam. The company requested a permit in 1882 to establish
a few lines to supply some nearby properties. However, the mayor and aldermen re-
fused to issue a permit, as they did with several other requests in the following years, so
as to protect the supply of so-called city gas by the municipal gas company.
Generating techniques developed rapidly; in particular the emergence of alternat-
ing current techniques led to the development of larger grids. Soon the City of Amster-
dam had to back down under pressure from private investors. The first permit to estab-
lish a small grid in Amsterdam (in a block between the Kalverstraat and Nieuwezijds
Voorburgwal) was issued in 1888 to a company named NV Electra. The permits for
block grids, however, were time limited, because the City had the idea that this type of
service might become as profitable as supplying gas. Because of this temporary limita-
tion, other private investors – including Krasnapolsky’s nem – refused to build a grid.
Electra remained the only company and it soon received a concession to supply elec-
tricity throughout the city. This led to the first alternating current power station in the
Netherlands, which started generating electricity in 1892.
The factor that persuaded municipal authorities to generate their own electricity
was the stimulating effect it might have on other sectors. In Rotterdam, the signifi-
cance of power in the harbor triggered the actions of the municipal authorities. In Am-
sterdam, the possibility of replacing the horse-drawn public transport was the main
reason for starting public electricity generation. The City decided to electrify all 50 km
of rail tracks in 1900 and for that purpose a new central power station was built and
managed by the City. The competition with Electra was considered undesirable. In
1913, the City of Amsterdam ended the concession, took over all the clients and Elec-
tra’s grid, and established the Gemeente-Electriciteitswerken (Municipal Electricity
works), maintaining a local public monopoly on the electricity supply. 
At the turn of the century, the number of individual consumers grew rapidly and
municipalities began to realize that electricity could be a profitable activity (Van den
Noort 1990). Municipalities that recognized the importance of electricity stimulated
the development of small local networks and the linking of consumers to the grid. In
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the following decades the dependency on electricity increased rapidly and the num-
ber of local and regional networks grew. These local networks were public, and the for-
mer private companies were taken over by the local authorities. As with waste man-
agement, the entire chain of electricity supply functions was subject to a process of
municipalization. As mentioned in an oblique remark, this had already happened
with the local gas companies. This was in line with the development in other Western
European countries, such as the UK (Foreman-Peck and Millward 1994). Unlike waste
removal, however, it was not primarily the utility character of the energy services that
was decisive in the municipalization process. Revenues were a crucial factor, as well as
the new possibilities the utilities offered for stimulating economic activity and shap-
ing the urban environment.
Municipal Waste Management within a National Framework
Soon after the era of municipalization, a series of scale increases and interventions by
national authorities took place. With waste disposal, the scale issue arose very quickly
because the opportunities for manure and compost sales were decreasing. Ironically,
the economic value of waste decreased partly because another service had been estab-
lished for hygienic reasons. In 1872, sewers were introduced in a small part of Amster-
dam. At first, this development was slow, as a system of pneumatically driven sewage
system had been chosen. This system, as proposed by the engineer Liernur, was prob-
lematic, but sewerage became more important when a system of flushing linked to the
drinking water system was introduced. The quality of the composition of waste as fer-
tilizer decreased as the amount of solid waste increased and sewage systems were built.
Furthermore, demand for organic material decreased strongly at the end of the centu-
ry when artificial fertilizer became readily available. Small, private enterprises disap-
peared and finally the only option for composting became the Vuilafvoer Maatschap-
pij (vam). The government founded this company for large-scale composting in 1929, as
a sort of development aid for the poor province of Drenthe. The vam has expanded over
the years and is still nationally significant in the waste removal sector. Today it also
processes other materials and it recently built a large incinerator for household waste.
The residual – a growing proportion of solid waste – was mainly landfilled. A large
number of small landfills were created for that purpose. At the beginning of the twen-
tieth century, Amsterdam needed a larger disposal site and decided to landfill the
Naardermeer, a lake near the city. A new movement of mainly biologists protested
fiercely and started a campaign to prevent the use of the Naardermeer for waste dis-
posal. This typical “lulu” conflict (locally unwanted land use) was one of the first cas-
es in which general environmental values were defended by civilians against spatial
developments proposed by authorities, something that became very common in the
second half of the 20th century (Wolsink 1994). Eventually, the campaign in 1904 re-
sulted in a new organization that bought the lake, which became the first natural re-
serve of the Vereniging tot Behoud van Natuurmonumenten (Union for the Conserva-
tion of Natural Monuments). The birth of this (still the largest) Dutch environmental
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organization for the first time showed that significance of waste was not limited to the
hygienic aspect of the human environment. The public perception of local risks and
wider environmental issues linked to waste facilities became textbook examples of ris-
ing environmental awareness and the conflict character of facility siting that desper-
ate authorities nowadays often try to dispose of as “nimby-ism” (McAvoy 1999; Devilee
2002).
After World War II, the amount of solid waste started to grow very rapidly as a result
of increasing consumption and the increased use of materials. The diversity of waste
increased because of new materials, particularly synthetics. It caused a shift from pri-
marily waste removal to waste management, including collection, processing, trans-
port, and disposal. The emergence of new, significant functions within the waste
chain created options for new private interests in waste management. Private enter-
prise started to deal with specific components of waste that could be recovered and
sold at a profit. These companies could concentrate only on the profitable aspects of
the waste stream and on functions that generated economically feasible revenues. Be-
cause of this “cherry picking,” the role of the municipalities was reduced to those func-
tions that were considered unprofitable.
Semi-Public Energy Sector
In the 1920s, provincial utilities started to electrify rural areas. Simultaneously, there
began a gradual shift towards national power planning and a partial integration with
gas. In 1920, most of the 33 private and 167 local gas utilities were producing gas them-
selves. The local networks distributed more than 200 different qualities of gas, but this
number decreased in the following decades. A few large industries (steel, mining) start-
ed to transport “distance gas,” a secondary product, in some regions and there the lo-
cal gas companies became distributors only (Tellegen et al 1996). Later in the 1950s,
municipalities throughout the northeastern parts of the country were supplied with
natural gas, derived from various small fields, to distribute to consumers. The produc-
tion of gas was in the hands of the Nederlandse Aardolie Maatschappij (nam), a joint
venture of Shell and Exxon. The exclusive right to drill in the northern and eastern
parts of the Netherlands was granted in 1933 to the Bataafsche Petroleum Maatschap-
pij (now Royal Dutch Shell). Nobody ever thought the commercial exploitation of nat-
ural gas would be important, but it later became the major consequence of this move.
The Staatsgasbedrijf (State Gas Company) was founded to carry out the large-scale
transport of natural gas from the numerous small fields.
In 1959, one of the world’s largest natural gas fields was found in Groningen (a
northern province). In 1963, the government abandoned all coal-based gas production
and a national grid for natural gas was created. Production stayed with the nam, but
half of the profit went to the state. The other side of the deal was that the nam got 50
percent of the Gasunie, a new company created for the transport and large-scale supply
of gas. It established a full national monopoly by taking over the networks of the Staats-
gasbedrijf and all the regional networks for “distance gas.” The local companies had
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gradually lost their production function and the result was a separation of production
and transport from distribution and supply. During these decades many gas utilities
merged with local or regional power utilities, which in Amsterdam resulted in the
Gemeente Energie Bedrijf (geb).
The semi-public Gasunie held a legal monopoly on transport, as the gas produced by
others was compulsorily delivered to it. Distributors remained the utilities, which
were governed by provinces and municipalities. Compared to the electricity supply
companies, most gas suppliers were rather small. Most utilities still owned power
plants and these power-producing utilities cooperated in the Samenwerkende Elec-
triciteits Producenten (sep; Cooperating Electricity Producers) in managing the high-
voltage electricity network. The national organization sep did not generate power it-
self, as it could only coordinate production.
Strong Policy Connections
In the decades following World War II, there was a strong belief in the power of the pol-
icy that used utilities as its tools. Expanding waste utilities were supposed to handle
the rapidly growing waste streams effectively, while energy supply was considered a
key factor in economic growth. The Social Democrats in particularly believed this and
tended towards state intervention. In the 1960s, Den Uyl, the former Amsterdam alder-
man, became minister of Economic Affairs. Den Uyl tried to enhance state interven-
tion in energy production in his proposed Continental Shelf Mining Act. Locally – par-
ticularly in Amsterdam, a town dominated by social democratic administrators –
waste and energy were also considered strong policy tools. Effective, cheap energy sup-
plies and efficient waste removal were tools for creating favorable conditions for the
establishment of new businesses.
The policy objectives shifted in the early 1970s. Environmental issues appeared on
the agenda, and this changed the perspectives on waste and energy policy. Waste man-
agement became a top priority in the new policy domain of environmental issues, a
trend that was accompanied by a scale increase in the waste planning system. Initially
the Ministry of Health and Environment (1972) was in charge of waste, but since 1984
the Ministry of Housing, Spatial Planning and Environmental Management has been
responsible for it. The objective changed from providing cheap and reliable waste re-
moval to achieving environmentally sound disposal, and was accompanied by a criti-
cal view on the growth of waste streams.
Under the administration of Economic Affairs, energy policy remained a primarily
economic policy domain. Here environmental issues were overshadowed by the energy
crises. The first energy crisis influenced Dutch energy policy, because the country was
boycotted by Arab oil states for several months in 1973. The electricity sector, which was
almost doubling its output every ten years, suddenly had to reconsider its position
within society. The 1974 Energy Policy Memorandum sketched three targets: more effi-
cient energy use, more economic exploitation of resources, and the reduction of exter-
nal dependence. The establishment of new, large-scale power plants became a matter of
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discussion. Although the Energy Policy Memorandum announced three new nuclear
power plants, nuclear energy was no longer acceptable to the public. The use of oil had
to be reduced because it had left the country too dependent on other countries, gas was
considered a strategic reserve and coal was criticized mainly for its environmental im-
pact. Hence, the establishment of new power plants came under pressure.
Since 1960, the demand had increased by over 7 percent, but after 1973 it dropped to
less than 3 percent. This was not the result of efficiency, but because of the economic
recession that followed the energy crisis. High energy prices had a strong social im-
pact, which became an issue in local policy in Amsterdam. Inefficient energy con-
sumption created income problems as many residents saw their energy bill rise quick-
ly, particularly in the nineteenth-century districts, which had high unemployment
rates and a high dependency on social security. Energy saving policies with insulation
and improved installations for block heating became an important part of municipal
housing activities. The geb was an important tool and was involved in many urban re-
newal projects.
Policy Loses Control
Strong tension between national and local policy levels emerged. While the objectives
within the energy and the waste sector deviated, scales of planning increased. At first
this ran parallel to scale increases in technology that created economies of scale. Many
small, uncontrolled and old-fashioned waste dumps were closed in favor of larger,
more sophisticated landfills. Then a shift from landfill to incineration was established
in the 1980s. Local and regional waste utilities were eager to create long-term access to
waste disposal capacity, but the planning of that capacity was legally given to the
provinces. Furthermore, the new, large waste facilities suffered from growing public
opposition at the local level. There was a long struggle in Amsterdam over an incinera-
tor that was finally built in the western industrial and harbor zone. Environmental
policy had its first small successes in starting up some separate collection activities
linked to waste processing instead of disposal.
Private investors tried to find profitable activities in separate collection and recy-
cling. Most of these were local companies (e.g. Icova in Amsterdam) with mainly busi-
ness customers. However, they also acquired contracts with municipalities for sepa-
rate household waste collection. These systems did not include door-to-door removal,
but mostly involved street containers to which citizens could bring waste components
like glass or paper. Obviously these activities focused only on components that were
profitable. However, the markets appeared very unstable and the reliability of these ac-
tivities was generally low, while the private waste companies’ commitment to the en-
vironment was often dubious. Mistrust was created by the many conflicts over permits
for waste processing plants, a generally low commitment to the environmental condi-
tions set in these permits, and various large waste disposal scandals. Nevertheless,
waste management became more diverse and private enterprises were successful in
cherry picking in the waste market.
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In the power supply sector, the planning of large generating capacity also created
struggles over the type and location of new plants. Strong differences emerged be-
tween the objectives of local and national energy policy, particularly among the pro-
ponents of strong public influence over the sector, such as the Social Democrats. Na-
tionally they were in favor of national government planning in the energy sector and
they supported organizational scale increases. However, the proposed concentration
and national planning conflicted with the rejection of nuclear power, a top priority in
their program (Wolsink 1985). This particularly large-scale technology, demanding
strong state control, would be supported by the concentration and state intervention
the Social Democrats favored. Local social democratic authorities, among those in the
City of Amsterdam, recognized that contradiction and questioned the need for con-
centration and scale increases. They wanted to maintain control over their utilities.
The discussion on concentration started by the government confirmed a trend of gas
company mergers and mergers of gas and power utilities (CoCoNut 1980). In Amster-
dam the relatively large geb was able to survive. Furthermore, regional and local au-
thorities wanted to secure the generating capacity of their own utilities. As the growth
in demand dropped, a large surplus of generating capacity developed in the 1980s and
building new generating capacity became more difficult for reasons of environmental
impact. This is similar to the difficulties in decision making on other infrastructure fa-
cilities such as waste incinerators (Wolsink 1994). Amsterdam had its own conflict over
thebuildingofanewcoal-firedpowerplantontheHemweginthewesternharborzone.
The disintegration of policy objectives was reinforced by the developments in tech-
nology and the energy market. Large-scale power generation was at its peak in 1983, as
the amount of electricity generated by private actors for their own use (supplying oth-
ers was illegal) was at its lowest level (4 percent). From that moment, self-generating ac-
tivities started to increase, because new small-scale techniques – in particular com-
bined heat and power – were becoming cost-effective. However, with the emergence of
the new phenomenon of managing efficient demand, the feasibility of these systems
was not only just a matter of effective generation.
Demand-Side Management
Originally, demand-side management (dsm) referred to activities engaged in by utili-
ties to change the time of demand for electricity. This was primarily economically mo-
tivated, because balancing supply and demand was still part of supply-oriented man-
agement. Time-of-day tariffs were intended to increase power sales at night and
weekends to improve the utilization of installed capacity. In Amsterdam, the City neg-
lected this intention, as it forced the geb in 1983 to discard time-of-day tariffs in favor
of a slight overall price reduction for all households as part of its income policy. This
intervention was contrary to the mainstream developments of the diversification of
services and prices, and of reducing the need for building new power plants.
Later, environmental benefits became a goal and the scope of dsm was expanded ei-
ther by associating environmental objectives with it or by including activities which
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might reduce electricity demand. Now, the activities of utilities can also include the
environmentally motivated stimulation of consumer demand for electricity produced
from renewables (“green” electricity). Similarly in the drinking water and waste sector
there has been diversification of services and the scope of dsm activities is growing
(Van Vliet 2002).
dsm should be considered all of the activities which have the following features:
supply-demand balancing, intervening “beyond the meter,” consumer auditing and
advice, and all kinds of demand reduction, exceeding regulations and standards
(Prindle 1991). Therefore, dsm measures are all of the activities performed by supply-
side organizations (environmentally or economically motivated) directed at shaping
consumer demand for utility services. Within the waste sector, activities directed at
separated collection and public campaigning about how to limit the amount of waste
are also dsm.
It is important to realize what services are actually provided to customers, as for an
optimal environmental performance the definition of these services may need to be
changed. For instance, in the electricity sector the service provided to customers can be
seen as “supply of electricity.” However, customers in fact need “energy services” such
as motion, sound, vision, heat etc., rather than of electricity per se. Similarly, they need
services helpful for managing their waste substances such as tools for separation,
reuse, and discarding waste, rather than waste removal per se. Helpful tools in the shift
to energy and waste services are “smart meters,” which can do a lot more than simply
count.
The environmental impact of waste management has become dependent on the
quality of the services offered to the customers. Similarly, to improve the environmen-
tal performance of the electricity sector, the question is how to optimize energy servic-
es provided rather than a question of how to optimize electricity supply. The latter
question was a rather simple one until the early 1980s. The emergence of new power
generating technology that meant high diversification in scales, and the diversifica-
tion in waste collection, processing, and disposal techniques required totally new sys-
tems of provision.
While private enterprise and competition already existed for particular waste serv-
ices, the new electricity provision act of 1989 introduced some competition in the pow-
er sector. The act included an organizational separation of large-scale electricity pro-
duction from electricity distribution, including small-scale generation (less than 25
MW). 
Liberalization
The separation of the production of electricity from its distribution may be considered
a first significant step towards liberalizing the electricity market. The Amsterdam geb
was split up into an electricity and gas distributor, and a power production company.
The City of Amsterdam still held the shares of both and still tried to use them for its
own policies. The system included a few incentives for competition among producers
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and between producers and distributors. The creation of new generating capacities
was stimulated and new combined heat and power systems fueled by gas were devel-
oped. Many of these were larger than 25 MW and were built by joint ventures of the new
distributors and private companies. This new capacity was more efficient both finan-
cially and environmentally, but resulted in a surplus capacity of large-scale genera-
tion. The costs of the capacity surplus were spread out over the entire sector, so that the
captive consumers ended up paying the costs. The system that combined central plan-
ning with incentives for competition appeared unstable. Economic and political pres-
sure grew, because in some countries a process of privatization had already started.
The UK was the European trendsetter during the Thatcher era, mainly for ideological
reasons. Soon other countries (e.g. Norway) followed suit, with more emphasis on lib-
eralizing markets. As a result, the EU Electricity Directive required liberalization of the
power sectors in all member states.
When liberalization is discussed, often the introduction of competition is what is
meant. In fact, however, the liberalization process can involve many more organiza-
tional changes. Attention is focused particularly on certain organizational changes,
which appeared to be crucial in the developments within the waste and electricity sec-
tors of several industrialized nations. Some core elements in the waste sector appeared
to be significant for the impact on waste reduction among households and these are all
elements included in the privatization and liberalization discussion (De Jong and
Wolsink 1997). The first is vertical separation, meaning the separation of functions
(Table 1) in the chain of services. The second is horizontal separation of different parts
of the waste market. The market for biodegradable waste could be separated, for exam-
ple, or a separate market for packing waste could be created as has been done in Ger-
many. The third element is the potential withdrawal of public bodies from market
functions. This is a matter that has to be distinguished from public involvement in the
fourth core element, the regulation and attribution of the responsibility for efficient
management and waste reduction.
Similar distinctions can be made in the electricity sector. Slingerland (1999) con-
cluded that liberalization involves the following organizational changes:
– A change in market structure, specifically the introduction of competition between
the existing utilities and allowing parties other than the traditional utilities to en-
ter the competitive market (third-party access).
– A change in the vertical structure of utility sectors. In its simplest form, this means
an administrative unbundling of utility functions, which will become competitive,
from those that will remain a “natural” monopoly. In its most drastic form, this can
be a complete organizational unbundling, having all utility functions (Table 1) per-
formed by different organizations.
– A change in ownership; in practice, often the privatization of formerly public utili-
ties. 
The changing context within which energy supply and waste companies have to oper-
ate after liberalization has large consequences for local governments. Their control
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over the energy and waste utilities has significantly changed. However, there is no full
understanding of the impact of the changed contexts, and hence policy has become in-
creasingly disconnected from an analysis of the regulatory and commercial pressures
that occur in privatized and partially liberalized markets (Guy and Marvin 1996). The
situation in Amsterdam is no exception.




Function Infrastructure Function Infrastructure
———————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————
Generation Power station Disposal Landfills,
incinerators
———————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————
Transmission High-voltage Regulation Processing Recovery plants
network
———————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————
Distribution Low-voltage grid Transport Shipping
———————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————
Supply Connection,meters Collection Removal system &
containers;meters
———————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————
DSM of Smart meter & Source Separation  tools & 
Consumption tariff system separation tariff system
———————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————
Functions in Utility Sectors
While utilities originally managed the entire chain of electricity supply and waste
management, the different stages within these chains are now separate economic ac-
tivities. Hence, the utility character of the services or the companies involved has be-
come less obvious. The utility used to be the municipal energy company (geb) that cov-
ered all functions from electricity generation to supply and metering, and the
Gemeentelijke Dienst Afvalverwerking (gda) that was responsible for everything from
removal to disposal. Since these functions may be carried out now by different organi-
zations, it is better to speak of utility sectors. 
Utility sectors should be regarded as systems of provision: collective, socio-material
systems – including the set of institutional actors, their interrelations, and the techno-
logical networks in use – which provide services to customers (Fine and Leopold 1993).
“Functions” in utility sectors are defined as tasks that have to be performed to provide
services to consumers. For instance, before energy services can be provided to con-
sumers in the electricity sector, the following functions have to be carried out: supply
of primary energy sources to electricity generators, generation of electricity, high-volt-
age transmission, low-voltage distribution, supply to consumers, and some effort to
manage electricity demand. These functions can be performed by separate, unbun-
dled organizations or by integrated organizations. The chain of five more or less com-
parable market functions in the electricity and waste sectors is presented in Table 1.
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A crucial fact is that public as well as private enterprises may perform all distin-
guishable functions, because basically there are markets for all these functions. The
only exception is the management of the grid. When organizationally separated from
the other functions, transmission and distribution networks are the only parts that
may still be considered a natural monopoly. The high-voltage network will remain
state owned, as was decided in 2000. The local distribution grid, however, remains in
the hands of the utility that keeps a territorial link this way, even though it is no longer
a public company. It gives them a strong strategic position in the local supply market,
as their competitors in local supply must use their grid.
Territorial links between companies supplying energy or waste services to cus-
tomers are no longer self-evident. We see “splintering” networks now, whereas once
they were clearly geographically determined (Guy et al 1997). Hence, the connection
between utilities and local policy is eroding. After the era of scale increases and the
growing influence of national policy, liberalization is leaving local policy even further
behind. Privatized utilities have started to concentrate on profitable activities (cherry
picking). After full liberalization, utilities can no longer be considered tools for local
policy-making (Marvin et al 1999b). Nevertheless, the current situation is not the
same for energy and waste, as can be illustrated by the developments in Amsterdam.
Policy in Amsterdam
The ongoing process of liberalization had large consequences for the Amsterdam geb.
In anticipation of the 1989 Electricity Act, a large number of mergers were carried out.
The production function became organized on a large scale when the number of com-
panies in the country decreased from fifteen in 1986 to four in 1989. The production
branch of the geb merged with its counterparts in North Holland and Utrecht. In 1999,
this company (una) was sold to Reliant, an American power company with a not entire-
ly undisputed reputation.
A little later, many mergers were carried out in the distribution and supply func-
tions as well. In 1989, there were still more than 40 distributors. The Amsterdam geb,
separated from production, changed its name to eba (Energie Bedrijf Amsterdam).
However, a few years later, it could no longer survive on its own and merged with the
provincial electricity company and some local gas distributors in the province of
North Holland. A scale increase in energy supply also occurred in the rest of the coun-
try. The former provincial energy utilities of Gelderland and Friesland, for example,
merged as Nuon, a company that became very active in taking over other activities in
the Netherlands as well as abroad. It also merged with Energie Noord-West, the compa-
ny that included the former eba. Nuon is now one of the four main energy distributors
in the Netherlands. The shares held by municipalities and provinces will be privatized,
so eventually Amsterdam will lose its control over the energy supply in the city.
All these privatization steps were in line with new EU regulations, although there
are ongoing discussions about the relation between privatization and liberalization in
the Netherlands. Amsterdam can no longer use the energy supplier for its own poli-
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cies. The city’s attractiveness as regards setting up business is no longer supported by a
publicly controlled energy infrastructure. The same applies to local social and envi-
ronmental policy. In practice, this means that the City of Amsterdam has to negotiate
with many partners about the energy infrastructure of new residential areas. In prin-
ciple, it is not inevitable that Amsterdam will have to deal with Nuon. The idea is that
the market for captive consumers like households will be free in 2004 as it is already for
the small segment of so called green electricity. Nevertheless, since Nuon still owns the
local infrastructure it has a strategic position. In most new residential areas such as the
large vinex locations (e.g. the new district of IJburg), the authorities still involve their
“own” utility in the planning stages, although other companies might opt for the sup-
ply of energy in these areas. Actually, the individual household will only get to choose
the supplier of energy. The decisions about the infrastructure (e.g. the local low-volt-
age grid and the local gas network) are addressed in the planning phase. Such deci-
sions may result in a district heating network, or only an electricity grid minus a local
gas network with consequences that will be felt by the individual customers.
Whereas policy and energy supply are almost completely disconnected, waste is a
different story. Within the waste sector, organizational scale increases are still going
on. The planning of waste management – and particularly of the processing and dis-
posal infrastructure – is shifting from the regional towards the national level, while
private waste companies operate on an international scale. Local and regional author-
ities play their part in national policy, because their organizations are important
members of the Waste Management Council. Although the legal obligations for plan-
ning have shifted to higher levels, the responsibility for the collection function and an
environmentally sound disposal system remains at the local level. In many municipal-
ities, private enterprise is contracted to carry out various services for municipalities;
sometimes these are privatized municipal waste agencies. In Amsterdam, the public
utility for waste collection, gda, still exists, but private companies may be contracted
for specific services.
There is a remarkable difference in the power sector at the level of generation when
it is compared to disposal in the waste sector. Whereas fully privatized production com-
panies own large power stations, large incinerators are mainly owned by public utili-
ties. Investments in this infrastructure are enormous. Private waste companies consid-
er the financial risks unacceptable because it would take too long to recover the cost. As
a consequence, municipalities bear the long-term risks of these expensive facilities.
Shareholders of incinerators are mainly large municipalities, and the gda exploits its
incinerator in the western harbor area of Amsterdam. Contracts between collectors of
smaller municipalities and disposers, or between collectors and processors, are meant
mainly to pass the risks of investments on to the contractors. So-called put-or-pay con-
tracts are often used, in which a period is set during which a collector has to supply a
certain amount of waste against a set price. A supply of less waste leads to extra costs,
which is why such contracts conflict strongly with waste reduction. Hence, the captive
consumers of the municipal waste collection systems carry the financial burden of ex-
pensive waste disposal. Private companies are not captive consumers and the waste
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companies they contract are able to negotiate with the disposers (Wolsink and De Jong
2001). Because the incinerators need to utilize their full capacity, the incineration rates
on the short-term market are very low compared to the rates in long-term contracts.
Furthermore, local authorities are involved in dsm. The decisions regarding the im-
plementation of different source separation systems are taken by the municipalities.
They have to implement national policy, for example, since 1994, the legal obligation
to separately collect biodegradable waste. Some less coercive policy measures are part
of covenants and of implementation agreements within the Waste Management Coun-
cil, mainly concerning other waste components. In Amsterdam, the decentralized bor-
oughs take decisions about waste collection systems and dsm. As a consequence the
waste removal and waste separation infrastructure varies from one part of the city to
another. The trend is towards discarding traditional door-to-door collection and intro-
ducing new systems, such as large underground containers for districts with many
apartments. Sometimes this offers more opportunities for waste separation, as apart-
ments usually show low participation levels in waste separation, but at the same time
it often means a decrease in overall waste services for financial reasons.
Further Diversification: Public or Profitable Perspective?
In the near future, the tendency to diversify services and to splinter networks will con-
tinue. There are new technologies that may be implemented and some of them, in-
cluding options for small-scale energy generation, may even be on the scale of individ-
ual households. For example, photovoltaic electricity generation with PV equipment
installed on rooftops. Nuon is involved in demonstration projects, and one of these is
in the new residential district of Nieuw Sloten in Amsterdam. One of the issues there is
why people who buy a new house would accept solar power installations on their
rooftop that are owned and managed by an energy company (Van Mierlo and Sprengers
1995). Although these installations are managed by the energy supplier, this solar
power technique can easily be applied on an individual scale or on the level of residen-
tial blocks. This would make customers less dependent on the supplier. Other promis-
ing techniques that may be applied on a small scale are heat pumps, fuel cells, and mi-
cro-power stations.
The application of these techniques will emphasize the significance of fine-tuning
between demand and supply from the grid. In the future, dsm will offer consumers the
opportunity to be more efficient in their consumption and their individual produc-
tion. It will reduce costs as well as the environmental impact. dsm when organized by
the supplier, however, will be supply-oriented. The connection between power supply
and information technology creates large opportunities for smart metering, a very
helpful tool in dsm. All opportunities involve the increased diversification of services.
It offers diverse and flexible services for the individual customer, and also opportuni-
ties for diversification between groups of customers. Hence, a smart meter is not a neu-
tral device. Several social forces are shaping the meters, as they may support very dif-
ferent interests (Marvin et al 1999a).
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Smart meters include developments such as pre-paid smart cards that can also car-
ry information about the consumer. These are particularly interesting for the suppli-
ers in low-income districts, because they prevent payment problems, as demonstrated
in the UK. Another example is the meter that can be read continuously from a distance,
using cable, computer and even satellite technology. enw Amsterdam held the first
smart metering experiment in the residential sector in the Netherlands. Smart meters
with remote monitoring and a display were installed in 250 households for a behav-
ioral experiment. Substantial energy conservation was found in the groups where the
remote monitor was used in combination with a differentiated tariff system. There
was a net decrease in electricity consumption for all rates, but significant load shifts
could not be established (Uitzinger et al 1995). While load shifts are very interesting for
the supplier, decreased consumption may be environmentally sound but not particu-
larly interesting for suppliers. Hence, the utility did not opt to carry out further exper-
iments.
The smart meter carries a potential danger, as the developments in the UK show
(Marvin et al 1999a). It could provide consumers with useful information concerning
their consumption pattern and could help them manage their total energy household.
In the near future that may include individual production by PV, fuel cells, and heat
pumps. As the meters are usually installed by the utilities, they obviously serve the pur-
pose of managing the demand for a more profitable supply. An example of that per-
spective can be found in the development of the smart card. Prepayment devices using
cards are usually more expensive for the consumer. However, they are usually used in
low-income households, whereas smart meters offering interesting services to the con-
sumer are found mainly in the wealthier parts of the cities. It is this kind of differentia-
tion that is in the interest of the suppliers, but it should also alarm the authorities be-
cause of the possible social consequences.
Within the waste sector, smart metering is not as common. Nevertheless, there have
been some developments here as well. Municipalities occasionally experiment with
economic instruments. Basic micro-economic theory suggests that charges based on
waste volume will contribute to waste reduction, and there are options for waste man-
agement systems that include such tariffs (Reschovsky and Stone 1994). In the Nether-
lands, waste reduction was achieved in most of the 16 experiments held in the second
half of the 1990s (Zelle and Van der Zwaan 1997). The most effective and most sophisti-
cated systems included sensors at the collection containers and meters on the garbage
trucks. The effects of differentiated rates are not always clear, however, and undesir-
able side effects such as illegal dumping or “waste tourism” (putting bags in containers
of others, like in neighboring cities, employers etc.) might occur. There are suggestions
that the motivation of citizens to separate waste and to reuse and recycle could be dam-
aged by economic incentives (Thøgersen 1996). Experiments with varying waste collec-
tion tariffs in the Netherlands show that the reductions achieved are paired with side
effects. The growing tendency of stopping door-to-door collection is another trend that
may affect the motivation of the consumer to handle waste in a proper way, resulting in
a less reliable and less environmentally sound collection system. When that happens
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in waste management, an effect similar to that in electricity supply can be seen. In 1992
the first proposals for discarding separate collection were done in some Amsterdam
districts, because of poor compost quality from underground containers.
The current development is one of splintering networks with local policy more and
more disconnected from the utility services, and rapidly developing communication
and control techniques applied by profit-seeking enterprises. The essence of this devel-
opment is that utility sectors are becoming infrastructure networks that consist of
vast collectives of social and technological actors (Graham and Marvin 2001). This is
part of splintering urbanism and whether that will be a favorable development for the
city from a social and environmental point of view will depend on our ability to devel-
op new policy scenarios that regulate the new utility sectors. From that perspective,
the main trend does not favor social and environmental values. In most policy dis-
courses, liberalization is usually called deregulation, although most studies on the de-
velopment of the new markets indicate that for a properly working market, we cer-
tainly do not need less regulation but instead different kinds of regulation. An
example is the proper definition of so called green electricity that must be strictly en-
forced by a regulator. At the present time, there is a strong tendency among electricity
suppliers to define power generated by waste incineration as “green” (Wolsink and De
Jong 2001). Probably the liberalized and privatized systems of provision need more and
stricter regulation of a kind that is not comprehensive in its aims and targets, but a reg-
ulating system that focuses on market conditions and on checks and balances.
In all of the countries that have taken steps that are supposed to be part of liberal-
ization, new agencies are established, generally indicated as the “regulator.” In the
Netherlands, an agency of the Ministry of Economic Affairs has been transformed to
the Dienst uitvoering en Toezicht Elektriciteitswet (dte, Agency for the Execution and
Supervision Power Bill). Officially dte is the regulator, but the regulations it should be
supervising and its own powers turn out to be very limited. It is still a very small organ-
ization compared to regulators of the power sector in other liberalized electricity mar-
kets, like offer (UK), per (California), or nve (Norway) that have several hundreds of
employees whereas dte has only a few dozen. Regulation regarding creating and sus-
taining reliability in the power supply system is almost nonexistent (Huygen 1999).
Within the waste sector, there is no independent regulator for the market, as the basic
idea is still that the involvement of authorities in parts of the market is enough to pro-
tect the public interest.
Liberalization is too often entangled with deregulation. Experiences with steps to-
wards privatization in the transport sector have triggered a new political discussion
on these issues. The referendum on the independence of the Amsterdam public trans-
port agency is an example, but the discussion also includes the power sector. In the
meantime, the emphasis on deregulation and privatization has removed a strong in-
strument from the city to maintain control over its development and this is probably
largely irreversible. 
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3.4 • Regional Greenbelts and the
Problem of Institutional Fragmentation
Marijke van Schendelen
Introduction
The flourishing economy of the Amsterdam region has caused enormous pressure on
the land market. Both the city and its extended region are attracting large numbers of
new people and businesses. Old residential areas are being restructured and dilapidat-
ed industrial sites are being renovated. Open space in the city is under pressure. And
rural areas surrounding the city are being targeted as locations for new housing proj-
ects, industrial zones, and other urban functions. Infrastructure is encroaching on the
open landscape in the form of new regional links. In the Amsterdam region, the poten-
tial offered by rural areas seems to be one of the factors contributing to increasing pros-
perity.
But that very same prosperity means that the people of Amsterdam are setting high-
er standards for their own living environment. The modern citizen expects not only a
larger home and a more spacious office, but also extensive recreational opportunities
in and around the city. These, however, are not naturally guaranteed; they require ad-
ministrative effort. This article investigates the tensions involved, based upon a study
of the historical development of the “green structure” in Amsterdam. It outlines the vi-
sions of land use which have shaped that structure down through the years, and the fi-
nancial, administrative, and legal instruments used. Finally, it touches upon the fu-
ture value of the regional “green vision” and the importance of the need to adapt the
instruments being used.
The Design of the Green City
Institutionalizing Green
Regulation in the growth of Amsterdam has always been colored by the importance of
“green” amenities in and around the city. This was already evident during the Golden
Age in the form of the public regulation of gardens attached to the premium housing
blocks along the city canals, and in the creation of private pleasure gardens along the
Amstel and Vecht rivers, in new polders such as the Watergraafsmeer and the Beemster
and along the inland side of the coastal dunes. During the 19th century, economic
growth led to the creation of the Plantage district – the “plantation,” including the
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Hortus Botanicus (botanical garden) and Artis zoo – as well as a number of parks just
outside the old city.
The enjoyment of fresh air and nature went hand in hand with a new-found cultur-
al appreciation of their biological aspects. Just as in Great Britain, the United States
and Germany, this interest was soon institutionalized in the Netherlands. The founda-
tion at the Koningszaal in Artis in 1905 of the Vereniging tot behoud van Natuurmonu-
menten ( the “Association for the Preservation of Natural Monuments”) an institution
analogous with the English National Trust and the German Naturschutz, is symbolic of
this. Today, thanks to its acquisition of vast tracts of land, Natuurmonumenten is one of
the wealthiest organizations in the Netherlands. Natural history has become an essen-
tial component in the education of the Dutch people. More than anyone, the school-
teachers J.P. Thijsse and E. Heimans, made sure that an interest in nature was awak-
ened in working-class Amsterdam children. Tadpoles in the classroom, the school
garden, annual outings to Artis, and holiday camps in the dunes generated great ap-
preciation amongst many young Amsterdammers for the natural world around them.
The founders of Natuurmonumenten and proponents of good natural history educa-
tion were also, together with the municipal administrators, very active in planning
the city and the countryside around it. The City of Amsterdam had long owned much
of the land outside the old defensive fortifications, which made the creation of
Sarphatipark, Westerpark and Oosterpark around 1880 fairly straightforward. Togeth-
er with the Vondelpark – which had been opened privately by C.P. van Eeghen in 1864,
the costs of which were recouped from the sale of land for luxury homes around it –
these parks landscaped in the English style added immensely to the attractiveness of
urban living. The Leasehold Resolution passed in 1896 by Amsterdam City Council,
building upon the opportunities created by the 1874 Compulsory Purchase Act, creat-
ed the financial scope for the later construction of a whole range of public amenities –
including parks and gardens (Delfgaauw 1934, 20 ff.; Slot 1996, 31; Van der Valk 1989,
138).
The 1901 Housing Act and the Health Act of the same year made specific reference to
the importance of air and space in the new urban areas for reasons of public health.
The new legislation imposed basic requirements for gardens, both public and private,
and canals as well as the adequate natural lighting of homes. According to a majority
in the National Assembly, a true city should be provided with parks, although this was
not included as a requirement in the Housing Act. In an extensive 1908 series of articles
on “the parks question” in the Handelsblad newspaper, Thijsse drew attention to the
need for urban parks – a call which eventually, in the 1930s, led to the creation of the
Amsterdamse Bos country park.
The public debate about the future shape of Dutch cities was dominated by two
schools of thought. One was that championed by engineers trained at Delft Technical
University and was based upon German ideas. The other was influenced by Ebenezer
Howard and the Garden Cities Movement, which struck a particular chord with social-
liberal and social-democratic politicians. The objective was to let Amsterdam evolve in-
to a “green and pleasant” city of avenues, parks, public gardens, and garden suburbs.
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The 1901 Housing Act provided the legislative and financial framework for achieving
this. As well as the sections devoted to urban planning, crucially the legislation also
contained financial clauses designed by the Minister and economist N.G. Pierson. Un-
der these the State would provide financial guarantees to local authorities and to so-
called “authorized institutions” – meaning housing corporations – in the form of
loans so that they could actually create the spacious and green new housing districts
provided for in the Act. These financial inducements were used as a tool to enable the
funding of “public green” as part of urban expansion plans. Spacious residential dis-
tricts with plenty of air and light, plus private and public gardens, canals, and parks
soon formed the basic component of the many new developments being planned in
the Netherlands. A recognition that “public green” was a basic requirement in the city
was thus institutionalized.
The Metropolitan Region as a Framework
Despite large-scale annexations of surrounding boroughs by Amsterdam in 1896 and
1921 – as a result of which the city increased many times in size – by the early 1920s the
issue of whether the metropolitan region would soon reach the level at which urban
development was determined was firmly on the agenda. This debate was promoted by
the International Town Planning Congress held in Amsterdam in 1924, at which the
city-hinterland relationship – and with it the importance of regional green structures
for the urban resident – was a central issue. Developments in land use in London,
Berlin, New York, Ruhr Valley, Brussels and other regions were discussed by the inter-
national delegates, enabling F.M. Wibaut, H.P. Berlage, D. Hudig, H. Cleyndert and oth-
er prominent local and national figures in the field to exchange views with Ebenezer
Howard, R. Unwin, P. Abercrombie, F. Schumacher and some 400 others.
Three models for growth were addressed at the Congress: concentric expansion, the
development of “satellite towns” at some distance from the core city and the evolution
of the “finger city.” The latter vision – propounded by the Belgian Raymond Ver-
wilghen and by Vincent Hubbard of Harvard University, and inspired by Patrick Ged-
des and the expansion plan for Greater Berlin as an example of a “finger city” – was par-
ticularly well received. The finger city offered room for urban development, while at
the same time this model allowed for parks and recreational amenities to be created
even in the heart of the city, along, for example, streams and rivers (Van Schendelen
1997, 155 ff.).
The satellite model championed by Unwin and Howard, with a core city surrounded
by garden towns, was criticized by Berlage, Wibaut and others who preferred urban de-
velopment over decentralization. M.J.W. Roegholt also regarded it as too artificial,
since it did not reflect economic reality. Echoing Geddes, he called for an economic-ge-
ographical approach in which concentration and compactness would serve urban eco-
nomic development whilst links with the countryside could be clearly created thanks
to the finger-city model.
A debate about administrative structure followed. In fact, there were actually only
two options: further annexations by the central city or a regional expansion plan
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based on general overall guidelines but leaving independent local authorities in the re-
gion free to define the details as they saw fit. Roegholt, however, came up with a third
option: establishment of a public corporation between the provincial and local-gov-
ernment levels. This would handle what needed to be arranged at the regional level,
particularly bearing in mind the interests of the smaller boroughs, whilst continuing
to allow the individual local authorities to operate autonomously within their own
boundaries. In the conclusions of the Amsterdam International Town Planning Con-
gress, which were formulated at the initiative of P. Bakker Schut, Head of City Develop-
ment for The Hague, the true urbanists seemed to come off worst. Preference eventual-
ly went to (a) some decentralization of urban areas, (b) limitation of built-up areas by
surrounding them with green belts to prevent endless “seas” of housing, and (c) close
cooperation between local authorities (Roegholt 1925, 228).
After various proposals for satellite towns in the region had been rejected – includ-
ing De Miranda’s famous plan for a garden city in the Gooi area – Amsterdam itself
eventually chose to make the best of a bad job by deciding in 1935, after much debate,
to adopt the General Expansion Plan (AUP). This would extend the city itself with gar-
den suburbs, and placed great store in the “finger city” model: green areas would be
drawn as much as possible into the city itself.
Space for Nature in the City and the Region
The subject matter of the 1924 International Town Planning Congress in Amsterdam
seems to have lost none of its topicality. This also applies to Cleyndert’s contribution to
the event. The international grain merchant, who had studied the conservation policy
which had led to the creation of national parks in the United States, demanded atten-
tion for the continuing decline in natural areas. He distinguished between three cate-
gories of such decline: the reduction in recreational areas, encroachments upon the
beauty of the natural landscape and the loss of “virgin” zones of importance to science
and the natural balance. To end this process, he proposed a coordinated series of meas-
ures in which the government would play a key role. Cleyndert’s efforts resulted in a se-
ries of official committees being established in the Netherlands immediately after the
Congress. Their portfolios included the Natural Monuments Act, recreational zones,
preservation of natural beauty during development, the landscape of the Zuiderzee
polders and regional planning (Van der Valk 1982, 51-63).
These activities eventually resulted in the importance of “natural space” being rec-
ognized at the regional and national levels. Above all, protection of the landscape de-
manded a national strategy if building development were not to harm its remaining
natural beauty irreversibly. It was partly for this reason that Cleyndert and Hudig also
favored Functionalism – they saw that a rational and effective approach to develop-
ment would leave room for nature both within and outside the cities. The establish-
ment in 1941 of the National Plan Board, the forerunner of today’s State Planning
Service, provided a framework for their vision. However, the Second World War and
the difficult period of reconstruction following meant that it would be some years be-
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fore Cleyndert’s and Hudig’s policy would be put into effect.
This does not mean that there were not many natural and recreational areas avail-
able to the people of Amsterdam during the 1930s. The so-called “Regional Map” in the
1934 AUP shows not only the Amsterdamse Bos, then under construction, but also the
coastal Waterleidingduinen and Kennemerduinen dunes, the Westeinder Plassen and
Loosdrechtse Plassen lakes, the Gooi area of course, and the banks of the Amstel, Waver
and Vecht rivers. In other words, all those areas and routes which had been enjoyed for
centuries, had been painted by Rembrandt and others, and had been popularized by
Thijsse, Heimans and Nescio. These nature reserves and leisure areas were easily acces-
sible thanks to the rail and tram networks – although many an Amsterdammer made
no bones about taking a stiff walk out to them. To protect them all, the AUP stressed the
importance of a regional program to prevent their general fragmentation. The local
authorities in the Gooi region were also praised for jointly commissioning a plan from
the Central Planning Committee – founded by an Amsterdammer who had moved to
the local village of Laren, Henri Polak, and now enthusiastically carried on by archi-
tect, W.M. Dudok – which pointed to the paramount importance of preserving natural
beauty. This resulted in an agreement under which the province of Noord-Holland and
the City of Amsterdam also made a significant financial contribution to the imple-
mentation alongside the local authorities in the Gooi (Algemeen Uitbreidingsplan, Nota
van Toelichting, Amsterdam 1934, 21 and Map B).
As well as the agreements at government level, there were also private initiatives to
provide recreational space in the Amsterdam region for citydwellers. Alongside the
holiday homes and villas built for the wealthy elite in the Gooi and the dunes, chalet
complexes in Bakkum, along the North Sea beaches and – again – in the Gooi, at “De
Fransche Kamp,” offered ordinary Amsterdam residents a chance to take a summer
break away from the city. Children’s camps for pale city youngsters were organized in
the dunes and on the heaths. Housing corporations, employers, political parties,
churches, and charities all made an effort to offer their tenants, staff, members, or ben-
eficiaries a summer break which would bring them closer to nature and allow them to
rest far from the busy, noisy and, of course, sinful city.
The countryside around Amsterdam was not just a refuge for those in search of
recreation. The AUP also addressed its agricultural functions. The farming and market
gardening areas around the city were crucial to the harmonious development of Am-
sterdam. Large areas to the west of the city were allocated for intensive market garden-
ing, whilst the rural Waterland district was to maintain its traditional role as a source
of milk for the Amsterdam population, as would the water meadows to the south of the
city. And the continuing importance of wide open rural spaces was stressed (AUP 1, 69)
in the context of urban development: “The more the city increases in size and signifi-
cance, the more its inhabitants become townspeople for whom contact with the coun-
tryside, being in free nature, becomes a rarer and rarer experience.” But, “It is of ines-
timable value for the Amsterdam of today that its residents can still be genuinely
‘outdoors’ within a relatively short distance of their homes.” (AUP 1, 69)
But space for nature and recreation was needed within the city boundaries, too. It
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wasn’t just the open spaces of the “Boschpark” (the Amsterdamse Bos), the Nieuwe
Meer and Waterland, however. Consideration was also given to local parks and public
gardens, playing fields and recreation grounds, watersports facilities, allotments, and
school gardens. The banks of the Amstel and the IJ were brought into the equation,
bikepaths, and footpaths were planned. The AUP endeavored to create sufficient recre-
ational provision for the entire population of Amsterdam. Prescriptive standards were
set in relation to use of space per inhabitant and accessibility by age category, so as to
achieve a balanced spread of recreational amenities. A distance of 400 meters between
home and a park was set as the maximum acceptable for mothers with babies or young
children and senior citizens. It was grudgingly accepted that the existing 1934 city did
not meet this “pram range” requirement.
The General Expansion Plan appeared to have broad public support when adopted
by the Amsterdam City Council in 1935. Heavily inspired by Geddes’ views as expressed
in Civics as Applied Sociology, both its vision of a “finger city” and its scientific justifica-
tion guaranteed that. Because of the efforts of the senior municipal officials C. van
Eesteren, L.S.P. Scheffer, and T. van Lohuizen, the plan gained international renown
thanks in part to its unique nature. Research, planning, and implementation were all
in the hands of the local government, in contrast with what was standard practice else-
where. In that respect the AUP outshone even the famous 1929 Regional Plan for the
New York area, which was also produced by noted planners but which proved impossi-
ble to implement because of the political complexities involved, and perhaps also suf-
fered from its regional character (Geddes 1905; Giedion 1978, 804).
The Green Region as a Phenomenon of Prosperity
“Buffers” and “Stars” in the Metropolitan Region
Dutch postwar prosperity led not only to huge pressures on the housing market but al-
so to the rise of mass recreation, which more than ever necessitated planned facilities.
In the 1966 Second Memorandum on Land Use in the Netherlands (Tweede Nota
Ruimtelijke Ordening), two strategies were presented. On the one hand, the national gov-
ernment believed that Waterland, the Gooi and other attractive cultural landscapes
should also have a recreational function, which could be reinforced by active care and
small-scale amenities. So-called “spatial yield” was deemed to be important, and could
be achieved through differentiation in recreational opportunities and increased ac-
cessibility – for example, by opening country estates to the public. On the other hand,
so-called “green stars” with a specific recreational function would be created close to
the big cities. Those in the Amsterdam region, Het Twiske and the Spaarnwoude recre-
ation zone, also act as geographical buffers preventing uninterrupted metropolitan
growth. In a direct continuation of prewar ideas, the Dutch planning community was
afraid of urban agglomerations forming under mass pressure. The “satellite” model
was revived, and now hailed as the ideal. The metropolitan region should be struc-
tured harmoniously according to a hierarchy of “nodes,” from small to large – from vil-
lage to growth hub to city. The “finger” model of the core city would continue to guar-
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antee direct contact between its residents and the surrounding countryside. No new
body was deemed necessary to administer the metropolitan region. The instrument of
the regional plan, combined with bilateral agreements, should ensure the implemen-
tation of metropolitan policy.
The creation and layout of the “green stars” was greatly inspired by the Amster-
damse Bos, and hence indirectly by English neo-romantic landscaping. For their ad-
ministration, so-called “Recreation Boards” were opted for. These were formed jointly
by the Province and the local authorities concerned, under the terms of the Joint Ad-
ministrative Arrangements Act. There was no dispute at the time that the original, pre-
dominantly arable, landscape of the Twiske Polder and the Houtrak Polder was unsuit-
able: the English country park remained the reference framework for recreational
activities. Now, 30 years later, these polders have become much-loved recreation areas
to which whole families go for a Sunday picnic and a swim, and where large num-
bers of cyclists and joggers keep fit. Criticisms have been raised, though, about the
high cost of their construction and maintenance, which has now resulted in a debate
about their full or partial privatization. Criticism has also been levelled at their uni-
form layout along classical but static lines, and about the amount of road traffic the
“green stars” generate at peak periods. These recreation areas are too far out of the city
for a lot of people to cycle to, and public transport to and from them is generally scarce.
In creating Amsterdam’s garden suburbs, it proved possible to combine utility with
recreation. The sand extraction pits dug to feed the construction of nearby housing de-
velopments were subsequently turned into lakes forming the centerpieces of local
recreation zones: Sloterplas in Amsterdam Nieuw-West and Gaasperplas in Amster-
dam-Zuidoost, for example. Amsterdam’s strategic participation in the Floriade horti-
cultural exhibition held every ten years has also provided the city with new parks after
the event’s closure. Legacies of past Floriades include the Amstelpark and the Gaasper-
park, and the Haarlemmermeer site of Floriade 2002 is set to follow suit.
The Battle for a Green City
The broad acceptance of a green metropolitan region had major repercussions for the
old city. Despite the presence of some fine parks in the 19th-century development belt,
residents of the area demanded more open spaces in their neighborhoods. The obser-
vation made in the 1934 General Expansion Plan that public parks and gardens were
scarce in the old city and the 19th-century belt – in other words, in all those residential
districts built prior to the passing of the 1901 Housing Act – became a political issue in
about 1970. Under the 1974 Amsterdam Structural Plan, the old city should accommo-
date not only urban functions but also its local residents. Following conflict and then
consultation with local people during the regeneration of the Dapperbuurt, the
Kinkerbuurt, the Jordaan and the Western and Eastern Islands, small parks, public gar-
dens and collective private gardens were created. Even before the regeneration and
renovations were implemented, many residents took their own initiatives in the form
of pavement gardens and architectural advice. All these improvements to the inner-
city environment have made an enormous contribution to the reassessment of the old
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city over the past 25 years, and persuaded many a resident to abandon their dreams of
moving to the suburbs. From a political perspective, the 1976 Urbanization Memoran-
dum and the 1983 Third Memorandum on Land Use reflected a similar reassessment
of the urban environment at national-government level. Another Amsterdam Struc-
tural Plan, The City Central, drawn up in 1985, did not confine its attention to the areas
undergoing urban regeneration – a process which was now in full swing – but also cov-
ered the expansion zones created under the Housing Act, both before and after the
war. Several of the prewar districts concerned were in need of renovation in the archi-
tectural sense, but their overall structure was not challenged. Indeed, they came to be
appreciated anew. Now that the homes in the garden suburbs of Amsterdam-Noord
and Betondorp and in the Amsterdam Style districts of Oud-Zuid and Oud-West have
been brought up to today’s standards, these areas are better-loved than ever. Their
heavily “green” structure, consisting of public gardens and squares linked by attrac-
tive tree-lined avenues and with a good ratio of private gardens to public open spaces,
has been given a new impetus by a process of renovation which has remained faithful
to the original design. It is surprising to realise that the town planning ideals of the ear-
ly years of the 20th century have lost none of their validity.
This outcome led to a critical review of the results of the 1935 General Expansion
Plan during the 1980s. Because of the austere way in which it was put into effect during
the postwar reconstruction period, the original principles of light, air, and plenty of
space certainly did not always produce exciting living environments. Opportunities
were sought to increase density.  The City Central regarded this form of “filling in” not
only as a way to alleviate housing shortages but also as an opportunity to reinforce the
social and urban structure of the city. But not everyone agreed. The residents of those
districts which were to be “filled in” were in an uproar, as were the users of allotment
complexes threatened with elimination or displacement and sports clubs that stood to
lose their pitches. The renewed appreciation of the city intensified the battle for space
in it, with postwar green amenities in the frontline. At the height of the struggle, in
about 1990, no open space seemed safe – especially when even the edges of the Vondel-
park, a very symbol of the city and perhaps even the nation, appeared to have become
negotiable if enough money was put on the table.
National Green Policy
The rising interest in nature and the environment during the 1970s also meant a
change of direction for the countryside. National attention after the war had original-
ly focused entirely on agricultural production. This led to the accelerated reclamation
of “waste” land and to the 1954 Land Consolidation Act. The powerful “Green Front”
headed by such figures like S. Mansholt led an onslaught on what wildlife and natural
beauty remained. In response, conservationists like Cleyndert, the biologist, V. West-
hoff, and the landscape architect, J.T.P. Bijhouwer, called for a new conceptual frame-
work at the interface between planning, agriculture, and nature conservation. The
new terms “landscape plan,” “landscape care,” and “landscape nursing” reflected
what should be happening in the countryside, quite apart from the creation of nature
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reserves. It was also argued that land consolidation should be used to create more
space for recreation and nature conservation. The conservationists at first made little
headway, particularly when it came to safeguarding cultural landscapes. What pur-
chases they did make were regarded not only as “natural gems” but also used for recre-
ational purposes (Van der Windt 1995, 130-134).
In the 1970s, however, the wind changed. The three “Green Memoranda” published
in 1975 as far as national policy was concerned, were decisive. They appeared in the
wake of the Orientation Memorandum on Land Use, which was in fact the first part of
the 1973 Third Memorandum on Land Use (Derde Nota Ruimtelijke Ordening). The Orien-
tation Memorandum proposed that national parks and protected areas of outstanding
natural beauty be established in the Netherlands (Oriënteringsnota 1973, 59-68). In de-
veloping rural areas, a balance needed to be sought which reflected both the econom-
ics of land use and an appreciation of the landscape in biological and ecological terms.
The three Green Memoranda developed the policy into concrete plans for national
parks, areas of outstanding natural beauty and so-called “Relationship Memorandum
areas.” The land in the new national parks was purchased or expropriated outright to
be managed solely for the purposes of nature conservation. The 1968 Nature Conserva-
tion Act also made it possible for the government to subsidize the purchase and main-
tenance of conservation areas by private persons or organisations (Nota Landelijke Ge-
bieden 1977, 112-122). This meant that agricultural land with the status of an Area of
Outstanding Natural Beauty or in a “Relationship Memorandum Area” could be man-
aged by farmers whilst preserving its natural beauty and gaining in natural value. The
intention was that management agreements with farmers would guarantee the con-
tinued existence of valuable cultural landscapes like Waterland and the Limburg Hills,
with management and reserve areas being created which would eventually be turned
over to conservation bodies. Coordination and implementation became an important
task for the provinces, which thus extended and reinforced their interest in nature and
natural beauty.
Claims on Green Areas in the Amsterdam Region
Agricultural Land as a Basis for Nature and Recreation
Nature and “green” have today become inherent elements of our culture. They also
provide recreation for citydwellers and the countryside surrounding Amsterdam has
become the subject of the following claims: the conservation of valuable cultural land-
scapes, in particular water meadows; space for “ecological infrastructure” and respect
for Bird Guideline and Habitat Guideline areas; water storage; and recognition of the
“Belvedere Memorandum” areas and UNESCO World Heritage Sites. And all these have
to be combined with agricultural uses (Vijfde Nota Map 22, Noordvleugelconferentie 2001,
11). Moreover, there are other claims being made upon green areas in compensation
for urban development elsewhere. The various visions and objectives threaten to al-
most inevitably lead to extensive fragmentation in control, strategy, and management
with regard to rural areas, when in fact a strong institutional framework is required to
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counterbalance “urban” claims upon them in the form of new housing developments,
industrial estates, and transport infrastructure.
Valuable parts of the landscape in the Amsterdam region have long been the subject
of institutional control within the framework of the Joint Administrative Arrange-
ments Act. Under this act, not only do various levels of government have a say in them,
but also non-governmental organisations (NGOs) like the regional farmers’ associa-
tion WLTO, Natuurmonumenten, the Forestry Commission, the Noord-Holland Land
Conservancy and the Netherlands Association of Recreation Enterprises (RECRON).
The status of Waterland – which includes the rural parts of Amsterdam-Noord – as a
“Valuable Cultural Landscape” (WCL Zone) means not only that it is recognized as an
important agricultural landscape but also that the necessary funds are available to
maintain and reinforce its character, and to make it more accessible to citydwellers for
recreational purposes. For example, the parties which make up the Waterland Conser-
vancy under the terms of the Joint Administrative Arrangements Act not only provide
financial and organizational support to the agricultural association which farms the
land but also create cyclepaths and canoeing routes through it. Marginal agricultural
land is withdrawn as much as possible from production and transformed into nature
reserves. The Amstelland Green Zone to the southeast of Amsterdam has similar objec-
tives. Since 1980, the provincial and local authorities here have been working within
the framework of the Joint Administrative Arrangements Act to arrange and manage
the area in such a way that recreational functions, agriculture and nature coexist har-
moniously. There is also broad cooperation with other interested parties. For example,
the Amstelland Green Zone is participating in the restoration of the historic Wester-
Amstel country estate and the Gaaspermolen windmill, both of which are to have pub-
lic functions. Several old orchards are also being maintained (Nieuwsbrief Groengebied
Amstelland, June 2001).
The growing interest in ecological processes – which, since 1990, have been an im-
portant aspect of the Natural Environment Policy Plan and in 1991 were also incorpo-
rated into the supplement to the Fourth Memorandum on Land Use as an official poli-
cy objective – has meant a shift from merely creating and maintaining nature reserves
to establishing “ecological link zones.” One example of these is the so-called “Nature
Arc,” which connects the waters of the IJmeer with the Rondehoep polder. Here, the
Amstelland Green Zone is working closely with the Amstelland Planning Authority. As
well as supplying money to build wildlife passages under motorways and railways, the
Green Zone is subsidizing ecologically-aware management by owners of reedlands and
other natural habitats in agricultural areas. This focused policy serves to protect and
encourage particular wildlife species, and where necessary includes specific manage-
ment and design measures to stimulate conservation, recovery and development.
Hand in hand with landscape policy, which concentrates upon cultural and historic
value and human experience, ecological policy targets certain characteristic species
typical of the selected areas.
Unlike earlier recreation zones such as the Amsterdamse Bos, Het Twiske and
Spaarnwoude, Waterland and Amstelland are characterized by the fact that the agri-
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culture-based scenery with its many historic elements forms the basis for the range of
new recreational amenities gratefully used by city residents. It is therefore little won-
der that, although the province has actual management responsibility for these areas,
the City of Amsterdam is heavily involved both administratively and financially in
their development and maintenance. Also typical is that, compared with earlier
decades, not only are static points considered – be they locations for human recreation
or the habitats of plants and animals – but increasingly also flows. That is, both peo-
ple’s movements from A to B and the migratory patterns of water shrews, butterflies,
and amphibians. Not surprisingly, then, the “Nature Arc” now forms part of the Provin-
cial Ecological Infrastructure of Noord-Holland.
Green Areas as Compensation for Urbanization
A detailed “green plan” has also been drawn up for the area to the south-west of Am-
sterdam. The “Haarlemmermeer Greener Framework Plan” is a strategy distilled from
a series of policy agreements between the Dutch State, the provinces of Noord-Holland
and Zuid-Holland, the Haarlemmermeer local authority and those of several sur-
rounding districts, the local water conservancies, and Amsterdam Schiphol Airport. In
fact, the Framework Plan is a combination of three separate programs: the “Haarlem-
mermeer West Strategic Green Project,” covering 1600 hectares and instigated in 1994
by the State as part of the Green Space Structural Scheme; “Mainport and Green,”
which involves the creation of 450 hectares of new green space to compensate for de-
velopment at Schiphol Airport as part of the Schiphol Core Planning Decree; and the
so-called “Green Axis,” an ecological and recreational link zone between Amstelland
and Spaarnwoude being created under the Natural Environment Policy Plan. Once
again, management is in the hands of the Province of Noord-Holland. The objectives of
the plan as a whole are to preserve this area as open space by setting a limit to the
process of urbanisation on the southern side of Amsterdam, to compensate for the
negative environmental effects of the airport’s continuing growth, and to create re-
gional recreational routes and ecological links between the various large-scale green
areas in southern Noord-Holland. One final crucial element in the Framework Plan is
integrated water management for the Haarlemmermeer Polder.
Although both the objectives and the administrative and financial arrangements of
the green policy seemed to have been clearly defined with the adoption of the Natural
Environment Policy Plan in 1990 and the Green Space Structural Scheme in 1994 –
with the creation, for example, of a “Green Fund” – in practice things went far less
smoothly. According to the official buyers at the Countryside Agency (Het Parool, 18 Au-
gust 2001), land purchases for green zones and nature reserves throughout the Rand-
stad conurbation – and certainly in Haarlemmermeer – have run into trouble. Amica-
ble transactions have been made increasingly difficult by the increasing pressure on
space and the consequent price increases and land speculation. It remains to be seen
how far the ambitious growth plans in the Amsterdam region can progress without
the authorities resorting to the instrument of compulsory purchase. And it is curious
to note that the new green areas which are urgently needed to compensate for the neg-
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ative environmental effects of intensive urbanization and increasing mobility are
themselves being threatened by that same pressure to urbanize (Raamplan Haarlemmer-
méér Groen, Beleidsnota Provincie Noord-Holland, Haarlem 2000).
A similar problem is occurring within the context of the so-called “ROM-IJmeer”
project, an attempt to achieve an integrated approach to planning and environmental
issues. To offset the impact on nature and the environment of the new IJburg district
being built on artificial islands in the IJmeer, the government and a number of conser-
vation organisations have agreed compensatory measures. These include wildlife de-
velopment projects in front of and behind the dikes on the Waterland and Muiden
shores, as well as nature reserves and recreation areas in IJburg itself. However, it is
now feared that the IJburg plans in particular could be endangered as a result of the
enormous development and construction costs of the new district. The civil engineer-
ing specifications of the individual IJburg construction projects may well include a
creative “cross-pollination” between a vision of urban planning and the development
of a “natural” environment, but ultimately it is the financial and economic viability of
the plans which is likely to prove decisive. The IJmeer conservation plans have also
been delayed, despite being legally enshrined in zoning plans, land-use plans, the
Birds Guideline and the Habitat Guideline. For example, the Kinselmeer lake in Water-
land now has the status of a nature reserve despite being surrounded by a number of il-
legal – but long tolerated – permanent campsites. Their users are not intending to
move out and leave the area to the wildlife without a fight (Natuurontwikkelingsfonds
IJmeer, Voortgangsrapportage 2000, Haarlem 2001). All in all, this seems to show that the
instrument of compensation is quite a vulnerable one, and can only be used with diffi-
culty against the process it is designed to combat – the pressure to urbanize.
Cultural and Historical Interests as Elements of Scenic Value
There is yet another important pillar upon which the recreation policy of the Amster-
dam region rests. The unique historical value of the Beemster polder and of the Am-
sterdam Defence Line has resulted in both of them being placed on UNESCO’s list of
World Heritage Sites. In fact, the two overlap: five of the Defense Line’s 42 fortifications
are in the Beemster. Preserving their cultural and historical character also serves two
other objectives. One is recreational: keeping the two sites as intact as possible increas-
es their appeal to citydwellers as leisure destinations. The other, which applies partic-
ularly to the Defense Line, is their potential inclusion in modern water-management
systems. Researchers are currently investigating whether the old flood zones could in
the future be adapted for permanent or temporary water storage. But it should be not-
ed that, despite their international recognition, the legal protection of neither area is
watertight. Plans to extend the Port of Amsterdam and other forms of pressure to ur-
banize could still prevail, even though the importance of the notion of cultural her-
itage to the living environment is officially acknowledged and – under the so-called
Belvedère Memorandum of 1999 – the Dutch State has allocated substantial funding to
preserve that heritage along with nature and recreation as effectively as possible with-
in the Amsterdam regional context. Nor is it only the Beemster and the Amsterdam De-
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fense Line which are highly valued for their cultural and historical value. Even leaving
aside urban Amsterdam, the same applies to such places as the river Zaan, Marken and
the Noord-Holland Canal. And to the south of the city, the polder De Ronde Hoep, the
Drecht and the Amstel, and the “floating gardens” of Aalsmeer and Kudelstaart can be
added to the list – as can the fortifications of the New Holland Water Line, which have
recently been elevated to the status of a National Project (De cultuurhistorie van Waterland
en Zaanstreek, inclusief Beemster en Schermer, Provincie Noord-Holland, Haarlem 2001; and De
cultuurhistorie van Meerlanden en Amsterdam, Provincie Noord-Holland, Haarlem 2001).
A number of areas of cultural and historical significance have already been incorpo-
rated into administrative and legal frameworks such as the “Waterland Valuable Cul-
tural Landscape,” the Amstelland Green Zone and the “Green Heartland.” The
Belvedère Memorandum – in which sites and areas of cultural and historic value are
placed in a broader context and which proposes an active conservation and develop-
ment policy for them – seems to provide additional protection. In the Amsterdam re-
gion, the monuments covered are Waterland, the Amsterdam Defense Line, the Beem-
ster, and the New Holland Water Line.
Amsterdam’s Scenic Vision
Within Amsterdam, too, an ideal vision is being developed in the form of the “green in-
frastructure” proposals. These were set out in the 1996 Structural Plan, and also form
an integral part of its 2002 successor. The principle underlying them is that, compared
with other urban areas of the Netherlands, the Amsterdam region has only a limited
capacity for recreational activities. The calls for a “finger” or “wedge” structure within
the municipal boundaries which have in practice formed the basis for all urban ex-
pansion since 1935 are retained, and the great value of the city’s various parks and a
number of green “recreational routes” is of course acknowledged. But it is also clear
that the many urban developments being discussed simultaneously in the city could
seriously encroach upon the green infrastructure. It is suggested that denser urban-
ization in fact requires a different, more qualitative vision of the existing green infra-
structure in the city. And it is also regarded as important that the edges of Amsterdam
be transformed from fragmented and disorganized fringe areas into high-value recre-
ational landscapes based upon an integrated vision – although this has yet to be devel-
oped. There are also calls for a new management structure for the green areas on the
edges of the city and for an integrated organizational and financial approach to them.
In this respect, structures like that of the Amsterdamse Bos and the Amstelland Green
Zone are cited as examples. Naturally, the green infrastructure also needs to be embed-
ded within the administrative and legal framework of regional, structural and zoning
plans. Any building should do no more than support the “green functions.” As for the
investment needed, the city has the Amsterdam Green Fund and would also hope to at-
tract subsidies from other government sources. It is also hoped that it might achieve
“win-win” situations by, for example, locating possible commercial building along the
new Westrandweg on the western edge of the city in such a way that space is left over to
create a modern recreational landscape which could link the residents of Amsterdam-
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West with Spaarnwoude and even the coastal Kennemerduinen dunes (Van Zoest, J.
2001).
To what extent this “green dream” might be combined with a “blue dream” is not
immediately clear. The Amsterdam Water Plan, which calls water “Amsterdam’s blue
gold” and is one of the basic building blocks of the latest structural plan, does not pro-
vide any direct answer. But, alongside purely functional matters like inland shipping
routes and the importance of reservoirs, it also mentions the recreational importance
of water. It states that the scenic and natural value of water can be reinforced by ex-
tending the existing network of waterways and connecting them with ecological and
recreational link zones. A number of green areas are explicitly named as temporary
reservoirs. Particularly in low-lying polders like Buikslotermeer, Watergraafsmeer,
and Amsterdam Southeast, space for water storage is being sought in green areas (Wa-
terplan Amsterdam 2001).
Vision and Policy Adjustment
Towards a Regional Vision
If we look at the municipal and regional visions of green space and recreation, the im-
pression gained is one of fragmentation. Most of the parks in Amsterdam itself are
cherished, but the green which exists to counterbalance the city’s “lobe structure” is
very gradually changing in function. The transition from city to metropolitan region
requires a coherent regional vision of the “green structure,” the question being to
what extent the lobe structure is applicable and preservable on that scale. At first
sight, there does appear to exist some potential. Zaanstad, West Amsterdam-Halfweg,
Buitenveldert-Amstelveen, and Amsterdam Southeast-Diemen can be regarded as ur-
banized lobes which could provide the framework for a solid regional green structure,
providing and even reinforcing the benefits which have been posited since the 1920s –
that is, the importance of citydwellers having some place within reach where they can
be “outdoors.”
Another possible variant is analogous with the development of the London and
Paris agglomerations. There, the original park-like edges of the city were enclosed by
new urban development and absorbed into the agglomeration as city parks. This also
seems to be happening to the Amsterdamse Bos, which is now enclosed as the old mar-
ketgardening area to the south of it is developed for housing. Connections can be es-
tablished between different park areas by creating “green-blue” routes or zones be-
tween them; these would not only have ecological significance but in particular could
be used as recreational cycling or walking routes. But the character and design of such
areas does change. Former agricultural land is transformed into park landscapes with
a high recreational value. Efforts may be made to keep linear elements such as rivers,
canals and dikes as visible as possible, but these continue to be threatened with frag-
mentation by the fact that the infrastructure frequently cuts across them or they are
obscured by buildings.
In the London and Paris regions, “green belts” further outside the city also provide a
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recreational counterweight. For the Amsterdam region a similar development would
mean that – as well as the nearby regional recreational zones such as the Gooi, the
North Sea dunes and beaches, and the lakes of  Vinkeveen and Loosdrecht, all of which
are already under enormous pressure – more distant areas such as parts of the “Green
Heart” and central Noord-Holland would have to be given a recreational function. The
importance of the Area of Outstanding Natural Beauty status confirmed for both of
these areas in the Fifth Memorandum on Land Use and the legal status given such
areas by the so-called “green contours” regulations gains additional significance in
this light. So, design considerations at this “higher” level are important as are infra-
structural requirements. The accessibility of these areas, particularly by public trans-
port, is an essential precondition. This means bringing them within easy reach of rail-
way and metro stations.
The lack of vision is combined with a lack of research into the wishes of visitors and
users at the regional level, as originally initiated by Geddes and followed up by Van Lo-
huizen and many subsequent generations of policy researchers. Of greater importance
seems to be the financial feasibility of acquiring residual areas which are not immedi-
ately interesting for other urban functions, combined with a previously defined natu-
ral status of certain regional elements. But these two aspects alone do not create a geo-
graphical structure which is accessible to recreation-seeking Amsterdammers.
The Administrative and Financial Structure
A vision of land use needs to be established within an administrative and legal frame-
work. An attempt in 1995 to give the Amsterdam region the status of a metropolitan
province, which might have somewhat streamlined the tangle of arrangements be-
tween various local authorities, failed. Nor was the “green vision” presented in the
Amsterdam Regional Structural Plan a shining example of clarity. In fact, it simply pre-
sented a collection of the existing and potential new green areas in the region, without
adding any geographical or strategic administrative vision. Yet again, it is the province
and the state which are trying to define the regional framework. For the province it is
the Noord-Holland South Regional Plan which is the preferred instrument; this was
adopted in 2002 and incorporates the Amsterdam Structural Plan entitled Chosing Ur-
banity. The Regional Plan emphasizes that, alongside existing green elements, a geo-
graphical structure needs to be created for the future. In practice, a forward-looking
consensus needs to be reached at the regional level about the missing links. The policy
memorandum A Green-Blue Vision for Noord-Holland South is supposed to provide a basis
for this but in fact does not present a coherent picture, either in geographical or in
strategic administrative terms (Structuurplan Amsterdam 2001; Groenblauwe Visie 2001).
At a higher level, the “contour policy” as proposed in the Fifth Memorandum on
Land Use is decisive. This retains existing nature and recreation zones, with the debate
centering on the transformation of agricultural land into new urban expansion zones.
Again, though, there is no geographical vision with respect to green space and recre-
ation.
The acquisition of land also presents problems. Because of the general lack of ade-
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quate funds, compulsory purchase has never yet been used in respect to land intended
for recreational purposes. Yet amicable transactions are becoming more and more dif-
ficult to agree as landowners seek more lucrative ways to dispose of their property. As
far as areas currently used for farming are concerned, the addition of recreational
functions often provides the best solution for both agriculture and the citydweller. It
seems perfectly possible to create recreational routes and locations through basically
straightforward actions as part of the planning process. Waterland and Amstelland
are excellent examples of this.
The suggestion that “red for green” could be a useful strategy at the regional level is
misleading. At the municipal level it is of course possible, and even usual, to redistrib-
ute “red” income to create “green” amenities. As a major city, Amsterdam has been able
to create some impressive parks in this way. But smaller districts by definition have
more limited resources, which means that the development of a new housing estate is
at most only likely to generate green space at the neighborhood level. The scale of a re-
gional green structure requires a regional land policy – something which has been dis-
cussed at length but is still far from being realized.
The current working relationships within the context of the Joint Administrative
Arrangements Act – which take the form of Recreation Boards and Land Conservancies
– therefore remain the basis for any results. This despite the fact that local authorities
often represent conflicting interests. Whilst a recreation board in which it partici-
pates is lobbying for the recreational use of a particular piece of land, the same local
authority could be negotiating with project developers about alternative plans.
The money to create, maintain, and manage green space is pooled from the “green
funds” held by various layers of government and from private sources such as Natuur-
monumenten and the Forestry Commission – needless to say, after plenty of negotiation
and tension. This can and must be done more effectively. The often contradictory in-
terests within the broad “green” and recreational sector – different perspectives on the
ecological value of an area, the value of farming, the need for water storage and the
combination of rural functions – only leads to that sector as a whole being weakened in
the face of powerful urban interests. Moreover, different and sometimes almost con-
tradictory visions of the countryside can result in very divergent standpoints about
the accessibility of an area. The heavy emphasis placed by Natuurmonumenten upon eco-
logical values frequently results in an area being closed to everyone but biologists. Like-
wise, there are still farmers who do not want citydwellers intruding onto their land.
Drawing some distinction between direct use of the local infrastructure of cyclepaths,
footpaths, and waterways and indirect use in the form of visual enjoyment of agricul-
tural and natural scenery, plus some degree of internal zoning of recreational land-
scapes, offers a possible solution in this respect. This makes the rural part of the met-
ropolitan region a clear part of the citydweller’s recreational domain, one which will
only be valued to the full if he or she can actually enter it. Moreover, from a political
point of view such appreciation is essential.
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B . The Social Dilemmas of Spatial Development
3.5 • Understanding Segregation in
the Metropolitan Area of Amsterdam
Sako Musterd and  Wim Ostendorf
Introduction
A few years ago, in a paper entitled “The changing distribution of incomes in Dutch
cities: myth and reality” (Musterd and Ostendorf 1998) we analyzed the development
of segregation within the city of Amsterdam and – in a second phase – also analyzed
the segregation between Amsterdam and the remaining part of the metropolitan area.
We dealt with several dimensions of segregation. Among our findings:
– Segregation with respect to income is lower than with respect to ethnicity and even
with respect to age; this holds true within Amsterdam as well as between Amster-
dam and the remaining part of the metropolitan area;
– Segregation with respect to income is not really increasing, while segregation with
respect to ethnicity and type of household appeared to be becoming more pro-
nounced between Amsterdam and the remaining part of the metropolitan area.
These findings appeared to be quite different from the assumptions in the ongoing po-
litical debate in the Netherlands. Therefore, the results were even more critically ap-
proached than usual. Two types of comments were given. These were related not to our
theoretical interpretation but to the empirical data. The first refers to the application
of data that were predominantly collected at the municipal level; no integrated re-
gional analysis could be performed at that time. Secondly, a lack of data only allowed
for the presentation of some preliminary results.
These comments encouraged us to try to extend and improve the analysis. There-
fore, in this contribution we will analyse the socio-demographic, socio-cultural and so-
cio-economic segregation of the population within the entire metropolitan area of
Amsterdam, and present recent information on these spatial inequalities. We will
make an effort to interpret the dynamics that are encountered, referring to theoretical
debates that have been developing over the past decades. In Section 2, we will elaborate
on the dimensions of segregation that appear to be recurring and why; we will also pay
special attention to the question at what geographical level(s) segregation should be
addressed. In Section 3, the focus will be on the theoretical debate about the condi-
tions for segregation. Old and new theoretical considerations will be briefly discussed
and theoretically linked to the segregation processes. Both sections 2 and 3 will focus
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on the segregation issue from an international perspective. In Section 4, we will pres-
ent empirical data on segregation. We will leave the international scope and focus on
the analysis of segregation in the metropolitan area of Amsterdam. Finally, in Section
5, we will present some conclusions.
Segregation: Dimensions and Geographic Scale
A substantial share of the urban social change debate consists of views on and visions
regarding spatial inequality. Extreme forms have been addressed, such as the heritage
of the apartheid regimes in South African cities (Christopher 1994) and the persistent
separation of Protestants and Catholics in Belfast and other cities in Northern Ireland
(Boal 1998), the residential isolation of the poor from the rich in mega-cities, such as
São Paulo, Brazil, and the processes of estrangement and exclusion that can be found
in hyper-ghettos in American cities (Massey and Denton 1993).
However, much more moderate forms of inequality have also been recurrently ad-
dressed; and this resulted in the “segregation issue” being put high on political agen-
das. Studies with such titles as “Divided cities” (Fainstein et al 1992) and “Towards un-
divided cities” (Musterd et al 1999) reveal that the socio-spatial inequality issue exists
in cities in states with and without a liberal regime and with or without institutional-
ized apartheid histories. Among these states are Sweden, the Netherlands, Germany,
and France. 
The fact that spatial inequality is on the agenda is without doubt related to the im-
migration processes that occurred over the past four decades with regard to these
countries (and several other rich Western countries). They have experienced the immi-
gration of a large number of people originating from various countries. Mediter-
ranean, Asian, or African labor migrants and their families, economic refugees, politi-
cal refugees, and inhabitants of former colonies were the dominant contributors to
these flows. These influxes were not without impact on the respective housing mar-
kets, labor markets, and social relations in cities in the countries of destination. Re-
sentment developed, especially where the immigration process was relatively sudden
and voluminous. The inequality issue became a socio-cultural, or even ethnic, segrega-
tion issue.
The social inequality debate was not confined to socio-cultural differences, though.
Because of a serious concern about social polarization in urban societies – or perhaps
in order to address the ethnic issue indirectly – the socio-economic dimension of spa-
tial inequality was also given a high position on political agendas, particularly in
countries with a strong social democratic tradition. Politicians’ fear that social ghettos
would develop seems to have been the driving force.
Thus, two dimensions of segregation received and still receive frequent attention.
However, efforts to understand the spatial distributions of the urban population can-
not be successful without also considering the socio-demographic inequality dimen-
sion. In fact, perhaps the best strategy to understand segregation processes is to focus
the attention on the multidimensional lifestyle differentiation, in which elements of
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people’s socio-economic, demographic and socio-cultural positions are considered si-
multaneously. Unfortunately, data combining these three dimensions are hard to ob-
tain. However, in this contribution we will also look at socio-demographic segregation.
The political attention to socio-cultural and socio-economic segregation is – as said
– clearly related to integration objectives. Most politicians desire the rapid integration
of those who are not yet entirely integrated into urban society. That is, after politicians
became aware that the immigration processes we referred to had to be regarded as
events with a permanent character (also in the sense that many immigrants would per-
manently remain in the country of destination), they tended to formulate various
forms of integration policies. The fear that cultural – and political – “worlds apart”
would develop was often the impetus behind their policy aims. 
These integration objectives and associated social participation objectives were also
the vehicles to formulate policies aimed at improving the conditions of the less well-off
socio-economic sections of urban society. Specific aims to reduce social polarization
and to integrate the poor into the rich society were formulated. 
In the integration efforts in both the socio-cultural and socio-economic domains,
special attention is given to the spatial dimension, since many believe that it is specifi-
cally spatial segregation that reduces the opportunities to integrate into and fully par-
ticipate in society. It is assumed that the spatial concentration of a certain cultural
group, or the spatial concentration of poor inhabitants in certain districts of the met-
ropolitan area, will reduce the opportunities to realize the upward social mobility of
those individuals who live in these concentrations. The assumption is that a neighbor-
hood effect exists, which can have a negative impact on the participation of inhabi-
tants in society.
As far as the geographical scale is concerned, it may be argued that a metropolitan
level seems to be the most appropriate one on which to present the various dimensions
of segregation, since housing markets and labor markets operate on that level. Spatial
sorting processes, the outcomes of choices and constraints, occur at that scale. In all
contexts where suburbanization processes have developed, segregation has to be
measured at the metropolitan level. However, there may be good reasons not to focus
on that scale only. Sometimes data are not available for the complete metropolitan re-
gion, but only for a part, such as the central city. It can also be interesting to find out if
the real differences are between the central city and the suburbs, or whether there are
real differences within these zones too. This situation occurs in metropolitan areas
that have experienced substantial gentrification processes. Then, the inner city will be
characterized by districts that are inhabited by the relatively better off, and by districts
which are characterized by predominance of the relatively poor, not seldom immi-
grant households. Also, when the immigrant flows tend to be directed toward the cen-
tral city of a metropolitan area, and the central city is still attractive for other cate-
gories of households (e.g. students, urban-oriented small households, etc.), a certain
duality may develop within the central city. In such situations it makes sense to focus
attention on the differentiation within the inner city, too. 
With regard to suburban areas, similar developments may occur. Suburban areas
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are not homogeneous per se. In Europe, several examples can be given of planned new
town developments in which substantial numbers of dwellings were built in suburban
environments intended for households with a low and or moderate income. These
somewhat poorer areas contrast with luxury residential districts elsewhere in the sub-
urban environment. By implication, the internal differentiation within the suburban
zones may be large as well. Thus, in these contexts, it would also make sense to study
the level of segregation within the suburbs. In situations in which the central city col-
lects all poor households and the suburban area the better off ones, the metropolitan
level is the one to consider; in situations in which there is substantial differentiation
within the central city because of gentrification processes (these situations can be
found in many cities all over the world) and/or within suburban areas (in many Euro-
pean cities), the analysis of segregation within each of the areas also makes sense. In
the Netherlands, the latter situation can be found (Musterd and Ostendorf 1991; Meu-
lenbelt 1997). Significant levels of socio-cultural and socio-economic segregation can
be found both in the central city and in the suburban zones. Since the overall distribu-
tion has resulted in a relative concentration (but not exclusively) of low-income house-
holds and immigrant households in the central cities, many segregation studies car-
ried out in the Netherlands have focused on the differentiation within the central city.
However, since some politicians persist in their ideas that all urban problems
(poverty, concentrations of insufficiently integrated immigrants, etc.) accumulate in
the central cities and hardly anywhere else, and since empirical criticism of intra-mu-
nicipal analyses of socio-economic and socio-cultural inequality is also persistent, we
will address the segregation issue in this contribution at the metropolitan level. We
will present the results at that level, but will also refer to the levels of inequality found
at the intra-municipal, central city level.
Conditions for Segregation 
There are multiple conditions that relate to segregation. The economic structure of a
city and the kind of restructuring that is going on are regarded as being among the
most powerful forces behind the social fragmentation and integration in the urban
realm. But welfare state regimes and the occurring changes in these areas are also
thought to be important. Other, related factors are frequently mentioned as well, such
as the cultural dimensions, the historically grown and place-specific structures and
the reinforcing effect of segregation itself. In this section, we will briefly refer to these
conditions and link them to the expectations with regard to segregation in the Am-
sterdam metropolitan region.
Over the past decade, global economic restructuring has led to an increase of inter-
connectedness and internationalization of firms and economic processes, which is ex-
pressed in the rapid growth of flows of people, money and goods around the world.
Among the characteristics of these changes are, on the one hand, a growth of the de-
mand for services and thus of service jobs, for which often high-skilled labor is re-
quired. But on the other hand the global economic restructuring process brings un-
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employment as well as a demand for low-skilled or unskilled jobs. The final result of
the restructuring process is therefore an increase of social inequality and a polarized
urban social structure (Sassen 1991). The social divisions are reflected in sharper socio-
economic and ethnic spatial patterns. The expected outcomes of the dynamics are sep-
arate residential concentrations of wealthy people in gated communities and of poor-
er households in ghetto-like neighborhoods, and ethnically homogeneous
neighborhoods. 
However, Sassen’s thesis that global restructuring creates social polarization (and,
subsequently, social and ethnic spatial inequality,) has been strongly criticized. Sever-
al authors, in fact, did not find increasing polarization, but professionalization in-
stead (Hamnett 1994). Scheme 1 shows an example of the theoretical difference be-
tween a polarization and a professionalization process. Professionalization was found
by Hamnett to be the dominant trend in the Dutch Randstad. If professionalization is
the dominant process, we must hypothesize that socio-spatial inequality will not nec-
essarily increase because of global economic restructuring. We assume this situation
fits the Dutch case.
polarization                                                                                                  professionalization
Scheme 1.   Theoretical social distributions
Others have argued that restructuring does not have to result in social polarization
but instead produces mismatches (perhaps only temporary ones) between the demand
and supply of labor. Subsequently, that could result in social polarization between the
working poor and the working rich, and also in a contrast between the employed and
the unemployed, the included versus the excluded. The extent to which the unem-
ployed are really excluded also depends on other factors, notably the welfare regime.
The Netherlands seems to have experienced mismatches which did not result in polar-
ization.
However, other dimensions are also relevant. Several scholars have pointed out the
differences in success (in society) of various categories of the population. Burgers and
Musterd (2001) referred to the sociologist Waldinger, who wondered why Afro-Ameri-
cans who live in the inner cities of American cities are often unemployed, while His-
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panics and Asians with a similar combination of educational level and geographical
location are not. He concludes that the mix of their cultural capital and the vacancies
in the labor market also determines the position of immigrants in the labor market
when they arrive in the country and city of destination. That may also partly explain
the different employment position of some immigrant categories in the Netherlands.
Another important condition for segregation is the organization of the welfare
state. Esping-Andersen (1990) shows that different types of welfare states have differ-
ent labor market structures and experience different levels of participation in the la-
bor market. Apparently, the global economy does not dictate the structure or the par-
ticipation rate in the labor markets of the advanced economies. Therefore, the social
consequences of globalization differ according to differences in institutional con-
texts. Some countries have developed very extensive welfare systems. Frequently, a sub-
stantial redistribution of the bargaining power was established. Progressive income
taxes, the development of minimum wage levels, the provision of benefits in situa-
tions of old age, illness, unemployment and disability, systems of redistributing the
costs and benefits in the sphere of housing (brick and mortar subsidies, individual
rent subsidies) – all of these types of state involvement were included as part of the sys-
tem of care in many countries.
Many support the idea that there is a relation between the extent to which the wel-
fare states have developed their social security and welfare systems and the levels of so-
cial polarization, socio-spatial segregation and social exclusion in urban areas. In gen-
eral, there is a belief that well-developed welfare states have thus far been largely
successful in shielding certain population categories from social deprivation and iso-
lation. The reduction of polarization is obvious when welfare provisions imply finan-
cial redistribution. We hypothesize that the Dutch welfare state – which is a combina-
tion of the corporatist model and the social democratic model – has resulted in
substantial reductions of inequality and has also helped to weaken the relation be-
tween people’s position in terms of income, housing and employment. Together that
will also have contributed to reducing socio- and ethnic spatial inequality.
Apart from economic, cultural, and welfare state factors that affect social (ethnic
and perhaps also lifestyle) divisions, we must also point at the historically grown so-
cial, cultural, economic, institutional and physical structures that impact upon the di-
visions discussed here. Since globalization processes tend to homogenize the world to
some extent, and accessibility becomes a less important factor in location decisions
from that point of view, the relatively unique, historically grown place-specific charac-
teristics will become relatively more important factors in location decisions of people
and firms. Economic and social development may be predominantly triggered by
these place-specific social, cultural, economic, and political structures, which to some
extent will be interrelated and result in fairly unique “local models” (e.g. the now fa-
mous “Dutch polder model” which includes a model of governance in which consen-
sus-building is extremely important). Consequently, the “place-specificity” thesis can
be interpreted as a divergence thesis. Each location, each city will show its own place-
specific characteristics and may be able to use these characteristics to attract certain
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economic activities. The differentiating effects of local specificity may also result in
dissimilar social structures. We estimate that the “culture of equality” that seems to
characterize the Netherlands as it developed after the Second World War, will again
have helped to reduce spatial inequality. 
One factor related to the idea that historical structures are relevant is the assump-
tion that socio-spatial or ethnic segregation patterns of the population that were de-
veloped in the past are a potential cause of ongoing social problems of individual
households in cities. However, much thinking seems to be inspired by images and per-
ceptions that originate from specific but relatively extreme cases (i.e. certain cities in
the US) where social polarization and social and ethnic segregation have reached very
high levels. In those circumstances, segregation may easily become a factor in its own
right. However, as stated earlier, we have to bear in mind that the ethnic and socio-eco-
nomic spatial segregation of the population in US cities is generally more rigid than
that of many other Western cities, particularly European ones. Although the conti-
nental European so-called redistributing welfare states – which are different in social,
political, and ethnic-cultural terms as well – have produced cities that are only moder-
ately segregated in the first place, it is questionable whether these moderately segre-
gated areas have any negative effect on social integration or exclusion processes at all.
Western countries should not be treated as though they were similar. Of course, this
applies to the states within Europe as well. Scarce information on neighborhood ef-
fects in Amsterdam, based on empirical research, leads to serious doubts (Ostendorf et
al 2001).
What can be learned from this elaboration is that social (and ethnic or other) in-
equality is not the inevitable result of globalization and economic restructuring. In
some places it is, in others it is not. Local conditions, both institutional and historical-
ly grown, as well as “cultural” factors may produce fairly different social inequality sit-
uations and a variety of socio-spatial patterns in cities. With regard to the Netherlands,
and particularly with regard to Dutch cities, based on earlier studies as well as on the
theoretical exercise we presented, we hypothesize that the segregation levels in Dutch
metropolitan regions such as Amsterdam will not be very large, nor will segregation
be increasing rapidly. In the section to follow, we will present some analyses that may
support our hypothesis. 
Segregation at the Metropolitan Level: Some Facts
Segregation can be expressed through indices (measures) and via maps. We will use
both. An index forms a good basis for comparison, but does not reveal the spatial pat-
tern; above we discussed the importance of spatial patterns, especially with respect to
the uniform or heterogeneous character of urban and suburban areas. While there are
many types of indices that can be applied to express inequality or unevenness, the
most commonly used one is the index of dissimilarity (ID), that is, the percentage of
the category that has to move to another neighborhood in order to reach equal distri-
bution (i.e. no segregation) of the category over the area under study. Thus, the ID ex-
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presses the spatial inequality of the distribution of a population category relative to
another population category and runs from 0 (no segregation) to 100 (absolute segre-
gation). If the second population category consists of the “rest of the population” (the
“other”), the index is labeled index of segregation (IS). To present a frame of reference,
we provide the average IS of blacks versus the rest in seven US cities (Boston, Chicago,
Detroit, Los Angeles, New York, Baltimore, Miami). In 1980, the IS turned out to be 81.
The calculation was based on census tracts data (Massey and Denton 1993).
Maps can also be constructed in various ways. Absolute figures, various relative fig-
ures, dynamics and many other things may be shown. If thematic maps are presented
the spatial scale is of great importance. We will mainly present maps in which we focus
on the metropolitan area and use data at the municipal level, except for the central
city. If data are available for urban districts (“boroughs”) within the central city, we will
use these urban district data and put them in one data file together with the munici-
pal data of surrounding municipalities within the same metropolitan area. The aver-
age size of the boroughs is approximately the same as the average size of surrounding
municipalities. In each map we will present the recent process (relative change), the re-
cent pattern (the position of a spatial unit relative to the entire metropolitan area) and
– if helpful – some additional information. 
The indices of segregation that could be calculated for Amsterdam for each of the
three dimensions we have discussed, while applying the combined municipal and bor-
ough data, are presented in Table 1.
Table 1. Segregation index for the metropolitan area of Amsterdam;urban districts within Amsterdam,
municipalities in the rest of the region,per year
———————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————
1994 1996 1997 1999 2000
———————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————
Socio-cultural
Immigrants / 28 27
Turks and Moroccans 40 42 42 42
Socio-demographic
Single-person household 24 25
Couple without children <18 yr. 15 15
Couple with children <18 yr. 18 18
Age 0-19 12 12 12 12
Age 20-40 13 12 12 12
Age 40-64 07 06 06 06
Age 65+ 16 16 16 16
Socio-economic
Lowest quintile 06 07
Highest quintile 23 22
———————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————
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The general messages to be gathered from the table above are firstly, the relative stabil-
ity of the spatial inequality at the metropolitan level and secondly, the relatively mod-
erate or even low levels of segregation. The highest levels of segregation occur with re-
gard to the socio-cultural dimension. Moderate to low levels of segregation occur in the
socio-demographic domain. In metropolitan Amsterdam, single-person households
are the most likely to live a segregated existence. Moderate levels are also present in the
socio-economic spheres, where the better-off households appear to be more separated
from the rest than, say, the less well-off households. The less well-off households are al-
ready highly mixed with other households, as is corroborated by other studies (Osten-
dorf et al 2001), but nonetheless the Dutch Big City Policy aims to help these lower-in-
come categories by providing housing in “mixed” neighborhoods.
In the following sections, we will discuss these findings in some detail and present
additional information. Where possible, comparable information with regard to oth-
er Dutch cities will also be provided.
Socio-Cultural Inequality
Over the past four decades, Dutch cities – with Amsterdam leading the way – have ex-
perienced a rapid and voluminous influx of immigrants from various origins. By 1998,
some 44% of the Amsterdam population could be labeled first, second or third genera-
tion immigrants (if immigrants from industrialized countries are excluded, the figure
is 34%). Guest workers dominated the immigration figures during the 1960s and
1970s. The first settled in lodging houses in the inner city, followed by areas where the
share of private rental housing is high. Today the majority of so-called ethnic immi-
grants, currently including post-colonial immigrants and asylum seekers, have gained
access to the social housing, mostly in post-war neighborhoods. 
The shifting pattern from the core of the city to the newer neighborhoods and from
private to public housing has been extensively dealt with in earlier work by the authors
(Musterd and Ostendorf 1996). While the patterns have changed enormously over the
past three decades, the IS scores have remained more or less constant. Thus, the various
processes never resulted in large ethnic concentrations. Recent micro-level research
aimed at debunking the idea of ethnic ghettos in Amsterdam used the data of 18,000
postcode areas to show that there are many small so-called ethnic concentration areas.
Clear concentrations (i.e. four standard deviations above the mean and showing at
least 1% of the total population in that category) of Turkish and of Moroccan inhabi-
tants in Amsterdam were indeed found (only partially overlapping with each other),
but in 1999, these concentrations did not reveal any noticeable dominance. The share
of Turks in the Turkish concentration areas did not surpass 21%. The share of Moroc-
cans in Moroccan concentration areas never surpassed 29%. Furthermore, only a third
of all Turks and Moroccans lived in such concentrations (Deurloo and Musterd 2001).
Thus, the majority of the population in ethnic concentrations consists of other people,
and the majority of the category involved lives elsewhere. These findings are in accor-
dance with the moderate level of segregation we found. Within the city of Amsterdam,
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the IS for Turks and Moroccans (measured at the neighborhood level) is 42. That figure
does not differ from the stable figure of 42 at the metropolitan level, as shown in Table
1. The fact that there are no growing spatial concentrations (other than can be ascribed
to the total rise of the share in the metropolitan population) supports the idea that the
spatial processes we discussed may be regarded as an expression of the upward social
mobility of the population category involved. The shifts they experienced went hand in
hand with an improvement of their housing situation, especially with regard to the
quality of the dwellings. We assume that the residential careers of at least part of these
immigrants will already have extended to the suburbs as well. The recent increase of
immigrants of non-Dutch origin in suburban municipalities such as Almere and
Diemen is larger than that of Amsterdam. The development of the share of non-Dutch
in the population of the central city of the metropolitan area, as shown in Figure 1, also
suggests some convergence between city (still housing the majority of the non-Dutch)
and suburbs as far as the socio-cultural dimension is concerned.
As is shown, similar processes have occurred in the other metropolitan areas (Rotter-
dam, The Hague, Utrecht). We must add, however, that the reduction of the share of
non-Dutch in the central cities must be partially ascribed to the fact that many people
succeed in obtaining Dutch nationality. However, this phenomenon in itself is an ex-
pression of cultural integration.
Socio-Demographic Inequality
The demographic structure of the metropolitan area also does not reveal rigid cleav-
ages between population and household categories. There are differences concerning
the locations of various categories, but again these are not absolute. Figure 2, which
shows the share of single-person households, provides an example of that argument.
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Although there are clear concentration areas, such as the inner city and adjacent
neighborhoods in Amsterdam, where the share of single-person households reaches
levels of almost 70%, there are also many other areas that reach substantial percent-
ages. The process of individualization has caused the share of single-person house-
holds to increase rapidly everywhere. This is revealing a more general shift in the
household composition. Together this has contributed to the overall moderate level of
segregation, as is expressed by the moderate IS scores.
Also, the IS scores per age category suggest only minor differences between districts
or municipalities within the metropolitan areas as far as age is concerned. There are
some remarkable patterns, however (Figure 3).
First, we can see that there is some development as far as the share of people aged 0-
19 and people aged 65+ in the various metropolitan area districts is concerned. Among
other things, an association with the evolving residential pattern of immigrant settle-
ment can be seen. The shift of immigrants in Amsterdam towards the post-war areas in
the western sections of the city runs parallel with an increase in the area’s share of the
children. It is a well-known fact that the birth rate of immigrants is still much higher
than that of the autochthones. The increase in the proportion of young people in these
areas obviously coincides with a similar reduction in former relative concentrations
elsewhere in the metropolitan area. In addition, Dutch families are scarce in the city;
most of them live in suburbs. Coinciding with this is the fact that the “student” cities
such as Utrecht and Amsterdam have a low population of 0-19 year-olds and relatively
few elderly people, especially compared to The Hague and Rotterdam. The share of sin-
gle-person households, however, does not seem to vary much. The proportion of older
people (65+) in the central cities seems to indicate that the bigger cities are less appeal-
ing to old people. Central cities have become more the domain of the young and of im-
migrants, while Dutch families and older people seem to avoid the city as a place to live.
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Socio-Economic Inequality
The socio-economic dimension is often regarded as the most important one. Govern-
ments and politicians tend to put the improvement of these socio-economic indices at
the top of their agendas. In some contexts, their aim is also to reduce social inequality
and/or socio-spatial inequality. There is a fairly widespread notion that social polariza-
tion as well as the spatial expression of that process are increasing steadily. These
processes would imply that the central city of the metropolitan area is losing ground
in the sense that it is becoming less and less affluent, while the surrounding munici-
palities are getting richer and richer. The central city might also experience increased
levels of inequality because of gentrification processes that develop parallel to impov-
erishment. These hypotheses have resulted from discussions about increasing polar-
ization caused by economic restructuring processes. The biggest worry is that the re-
sulting sharper segregated structure will have negative effects in terms of upward
social mobility opportunities. Living in a concentration of poor people might result in
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too many negative examples and might prevent people from getting a job because of
stigmatization of the area that is involved or because of negative socialization proces-
ses.
But, can these hypotheses be supported with empirical data about Dutch metropol-
itan areas such as Amsterdam? Several contradictory processes influence the social
and spatial outcomes. We have already noticed that immigrants from non-industrial-
ized countries tend to settle in the larger cities; we can add to that the fact that in the
Dutch urban situation those who finish their educations, and get a job and are begin-
ning to set up a family and/or a household frequently have to look elsewhere for oppor-
tunities, generally outside the central city and in surrounding suburbs. We also men-
tioned the gentrification processes that result in the upgrading of certain urbanized
neighborhoods in the city. These processes – suburbanization, immigration, and gen-
trification – may result in an increase of socio-spatial segregation both at the metro-
politan level and within the central city. Simultaneously, however, the Netherlands is
well-known for its safety nets and redistribution policy measures, and for reducing so-
cial inequality in general; these may well have had the desired counter-balancing ef-
fects. Furthermore, central cities have some very special characteristics that clearly fit
the requirements of today’s economic development. Dutch central cities, especially
those with only a modest history of manufacturing (such as Amsterdam, Utrecht, and
The Hague) but with a rich history in trade, traffic and culture, are well suited for the
new consumption- and trade-oriented economic activities (culture and service related
industries, for example). That may have brought new activities to the central cities,
with all kinds of resulting positive effects.
In short, there are positive and negative forces that contribute to the socio-spatial
composition of the city and the metropolitan area. That is sufficient reason to take a
closer look at the actual empirical data. The IS data of Table 1 reveal that in Amsterdam
the poor are not spatially isolated; neither are the rich, although some spatial segrega-
tion is associated with the relatively higher scores. If we study the maps of social in-
equality (Figure 4), the overall picture is that of a relatively poor central city and a rela-
tively rich surrounding suburban area.
———————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————
Table 2. Difference between the average total income per earner of the population of the central city
and of the urban region (minus central city),1974-1998
———————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————
1974 1984 1989 1994 1996 1998
———————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————
Amsterdam -15.8% -16.7% -15.7% -18.8% -18.7%            -16.8%
Rotterdam -10.1% -15.9% -15.5% -18.2% -17.1%            -16.4%
Den Haag -10.3% -11.7% -11.2% -11.7% -16.0%            -14.2%
Utrecht -13.2% -17.2% -18.9% -21.0% -18.9%            -18.1%
———————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————
Source:CBS,adapted by the authors
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However, the process that is occurring cannot be labeled as a general increase of socio-
spatial inequality or as an impoverishment of the inner city. An important factor in
this regard is which years are compared. All structural and cyclical dynamics will be
reflected in the relative social positions at a certain point in time. Therefore, if we com-
pare 1989 with 1998 the process may generally be regarded as one of a losing city and
winning suburbs (measured in terms of disposable income); but if we compare 1994
with 1998 we would be talking about a winning city and losing suburbs. Table 2 pro-
vides information about the city-suburb differences in terms of disposable incomes
in the metropolitan areas of Amsterdam and the other cities over a longer period of
time. The negative position of the central city, which developed during the large waves
of suburbanization of the 1960s and 1970s, has remained relatively stable since, but
has actually been showing some recovery in recent years. That recovery parallels the
rapid reduction of unemployment levels of the central city (in Amsterdam, the figure
was only 6% in 1999, as opposed to 12% in 1996) and also the booming economy
around the end of the 20th century. 
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The conclusion must be that the central cities in the Netherlands are not continu-
ously losing their position. Moreover, there is another interesting phenomenon: the
separation of the poor from other income categories is only modest, as the IS in Table 1
shows. Moreover, this will be a function of moderate social inequality in general. The
moderate spatial separation of the poor can be illustrated in various ways. One way is
to take a closer look at the income distributions of the poorest urban districts of the
city (boroughs). In Figure 5, recent data are presented. It is clear that almost similar
shares of households with incomes in the 2nd, 3rd and 4th income quintiles accompany
the lowest (1st) income quintile.
Figure 5. Income distribution of the four poorest urban districts (boroughs) of Amsterdam (with
the lowest share in the fourth and fifth income quintile categories), 1998
In earlier research, we also used a narrower definition of “poor” people. In a represen-
tative sample of the Amsterdam population, we found that only 4.5% of the population
18 years and older could be labeled as under-educated, unemployed without a partner
with a job. There turned out to be only very few small pockets of poverty and none of
these had more than 20% levels of poverty (Ostendorf et al 2001).
Conclusion
Over the past decade – and certainly over the past few years – there was clearly what
may be called a significant increase in attention paid to the problems related to segre-
gation and inequality. Concepts such as socio-spatial segregation, urban underclass,
social exclusion, social polarization, and deprivation became fashionable. However,
we should not forget that many comments and texts are hardly more than an expres-
sion of fear and a reflection of the predominant discourse that may well conceal a lack
of understanding. In the Netherlands, scientists and politicians have for some decades
now expressed the fact that they fear future increases in ethnic and socio-economic
segregation.
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Dutch research projects, however, repeatedly produce empirical data on the devel-
opment of segregation patterns. The stability of the segregation levels continues to be
revealed. Sometimes the spatial picture appears to be changing, but the level of segre-
gation hardly ever does. It appears to be persistently low. Most of the analyses, however,
were aimed at understanding segregation at the local level of central cities in metro-
politan areas. In this paper we have presented a closer examination of new regional da-
ta on spatial inequality by extending the analysis from the city to the entire metropoli-
tan region, and by looking at all three dimensions of social segregation in order to find
out to what extent this could result in new findings. But like earlier research we found
that the level of segregation in Dutch metropolitan regions remains moderate and
does not appear to be increasing. Of the three dimensions, socio-economic segregation
is the lowest, while socio-cultural segregation is the highest. The segregation of people
with low incomes is especially low; much lower than the segregation of people with
higher incomes. This finding again causes doubts regarding the strategy of the Big City
Policy in the Netherlands, which is intended to help lower income categories by offer-
ing housing in “mixed” neighborhoods, because they apparently to a large degree al-
ready live in “mixed” neighborhoods.
Thus, there is reason to reduce the level of rhetoric related to the scientific and soci-
etal debates regarding segregation. Amsterdam, and the other cities and their metro-
politan areas, are still urban areas with relatively moderate levels of ethnic, demo-
graphic, and social segregation. Although there are obvious differences between
districts and areas within the metropolitan area, the overall picture is one of moderate
levels of ethnic, demographic, and social inequalities, which is reflected in equally
moderate spatial inequalities. State intervention and redistribution, moderate social
inequality in general and relatively successful integration processes have apparently
balanced out the counterforces of the economic restructuring, gentrification, and
suburbanization processes. Welfare state characteristics and local history may be re-
garded as the most important factors behind these results. More market involvement
in an increasing number of domains will probably result in somewhat sharper divi-
sions once the ethnic, household, and social inequality also increases. But thus far, this
has not happened.
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Cities are known for their continuously changing groups of residents. Some people
spend their entire lives in the same neighborhood. Others settle there, relocate within
the neighborhood and then move away. All of the residents are deeply concerned with
their residential environment to match their social careers with respect to both eco-
nomic and cultural characteristics, which are closely related to the origins of the resi-
dents. This established ecological vision underlies the present study about the mobili-
ty of eight population categories in the Amsterdam region between 1988 and 2000. The
results correspond largely with the ideas of Burgess et al, although Amsterdam is nei-
ther a classic example of a liberal capitalist city nor is it in a period of industrialization.
The study also demonstrates that examining only the central city (without the sub-
urbs) and comparing distribution patterns over time leads upward mobility to be seri-
ously underestimated.
Introduction
Like all cities with a wealth of international relations, Amsterdam attracts people
every year from all corners of the world in search of an existence and a suitable place to
live. They come from very different origins and consequently differ with respect to
their opportunities and needs. Japanese and German managers seconded by their
firms for a few years and refugees from Somalia and spouses from Morocco are all seek-
ing a place in the Amsterdam arena. In addition, young Dutch people move here to
complete their educations and find their first jobs, partners and homes. Amsterdam is
thus a specific environment for those of various origins to enrich their lives over a cer-
tain period. MacKenzie (1926) labeled these long-term processes as mobility rather
than fluidity, which denotes the daily pattern of activities. Interest in this subject is
longstanding and is based on the classic principle established in The Growth of the City:
“In the expansion of the city a process of distribution takes place which sifts and sorts
and relocates individuals and groups by residence and occupation.” In this renowned
research proposal, Burgess (1925) expressed ideas that have retained their value be-
cause they call attention to important relations between the characteristics of new and
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longstanding residents and their residential environment. Some seventy years later,
Short (1996, 180) summarized them as follows:
Most of the migrants to the city had little money and limited resources. Their first move
was to the inner city, where the cheapest housing could be found. As they gained a firmer
foothold in the urban economy they moved further out to the more expensive housing. ...
The older-established residential groups lived further out while the more recent arrivals
have the poorest housing in the city. This is still a useful generalization through which to
understand the relationship between housing and length of residence by social group for
many cities in the world. It is not a universal model. It applies to cities with poor migrant
groups and a private housing market in which housing quality is a function of income.
According to this interpretation, Burgess’s ideas do not really apply to cities like Am-
sterdam, where the private housing market is not dominant. Whether this is indeed
the case remains to be seen.
The scope of this analysis has been deliberately expanded beyond migrants from
less developed regions. This decision arises not only from social considerations that
figure in urban development. In world capitals like Amsterdam, this is probably in-
creasingly true, considering the growth of international relations. But there is also an
academic reason. Virtually no systematic research is available on environments where
people settle and relocation patterns to other residential environments by people
from diverse cultural origins. To what extent are specific paths or types of spatial mo-
bility identifiable? Can types be distilled from the cultural origins of the migrants,
who are helpful to understand these paths? Settlement and the subsequent moves
should obviously be analyzed as processes, rather than as consecutive situations. “No
study of expansion (of the city) as a process has yet been made…” (Burgess 1925). Three
quarters of a century later, the majority of these studies still consists of descriptions of
patterns of spatial disadvantage of ethnic groups, expressed largely through segrega-
tion indexes.
Some of the aforementioned relations merit a more detailed description. First, the
social-economic position of families was directly linked with the quality of the neigh-
borhood where they lived. Following upward socio-economic mobility, they usually
move to newer, more attractive residential surroundings. In the highly industrialized
United States from the early twentieth century onward, this entailed an exodus from
the congested industrial areas and overcrowded residential areas to the more peaceful,
spacious suburbs. This image is now eroding in two respects. First, many of the resi-
dents and units moving out are no longer traditional families with children. Second,
many inner cities are no longer busy production centers and have been partially trans-
formed into residential and consumption areas since deindustrialization. The trek of
inhabitants from one residential environment to another need not result from rising
affluence alone. Cultural differences that arise through origins may come into play as
well. Walter Firey (1945), for example, demonstrated the significance of culture for the
elite in maintaining Beacon Hill in Boston, a neighborhood that the upper ten consid-
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er the embodiment of this city’s great English tradition. Even then, not all population
categories regarded the suburbs as the Promised Land in the hierarchy of residential
environments. 
Although Firey criticized the Chicago School’s overly economic approach, they did
however distinguish residential environments according to cultural differences.
These districts were largely named after the origins of their residents: Little Italy, Little
Sicily, Ghetto, Greektown, Chinatown. Such neighborhoods often served as gateways
where newcomers found support among their countrymen. This made the transition
easier and helped them find provisional accommodations and jobs. These residential
environments were rather closed societies with specific local characteristics. This idea
of a closed society of poorly educated immigrants exercising internal social control is
not very popular among politicians and planners in the Netherlands or among their
counterparts in other modern countries, contrary to the district idea supported for
the native lower classes and upper middle-class. Burgess, however, considered the
ghetto of German Jews as the stepping-stone to Germany and on to the Promised Land
beyond, culminating in the suburbs. Upward socio-economic mobility required eras-
ing cultural differences to make way for the culture of the new country. This process
may span one or several generations, while the need for a suitable residential environ-
ment depends on the stage of one’s life as well.
The question also arises as to whether in the current global society certain cultural
differences can persist without jeopardizing socio-economic advancement. At any
rate, English, as the dominant world language, increasingly controls communication,
although other cultural attributes (e.g. music, dance, architecture, cooking) can even
be beneficial. The next question is whether different cultural domains can emerge in
the urban structure as well. The emancipation of primarily young, upwardly mobile
professionals (yuppies), for example, revived the charm of living in “authentic” city
districts for certain groups with high incomes (Cortie and Van de Ven 1981), and the af-
fluent have a discerning appreciation of posh districts and suburbs (De Wijs-Mulkens
1999). 
Social geographers can thus explore social mobility in a city from at least two an-
gles. While the significance of socio-economic position is the primary focus, cultural
attributes are relevant as well.
In and around Amsterdam, there are very few residential environments associated
solely with the origins or cultural background of their residents. Immigration num-
bers were not high enough, and the newcomers were just too similar to those already
settled there. There is no Little Friesland or Little East Indies, and Chinatown covers
barely one hundred square meters while the Jewish Quarter did not survive World War
II. The images are more stereotypical: the working-class North, the posh South, the
gentrified city center and the Bijlmer ghetto.
The socio-economic approach does enable a clear classification of residential areas
and residents. The procedure, which I will describe briefly, basically entails exploring
the changing relations among residents and residential environments based on relo-
cation trends; it is known as voting with one’s feet. The following questions will be an-
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swered and will concern both the origins of the residents and the nature and attrac-
tiveness of their residential environments.
– How likely are migrants of different origins to settle in certain types of residential
environments? To which types do they subsequently relocate?
– In what measure do their patterns of settlement and subsequent relocations indi-
cate upward social-economic mobility among the different population groups?
– Does such upward mobility concern specific types according to their stage in life?
– What kind of changes emerge during the investigation period?
All the empirical material comes from O+S Amsterdam (the Amsterdam Bureau for Re-
search and Statistics) and the CBS (National Bureau of Statistics).
The Amsterdam Context
Amsterdam has long consisted of attractive and less attractive residential areas (Van
Engelsdorp Gastelaars and Wagenaar 1985). This distribution is based on longstanding
ecological principles: attractive residential districts are as far away as possible from
activities that cause pollution, danger and noise. In Amsterdam these areas were pri-
marily the eastern and western dockyards and sites across the IJ (North). Generally,
most of the city center and sections of Amsterdam South have been privately owned
since they were built and are designed as attractive professional environments for liv-
ing and working. The West, East and North of Amsterdam were developed largely after
World War II under a socialist municipal administration that focused almost exclu-
sively on the public sector. In the private sector, ageing residential areas appear less
likely to be filtered down than in the public sector.
The quality of a residential environment therefore does not appear to improve in a
centrifugal pattern in Amsterdam. Aside from the political reason stated above, the
city center was built during the affluence of the Golden Age, which was followed by an
extended period of stagnation. 
Arriving at Central Station, the visitor is immediately immersed in a city of the Baroque
Age. Wonderful tall and narrow brick mansions with picturesque gables mirror in scores
of canals. The streets are bustling with pedestrians and cyclists, many of them of exotic de-
scents. Much of the traffic is by streetcar. The only metropolis in the western world where
such an extensive old city center has been preserved is Venice – partly for the same reason,
the canals, and for a long time the fact that it was so difficult to build houses higher than
four storeys. (Claval 2000, 59).
Nonetheless, the city center appeared to be heading for the same fate as many Ameri-
can cities during the 1960s. In the wake of industrialization came city formation, con-
struction of urban roadways and neglect of residential neighborhoods, combined
with the arrival of poorly educated guest laborers from Turkey and Morocco (Van
Amersfoort and Cortie 1973; Cortie 1975). In the 1970s, however, these people moved
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out of their boarding houses in the city center and the Old South, in part because they
had started families or had brought them over (Cortie and Van Engelsdorp Gastelaars
1983). They relocated to largely renovated districts along the East and West ends of the
city center, while the original residents passed away or moved away with their chil-
dren to the new towns. A few years later the immigrants or their children’s families
moved to districts such as Geuzenveld/Slotermeer (Cortie 1994), which made large sec-
tions of the outlying western districts of Amsterdam considerably less attractive. In
keeping with the general expansion plan for Amsterdam to benefit the skilled working
classes, these areas were virtually inaccessible to unskilled non-Dutch residents. The
rapid rise in affluence, however, caused massive suburbanization, which allowed the
unskilled immigrants to benefit from the now vacant dwellings. Moreover, Amster-
dam residents of Dutch origin took little interest in the Bijlmer district built according
to the principles of Le Corbusier. In this case, new was not synonymous with attractive,
and the district largely accommodated immigrants from Surinam.
During the same period, the discontinuation of the city formation combined with
the emancipation of the young (1960s) and the rise of international services restored
the appeal of the Amsterdam city center as a living environment for specific groups
and as a center for all kinds of alternative forms of culture and entertainment. Young
urban professionals, for example, took an interest in the dilapidated residential and
industrial district of the Jordaan and turned it into the first yuppie district in the
Netherlands. Some of the immigrants from developed countries preferred the city cen-
ter or Amsterdam South (Cortie and Van de Ven 1981).
The historical distribution comprising the appealing but expensive sector in the
South thus remained unchanged after World War II. In many cases, new housing was
not considered more attractive than old housing.
The distribution by type of residential environment selected for the empirical sec-
tion reflects the above historical sketch, with regard to political boundaries related
to the available statistical data. Overall, this distribution conveys images recogniza-
ble to authorities and residents as the city center, the Southeast (Bijlmermeer) and
the North. The same holds true for the breakdown of the region surrounding Amster-
dam. Based on the 1971 census (Engelsdorp Gastelaars et al 1980), most of these towns
were still regarded as rural, poor or stagnating countryside communities in central
districts: Zeevang, Waterland, Wormerland, Landsmeer, Oostzaan, Ouder-Amstel,
Aalsmeer, Beemster, Edam-Volendam. With respect to urban development, these
towns have a residential environment more akin to villages, although most residents
work elsewhere in the service sector, and no longer in agriculture or locally (Droogh et
al 1991).
Within the ROA (regional area of Amsterdam), Amstelveen is the prototype of the
private old suburb and abounds with high-level employment. The Haarlemmermeer is
a new version of this variety that also includes Uithoorn and Diemen. As one of the old-
est industrial centers, Zaanstad has areas for residence and employment, although the
level is not as high as those in Amstelveen. Almere and Purmerend are the public sub-
urbs in the region and offer relatively little employment.
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Unlike Amsterdam, much of the housing in the area is owner occupied. This differ-
ence increased during the period examined. In addition, new housing development
declined throughout the area and reduced Amsterdam’s share in housing production.
Elaboration of the Research Question
Research on the type of residential environment raises very specific questions, such as
what kinds of Dutch neighborhoods (residential environments) are likely to have im-
migrant residents in a city like Amsterdam, and does the distribution pattern of
groups of different origins differ from that of Dutch people? How likely are they to set-
tle and subsequently move on to residential environments with a high concentration
of people of the same origins?
The questions regarding the behavior of these groups are more specific in the socio-
economic approach. In accordance with Burgess, this exercise is designed to interpret
origins as cultural data relevant for the socio-economic and consequently the spatial
career of the category concerned. This requires translating the current classifications
of residents by origin into categories reflecting their opportunities for upward social
mobility. Burgess (1925, 56-57) emphasizes the position of the new residents in the la-
bor market, which derives from the economic structure of the country of origin. “The
immigrant from rural communities in Europe and America seldom brings with him
economic skill of any great value in our industrial, commercial, or professional life.” In
the present Dutch context, the Social and Cultural Planning Office of the Netherlands
and the Netherlands Interdisciplinary Demographic Institute NIDI use similar indica-
tors: command of Dutch, level of education and relation to the labor market (Erf and
Tesser 2001). In addition to the residents, the residential areas need to be classified es-
pecially in terms of their attractiveness to determine the extent to which Amsterdam
residents of different origins improve their residential environment or achieve socio-
economic advancement. In keeping with the sources discussed above, attractiveness is
defined according to socio-economic rather than physical characteristics. Income per
resident will serve as the indicator and will be based on data published by the Inland
Revenue Service. Individuals, rather than households, have been selected as research
units, on the grounds that households change as a result of migration processes. This
is also part of the reason why the household characteristic is not properly registered.
Stage of life is approximated by age based on a much-used classification system to facil-
itate comparisons. Three classes of attractiveness have been identified. The central
class comprises the 10 percent of all incomes immediately below and the 10 percent of
those immediately above the average for all residents of the City of Amsterdam for that
year. This allows the neighborhood combinations and municipalities to shift to a dif-
ferent class during the research period.
Changes in the relations between residents and their residential environment are
generally explored according to three steps: settlement, relocation within the city and
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departure from the city. This last displacement, provided it takes place within the
city’s suburban area, should be regarded as an alternative to moving within the city.
Moves outside the area are irrelevant for this research, as the subsistence base is usual-
ly the underlying factor rather than quality of life. The suburban area is therefore re-
stricted to the ROA (regional area of Amsterdam, see Figure 1).
Population Distribution by Type of Residential Environment
Except for Short, few will be surprised that the various population groups are distrib-
uted so unevenly throughout the city of Amsterdam.
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Table 1. Population distribution by origins and type of residential environment (2000, in percentages)
———————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————
Origin City South North South- New Other Total
center east
———————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————
Turkey 02 07 11 02 1 77 018,088
Morocco 02 08 09 02 2 76 032,601
Surinam 03 07 10 38 5 36 066,085
Antilles 05 08 08 48 4 26 010,605
Non-ind. nations 09 13 12 22 3 42 025,841
Southern Europe 11 20 09 07 5 48 011,458
Industrialized nations 24 28 05 07 5 31 027,300
Netherlands 12 20 13 08 6 41 544,562
———————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————
Total 11 18 12 11 6 43 734,540
People from Turkey and Morocco are concentrated in the parts of Amsterdam other
than the city center, South, the new districts and Southeast. People from Surinam and
the Antilles, as well as from the other – less developed – countries are concentrated in
Southeast. People from industrialized (i.e. developed) nations and to a lesser degree
from the Netherlands and Southern Europe, however, are highly overrepresented in
the city center and South. This group is more dispersed, with more Dutch people in the
North and somewhat more Southern Europeans in other sections of Amsterdam.
What are the main reasons for this difference in distribution? In the discussion of the
context, the city center and South were identified as the posh, private and expensive
residential areas. Financial means are probably the decisive indicator. The division be-
tween immigrants from Turkey and Morocco versus those from Surinam and the An-
tilles is due primarily to the social housing supply at the time people from each group
settled in Amsterdam. Following their massive arrival around 1975, Surinamese peo-
ple became concentrated in the newly built Bijlmer (Southeast), which had been
deemed unattractive by Amsterdam’s middle-class.
Settlement in Amsterdam
Settlement patterns for 2000 are full of discrepancies as well. Compared with the aver-
age, which is heavily influenced by people of Dutch origins, Moroccans and Turks set-
tle largely in other sections, Surinamese and Antilleans in Southeast and persons from
industrial nations largely in the city center and South. Dutch people are also more like-
ly to settle in the South and the city center, although far less so than immigrants from
highly developed (i.e. industrialized) nations. On the other hand, Dutch people born
and raised here are more likely than this group to settle in the North and other sections
of Amsterdam. Settlers from Southern Europe and non-industrialized nations are in
the middle. They are less likely than Moroccans and Turks to settle elsewhere in Am-
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sterdam, less likely than Surinamese and Antilleans to settle in Southeast and less like-
ly than immigrants from the industrialized nations to settle in the city center and
South. Generally, the first settlement by type corresponds closely with the residential
distribution by type.
Table 2. Residential environment and initial settlement in Amsterdam (2000, in percentages)
———————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————
Origin City South North South- New Other Total
center east
———————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————
Turkey 6 10 8 3 2 71 1,018
Morocco 4 8 9 5 1 73 1,443
Surinam 4 6 9 42 3 35 2,704
Antilles 4 5 7 51 2 31 1,412
Non-ind. Nations 11 15 10 19 2 43 4,657
Southern Europe 21 22 5 5 3 45 1,041
Industrialized nations 27 32 3 7 3 28 4,882
Netherlands 14 21 7 9 5 44 22,658
———————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————
Total 14 20 7 14 4 43 39,815
The main difference is that the city center, South and Southeast attracted more settlers
than their share of residents. They are a gateway, especially for those settling from
Turkey, the industrialized nations, and Southern Europe. Remarkably, fewer people
from Turkey and Morocco settle in other sections of Amsterdam compared with the
resident population.
The final question that arises in this part of the analysis concerns the role of reloca-
tions in increasing the concentration of residents of a specific origin. We will examine
the relevant data for 2000.
Concentration through Migration?
Here, we will consider relocations within the city of Amsterdam from one type of resi-
dential environment to another, between the city and its suburbs (ROA) and, beyond
the residential and employment area, the migration with the rest of the Netherlands
and the world.
In 2000 the concentration areas of people of Turkish and Moroccan origins have a
small migration surplus from abroad, which resulted largely from the ongoing rela-
tions with their countries of origin. Bringing over a partner from one’s country of ori-
gin remains a common practice.
Surinamese, Antilleans and people from non-industrialized nations have very dif-
ferent patterns of migration. All of these groups have a relatively high settlement sur-
plus with respect to their country of origin. Among the Surinamese, however, the mas-
sive trek to the suburbs yields a net surplus of departures from their concentration
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Table 3. Net migration for each concentration area per 1,000 residents of this area (2000) 
———————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————
Origins Concentration area Amster- Suburbs Nether- Abroad Total
dam lands
———————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————
Turkey Other sections of -0 0-0 -0 -1 -1
Amsterdam
Morocco Other sections of  -0 0-0 -0 -2 -2
Amsterdam
Surinam Southeast -0 0-4 -0 -3 -1
Antilles Southeast -1 0-1 -1 -3 -1
Non-industrial. nat. Southeast -0 0-0 -1 -5 -6
Southern Europe South -0 0-0 -0 -0 -0
Industrialized nations City center -2 0-0 -0 -6 -5
Netherlands South -9 -13 -3 -2 -8
———————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————
area in Southeast. While Antilleans are emulating this exodus to some extent, the pos-
itive balance of those settling from non-industrialized nations continues to increase
this group of origin in Southeast.
People from industrialized nations have the highest foreign migration surplus for
their concentration in the city center. Although they move to other parts of Amster-
dam relatively frequently (especially Amsterdam South), their migration surplus with
respect to their concentration area is almost as large as that of people from non-indus-
trialized nations.
Unlike the residents from Southern Europe, the Dutch have experienced consider-
able changes with respect to their concentration area in South. While many Amster-
dam residents settle there, still more move to the suburbs, and their departure surplus
to places elsewhere in the Netherlands and abroad is substantial as well.
The main observations from this preliminary summary analysis of the conse-
quences of relocations for the concentration of groups of origin reveal large discrepan-
cies. Other than in the concentration areas of residents from Morocco, Turkey, Suri-
nam, and the Antilles, the major increase consists of residents from industrialized and
non-industrialized nations. Relations with the country of origin remain decisive, ex-
cept for the Surinamese.
The pattern among the Dutch is unique and highly diversified with a strong preva-
lence of concentration within the city and especially of suburbanization from their
concentration area.
The following section will contribute several suggestions for interpreting spatial
mobility inside the Amsterdam region.
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Origins and Socio-Economic Mobility
Distribution
Overall, the population groups identified appear to live in the residential area accord-
ing to their cultural background (Table 4).
Table 4. Distribution pattern * of the Amsterdam population based on attractiveness of the residential
area 1988-2000
———————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————
Origin 1988 1992 1996 2000
———————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————
Turkey -49 -52 -50 -51
Morocco -41 -46 -46 -47
Surinam -38 -39 -44 -44
Antilles -34 -37 -35 -40
Non-industrial.nations -24 -17 -21
Southern Europe -14 -11 -04 00
Industrialized nations +25 +33 +46
Netherlands + 8 +12 +14 +09
———————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————
*  The mobility index reflects the percentage points of a population group that would need to move to more (-)
or less (+) attractive residential areas to achieve the municipal average.
Amsterdam residents originating from Turkey and Morocco are so likely to live in un-
attractive neighborhood combinations that about half would need to move to a more
attractive residential environment to achieve the average residential environment for
Amsterdam. The situation is nearly the same for immigrants from Surinam and the
Antilles. People from less developed countries and Southern Europe require far less up-
ward mobility to reach the average. Regarding residents from less developed coun-
tries, this situation confirms the previously presumed “positive” selection. Immi-
grants whose cultural characteristics are the most suitable in global respects are the
most likely to live in attractive residential surroundings on average, not the Dutch peo-
ple. They would thus need considerable downward mobility for their distribution to be
origin-blind. Comparing the four measurement years, however, suggests that differ-
ences between the groups are increasing somewhat, as the Amsterdam residents from
industrialized nations and Southern Europe improve their circumstances.
Many studies conclude after comparing two or more file samples that spatial polar-
ization is deepening. This conclusion is premature, however, because individual spa-
tial mobility has not been traced. Such research is especially important for groups
with a highly dynamic composition due to continuous addition of new members. This
process is comparable to a school where the constant arrival of foreign students re-
duces the share of Dutch-speaking students (general pattern). The students already
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present, however, improve their command of the language during their school careers
(individual process). Residential and employment mobility advance over the years as
well. Young adults living on their own for the first time generally live in less attractive
neighborhoods than their parents. This pattern will have a negative impact on the
score of a population group comprising many young adults starting off. Considering
the respective stages of life of the groups is therefore important.
Settlement in Amsterdam
The settlement of newcomers largely reflects origins as well. On average, immigrants
from Surinam and the Antilles settle in even less attractive areas than Turks and Mo-
roccans. Their low income forces all of them to settle in unattractive neighborhoods.
They are allocated homes based on their stage of life, especially household composi-
tion. Arrivals from Surinam and the Antilles may be more likely at a disadvantage on
the housing market, especially young, singles. I will deal with the importance of stage
of life in more detail below.
While the trend in the research period is hardly linear, it definitely does not suggest
that the gap is narrowing between the groups at the “bottom” and those at the “top”.
Table 5. Settlement in Amsterdam based on attractiveness of the residential area (mobility index)
———————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————
Origin 1988 1992 1996 2000
Turkey -48 -45 -51 -48
Morocco -40 -43 -54 -50
Surinam -43 -41 -58 -54
Antilles -49 -40 -53 -58
Non-industr.nations -25 -21 -35 -19
Southern Europe + 3 -02 + 7 +16
Industrialized nations +31 +34 +49 +46
Netherlands +15 +20 +13 +08
———————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————
+:settle more in attractive residential areas
The trend is relatively unfavorable for immigrants from the Antilles and Surinam,
while the figures keep improving for those from industrialized nations and Southern
Europe. Are the arrivals from these countries an increasingly homogeneous group of
well-educated employees of multinationals temporarily based in booming Amster-
dam? No signs of advancement are indicated for the Dutch themselves. Perhaps they
include many young single individuals who aim to complete their education and then
move elsewhere. With respect to both income and stage of life, they are low on the so-
cial housing ladder. This assumption ties in with the idea that the school analogy is es-
pecially true for Dutch people settling in Amsterdam. Differences in arrivals at the
“top end” thus require a stage of life analysis as well.
Basically, the gap is widening between arrivals from various developed and less-de-
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veloped nations. Dutch people who settle in Amsterdam are losing ground as well, pos-
sibly because of their – progressively – specific selection.
Socio-Economic Mobility
Table 6 reviews spatial mobility over the four measurement years. This score reflects
the number of relocations to more or to less attractive residential environments and
assigns one point to each progression of one class. The total points are then divided by
the number of Amsterdam residents in the corresponding population category. This
procedure is based on the same principle as the one applied in calculating the figures
in Tables 4 and 5.
Table 6. Mobility of Amsterdam residents following moves within the city (Mo) and departure (Ex) to the
ROA (per 1,000 residents)
———————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————
1988 1992 1996 2000
———————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————
Origin Mo Ex Tot Mo Ex Tot Mo Ex Tot Mo Ex Tot
Turkey -00 1 -2 -09 01 -08 -5 01 -4 -1 03 -4
Morocco -01 1 -0 0-1 02 0-3 -4 03 -2 -1 02 -3
Surinam -01 4 -5 0-6 09 -15 -0 12 13 -3 12 14
Antilles -13 6 -7 0-7 14 -20 -2 09 -7 -2 13 15
Non-industr.nations -12 13 0-1 -1 10 -9 -1 07 -6
Southern Europe -03 2 -0 0-2 09 -11 -1 05 -4 -0 06 -7
Industr.nations -07 09 0-2 -1 02 -1 -5 02 -2
Netherlands -01 3 -4 -11 10 -21 -4 16 20 -2 07 -9
———————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————
Total -01 3 -4 0-1 09 -10 -1 12 13 -0 07 -7
The result leads to the following conclusions. Spatial mobility does not fully reflect the
cultural potential of the Amsterdam population groups, if upward spatial mobility is
assumed to be the highest for the group with the greatest cultural potential. People
from developed (i.e. industrial) nations manifest virtually no upward mobility. They
consolidate their places in the most attractive residential environments and stay
there.
Mobility among people of Turkish or Moroccan origin keeps dropping further be-
low the average until 2000. While some improvement is apparent for 2000, their mo-
bility remains below average. Surinamese and Antilleans, however, consistently score
above average and even had the best mobility figures of all groups in 2000.
Amsterdam residents from non-industrialized nations scored slightly below aver-
age, but better than foreign guest workers and their children. This might confirm the
assumption that the migrants from less developed countries represent a strong posi-
tive selection, and that a brain drain is under way from these countries. Amsterdam
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residents from the former Caribbean colonies of the Netherlands achieved the highest
mobility and consequently attest to the importance of an appropriate cultural back-
ground.
Entirely in keeping with the cultural background thesis, Amsterdam residents of
Dutch origin achieve the highest social mobility virtually every year.
Upward spatial mobility within the city of Amsterdam is not particularly high for
any single year. This is understandable, as major changes in the relationship between
neighborhood combinations are unlikely to occur over a twelve-year period as far as
the quality of the residential environment is concerned. Moreover, the moves within
the city are not a closed system in which all relocations within the city would yield a
mobility of zero. People also settle in and move out of the city, just as there are births
and deaths. These changes explain the minor systematic deviations from zero (which
are systematic in a positive sense). Nonetheless, substantial differences exist between
the groups of origin and indicate shifts in neighborhood combinations. The process
merits further study.
Among all groups, suburbanization is the leading factor underlying upward spatial
mobility. Overall:
– Initial settlement and distribution by attractiveness of residential environment is
virtually identical among people from less developed countries. Surinamese and
Antilleans, however, manifest far more social and spatial mobility than Turks and
Moroccans, although their massive settlement in the Netherlands took place later.
This difference in development is largely attributable to differences in cultural ori-
gins.
– Among the Amsterdam residents from developed countries, people from the indus-
trialized nations are more likely to settle and live in attractive residential areas than
people of Dutch origin are. Unlike the Dutch, however, they do not improve their
residential environment through relocations.
I will conclude the empirical section by briefly addressing the influence of stage of life
on mobility. The material for this analysis is not perfect, as it indicates only the ages of
the individuals. Reliable information regarding the required household composition
prior to and following the move is unavailable. In addition, we have used only data
from 2000, as the analysis of all four measurement points would require too much
space.
Distribution According to Stage of Life
The differences in age distribution are substantial. Moroccan and Turkish residents
comprise a far larger share of children and young adults of marriageable age than resi-
dents from developed and especially industrialized countries. Their age breakdown is
thus most comparable to that of classic immigrants. Accordingly, many members of
this group do not earn incomes, which explains their low average income and their
tendency to live in unattractive neighborhoods.
Dutch people have few children and comprise a very large share of the senior citi-
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Table 7. The population in 2000 by age (percentages)
———————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————
Origin 0-14 15-24 25-34 35-44 45-54 55+ Total
Turkey 30 21 22 12 08 08 016,088
Morocco 32 23 19 11 07 07 032,601
Surinam 24 15 17 21 13 11 066,085
Antilles 23 16 18 20 15 09 010,605
Non-industr.nations 22 15 34 19 07 04 025,841
Southern Europe 13 10 29 18 14 15 011,485
Industrialized nations 13 08 34 24 13 07 027,300
Netherlands 13 11 22 18 14 23 544,562
———————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————
Total 16 12 22 18 13 19 734,540
zens, but the same share of 25-34 year olds as the Moroccan and Turkish immigrants.
However contrary to the Moroccans and Turks, many of this Dutch age group live alone
or with a partner. Amsterdam residents from industrialized countries consist largely
of people in their thirties and forties without children. Most people at this stage of life
have advanced in their careers. Those settling at the “top end” thus reflect major dif-
ferences in stage of life, which, in turn, affects the attractiveness of the environment in
which they live.
Stage of Life and Spatial Mobility
Below we will illustrate the importance of stage of life for four groups of Amsterdam
residents. In addition to major differences in spatial mobility, one significant similari-
ty prevails: families with young children move to more attractive residential areas.
Table 8. Stage of life and spatial mobility (per 1,000) in 2000
———————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————
Age Morocco Surinam Industrialized Netherlands
nations
———————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————
0-14 -5 05 -2 21
15-24 -4 17 -6 04
25-34 -1 32 -3 08
35-44 -5 16 -3 09
45-54 -1 08 -2 06
55+ -4 09 -2 08
Average -3 15 -2 09
———————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————
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Among the Dutch, families with children are especially likely to move to more at-
tractive residential environments. The traditional mobility described in American
sources thus often coincides with the trek to the suburbs in Amsterdam as well. Suri-
namese people follow the same course. Among Moroccans, preliminary signs of mod-
ern Western spatial mobility are apparent, although having children still appears to
be an obstacle to achieving positive social and spatial mobility for this group. Among
Amsterdam residents from developed countries, people in their twenties manifest sub-
stantial negative mobility. Note that their parents are the most likely to live in attrac-
tive areas.
Concluding remarks
This article deals primarily with the longstanding question whether the origin of im-
migrants influences their socio-spatial mobility. The theoretical background is the
statement that “new” employment imposes cultural demands that people meet de-
pending on the economic structure of their area of origin. Burgess (1925) formulated
this statement during the industrialization of Chicago.
At least two other elements merit consideration in this question as well. First, not
only immigrants from economically backward areas are relevant to this research be-
cause the growth of international relations also leads to migration flows between de-
veloped countries. Second, many selection mechanisms come into play in the coun-
tries of origin and settlement alike and underlie the differences in the characteristics
of migrants. The recruitment of guest workers from less developed countries in the
1960s versus that of computer experts in the 1990s is a well-known example.
The Amsterdam region is a suitable modern arena for the examination of this long-
standing question. The deindustrialization of the 1970s was followed by a major tran-
sition toward service industries and economic growth since the 1980s. While Amster-
dam is also a city “with poor migrant groups,” it is not a city with “a private housing
market in which housing quality is a function of income” (Short 1996). Several sur-
rounding communities, especially old and new suburbs and the countryside, meet
this last criterion.
The findings are tentative and primarily serve to encourage additional research on the
processes covered in this contribution.
– At the time of settlement in Amsterdam, the selection seems based primarily on the
economic position of the country of origin. Migrants from less developed countries
end up in the least attractive residential environments. This correlation is not fully
applicable, however, as immigrants from “non-industrialized countries” are far less
likely to settle in the least attractive residential environments. Remarkable differ-
ences exist at the “top end” as well, especially between Dutch arrivals and those
from industrialized nations. Here, stage of life is a major factor, along with a consid-
erable difference in income or capital. This last characteristic also appears decisive
for differences in residential environment between the “bottom end” and the “top
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end.” After all, people with incomes below a certain level live in social housing.
– After settlement, opportunities for social mobility depend on whether an individ-
ual qualifies for employment in the Amsterdam region’s sophisticated internation-
al sector. Here, the political system is virtually irrelevant. The government-regulat-
ed educational system will achieve an impact only over the long term (Gramberg
2000). People from Surinam and the Antilles are prime examples of the advance-
ment to the suburban Promised Land (albeit to the cheaper public sections) associ-
ated with the traditional stages of life. They have the required cultural attributes.
Upward social and spatial mobility is also emerging among people from Turkey and
Morocco although to a lesser degree. Still, they lag considerably behind people from
other less developed (i.e. non-industrialized) nations that have already penetrated
the old and new suburbs, as well as the city center and the South districts of Amster-
dam.
– People of Dutch origin manifest strong traditional upward mobility, both through
their increasing trek toward the new (private) suburbs and toward the more mod-
ern urban sections (gentrification). Today the core growth areas appear to be losing
their attractive appeal but have been equally important for Amsterdam residents of
Dutch origin in moving to a more attractive residential environment as they have
been for Amsterdam residents from less developed countries today. Amsterdam res-
idents of Dutch origin are typically widely distributed by stage of life, unlike the
Amsterdam residents from developed countries, who tend to be so at a later stage in
life. When members of this category move, they are more likely than their Dutch
counterparts to settle in the more attractive urban (city center, South) and subur-
ban (old and new suburbs) sections.
– Finally, discussions about a socio-spatial dichotomy are worthwhile only when
based on processes at the relevant spatial level. Had the analysis merely compared
distribution or settlement patterns, it would have incorrectly suggested that up-
ward mobility is virtually nonexistent. This would also have been the case if the re-
search had concerned only the city of Amsterdam.
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In this book about Amsterdam and its inhabitants, spatial developments, social prob-
lems, and political issues it is logical, necessary and interesting to also pay attention to
the position of its youngest citizens. Children make up a considerable part of Amster-
dam’s population. Their numbers certainly justify some attention. In addition, the
study of children’s geographies is a further step in the development of the geography
of households (Vijgen and Van Engelsdorp Gastelaars 1992). Households cannot be con-
sidered as homogenous boxes. The processes of emancipation contribute to the recog-
nition of the different positions of men and women, and adults and youngsters in a
family household. In many respects, children’s daily activities, their needs and opin-
ions are different from those of their parents. Children form a unit of analysis in their
own right. 
The specific position young citizens have can be highlighted in different ways, but is
best characterized by the mutual relationship between dependency and growth. On
the one hand, children are dependent on adults – parents, teachers, and neighbors, as
well as urban policymakers and politicians. On the other hand, they are continually
engaged in a process of growing up and assuming their own responsibilities. They are
constantly building on the construction of their individual identities, and adults
should respect and support that process. 
One way of taking youth seriously is to make their position visible and to problema-
tize the conditions under which children are growing up. Over the last decade, chil-
dren’s geographies have become a booming discipline in urban geography. In this re-
spect, the founding of the international journal Children’s Geographies (Routledge) can
be considered as a landmark. While internationally, children’s geographies is a fast ex-
panding subject, in the Netherlands only a few studies in this new discipline have been
carried out (for an overview, see Karsten et al 2001). In this chapter, fragmented re-
search will be brought together as far as it is relevant to the Amsterdam situation. 
This chapter starts by highlighting the changing position of children in Amster-
dam, their daily activities and scale of life. First I will provide an insight into the num-
bers and backgrounds of the multicultural population of Amsterdam children. I will
then highlight their daily activities: playing outside, club activities, and mobility. This
217
Adam.HumanCapital  06-03-2003  16:50  Pagina 217
will lead to conclusions about differences: the spread of different types of time-space
behavior over Amsterdam. I will end this chapter by taking a look at the future: what
will the future of childhood in Amsterdam look like?
Children’s Population in Amsterdam
Amsterdam has a population of over 700,000. Many of the city’s residents come from
other parts of the world: in 1999, only 56 percent of Amsterdam’s residents had a
Dutch mother and/or father. Families with children make up about onethird of the
population: 22 percent live in two-parent households and 11 percent live in one-parent
households (data: O + S Amsterdam). 
Children (0-12 years) constitute 14 percent (101,793 children) of the Amsterdam pop-
ulation. Both the percentage and the number are expected to grow slowly in the near
future. The distribution of the child population over the city is uneven (Figure 1): the
farther from the center, the larger the child population. The most densely populated
districts in terms of child population are Amsterdam Southeast, West, and North.
These are also the urban neighborhoods where the majority of citizens are immi-
grants. As such, Dutch children living in Amsterdam form a minority, albeit the
largest (36 percent of the 0-12 age category). Dutch families in Amsterdam continue to
move out of the city and those who stay have few children. They live predominantly in
Amsterdam South, Watergraafsmeer, and various new neighborhoods on the out-
skirts of the city. In addition, some centrally located restructured neighbourhoods
have recently been transformed into enclaves of middle-class households with chil-
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Ethnicity and class are strongly linked in Amsterdam. The Amsterdam ethnic mi-
norities mainly consist of lower-class families. There is only a very small (though grow-
ing) ethnic middle-class. Dutch Amsterdam children belong predominantly to the
middle or upper-middle-class. 
Amsterdam Children’s Time-Space Behavior
To describe children’s daily lives, I will refer mainly to two studies: one by Van der Spek
and Noyon (1993), the other by Wiggers, Kouwenberg and Karsten (1996). Van der Spek
and Noyon did a survey of 126 parents (59 percent Dutch Amsterdam) with children
aged 4 to 12 in the nineteenth-century neighborhood, Kinkerbuurt. Wiggers et al
talked with 454 children (29 percent Dutch Amsterdam) aged 7 to 12, and 225 parents
in five Amsterdam neighborhoods (Karsten 1998). What do Amsterdam children do af-
ter school, where and with whom? 
Playing Outside 
Playing outside is still the most common activity among Amsterdam children: no oth-
er after-school activity has such a high participation rate. Wiggers et al (1996) found a
mean of three to four times a week for Amsterdam children (7-12). However, there are
large differences. Especially Dutch Amsterdam boys and girls and Turkish, Moroccan,
and Surinamese Amsterdam boys frequently play outside. The group aged between 9
and 12 plays outdoors more often than the younger children do. 
Where do Amsterdam children play? Playing outside appears to be a very local activ-
ity. Their own street, a playground in their own neighbourhood and the school play-
ground are the most often mentioned. The two main arguments given for “choosing” a
space to play are “Because my friends come here” (41 percent) and “Because it’s close”
(21 percent). Although the nearest location to play is not always favorable for Amster-
dam children, playing outside is often done close to the home. This has much to do
with the spontaneous character of playing outside and the relatively short periods
available for playing on weekdays. If you’re not sure whether your friends will be there,
you’re not going to travel long distances: it would take too much time and too much ef-
fort. Studies in other cities affirm the very local character of playing outside (Karsten et
al 1998). That is not to say that Amsterdam children do not go on excursions: family
outings to the Amsterdamse Bos (wood), Het Twiske (big recreation green area) and the
North Sea beaches are quite common, although certainly not for all children and not
on a daily or even a weekly basis. 
Although playing outside is a common activity for many Amsterdam children,
there is a large group of children who almost never go outside: between 24 (Wiggers et
al 1996) and 44 (Van der Spek and Noyon 1993) percent play outside less than once a
week. They live in neighborhoods with bad playing conditions. In old urban districts
claims on space have grown: the density of cars, houses, and businesses has increased.
Competition for urban space has grown intensely since the 1980s; this is apparent not
only in the older central neighborhoods, but also in the newer ones. In Nieuw Sloten –
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a residential area constructed at the end of the 1980s – not only is public space limited
but also the spaces to play are scarce (Gramberg and Zuidema 1996; Van Kessel and
Ottes 1995). In the Oostelijk Havengebied (the former Port District), which was devel-
oped in the 1990s, public space is even more constricted and there is hardly any space
to play (Karsten and Blom 2002). Increasing claims on urban space and the trend re-
ducing public space in newly built neighborhoods have negative influences on chil-
dren’s outdoor behavior. 
But physical circumstances are not the only determining factor. Because of cultural
norms, particularly Turkish and Moroccan Amsterdam girls do not play outside very
often. After school they go home and are expected to stay there. In addition, children
belonging to a minority group in a neighborhood often do not play with other chil-
dren. This applies to migrant children in neighborhoods dominated by “white” chil-
dren as well as to “white” children in neighborhoods with a majority of migrant chil-
dren (Visser 1991; Karsten 1998). Power relations between groups of related (by kinship
and friendship) children lie at the basis of this phenomenon of exclusion. All in all, it
must be concluded that playing outside is not a matter of course for every child every-
where in Amsterdam. 
Leisure Clubs
Even in Amsterdam with its small percentage of middle-class families, more and more
children are joining clubs. While in the 1960s children’s participation in sporting
clubs was about 25 percent, in the 1990s this figure had increased to over 50 percent
(Heinemeijer and De Sitter 1964; Karsten 1998). However, this figure is below the Dutch
mean. And on the whole, Amsterdam children do not join many clubs: only between 9
(Karsten 1998) and 22 (Van der Spek and Noyon 1993) percent are a member of two or
more clubs. As one might expect, Dutch Amsterdam children are more likely to be
members of more clubs (see also Karsten and Blom 2001). 
In contrast to playing outside, children going to a club have to leave their neighbor-
hood to participate, because not every neighborhood has it own sports fields or music
school – in fact, far from it. Looking at the city as a whole, however, children’s leisure
domains are being scaled up in two different directions (Karsten, 2002). First, the open-
air sports facilities are being sited nearer the city’s outskirts. This outward locational
push of open-air sports facilities already has a long history. After the Second World War
with the realization of the AUP (Algemeen Uitbreidingsplan; General Extension Plan),
large sports parks were created on the outskirts of the city. In the old Amsterdam
neighborhoods, only a few sports parks have survived and with the restructuring of
the old city there has been no provision for new ones. This means that many children
growing up in Amsterdam have to travel large distances to reach their football, tennis,
or horse-riding club.
Secondly, in the central parts of the city new cultural activities for children
(e.g. children’s theater) have been created. This development started in the 1970s and
tends to cater to the cultural tastes of the middle-class. These cultural programs are or-
ganized in all-age spaces (e.g. concerts for children in the Concertgebouw – a place nor-
220 LIA KARSTEN
Adam.HumanCapital  06-03-2003  16:50  Pagina 220
mally reserved for “grown-ups”) as well as in child-specific domains, such as restau-
rants specially for children to try out their culinary skills (Figure 2). In addition, new
commercial domains ranging from children’s bookshops to children’s hairdressers
have been established in the central parts of the city. All these new centrally located
children’s domains reflect and contribute to the new children’s consumer culture
(McKendrick et al 2000; Chin 1993) which is making its presence felt in Amsterdam. 
But, as was mentioned earlier, intensive membership of clubs is not that common
in Amsterdam. Over 40 percent of Amsterdam children are not a member of any chil-
dren’s club. Some of these children may attend open activities organized by a neigh-
borhood center, but they do not regularly leave their neighborhood to participate in
leisure activities. Interestingly enough, the figure of 40 percent was also found by
Heinemeijer and De Sitter in their 1960 study of children’s lives in Amsterdam. Not
much seems to have changed since then. What is new, however, is the composition of
the group of “unorganized” children: while in the 1960s these were Dutch lower-class
children, today they are ethnic minority lower-class children, especially girls. A child’s
class position continues to be the determining factor in their club activities. 
Mobility
What about children’s freedom of movement? Where are Amsterdam children al-
lowed to go, and where are they allowed to go on their own? Many children spend the
day in their own neighborhood: it’s where they go to school, where they play outside
(or are kept inside the home) and where they meet their friends. Parents often do not
want their children to leave the immediate vicinity of the home. Young children (un-
der ten) are usually only allowed to play in their own street, and only when they grow
older are they allowed to play on their own a few streets away. The pavement in front of
the house is therefore the most popular (in the sense of the most often used) place to
play. Playgrounds come second.
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That very local character of playing outside is closely connected with parents’ con-
cerns about the well-being of their children. Van der Spek and Noyon conclude that
over 40 percent of parents accompany their children to the playground. Wiggers et al
(1996) also report a high percentage of parental supervision: 33 percent accompany
their children. That makes playing outside a time-consuming activity for parents.
Sometimes older children are responsible for keeping an eye on their younger siblings.
The (perceived) lack of safety because of traffic and social dangers is the main reason
for the reluctance to let children play on their own.
Table 1. Parents/adults accompanying children to school, friends,and clubs 
———————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————
Amsterdam Playing outside School Friends Clubs
———————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————
Wiggers et al 1996 33% 15% – 45%
Spek & Noyon 1993 42% 65% 62% 70%
———————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————
The figures (Table 1) reflect the big role parents have in accompanying their children
in Amsterdam, particularly when attending children’s clubs. Girls enjoy less freedom
of movement than boys. The higher figures Spek and Noyon found for the supervisory
role of parents are probably related to the younger age groups they focused on. It is
clear that age is an important determining factor in questions regarding children’s
freedom of movement. In general, the older the child, the higher his or her freedom of
movement. The traditionally larger families of migrant citizens make surveillance by
sisters/brothers more possible. This is one reason for the low figure (15 percent) found
by Wiggers et al for parents’ involvement in the daily trip to school. It is middle-class
children who are most intensively accompanied through the public space. These are
also the children – as we have seen – who participate most often in clubs. 
Amsterdam: A City of Differences
Abovementioned empirical findings make clear that Amsterdam children’s time-
space behavior is characterized by considerable differences (cf. Fincher and Jacobs,
1998). I will outline the different types of childhood in terms of space-time behavior,
keeping with the literature where the “many childhoods” (Holloway and Valentine,
2000) are discussed.
We can no longer write about “children in general” – not even about “Amsterdam
children in general.” Statements such as “Children no longer play outside” or “The big
city is bad for children” do not reflect reality enough. Diversity is great, as has also been
made clear in several Dutch publications (Overview: Karsten et al 2001). On the contin-
uum of the frequency of playing outside, three types of time-space behavior can be dis-
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tinguished, and all three are present in contemporary Amsterdam: indoor children,
the back-seat generation and outdoor children.
Amsterdam’s children population is characterized by a rather large – perhaps the
largest – group of indoor children. Figures indicate that 24 to 44 percent almost never
play outside. These are mainly lower-class children who do not have other compensat-
ing activities in the form of club activities, either. They live predominantly in old, for-
mer working-class neighborhoods (e.g. Kinkerbuurt) and in the high-rise apartment
complexes in the Bijlmermeer. They experience a sharp divide between house and
neighborhood. Going outside means taking a risk because of the dangers posed by mo-
torized traffic and antisocial behavior. Girls are overrepresented among these indoor
children. Some groups of girls, particularly those with an Islamic background, are not
at all allowed to explore the public domain on their own.
A second group of children can be labeled as the back-seat generation. These are
mainly middle-class children with diverse daily lives. They play outside regularly, at-
tend various clubs, and participate in all kinds of activities especially organized for
their age group (films, concerts, etc.). Their time-space behavior is characterized by a
high number of activities demarcated in time and space. Parents or other adults are an
inevitable link in their daily lives. They serve as the accompanying adults not only
through the public domain, but also in the choosing of “appropriate” activities and
places. In Amsterdam, they make up only a minority of the children’s population and
they live predominantly in the mostly white, better-off neighbourhoods (Amsterdam
South, Watergraafsmeer) and the recently restructured urban districts, such as the
Oostelijk Havengebied (former Port District).
There is still a group of outdoor children in Amsterdam, even though they have of-
ten to deal with the poor quality of outdoor space. They play outside not only regularly
but also for long periods of time. In my research, I met children – mostly boys but also
groups of girls – who came to a playground directly after school and did not go home
until six. They followed the same pattern almost every day. The vast majority of these
intensive outdoor children did not have any other leisure activity like attending a club.
They live near the big playgrounds (with soccer facilities) in the old neighborhoods
and probably also in neighborhoods in Amsterdam West and North (no figures avail-
able).
Thus the nature of childhood varies across different contexts. The three different
types distinguished here (more research will probably lead to more details) live in
three different worlds. Segregation is related to the neighborhoods they live in, and to
their various personal, socio-economic, and ethnic backgrounds (Karsten 1998). 
When we include the daily scale on which each of the types lives, we see the following.
For children belonging to the first and the third type, the neighborhood is the main lo-
cality where their daily lives unravel, and which they explore mainly on foot. It is here
that they go to school, play outside (or are kept inside the home) and sometimes partic-
ipate in a children’s activity at the neighborhood center. However, interestingly
enough, the scale of the neighborhood is not the only geographical scale they explore.
AMSTERDAM HUMAN CAPITAL: WHAT ABOUT CHILDREN? 223
Adam.HumanCapital  06-03-2003  16:50  Pagina 223
Many of these children have families and friends abroad. From time to time they travel
all the way to Surinam, Morocco, or Turkey. They live simultaneously in a very local
and in a very global manner, going beyond the urban and regional scale.
In contrast to the daily scales of life of indoor and outdoor children, the back seat
generation explores the city as a whole. The relatively small group of Amsterdam mid-
dle-class children are escorted by their parents to many different activity places, such
as clubs, cultural events, and sometimes schools and childcare facilities outside of
their own neighborhood. For them the city of Amsterdam is an archipelago consisting
of enclaves they regularly visit. There they meet other middle-class children, who
move like themselves – accompanied by adults – from one children’s domain to anoth-
er. In so doing, they are constructing their own urban field. For these children the
neighborhood may still be a significant place to grow up in and in which to play out-
side, but they have significant others (places and friends) outside their own neighbor-
hood (Karsten 2001).
Reflections on the Future of Childhood in Amsterdam 
Predicting the future is always difficult, if not impossible, but it may help to look at de-
velopments in other big European and American cities. It is amply documented in the
literature that both parents and children judge general safety conditions (especially
those in big cities) as minimal. As a consequence, playing outside has become less a
matter of course and consequently children’s freedom of movement has been mini-
mized. On a structural level, fulfilling children’s needs inside “safe” buildings is be-
coming more and more apparent. 
The whole safety issue is widely discussed in the literature. Valentine (1996 and
1997) shows how parents are aware of all kinds of risks and possible dangers to chil-
dren in public spaces. In the minds of parents, their children are “only kids, what do
they know?” (1997: 69). The construction of the outside world as a “bad” place filled
with unknown people (the image of the stranger as the danger) is constantly rein-
forced with “terror” talk. Not surprisingly, safety concerns are most vividly expressed
when referring to growing up in cities. Katz (1993: p. 102) states that: “Fear, danger and
children’s safety rattle around at the root of children’s geographies in urban settings.”
Big cities are associated with chaos and traffic, concrete and asphalt, and – perhaps
most importantly – anonymous relationships; in other words, they are not the ideal
environment in which to bring up children (Lynch 1977; Ward 1978; Aitken 1998).
One of the consequences of parents perceiving lacks of safety is the later age at
which children are allowed to play out of their parents’ sight (Huttenmoser 1995) and
go to school and clubs on their own (Hillman et al 1990; Van der Spek and Noyon 1993;
Karsten et al 1998a). The safety discourse is potentially powerful when it comes to par-
ents deciding where to let their children play and whether to give them some sort of
freedom of movement. Parents’ fear “produces public space as an adult space” (Valen-
tine 1996: 206). Sibley (1995) concludes that home is increasingly becoming a haven
which makes the border between private home and public outside even sharper.
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Valentine and McKendrick (1997) consider the increase in children’s participation
in clubs as a trend related to the increase in the number of working mothers. They un-
derline what has been analyzed by German authors (Adler and Adler 1994), who de-
scribe middle-class children hopping from one children’s domain to another (school,
club, child care facility). They interpret this as a means used by the middle-classes to
collect cultural capital for their children (Zeiher and Zeiher 1984; Zinnecker1995) – a
phenomenon very comparable to the back-seat generation described earlier.
The main challenge for urban policymaking will be the (re) conquering of public
space for children. Will the city pay more attention to children as small citizens with
their own needs and desires? If no special efforts are made in this regard, Amsterdam
will see a further decrease of playing outside, and children’s freedom of movement
will be even more restricted. One of the consequences is a further spatial institutional-
ization of Amsterdam childhood (Karsten 2002). The expected growth of all kinds of
child care facilities and the development of primary schools towards a “brede school”
(a sort of community school that supplies education, leisure and care in one building
with long opening hours) contribute to this phenomenon. Childhood is becoming
more and more physically segregated from adulthood. All three groups of children
will be further marginalized in public space, if no measures are taken. The group of in-
door children will become larger, but will also change character. They will no longer
spend most of their free time inside their own homes, but inside other buildings
which function as child care, after school care, and “brede school.” The number of out-
door children will decrease and they, too, will become spatially enclosed in the same
kinds of children’s facilities. When the gentrification of Amsterdam continues, the
back-seat generation will grow larger and continue their escorted trips through public
space in order to attend the various privatized children’s domains in Amsterdam.
Thus, the unique position, needs and vulnerability of children justifies specific atten-
tion in research and policymaking. So far, only a handful of studies on the daily lives of
children in Amsterdam have been completed. We need new and more recent data, es-
pecially qualitative data about parents’ and children’s points of view. What do parents
value as important for their children, and how do they evaluate their own neighbor-
hood? How important is a safe neighborhood when deciding whether to stay in the
city? What ideas do children have about the spatial conditions to grow up, the quality
of streets and neighborhoods, their lack of daily freedom of movement and the ten-
dency to accommodate children in “safe” buildings with adult supervisors? How do
different groups of children experience today’s segregated city, and what kind of im-
ages does each “imprisoned” group have of one another? Children’s geographies – a
rapidly growing discipline in the international research context – needs a firm injec-
tion at the University of Amsterdam. This could also help to inform policymakers, who
are often blind to the specific needs of children and families.
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My research among residents of urban renewal areas, urban nomads, squatters, house-
boat and caravan dwellers, and the homeless in Amsterdam began over thirty years
ago. It was the end of the sixties, the era of grandiose plans for city-making and radical
solutions to traffic problems. The city center was going to be opened up to provide
space for shops and offices; living there was passé. The notion that society was some-
thing of our own making was at its height. There were no homeless people. And if there
were, the director of the shelter knew them from the vagrancy list, and we didn’t see
them lying around in the streets. The directors of the shelters kept simple lists of
names and met regularly to compare them and exchange information.
In the seventies, local residents and the municipal authorities almost came to
blows. “Cleanup” – brazen demolition – was transformed into rehabilitation. The em-
phasis on cities as production areas gradually changed. During a host of on-going de-
bates, a vision emerged in which the city was envisioned as more of a consumption
area where people could also live. There was so much talk and discussion that housing
construction almost came to a halt. There were lots of places for a homeless person to
find shelter in those days, with neglected properties, large buildings taken over by
squatters and empty warehouses and other buildings in abundance. The fight by ac-
tivist groups such as De Sterke Arm (The Strong Arm) in the Dapperbuurt district – and
the GAJ (Joint Action Groups) in the Jordaan – ended in 1978 and housing construction
got under way again. As Jan Schaefer noted in Parliament, “You can’t live in moon-
shine,” and in his capacity as Alderman for Housing he stepped up output. Urban de-
cay was halted, and the widelyheld pejorative notion of the city as a den of iniquity
that dominated the sixties and seventies started to fade. The city was appreciated
again and tourists and daytrippers flooded in. The city became a place for people to go
out and enjoy themselves. Living in the city also lost its negative image. Old and new
urbanites moved into houses in the 19th-century districts. Vagrants still found plenty
of places to sleep, for example near Artis, on the Gevleweg, at the artschool, in the East-
ern Docks or Westerdoksdijk. The four periods – of city-making and traffic control,
campaigning and debate, homes and yet more homes, and lastly public space – are the
background for this paper on the homeless and the use of urban public space. Re-
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search, knowledge, and experience in Amsterdam are the threads running through
it.
Homelessness
In America, activists sounded the alarm about the increasing number of homeless in
the late seventies. Mitch Snyder, a leading activist, estimated the number at 1 million.
In 1982, he updated his estimate to between 2 and 3 million. By American standards
homelessness in the early seventies was not a major problem: it played only a minor
role in the public debate, and the administration saw no reason to research the extent
of the problem and did not have figures with which to rebut Snyder’s claim. In 1992,
Richard White quoted Snyder looking back on his fight against homelessness: “Every-
body said, ‘we want a number…’. We got on the phone, we made a lot of calls, we talked
to a lot of people, and we said, ‘Okay, here are some numbers.’ They have no meaning,
no value.” Nonetheless, Snyder rejected the result of the first census of the homeless
carried out by the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), saying that
the figures were far too low. Snyder subsequently commented: “If HUD’s numbers were
accepted… they would take some of the power away… some of our potential impact…
and some of the resources we might have access to, because we’re not talking about
something that’s measured in millions.” There is still some controversy surrounding
these figures in America. Activists still maintain that millions of Americans live and
sleep rough. Richard White calls this lying for justice (White 1992).
In the Netherlands – Amsterdam in particular – lying for justice is not unknown in
the homeless sphere. A minor dispute has been raging since 1990 among the initiated
in the capital on the number of young vagrants. Rob Jezek, researcher and organizer of
projects for the homeless, introduced a figure of 1,200 young vagrants, based on Thuis
op straat, a fact-finding study into young vagrants in Amsterdam’s city center by Dirk
Korf and Helen Hoogenhout (1989). The number then appeared in City of Amsterdam
publications as well as others. Anyone reading Korf’s report, however, will discover
that numbers are not mentioned at all.
The implementation of a policy on the homeless in the Netherlands was handed
down from central government to the local authorities in 1989. At the same time, the
number of homeless people in Amsterdam seemed to be rising sharply – at least the
phenomenon was increasingly visible on the streets. In the early nineties, the City of
Amsterdam decided to find out how many homeless people were living on the streets.
Dorine Greshof and myself from the Urban Sociology Department at the University of
Amsterdam suggested – based on the example of Peter Rossi in Chicago (Rossi 1989:
Chapter 3) – going out and simply counting them. The City supported the idea. To be-
gin with, the aid organizations, such as the Salvation Army and Hulp voor Onbehuis-
den (HVO), at first argued in favor of collecting data from key informers, but eventually
agreed to a street census.
In our study we refer to the “homeless” rather than the “roofless and homeless,” the
umbrella term often used in the Netherlands. The distinction we make is between the
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actual homeless, the residential homeless, and the potential homeless. The actual
homeless sleep rough or in night shelters, the residential homeless in hostels and
boarding centers – the latter category could also be referred to as “homeless” rather
than “roofless.” The potential homeless, those living in marginal housing, form the
reservoir: these are the people who live in the lowest forms of housing, seedy boarding
houses or rented rooms, old caravans, ramshackle boats, houses due for demolition,
and squats. In this paper, however, we are concerned solely with the first category, the
actual homeless, people who sleep rough, nocturnal vagrants, people for whom the
streets are home at night – not merrymaking bachelors from the provinces.
Urban Public Space
Along with the new vision of the city – the consumer city – the neglect of public areas
came sharply into focus in the nineties. In the era of urban renewal there was little
time for it and little interest in it. Left-over spaces and nooks nobody knew what to do
with were filled with benches or playground equipment for children, or left as waste
land, or they became places for dog walkers or illegal car parks. The creation of the
“Red Carpet” from Central Station to Muntplein and the improvement of Nieuwmarkt-
plein heralded a new era, with Dam square as the provisional high point. The nineties
saw an upsurge of interest in the city’s streets and squares, especially concerning their
external appearance and beauty. It was as if something like the “City Beautiful” move-
ment from the beginning of the twentieth century had been revived.
Firstly, there was renewed interest in the design and upkeep of public spaces as part
of what has been called “urban revitalization.” A fight for control over urban public
space has begun, and that the results are not to everyone’s satisfaction is obvious from
the terms used in this connection by some people: “festivalization”, “theme park-iza-
tion”, and “museumization.” Any self-respecting municipality has by now learned to
pay particular attention to the design of squares, streets, and canals, and administra-
tors travel the world over in search of inspirational examples. Public space is being
used to tackle deprivation and local crime. Other developments are also placing pres-
sure on public space. Thus, interest and use have increased not only at the “top-down”
but also “bottom-up” level. In recent years, large areas of urban public space have been
privatized or even “colonized” by interested parties. Alleys, passageways, small
squares, and sections of streets or districts have been sealed off, with only selected resi-
dents allowed in. Many variations on this “domain-formation” can be seen.
At first sight there would not seem to be any reason for concern about public areas.
At last people are showing an interest again in properly maintained and designed pub-
lic space. If we take a close look at the changes, however, we also see developments that
are making public space less public. The concern regarding the organization, upkeep,
and supervision of public areas is coming at the expense of access, use, and comfort.
On closer examination we find that street surveillance, the renewed interest in street
layout and street furniture, do not necessarily encourage utilization of the public do-
main. The effect is often to exclude as well as include. Appropriate use, such as shop-
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ping or walking, must be enabled and inappropriate use discouraged, prevented, and
made difficult.
Urban public space is by definition freely accessible to everyone and available for
many different purposes. The public domain comprises streets and squares, parks and
courtyards, bridges and waterways. People can enter the public domain, use it to get
from A to B, as a place to sit, meet people, do business, look around, without having to
ask anyone’s permission, as often and as long as they like, day and night, summer and
winter, without distinction as to rich or poor, male or female, black or white. Anyone
who looks at their actual experience will realize that this notion is an ideal: in practice
some places are more public than others for some people and activities, and this can
vary with time and from one culture to another (see Lofland 1973, 1998, 2000).
Public space is referred to as “democratic space,” it is likened to the Greek agora, the
place that is accessible to everyone and fit for all sorts of purposes: you can sit there and
stay as often and as long as you like. These characteristics may relate to the central
plaza of a city center, but they are equally applicable to the local park around the cor-
ner or the pavement in front of someone’s home. This is also the site par excellence for
the homeless, men and women who spend most of their day there. The privatization of
public space by definition affects the public nature and essence of the city (Jos Gadet in
a letter to the NRC Handelsblad newspaper, 29 December 2001). In this researcher’s opin-
ion, exchange and diversity in the public domain are a guarantee of dynamism, toler-
ance, and integration. The homeless, the “others,” are part of everyday life and are re-
spected in their “otherness.”
In this paper, I examine whether the essence of public space is coming under pres-
sure from the plans for the refurbishment and management of the public domain as
regards a particular category of users of public space, viz. the homeless. To what extent
do the increased surveillance, the refurbishment and the upkeep of, and reduced ac-
cess to, parts of the public domain change the essence of that domain as far as the
homeless are concerned?
The use of public space by the homeless has become increasingly clear from the cen-
suses we have carried out since 1995, which seem to have established a tradition in ur-
ban sociological research in Amsterdam. The other side of the city, the frayed edge, has
been brought into focus via hard facts. At the same time, this is an example of research
that has had policy applications and that has ramifications for other sectors such as
welfare and the management and supervision of public space in the city. Who comes
up with the figures, when, and on what basis? That is always the question. A precise
definition is essential, and it is not easy to do research into a group of people who are
here today, gone tomorrow, constantly changing, and living partly in seclusion. After
discussing the definitions, the research done in recent years into the numbers of peo-
ple sleeping rough in Amsterdam, their validity and pitfalls, I conclude by considering
the changed relationship between this group of rough sleepers and ambulants and the
use of public space in the city.
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Are There Many?
When a boarding house burns down or a homeless person dies, the first question jour-
nalists and administrators ask is: how many homeless people are there actually? When
they discover that there are only rough estimates available they criticize the re-
searchers for wasting reams of paper without having come up with the answer. “The
homeless are an elusive lot” the press then proclaims (de Volkskrant, 24 January 1996).
Policymakers want to know how many homeless there are so they can gauge the
amount of welfare facilities required; they want to quantify social problems. Shelters
can provide figures on their own occupancy, but they don’t have an overview. On top of
this, aid organizations may use figures to influence policy. There is a need for reliable,
objective figures. It is not easy to supply such figures for all the homeless in the Nether-
lands. Because of the system of measuring and recording and the definition of home-
lessness the number is not clear-cut, and direct experience and subjective impressions
play a major role.
At the end of the eighties, there were many signs that the number of homeless sleep-
ing rough was on the increase. The press devoted a good deal of attention to this, and
aid workers in Amsterdam agreed: the number of homeless inside and outside the
shelters was growing, the queues at the night shelters were longer than ever. Whether
there were more was debatable, as we did not have any basis for comparison. In any
event, we started seeing more of them. That was only to be expected: the more we tidy
up the city the more we are struck by anything out of the ordinary.
The numbers affect substantial interests. Tens of millions of euros are sloshing
around in the shelter system, and numbers play a vital role in gaining public funds. The
debate on the subject has kept flaring up, especially since the implementation of poli-
cy on the homeless was handed down (see my NRC Handelsblad interview, 24 July 2001,
“Koehandel met daklozencijfers” [Horse trading with figures on the homeless]). In a
word, there is a lot of confusion about the numbers. The figures given for the young
homeless in the Netherlands (and in Europe) are illustrative. Young people do not con-
form to the “vagrant” stereotype and remain to a large extent invisible. “We’re careful
not to walk around in rags with a bottle in our hand,” they say. At night they do not
crawl under a bush or lie in a stinking doorway. And yet a few years ago the newspaper
Het Parool claimed that “the Netherlands has at least ten thousand street children.” The
street children in an article a few years ago entitled “Street children in boxes in the Bijl-
mer” eventually turned out to be dogs. No doubt there are a lot of latch-key children in
the Bijlmer who hang around the streets during the daytime, but there is still a world of
difference between glue-sniffing street children in Mexico City and truants or latch-
key children in the Bijlmer. In 1987 – proclaimed the Year of the Homeless by UNESCO
– it was claimed, to the disbelief of many, that the Netherlands had over 200,000 home-
less. There was substantial confusion, sensation, and fuss about the numbers.
The City of Amsterdam’s Welfare Department had a growing need to know how
many people were sleeping rough. The number of times places in the shelters were
used was fairly well-known: between 2,500 and 3,000 homeless slept at least once a
year at the shelters of Hulp Voor Onbehuisden, Jellinek and the Salvation Army. This
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covers the provision of basic housing for the homeless in the broad sense, ranging
from night shelters to hostels and other sheltered accommodation. How many people
were actually sleeping rough is something nobody knew for certain in the first half of
the nineties, and we heard figures ranging from a few hundred to over a thousand. As
already mentioned, following a certain amount of negotiation the City of Amsterdam
at the end of 1994 commissioned a study from us.
The 1995 Census
By the winter of 1995 everything was organized. In the early morning, between 6 am
and 9 am, some fifty “censustakers” set off for the places in the city where we had in-
formation that a lot of homeless people were camping out: the city center, Zeeburg,
and the Bijlmer high-rise flats. The census area was divided into smaller blocks where
pairs of censustakers armed with flashlights, coffee, tobacco, and cake set out to find
the homeless. Our preliminary survey showed that the city center, Zeeburg, and Am-
sterdam Southeast were the most untransparent areas, which could not be surveyed
with the aid of key individuals. Osdorp and Watergraafsmeer, for instance, also had
some homeless people sleeping in parks, gardens, and other places, but we knew about
them and they could usually be counted on the fingers of one hand. In the city center
and Zeeburg we found about 150-175 rough sleepers in 1995, and 50 “indoor rough
sleepers” in sheds in Bijlmermeer. It should be noted here that it was winter (it was very
cold and wet) and the Stoelenproject – a low-threshold shelter – at that time in De
Ruyterkade, was open.
The results of the census were never officially reported, however. In an article in de
Volkskrant in January 1996 we expressed our criticism of the controversy surrounding
the numbers of homeless. Those concerned seized upon this interview to make noise.
The aid organizations complained to their Alderman about the leak. In reality, they
were nervous about what they saw as low numbers of rough sleepers: they were appar-
ently afraid that the legitimacy of the public money granted to them could come into
question if these figures were published. The responsible Alderman blew the whistle
on the report at the request of the aid organizations. Tempers had become frayed, and
the Alderman expressed a need for “calm” on the homeless front.
But the fleeting media obsession soon made way for realistic questions from the pol-
icymakers. The City knew from the draft report on the survey findings that the num-
bers would not be high, and the organizations realized that they would be in a stronger
position if there were reliable figures. Without further ado the new Alderman gave the
go-ahead for a fresh census in 1997 in and around the city center and the Vondelpark.
The Bijlmer flats with its large number of sheds were such an unusual case that the
Nieuw Amsterdam housing association commissioned a special study there: this area
is not considered here.
The main aim of the census of rough sleepers was to create a point of reference,
something we could refer to if the census was repeated in a few years’ time to find out
whether there were more women, young people, foreigners, etc. on the streets. It
can be seen as a kind of alarm: if the numbers increase there is something wrong
234 LEON DEBEN
Adam.HumanCapital  06-03-2003  16:50  Pagina 234
with the facilities being provided. It is the smoke alarm of the streets.
Two things are critical in a census: where and how to count, and how to avoid double-
counting errors. Misses result in underestimation of the “problem,” double counting
results in overestimation. There is only one way to avoid misses: search carefully and
carry out a thorough preliminary research. We interviewed police officers (especially
community police officers), supervisors from the municipal management organiza-
tion, cleaners and gardeners, and we organized the censustakers carefully. We also
rode around on our bicycles and used our eyes, talked to a lot of people, such as people
walking their dogs or other walkers, anyone who knew a place used by the homeless to
sleep. How can you prevent double-counting errors if you want to count several times
and don’t want to miss anything? An officer at the Warmoesstraat police station (as it
then was) understood precisely: “Oh, you’d like to ring them!” – but we were not dealing
with homing pigeons. In 1995, we tried to avoid double-counting errors by making
notes on the appearance of each homeless person in a kind of log book, including the
pattern on the sleeping bag, the clothes under the coat and the color of his or her dog.
The final result was a mishmash of hilarious descriptions which was not in the least
helpful in distinguishing between one person and another. The description usually
boiled down to “trainers, jogging suit, dark curly hair.” The only result was a cartoon in
de Volkskrant showing three tramps all looking alike, with beards, and thick layers of
clothing.
In 1995, we wanted not only to count rough sleepers but also to find out something
about their backgrounds. A flyer asked them to go to the Stoelenproject at the Oos-
telijke Handelskade between 11 am and 2 pm, where pollsters would interview them in
exchange for a “smoke” and lunch. Hardly anyone showed up, it didn’t work. We did
notice during the census, however, that the ones that showed up did want to talk about
their situation.
In 1997, we abolished the log book. From then on we detected double-counting er-
rors by means of recognition by the censustakers and a name code assigned to the
rough sleepers on the spot at night, consisting of the first two letters of the forename
and surname and the year of birth: thus Jan Jansen born 1950 was noted as “JAJA50.”
The censustakers also took a brief poll on the spot. The direct method proved effective:
the vast majority of the subjects had an attitude of “fire away with your questions.”
They were so keen to tell their stories that this occasionally put the census in jeopardy...
Finally someone who would listen to them.
The 1997 and 1999 Censuses
In 1997, we moved the census from the early morning to between 1 am and 4 am. By
the early morning, a lot of the homeless had been “chased off” by the first cleaning
teams. The censustakers familiarized themselves with the areas assigned to them in
daylight so as not to be taken by surprise at night. They were given notes about their
area regarding the places where someone had been found sleeping, a kind of checklist,
then.
One census one night is a snapshot, and the question is whether it is representative
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of a longer period: weather conditions or the amount of nightlife can affect the num-
bers considerably. In busy squares such as the Leidseplein and Rembrandtplein, for in-
stance, no one sleeps rough there when the nightlife is in full swing. This is why we
counted three times in one week for the first time in 1997, Monday night, Wednesday
night and Friday night; while in 1999, the census got spread over a period of three
weeks. This enabled us to apply a statistical method known as capture/recapture
(Williams 1999). This method has its origin in ecology. Essentially what it amounts to is
this: the researcher fishes several times in the same pond, marks the fish he catches
and puts them back. If he keeps catching the same fish he can assume that the number
of fish caught is approximately the total number of fish in the pond. If he keeps catch-
ing different fish the total number must be much higher than the number caught. Us-
ing the name codes and recognition of the homeless by the censustakers we were able
to estimate how many people were sleeping rough over one week, two weeks, and three
weeks. This neutralizes underestimates and overestimates resulting from the snapshot
approach. The problem with the method is that it assumes a “closed fish pond” where
the angler is always fishing the same population. Those who sleep rough do not do so
all year round, however, so the group on the streets keeps changing. The “pond” of
rough sleepers has an open connection with the sea, as it were. But by comparing them
with the lists kept by the shelters we were able to keep this problem under control.
During the first night of the 1997 census a fresh obstacle arose, which had not been
noticed in 1995. Groups of homeless people were found in the Wallen area, at Central
Station, the town hall and the Magna Plaza shopping mall (behind the Royal Palace),
who spent all night on the streets but did not sleep; they just hung around, standing,
sitting, or walking. We refer to them here as ambulants. To begin with, the censustakers
did not know exactly what to do with them. In hindsight, it turned out that most of
them were drug addicts. The polls show – and this confirms how important it is not on-
ly to count but also to ask some questions – that these ambulants claim they sleep
rough a large number of nights a year on average. I emphasize claim, as the reliability of
answers in surveys of this kind is a problem, but with repeated queries this can be kept
under control. The answers the ambulants gave were not that different from the rough
sleepers, those found sleeping or lying down. In other words, anyone wanting to know
how many people spend the night on the streets in Amsterdam has to include some of
the ambulants in the census. In 1997, we began including ambulants who claimed
they slept rough at least eight nights a year. To avoid arguments, we tightened this up
in the estimates for 1999 and 2001; we only included ambulants who claimed to sleep
rough at least one month a year.
In 1997, using our method, we calculated 200 homeless per night spent the night on
the streets, 150 sleeping and 50 ambulant. The figure was almost the same in 1999,
slightly lower in fact: about 190 homeless spent the night on the streets (this time
slightly more ambulant than sleeping). But whether they were ambulant or sleeping
was not so important; the rule of thumb remained that just under two hundred home-
less spent the night on the streets in Amsterdam. Finally we had a good figure, a point
of reference for rough sleepers, the actual homeless.
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At the beginning of 2001, a fresh census was taken, with some 60 censustakers going
out onto the streets on three nights spread out over three weeks in February. The 2001
census showed a marked decline in the number of rough sleepers and a slight decrease
in the number of ambulants. As no surveys were carried out at the shelters (unlike in
1997 and 1999) we were unfortunately unable to make estimates for Amsterdam as a
whole, and this conclusion only applies to the areas we included in the census: the city
center, Zeeburg, and the Vondelpark.
The 2001 Census
In 2001, we had effective name codes and well-informed community police officers
who knew what they were talking about. For the first time in years the police seemed to
have an understanding of the street life in the areas where they worked. There was a
fresh problem, however wich involved the possible effects of the chase-away policy in
the city center, with Central Station now closed at night as well. Last year police and ju-
dicial action on rough sleepers and ambulants was stepped up sharply: this applied
throughout the city but especially in the city center. It has been increasingly difficult
for rough sleepers to hold their own in the city center in recent years. Under a munici-
pal bylaw sleeping rough is a form of nuisance: it constitutes a criminal offense and is
grounds for being chased away. In the final analysis, this policy has substantially re-
duced the number of sleeping places in the city center. This supposition was con-
firmed by the police in the preliminary survey. This “moving on” policy in the city cen-
ter was almost certainly likely to reduce the numbers of homeless that we found on the
streets in the 1997 and 1999 census area, but does it mean that there are actually fewer
homeless people on the streets? In theory they probably moved to the outer areas of the
city.
It is technically impossible to cover the entire city in a single census. There are so few
homeless on the streets in large parts of Amsterdam that finding them would entail an
enormous amount of work. The alternative, confining ourselves to the old census area,
is not particularly enticing either, though, as we would find fewer rough sleepers,
whereas the number has presumably not gone down in Amsterdam as a whole. We are
concerned that, while the number may have declined in our census areas, in practice
the problem has moved elsewhere. The same situation caused a major controversy be-
tween policymakers and aid workers in London last year.
We finally opted for a compromise, a precise repetition of the census in the old area
(the city center, Zeeburg and the Vondelpark) supplemented by four areas where we al-
so counted three times at night (Schiphol, Amsterdam South/WTC Station, Ooster-
park, and Sarphatipark). We carried out a somewhat more general survey in the ring
around the census area, where we watched out for sleeping places and sleepers during
the daytime and in some cases also at night. This provided us with information on
whether there had been a shift.
For years stories have been going around among aid workers and the homeless that
a lot of homeless people sleep at Schiphol Airport. To check this, Schiphol was includ-
ed as a separate area in 1999. On the three nights we counted between 15 and 20 people,
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including 5 to 10 rough sleepers. Thus, the situation is not that bad, even if we missed
some because Schiphol is a gigantic, intricate complex of shopping arcades, car parks,
and station platforms. Even if there are twice as many homeless, the numbers are still
not much cause for concern. But at the beginning of this year, the preliminary survey
led us to surmise that there really are large numbers of homeless spending the night at
Schiphol. This January, a homeless man known to us who had been staying at Schiphol
for some time without hesitation pointed out some 40 or so homeless to us who, he
said, regularly spent the night in the Arrivals and Departures halls. The Schiphol man-
agement has also let it be known in the press that large numbers of homeless regularly
stayed at Schiphol. According to Het Parool of 27 July 2000 there were as many as 200
homeless regularly hanging around Schiphol. A television program broadcast on the
IKON network estimated the figure downward to between 100 and 200.
At the end of January 2001, there was a small fire in one of the toilets in the Arrivals
hall at Schiphol, causing substantial damage and inconvenience. Although initially
unaware of the cause of the fire, the Schiphol management introduced a strict admis-
sion policy after it occurred: after midnight no admission without a ticket. Just before
midnight the homeless – sleeping or sitting – are removed from the halls and station
platforms. Schiphol is an attractive place to stay for some of them, as it is not only
warm and dry; there are also lots of things to find there. Many travellers throw away
their telephone cards, train tickets or even their weed (especially if they suddenly get
scared as they are about to depart for the US), thus providing smart homeless people
with something on the side. With a train ticket they can, for instance, legally make a
round trip to Utrecht, Rotterdam, and The Hague (with coffee breaks) after midnight,
then resume their sleep on returning to Schiphol around 4 a.m.
Despite Schiphol’s strict removal policy at the time of the census (we now took the
census slightly earlier), we found almost twice as many homeless at Schiphol as in
1999. Everything points to the conclusion that, before the fire, considerably more
homeless were spending the night at Schiphol than in 1999 and that there are still peo-
ple spending the night there. Where do they come from – the city center or other parts
of the country? We asked the homeless in the regular census area of the city whether
they had slept at Schiphol for at least two weeks in recent months: only 7% of the re-
spondents said they had. The Amsterdam Municipal Health Department also con-
cludes from other research that it is not possible, based on the data from Schiphol
management and the police on 1998 to 2001, to say anything about what ties the rough
sleepers at Schiphol have with Amsterdam. It would seem that the Municipality of
Haarlemmermeer is responsible for taking care of them, but thus far it has referred the
matter to Amsterdam.
A recently completed ethnographic survey of the remaining group of homeless at
Schiphol indicates that there is a regular group of about 35 who sleep in and around
Schiphol, along with a constantly changing group of 20 occasional sleepers. Only a
small percentage of these homeless were sleeping in the city center of Amsterdam in
1997; in fact, it seems that they come from all parts of the country.
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The WTC
A distinctly new location for the homeless in 2001 is Amsterdam South/WTC Station
and environs. In 1999, there were only a few homeless people sleeping there; in 2001,
we counted 15, with the largest group in the waiting room on the station platform.
Here again it is doubtful whether these are people who were sleeping in the city center
of Amsterdam in 1999 or earlier. The surveys show that the majority of the sleepers are
young Polish males who only remain in Amsterdam for a brief period of time. At night
they sleep at the WTC Station, generally spending the daytime at Schiphol. It is strik-
ing, in fact, that since 1997 we keep discovering a small group of Eastern Europeans,
predominantly Poles. In 1997, we found them around the former loading docks of the
warehouses along the banks of the IJ in the Eastern Docks area; in 1999, under the
Toronto Bridge, just across from the Amstel Hotel, and now at the WTC.
The Remainder of the City Center and its Immediate Vicinity
Where else do we come across the homeless in the public domain? Where else have
they been found? Since 1997, we have found ambulants at Central Station, in the Wallen
area, and around Nieuwendijk. Since Central Station began its late-night closing poli-
cy in 1999, we have increasingly seen them in the Wallen area and around Nieuw-
markt. After the introduction of banning orders in 2001, there was a further shift to-
wards Nieuwmarkt and environs. We found hardly any sleepers at Nieuwmarkt apart
from the odd drunk sleeping it off on the cold Gaudi tiled benches at the top of Klove-
niersburgwal. In Rembrandtplein too, we didn’t find any rough sleepers apart from a
drunk in the gardens. Leidseplein is far too busy. Both squares are kept under surveil-
lance by the police (and the catering establishments). The Dam provides few facilities
especially since the Peek & Cloppenburg arcade has become part of the store, the C&A
arcade closes at night, and the corner building of the Rokin diamond area doesn’t have
doorways any more. It is also too busy around there.
Where do we find the sleepers, then? First, we need to distinguish between individu-
als, couples, and groups. The individual rough sleepers (and those sleeping as couples)
are spread out over almost the entire city center; we do not find them in busy squares,
nor in the parks (with the exception of the north end of the Vondelpark). In Ooster-
park, for instance, where preliminary research had led us to expect rough sleepers, we
found no more than two during the three nights of the census, and no one in the
Sarphatipark. There are hardly any rough sleepers in the parks at night (except for the
Vondelpark); the odd ones lying there usually have well-camouflaged spots.
Groups of sleepers are generally an exception in the Netherlands; this is also true of
Amsterdam. In 1999, we found small groups at Frederiksplein, under the passage (now
closed) under the Toronto Bridge, in the Stopera car park and behind Magna Plaza, at
Schiphol and in the northern part of the Vondelpark. In the outer ring of Amsterdam
in 2001, we found rough sleepers in the parking lot of the World Fashion Center, Wes-
terpark, Amsterdam North (the former NDSM site) and along the railway line between
Amstel Station and Muiderpoort Station. About the same number of people were
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sleeping at these places in 1999. The main concentrations at the Fashion Center (10-15)
and Amsterdam North (about 10) remain about the same and they comprise a hard
core of regulars. Now that places have disappeared from the center, groups look for
places in the surrounding area, in particular in the World Trade Center area and
Schiphol. It may be that potential rough sleepers realize that new groups are not toler-
ated and now sleep alone or in pairs spread out over the outer ring of the city. However,
according to the staff of the HVO’s Mobile Service Center and the Salvation Army’s
“Soup Bus” there are no indications of this trend. Currently, there is no reason to con-
clude, based on observation and preliminary research, that sleepers who have gone
from the city center have taken up residence in Amsterdam’s outer ring – apart from
the WTC and Schiphol – and we may conclude that the overall number has decreased
considerably.
The Nature of the Homeless
A census on its own is not the solution. Knowing how many homeless there are is not the
same as taking effective action. The homeless comprise a highly diverse category.
There are the recently homeless and the long-term homeless; the homeless include
groups of addicts, mental patients, illegal immigrants, fortune hunters, and even peo-
ple who have no clear problem other than the fact that they have nowhere to live. These
categories are in turn made up of people from different ethnic backgrounds, men and
women, old and young people. Anyone wishing to tackle homelessness needs to have
some idea of the number but also, above all, of the nature of the homeless. Let me focus
on two aspects, length of vagrancy and length of stay in Amsterdam.
Most rough sleepers have been vagrants for a long time. In 1997, almost half of them
had been vagrants for over two years. In 2001, the proportion rose to over two-thirds
(70%). The proportion of short-term vagrants (up to three months) remains the same,
that of medium-term vagrants (three months to two years) is going down. The length of
time rough sleepers in Amsterdam remain vagrants is constantly increasing. The num-
ber of “new” rough sleepers remains the same.
Now let us consider length of stay. Although only one in five rough sleepers was
born in Amsterdam, a substantial majority of them have been living in Amsterdam for
a long time. This is also true of the 25% originally from Surinam. As our surveys show
again and again, Amsterdam is really not that much of a magnet for rough sleepers
from the provinces or other parts of the world, which remains the main concern of al-
dermen.
The number of illegal immigrants among rough sleepers – despite the tightening-
up of asylum policy – remains low and stable; perhaps it will increase in the years to
come.
To sum up, the majority of rough sleepers have been living in Amsterdam for a long
time, have been homeless for a long time and sleep on the streets a large number of
nights in the year. About 10% are women, the average age has risen since 1999, from 38
to just under 39. About half are not receiving welfare benefits and again, about half of
them do not take advantage of the homeless facilities provided in the city. There is a
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kind of hard core of rough sleepers who may perhaps never leave the streets.
The number of people spending the night on the streets in Amsterdam is going
down. The reduction is mainly among rough sleepers and to a lesser extent among am-
bulants. The figures show a marked decline in the number of rough sleepers: over a pe-
riod of three weeks there were 203 rough sleepers in the city center of Amsterdam in
1997, 140 in 1999, and 97 in 2001. Thus, the 1997 figure has been almost halved. This
reduction is largely due to the increasing amount of double-counting (yet another in-
dication of a hard core).
The Amsterdam municipal authorities have set themselves the target of providing
everyone sleeping on the streets even against their will with a roof over their head – a
laudable aim in itself. In the case of the hard core, the question is whether they actual-
ly sleep rough against their will. One rough sleeper at the Maritime Museum said the
shelters were too busy and crowded in the winter and he preferred to be outside al-
though he did use them more in the summer. It is going to be a difficult job persuading
people who have been living on the streets for a long time to live indoors again. The cen-
sus would seem to offer an indication of the nature of the hard core of rough sleepers.
Although the number of rough sleepers is going down, the proportion who claim to
have become homeless as a result of drug addiction has gone up from 20% to 33% since
1997. Rough sleepers who are drug addicts have more difficulty coming off the streets
than rough sleepers in general. This may be partly due to the organization of the aid
services, which are still based on the old-fashioned idea that people only stay indoors
at night to sleep.
Recent Changes in Public Space
Thus far I have sketched a picture of a special group of users who spend time in public
areas and have made them their home. The public domain is changing, however. As al-
ready mentioned, and as stated in many publications, the public domain is defined as
democratic space, the place that is open to everyone and available for all sorts of pur-
poses: you can sit there and stay as long and as often as you like (Whyte 1988, Heine-
meijer, et al 1968; Lofland 1993; Oosterman 1993). The key question for us is: Is free ac-
cess to public space as defined by various urban sociologists coming under increasing
pressure? In other words, we ask ourselves to what extent the democratic element in
public space is going to change as a result of the implicit and explicit disciplining and
regulation associated with the refurbishment and management plans.
In recent years, public space has become less of an obvious place to stay for some
users as a result of its design and organization. Some of the changes are minor, some of
them major: for example, fitting benches with ugly brackets making it impossible to
lie down, installing benches with no backs, and replacing seats at bus and tram stops
with ledges for people to lean on. Sometimes administrators go for the easiest solution,
removing all the seats so there is nowhere for people to sit. Replacing the old-fashioned
wooden benches with perforated metal structures is now common practice. The beau-
tifully designed, expensive one-and-a-half-seat benches near the Westerkerk church –
which you cannot lie down on – are another example. Another solution could be to add
PUBLIC SPACE AND THE HOMELESS IN AMSTERDAM 241
Adam.HumanCapital  06-03-2003  16:50  Pagina 241
a few benches so that one or two sleeping homeless people are not conspicuous. The re-
searcher (Whyte 1988) points out that the “public-friendliness” of a city can be gauged
by the amount of seating facilities provided.
Physical solutions to prevent a particular use have always been around: the under-
side of the walls of the Royal Palace, for instance, are slanted to keep the riff-raff away.
Government bodies, businesses, users, and individual residents all nibble away at
public space. Fear of strangers, the need to control, and selfishness fight for domi-
nance. Residents are very inventive in screening off public space and in some ways pri-
vatizing and colonizing it for their own use, with hard and soft solutions, with
planters, pavement gardens, fences, and benches. The justifiably growing interest in
and concern for the organization, upkeep, and supervision of public space conflicts
with general accessibility, use, and comfort. Officially, you can sit there and stay as of-
ten and as long as you like, but we are increasingly seeing appropriate use – e.g. shop-
ping and walking – being enabled and inappropriate use – loafing, playing, skate-
boarding, sleeping or playing football – discouraged, prevented, and made difficult.
These physical modifications affect not only the homeless but also young and old
alike.
We note that four trends were increasingly apparent in 2001 (see Deben and Rings
1999). Firstly, existing bans are being emphatically tightened up and new ones intro-
duced: no smoking on the station concourse, obligatory consumption every half-hour
in catering establishments. This includes not only the restrictions on musicmaking
and performances in certain streets and squares in Amsterdam but also a ban on sleep-
ing in public areas. The 1999 police handbook, entitled Streetwise, also fits pattern.
Secondly, certain groups are being kept out via the redesign of the public domain
and street furniture, using fences and barriers. Minor changes and modifications re-
duce user-friendliness – these may not be immediately noticeable to outsiders but they
are inconvenient for those concerned. The ledges, sills, and fences intended to keep
skateboarders out do not make life easier for wheelchairs and the users of walkers (Bor-
den 1998; Brunt 1991).
Thirdly, lots of street surveillants have come on the scene. While this is quite under-
standable, at the same time it makes public areas less public. A host of new kinds of sur-
veillants have appeared in the public domain, as nicely listed once in the NRC Handels-
blad: caretakers, village watchmen, city watchmen (Amsterdam), night watchmen
(Haarlem), flat watchmen (Bijlmer), park keepers (Amsterdam West), beach guards
(Zandvoort), fire watchmen (Hoogezand-Sappemeer), community caretakers (Am-
stelveen, Amsterdam Westerpark), traffic supervisors (The Hague), security assistants
(Rotterdam), prevention teams, teenager teams, neighborhood watches and district se-
curity officers, in addition to the various commercial security services such as Randon.
A wave of surveillance has swept the Netherlands, but on closer inspection we find that
they have taken over surveillance and enforcement from the police (and in some cases
the social control by community and welfare workers), who do not get around to this as
a result of cutbacks, reorganizations, and changes in attitudes.
Fourthly, there is a Dutch variation on the concept of zero tolerance imported from
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America, as introduced by Rudolf Guiliani, the former mayor of NewYork, and Bratton,
his Police Commissioner. In some places, their approach has been too easily copied by
administrators in the Netherlands. Zero tolerance means that a prohibition sign or a
few words are not enough; harsh measures that make themselves felt are seen as the
only solution. The tit-for-tat policy is part of this. Public space – however contradictory
it may sound – is increasingly being fenced off with ugly railings and monitored with
24-hour CCTVs (see Merry 1996; Davis 1992).
However understandable and logical these measures may seem, they are often con-
ceived from a purely management or maintenance point of view. You can put up a
fence, you can employ more surveillants, you can remove a bench, or you could install
a few more, you could remove the fence at the Toronto Bridge to let walkers continue
their walks along the Amstel again – cities such as Barcelona and Berlin are less up-
tight in this respect.
Conclusion
The tolerance of a city can be gauged from the amount of seating facilities provided.
Amsterdam covers a relatively small area, the pavements are narrow, the pressure on
public space is constantly increasing, the streets and squares are busier than ever, the
list of applications for events in streets and squares is getting longer and longer. The
hustle and bustle is increasingly regarded as a problem.
The increased interest in “better” public space makes “undesirable” aspects more
conspicuous sooner. Thus the homeless sleeping rough, loafing junkies, and other
groups who hang around are a major thorn in the sides for policymakers and design-
ers, a stain on their beautifully designed new squares.
Measures to control urban public space will only increase as a result of the events of
September 11th, 2001 in the United States. It will be more difficult to criticize these
processes and measures from any point of view other than security.
In the introduction, we questioned whether the essence of public space – free access
– is coming under pressure as a result of the plans for refurbishment and the manage-
ment of the public domain and whether, as a result, life is made more difficult for cer-
tain kinds of users of public space – in particular the homeless who sleep rough and
live outdoors. The answer is yes. During the past decade the pressure has increased as a
result of more surveillance, specific refurbishment, and the sealing-off of parts of the
public domain. The characteristic of public space remains free access for all, and pub-
lic order maintained on the spot by neutral guardians is a disappearing order (Gadet,
NRC Handelsblad, 29 December 2001).
At the same time, however, we find that the number of rough sleepers in Amster-
dam has decreased substantially as a result of more provision for the homeless and the
physically debilitating effects of life on the streets. It makes sense to assume that the in-
creased pressure in the public domain has been a factor in exchanging the streets for
shelters and hostels, but this is currently only a hypothesis.
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C . The Political and Institutional Dilemmas of Spatial Development
3.9 •Voting in an Old and a New Town
Rinus Deurloo, Sjoerd de  Vos and Herman van der  Wusten
1. Introduction
This paper compares the political preferences of the inhabitants of Amsterdam and
Almere as they show up in four elections in 1994 and 1998. The sensational elections
during 2002, including the apparently political murder of Pim Fortuyn, certainly af-
fected the public climate in the country. The results of these municipal and parlia-
mentary elections could not be analysed in this paper in any depth. At first sight, how-
ever, they do not seriously impair the conclusions drawn from the results of the earlier
elections and we will on a few occasions refer to them.
The distance between Amsterdam and Almere is approximately ten kilometres by
air, and 25 by road (see Figure 1). Yet the two towns are very different. Amsterdam’s his-
tory dates back many centuries, whereas Almere was built only about 25 years ago. This
age factor accounts in part for the considerable differences between the two towns in
terms of metropolitan character. A “real” city is like a mosaic, composed of many dif-
ferent facets. Amsterdam with its very heterogeneous population, large variety of em-
ployers and many cultural and entertainment facilities fully deserves to be called a me-
tropolis. This is where Almere still has a very long way to go. Therefore, we can first of
all assume that the political preferences of the inhabitants of Amsterdam will have a
more urban character than those of the residents of Almere.
However, the two towns are intimately interconnected. Almere originally served as
an overspill town for Amsterdam and therefore has many residents who originally
came from Amsterdam. Many of Almere’s inhabitants are also linked to Amsterdam in
every-day life. Employment is still quite scarce in Almere and so a large proportion of
Almere’s inhabitants work in Amsterdam or in the area. And those who fancy a “good
night out” often head for Amsterdam to take advantage of the many possibilities the
metropolis has to offer. 
The fact that Almere is inhabited by many former residents of Amsterdam, that a con-
siderable portion of Almere’s inhabitants work in Amsterdam, and that entertain-
ment and cultural life are strongly oriented towards Amsterdam raises the question of
whether this involvement with Amsterdam might be the reason why the attitude and
behavior of Almere residents as well as their political preferences have a strong Am-
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sterdam character. Do Almere’s inhabitants vote like Amsterdammers – that is, as real
urbanites – or does the profile of local voting preferences demonstrate a more rural
character? 
In order to answer these questions, we will look at the results of the 1994 and 1998
elections. Two elections – one parliamentary and one council election – were held in
both years. This paper will examine the results of these elections and describe a num-
ber of striking similarities and differences between Amsterdam and Almere. In order
to do this we will look at the aggregate results in both places as well as at the spatial pat-
terns in each of them. In the concluding section, we will examine whether similarities
and differences are attributable to the link between Amsterdam and Almere, and/or to
differences in the urban character of these two towns.
The substantial part of this paper is divided into four sections: 
In Section 3, the Dutch political system including the main issues regarding the
four elections will be discussed. A number of important changes occurred in national
political relations, particularly in the first election year to be dealt with (1994). Firstly,
support for the largest religious party – the CDA – was strongly reduced and for the
first time a cabinet was formed without it; this cabinet was called the Paarse Coalitie
(Purple Coalition). Secondly, we will deal with the sharp increase in votes for the ex-
treme right in that election. Finally, we will consider the remarkable rise of parties
whose political agenda was aimed chiefly at the interests of elderly citizens. In retro-
spect, the rise of the extreme right and of the parties for the elderly appear to be trivial
incidents, as in later elections these political tendencies practically disappeared. How-
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ever, these events are indicative of more general processes that are manifested in dif-
ferent guises as time goes on. The support for both the extreme right and the parties
for the elderly indicate the inability of the main political parties to incorporate size-
able portions of the electorate. Both are indications of the withdrawal of voters exhib-
ited in other Western societies, particularly in urban areas. The question is where these
manifestations of withdrawal are strongest.
Section 4 provides an initial overview of the election results in the two municipali-
ties in general terms. To what extent do the results correspond with or differ from the
national picture?
Section 5 compares the voting behavior in both places as a whole regarding those as-
pects related to the urbanization level. For that purpose we will consider the turnout
at the elections and the extent to which people voted for the extreme right. As voter
turnout is an indication of political participation and involvement of the electorate in
general, and voting for the extreme right implies disapproval of the present political
order, taken together these two indicators provide some general information about
the political attitude of the population. The SP (Socialist Party) and the parties for the
elderly could also be considered to be operating on the margins of the electoral process
and could also indicate dissatisfaction with the current political relations. In Section
5, we will restrict ourselves to working with the two examples of turnout and the ex-
treme right.
The fourth and last substantial part of this paper (Section 6) deals with the election
results for the individual polling districts of each town and how these relate to popula-
tion characteristics. This analysis is intended to indicate where within urban areas we
can find these manifestations of electoral withdrawal in particular, and to what extent
the spatial patterns of voting are reflected in the same way in these two municipalities.
First, we will examine whether there is a relation between the support for the various
parties at the polling district level. Subsequently for both towns, we will examine the
differences with respect to turnout percentages and support for the extreme right be-
tween individual polling districts. We will then examine whether these attitudes are
connected to the socio-economic population characteristics of the neighborhood in
which the polling district is located.
Finally (in Section 7), a short conclusion will be given. But first, Section 2 will pro-
vide some historical context for the Amsterdam-Almere comparison.
2. The Historical Context
Amsterdam developed around a dam across the Amstel River. The first official record
of Amsterdam dates back to 1275, but presumably Amsterdam already existed at the
beginning of the thirteenth century and perhaps even before then. The town grew rap-
idly and developed into an important trading center. In the Golden Age of the Dutch
Republic (i.e. the seventeenth century), Amsterdam was the center of the world econo-
my, and the world’s most modern city. It was built in a famous pattern of parallel
canals structured around the city’s core and closed off by a port area. As growth re-
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sumed in the later part of the nineteenth century, the city’s limits continued to ex-
pand and the population increased. In 1959, the population of the municipality of Am-
sterdam reached its all-time high: 870,000 persons. 
After that, the number of inhabitants decreased – as a result of suburbanization –
until the mid-1990s, when it gradually increased again, mainly as a result of immi-
grants settling there. Currently, its population numbers about 740,000 (Wintershoven
2001). Amsterdam is surrounded by a number of municipalities that form an integral
part of the metropolitan area. However, in this paper we will limit our analyses to the
municipality of Amsterdam. Compared to such metropolises as New York, Mexico City
and Tokyo, Amsterdam is rather small, but it is the largest city in the Netherlands. And
it is a “real city” in all kinds of ways. For example, it has a large variety of different cul-
tural facilities, such as museums and theaters. There is a large supply of hotels, cafés,
etc. and an abundance of entertainment facilities, such as cinemas and discotheques.
The living standard of the inhabitants is very mixed and ranges from the very rich to
those who are dependent on social security benefits. In certain parts of the city, one
may admire beautiful houses lining a canal, whereas in other parts there are rather
run-down neighborhoods. Amsterdam has many single- and two-person households
(55 percent and 20 percent, respectively, on 1 January 2000), meaning that three-quar-
ters of Amsterdam households are small. Only 15 percent of all households consist of
two-parent families with children (Wintershoven 2001). The presence of universities
and other institutions of higher education attract a considerable number of students.
There are people from 171 different countries living in Amsterdam. Approximately 40
percent of the population is of foreign origin. In ethnic terms, this 40 percent forms a
very heterogeneous population. Surinamese and Antillean inhabitants form impor-
tant ethnic groups. In addition, Amsterdam has a considerable number of Moroccan
and Turkish inhabitants, most of whom originally came to the Netherlands as foreign
workers. Moreover, Amsterdam houses a large number of political refugees from non-
industrial countries, who have sought asylum in the Netherlands in recent years
(Schyns et al 2001).
Although the name “Almere” is much older than the name “Amsterdam” (as far
back as 753, Bishop Bonifatius crossed a stretch of water named Almere to reach Fries-
land), Almere is a brand-new town. The decision to build it was taken by the national
government in 1971 as a partial solution to the problem of space in the northern part
of the Randstad (the urban agglomeration in the western part of the Netherlands).
Almere is situated in a polder in the IJsselmeer (a large, shallow lake in the northern
part of the country) that was drained in 1968. The first residents were welcomed to
Almere as recently as 1976. Since then the town has grown at an unprecedented rate.
For many years now, it has been the fastest growing town in the Netherlands with
roughly 7,500 new residents each year. Almere was originally supposed to serve as an
overspill town for Amsterdam, and until the mid-1980s, the majority of its new inhabi-
tants did indeed come from Amsterdam. Since then, however, the influx from Amster-
dam has been large but no longer predominant (Cortie and Ostendorf 1996). When the
“new town” policy was changed into the “compact city” policy in the mid-1980s, and
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the number of new residents in other “new towns” such as Lelystad and Purmerend de-
clined considerably, Almere turned out to be an exception: it developed into a boom-
ing town (Cortie and Ostendorf 1996). At the time of this writing (2001) Almere has al-
ready exceeded the respectable number of 150,000 inhabitants and is the Netherlands’
eleventh largest city. By 2010, the number of inhabitants will have reached 200,000,
and eventually – with 250,000 and possibly even 300,000 inhabitants – Almere will be-
come the fourth largest city in the Netherlands. However, simply having a large num-
ber of inhabitants does not turn a town into a “real” city, and in the case of Almere
there are a variety of reasons why it does not deserve that qualification just yet. For ex-
ample, the opportunities for education, culture, and entertainment are very limited.
Recent comparative research carried out by Nyfer University among the larger munici-
palities in the Netherlands, resulted in Almere ranking relatively low (27th) on the at-
tractiveness index – an index which includes such aspects as culture, criminality, and
infrastructure (Almere’s Green Weekly, 18 July 2001). And as the increase in employment
cannot keep up with the increase in population, Almere is first and foremost a dormi-
tory town. However, Almere is making efforts to gradually turn itself into a real city. Its
new skyline has already been finalized on paper. The first row of houses in the town
center has already been demolished in order to make room for a new, dazzling center.
On the site of the business center – a location for which Almere proudly managed to
acquire the status of World Trade Center – the first buildings are nearing completion.
With the newly established Institute for Information Engineering, a training college
for primary education, and the launching of various teaching programs by the Univer-
sity of Amsterdam, Almere has succeeded in developing an incipient higher-education
sector. Additionally, Almere is trying to attract ICT businesses to the town.
Recently (April 2001), a joint Amsterdam-Almere report was published by the two
town councils, in which it stated that Almere will again become Amsterdam’s growth
center. Amsterdam has no more development possibilities because it is completely sur-
rounded by a protected green belt. Almere is going to meet this demand. According to
the report: “Almere is expected to build a considerable quantity of houses, so that the
municipality can and will develop into a full-grown town” (Almere’s Green Weekly, 7
April 2001). With this, it is explicitly acknowledged, however, that it has not reached
this status yet.
3. The Dutch Political System in the Mid-1990s
Elections in the Netherlands take place according to the system of proportional repre-
sentation with a very low threshold, often resulting in a considerable number of dif-
ferent parties winning seats in the Dutch Lower House (Tweede Kamer) or on munici-
pal councils. In small municipalities, one party may obtain the majority of seats but in
the council of the larger municipalities and in the national parliament this is rarely
the case. Therefore, forming a national government or a municipal board of aldermen
may be a complex task, as a coalition of several parties has to be established, and this
usually involves a great deal of bargaining.
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In the Netherlands, all inhabitants with Dutch nationality have the right to vote
from the age of 18. Since 1985, immigrants who have been living in the Netherlands for
longer than five years are allowed to participate in municipal council elections; how-
ever, unless they have obtained a Dutch passport, they are not allowed to vote in parlia-
mentary elections.
Furthermore, Dutch citizens are not obliged to vote. Since compulsory voting was
abolished in 1969, the turnout of city dwellers has been lower than the turnout of peo-
ple from the countryside. Furthermore, the turnout at municipal council elections is
lower than that at parliamentary elections.
At the time of the 1994 and 1998 elections, there were four large nationwide parties
in the Netherlands which had governed the country in a ruling coalition at one time or
another. The PvdA (Partij van de Arbeid; Labor Party) is a social-democratic party, pro-
grammatically slightly inclined towards the less privileged portions of the electorate.
The VVD (Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie; People’s Party for Freedom and
Democracy) is a liberal party, programmatically slightly inclined towards the better-
off portions of the electorate, preferring market economy to state intervention. In
1977, the CDA (Christen-Democratisch Appèl; Christian Democratic Appeal) started as
a religious party, which resulted from the fusion of several Catholic and Protestant par-
ties. Programmatically the party gives preference to voluntary, private institutional
arrangements backed up by state funding over state intervention or a strict market
economy. It puts great emphasis on the family as the basic societal unit. D’66 (Demo-
craten ’66; Democrats ’66) was founded in 1966 with the objective of bringing about
political change in the Netherlands in terms of a new line-up of parties, with more em-
phasis on direct participation and an interest in new technology. It continues a long-
standing tradition of the liberal left, and is especially appealing to higher-educated
young adults.
Undoubtedly the most important result of the 1994 elections was the formation of a
completely new “purple” coalition. For a long time in the Netherlands, religious par-
ties had played a key role in Dutch politics. Like its predecessors, the CDA was posi-
tioned in the middle of the political spectrum. As mentioned earlier, the Netherlands
had to be governed by a coalition of several parties. But regardless of which party was
dominant, the CDA and its predecessors were always needed to form a ruling coalition.
At times there was a “left” coalition with the PvdA, and at other times a “right” coali-
tion with the VVD. Thus, Christian politics was always at the center of power. To some –
especially D66 – this was a thorn in the inside. D66 was a late, rather small entrant in
the political arena. It shared with the CDA a position in the middle of the left-right
scale. Most of the time D66 teamed up with the PvdA but it could never dominate coali-
tion negotiations. However, in 1994 the political situation in the Netherlands changed
in a spectacular fashion.
In the 1994 parliamentary elections, the CDA in particular but also the PvdA per-
formed badly. The beginning of the 1990s was a time of economic recession and the
leaders of the CDA disagreed on the direction the party should take, and this turned in-
to an open conflict. As a result, the CDA lost 20 seats in 1994. Neither the combination
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of the CDA and the PvdA nor that of the CDA and the VVD won a majority of seats; both
potential coalitions needed the help of D66, which had gained considerable support.
D66, however, only wanted to participate in a coalition with the PvdA and the VVD and
now had the opportunity to get its way. Forced by these circumstances, a coalition gov-
ernment consisting of the PvdA, the VVD and D66 was formed after prolonged and
hard negotiations. The “red” character of the PvdA and the “blue” color associated
with the VVD led to this government being labeled the Purple Coalition. The coalition
survived its entire four-year term of office. And although the major initiator of this gov-
ernment – D66 – suffered a considerable defeat in the 1998 elections, the Purple Coali-
tion continued to govern. It melted down in the run-up to the fiercely contested parlia-
mentary elections of 2002. The parties of the Purple Coalition were severely beaten.
The list launched by Pim Fortuyn obtained 17%, a record result for a first-time partici-
pant in Dutch electoral history. CDA was a strong winner. It got 28% of the vote and be-
came the largest party in parliament.
In addition to the four large parties mentioned above, several other nationwide par-
ties are significant players in the political arena. GroenLinks (the Green Left), a leftist
party, also attaches great importance to environmental issues. It is the result of a fairly
recent merger of pacifists, communists, and Christian radicals, and – like the PvdA and
the SP (Socialistische Partij; the Socialist Party) – it is especially inclined towards less-
privileged groups. The SP is slightly smaller, and also somewhat more extreme in its re-
jection of the establishment. 
Furthermore, in the last part of the twentieth century, the extreme right is again at-
tracting a great deal of attention in Europe; the Netherlands has also seen several at-
tempts to form an ultra-right-wing party. These parties are single-issue parties because
they actually only have one real item on the agenda, in this case, the expulsion of im-
migrants and ethnic minorities from society. Their suggestion that the many prob-
lems European countries are suffering from are primarily caused by immigrants, at-
tracts a considerable number of voters in many countries. Their rhetoric, style, and
tactics indicate that they cater to an electorate that is strongly dissatisfied with the po-
litical system and is willing to support programs of radical change. In France, the Front
National (National Front) won a considerable percentage of the votes in elections, al-
though – due to the French voting system – it did not result in many seats. In Flanders
(the Dutch-speaking part of Belgium), and particularly in Antwerp, the Vlaams Blok
(Flemish Block) has achieved considerable success. And in Austria, the FPÖ (Freiheits
Partei Österreich) recently succeeded in getting into the government, despite protests
from all other EU countries.
Against this background, the extreme right in the Netherlands has not achieved
much success. Their existence after World War II first became apparent when the NVU
(Nederlandse Volks-Unie; Dutch Popular Union) participated in the 1974 municipal
council elections in The Hague and almost won a seat on the city council. In 1980, a
small party named the CP (Centrumpartij; Central Party) emerged from a splinter
group of the NVU, and after the 1982 parliamentary elections, Hans Janmaat, the par-
ty leader, made it into the Dutch Lower House. However, partly due to Janmaat’s gener-
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al lack of charisma, the CP – the party was later renamed the CD (Centrum Democrat-
en; Central Democrats) – was not very successful. The supporters of the CD mainly
come from the larger towns, especially from the old industrial centres. In the 1990s,
another, much smaller ultra-right party – CP86 (Centrumpartij 86; Central Party 86) –
made a name for itself. This party was even more radical than the CD and has since
been banned by the courts. The party had some support in the larger cities, but was
never really significant in electoral terms.
These small, right-wing parties – especially the CD – obtained remarkably good re-
sults in the 1994 elections, with over 2.5 percent of the national vote (see Table 1). In
municipal council elections they won 78 seats in 43 municipalities, and in the parlia-
mentary elections, they won three seats – all for the CD – in the Dutch Lower House.
However, in contrast to other European countries, where the extreme right still plays a
role, the number of Dutch right extremist supporters rapidly declined again: in the
1998 elections, these parties obtained only 0.5 percent of the national vote – not even
enough for one seat in the Dutch Lower House.
In addition, in the early 1990s some parties representing the interests of the elderly
were launched. Like the parties for the extreme right, these, too, are single-issue par-
ties. Their political agenda focuses on only one aspect of Dutch society, namely the in-
terests of the elderly. These parties consider a decent old-age pension and good facili-
ties in the field of medical treatment and care to be of paramount importance. In
discussions about the position of the elderly in the Netherlands, quite frequently they
refer to the role the current older generation played in the post-war reconstruction of
the Netherlands. These parties for the elderly did not participate in the 1994 munici-
pal council elections, but did make a surprisingly strong debut in the parliamentary
elections held in that same year. They obtained 4.5 percent of the votes (see Table 1),
which earned them seven parliamentary seats. The seats went to two different parties:
the AOV (Algemeen Ouderen Verbond; General Elderly Alliance), which received six
seats, and the Unie 55+ (Union 55+), which received one seat. This split is characteristic
of these parties: there is disagreement about the way in which the interests of the eld-
erly can best be served, and above all, who would be most capable of carrying serving
those interests. It was not long before the consequences became apparent. Because
they bickered in public and the AOV parliamentary fraction fell apart, these parties
soon lost a great deal of sympathy. In the 1998 parliamentary elections, they only got
one percent of the national vote. And because of the disunity among them, they did
not obtain the corresponding seat in the Dutch Lower House, as the votes were distrib-
uted among a coalition of the AOV and Unie 55+ on the one hand, and a breakaway par-
ty called Senioren 2000 (Seniors 2000) on the other hand.
Finally, another interesting phenomenon of the political relations in the mid-1990s
is the existence of so-called local parties. Until 2002 these parties had only participated
in local elections (in 2002 they won 2 seats nationally in the end after they had first in-
vited Pim Fortuyn as their leader and then split up again) . The political agenda of the
local parties is primarily aimed at local interests, which is often expressed in their
name, such as Leefbaar Amsterdam (Liveable Amsterdam) and the Almere Partij
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(Almere Party). Others are named after the person who heads the list of candidates, of-
ten a well-known person in the community, such as the Schimmelpennink Lijst
(Schimmelpennink List) in Amsterdam. Nationwide, local parties attract a large num-
ber of voters: in the 1994 municipal council elections they obtained over one fifth of
the votes cast, and in 1998 (when a record number of 750 local parties participated in
council elections) almost a quarter of all votes (see Table 1). Local parties are especially
significant in smaller communities.
4. The Political Profile of Amsterdam and Almere
So what is the situation in Amsterdam and Almere regarding the electoral attraction
of the three parties that make up the Purple Coalition, and of the opposition party (the
CDA) and of the other parties? To what extent does the picture differ from the national
picture? Table 1 – which presents the election results of Amsterdam and Almere (two
parliamentary elections and two elections for the municipal council) – provides the
answers. The table also includes the nationwide election results.
Table 1. Results of elections for the municipal council and for parliament in Amsterdam, Almere and
nationwide in 1994 and 1998
———————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————




PvdA 26.3      15.9      16.9      33.2      22.7      24.0      28.0      20.8      18.6      32.3      30.0      29.0
VVD 16.0      25.2      15.4      18.3      28.2      20.0      18.5      28.8      17.6      22.2      35.0      24.7
CDA 07.4      09.1      21.6      07.9      08.7      22.2      06.2      08.7      20.4      06.1      06.8      18.4
D66 15.9      23.2      11.0      17.7      22.1      15.5      08.4      11.5      05.6      14.3      11.1      09.0
Green Left 12.6      09.4      05.5      08.5      04.1      03.5      14.8      10.9      06.1      15.0      08.1      07.3
SP 02.2      00.–      02.0      01.5      00.9      01.3      07.1      00.–      03.3      04.5      03.0      03.5
Small Right 00.6      01.6      02.7      00.8      01.5      04.8      00.7      02.9      02.9      00.9      01.9      05.1
Extreme right 09.7      07.9      02.6      04.3      03.7      02.8      01.5      00.–      00.4      00.9      00.7      00.6
‘Elderly’ parties 00.–      00.–      00.–      05.1      06.2      04.5      02.9      03.7      00.4      01.3      01.4     01.0
Local parties 04.0      07.9      21.3      00.–      00.–      00.–      11.0      12.1      24.4      00.–      00.–      00.–
Other 05.3      00.–      00.9      02.5      01.9      01.4      00.9      00.6      00.3      02.5      02.1      01.5
Turnout 56.9      60.6      65.3      69.2      77.1      78.8      47.9      50.8      58.9      64.4      69.6      73.3
———————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————
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We will not go into all the results presented in Table 1, but restrict ourselves to a gener-
al observation of the larger parties (PvdA, VVD, CDA, D66) and the most conspicuous
events (Purple Coalition and parties for the elderly) in the period considered. In the
next section, the phenomenon of the extreme right and its rise will be discussed sepa-
rately.
Together the three parties of the Purple Coalition have achieved a better result in
the two towns – especially in Almere – than in the Netherlands as a whole. However,
the distribution of the votes between the three parties differs considerably. The PvdA
traditionally has many supporters in Amsterdam and has received a much larger per-
centage of the votes there than in the Netherlands as a whole. But in the 1998 parlia-
mentary elections the situation was different, mainly due to strong competition from
the Green Left and, to a lesser extent, the SP. In Almere, on the other hand, the PvdA ob-
tained approximately the national percentage. The reverse picture applies to the VVD:
in Amsterdam roughly the national percentage of votes cast, but in Almere a much bet-
ter result. Only D66 has clearly obtained more than the national percentage of votes in
both towns consistently, with Almere nearly always getting the highest percentage. All
in all, the conclusion therefore has to be that the voting behavior of the population of
Almere as regards the three parties of the Purple Coalition does not clearly reproduce
the Amsterdam pattern. This reflects selectivity in the outmigration from Amster-
dam, changes in electoral preferences depending on local context, and immigration in
Almere from places other than Amsterdam in a combination that we cannot disentan-
gle at the present stage.
In the current Dutch political relations there are considerable differences between
urban and rural electorates (Ostendorf 1987). Regarding the established parties, in the
city people have little sympathy for the CDA. The CDA vote is predominantly concen-
trated in the countryside. Therefore, it is to be expected that in both Amsterdam and
Almere the CDA will obtain a considerably lower percentage of votes than in the
Netherlands as a whole. This is confirmed by the results presented in Table 1. And,
again as might be expected, the CDA share in Amsterdam is consistently below that of
Almere. In council elections, when it concerns local issues, this applies to a greater ex-
tent than in the Dutch Lower House elections. Both observations reveal that in this re-
spect the Almere electorate has more rural characteristics than the Amsterdam elec-
torate.
How did the parties for the elderly do in Amsterdam and in Almere? Of course the
electoral success of these parties depends above all on whether or not many older per-
sons are living in a particular polling district. In addition, one has to appreciate that
new parties have to attract voters with limited loyalties to existing parties. According
to Table 1, their electoral history follows the pattern described in the previous para-
graph: many votes were won in 1994 but only a few in 1998. But in both Amsterdam and
Almere, the parties for the elderly come out somewhat stronger than in the Nether-
lands as a whole. So, in this respect both towns are showing a similar voting behavior.
Regarding Almere, this is both remarkable and quite unexpected. After all, this com-
munity – as a fast-growing overspill town – has a relatively young population. Just look
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at the percentage of older people among the electorate of the 1994 parliamentary elec-
tions. First, we will look only at people who definitely belong to the target group of the
parties for the elderly, namely those aged 65 or above. In Amsterdam and in the Nether-
lands as a whole, they make up roughly 17 percent of the electorate; in Almere, howev-
er, only 11 percent. If we go by what the name of Unie 55+ implies and also include peo-
ple aged 55-65, then the percentage of older people among the electorate increases to
roughly 26 percent in Amsterdam, 29 percent in the whole of the Netherlands and 19
percent in Almere. In both cases the good results of the parties for the elderly in Almere
compared to the results in Amsterdam and the national results are conspicuous. A
spokesman for AOV/Unie 55+ in Almere ascribed the good result to an intensive elec-
tion campaign, and to the notion that the party also attracted inhabitants under the
age of 55 – who might have had their future interests in mind.
In the earlier discussion of CDA we pointed out the difference between the urban
and the rural electorate. In the following section we will go into more detail about the
aspect of urbanity in voting behavior in Amsterdam and Almere. Therefore, as men-
tioned in the introduction, we will consider turnout behavior and the extent to which
people have voted for the extreme right as indicators of non-commitment and dissatis-
faction with the present political reality.
5. Amsterdam and Almere: Two Urban Electorates?
In general, urban voters feel less committed to the political establishment (Verba, Nie
and Kim 1987). This translates in a lack of interest demonstrated by a small turnout
percentage. It also results in a high level of consistent support for parties which oppose
the current political establishment or which, because of the ideas put forward, are rel-
egated to the margins. In the context of the studied elections there are different parties
that may be considered to be in that position. This applies during 1994 and 1998 to the
extreme right, and to the radical left party (the SP), and to the parties for the elderly
and, during 2002, to the List Pim Fortuyn. We will look at the support for the extreme
right here. Thus the question is: how urban are the Amsterdam and Almere electorates,
considering turnout and support for the extreme right as an example of a marginal
party?
In each of the four elections, the turnout percentages in both Almere and Amster-
dam were below the national average. As far as this aspect is concerned both show a
somewhat “urban” voting behavior. And for all four elections, less people voted in Am-
sterdam than in Almere (see the turnout percentages presented at the bottom of Table
1). Considering turnout percentages, Amsterdam – as might be expected – indeed ex-
hibits more urbanity than Almere.
Concerning the second indicator (i.e. support for the extreme right), attention
should first be drawn to the fact that in the Netherlands the extreme right is primarily
a metropolitan phenomenon. This, among other things, is related to the fact that
many immigrants live in the larger towns, so the presence of immigrants is most evi-
dent there. A study conducted about the 1994 elections in Amsterdam showed that the
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extreme right has the highest number of supporters among the Dutch population in
polling districts with relatively larger numbers Turkish and Moroccan inhabitants; i.e.
population groups with an Islamic background (De Vos and Deurloo 1999).
That the extreme right mainly finds its supporters in urban areas also becomes appar-
ent when the results of the 1994 Amsterdam municipal council elections are consid-
ered: percentage-wise, the extreme right had almost four times as many supporters in
Amsterdam than in the Netherlands as a whole. Yet, in the subsequent parliamentary
elections, a considerable number of Amsterdam’s inhabitants had already lost their
sympathy for the various parties of the extreme right, so that the percentage of their
supporters was halved. One explanation put forward for such differences is that these
elections are considered to be more important. In elections deemed less important,
voters are assumed to be more willing to take a chance and to express their anger in the
form of more extreme preferences. In first-order elections, voters are supposed to also
consider the effect of their votes for eventual governing coalitions and thus refrain
from extremist voting behavior (for differences between first- and second-order elec-
tions, see Van der Eijk 1995). In Almere too – especially in the 1994 municipal council
elections – the extreme right obtained percentages far above the national percentage,
despite the fact that the relative number of Turkish and Moroccan inhabitants is much
lower than in Amsterdam. It seems that here is where the orientation of Almere to-
wards Amsterdam comes to the surface after all; we will return to this aspect later on.
By 1998, the only remaining party of the extreme right (the CD) had shrunk consider-
ably – even in Amsterdam – although its percentage was still much higher than the na-
tional percentage. In Almere, the CD was banned from participating in the municipal
council elections, and in the parliamentary elections the party’s percentage dropped
to a very low national percentage. Considering all four election results regarding sup-
port for the extreme right, the conclusion may be drawn that both Almere and Am-
sterdam vote in an urban way, and that Amsterdam, as is to be expected, votes “more ur-
ban” than Almere.
Incidentally, as a result of its notorious voting behavior (i.e. voting for the extreme
right), Almere has had a bad image since its earliest days, before it was even a real
municipality. In the 1983 municipal council elections, the CP obtained over nine per-
cent of the votes in Almere, earning it two seats on the municipal council. For weeks,
this fact gripped the attention of the large political parties. An article in a national
newspaper suggested that apart from other reasons, the “escape from Amsterdam” or
“Amsterdam” in general played a significant role for many CP voters in Almere (de Volks-
krant, 1 October 1983). Donselaar and Van Praag (1983) also tried to find the explana-
tion in the Amsterdam origins of the then inhabitants of Almere. This does not refer to
a positive orientation towards Amsterdam, but to an aversion to what has been left
behind.
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6. The Spatial Fracturing of the Urban Electorate: Analyses on the Level of
Neighborhood and Polling District 
Low political interest expressed in small turnout figures and high support for margin-
al parties are not evenly distributed across the city, but are connected with parts of the
electorate that are concentrated in certain neighborhoods and districts. In this sec-
tion, we will look for the areas where this may be the case in Amsterdam and Almere.
Each of the various parties has its own electoral grassroots support. Because the
population is not distributed evenly across town, the support for the parties across
town varies considerably. With respect to each of the four elections in both Amsterdam
and Almere, we have examined the relationship between support for the different par-
ties on the polling district level. Each polling district has about 1,500 qualified voters.
In 1998, Amsterdam had 476 polling districts and Almere 60. When a particular party
has relatively many supporters in one particular polling district, does that mean that
other parties are generally as strong in that particular polling district, or does it imply
exactly the opposite? The analyses revealed a large number of strong and slightly
weaker relationships. Here, we shall only discuss the most significant ones, without
showing figures.
Some relationships are quite obvious. The three left-wing parties (PvdA, Green Left,
SP) have positive correlations in both towns in all elections. If one of these parties is
strong in one particular polling district, the other parties are generally also strong in
that polling district. Also an obvious result: for all three left-wing parties there is the
expected strongly negative relationship concerning the support for the VVD. After all,
the VVD does not find its supporters in “low-status” working-class neighborhoods with
high unemployment rates and lots of workers on disability – precisely some of the peo-
ple who favor left-wing parties. The support for the CDA and that of the small religious
parties – combined under the name Small Right – displays the same expected positive
correlation.
Yet, there are also less obvious relationships. One striking result – which at first
sight is unexpected – is the following. In both towns and in all elections for which the
extreme right, the parties for the elderly and the SP ran, there are, without exception,
positive correlations between their support. This is remarkable for three parties that
are so different: the extreme right parties with their xenophobia, the parties for the
elderly with their preoccupation with the interests of the elderly, and the SP, a party on
the left of the political spectrum. The SP, incidentally, is somewhat of a black sheep
among the parties of the left, with little appreciation for the political establishment.
An inference can nevertheless be made as to the “common” character of these three
parties. All are in opposition to the large, established parties, and thus against the ex-
isting political order. In a way, all three parties are protest parties. Dissatisfaction or
deprivation in certain neighborhoods is often expressed by the residents of these areas
voting for one of these three totally different protest parties. Therefore, this result sup-
ports our proposition that these parties are more or less interchangeable as indicators
of urban voting behavior.
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Another, less obvious phenomenon is that in all of the elections in both towns, the
VVD, the CDA and D66 won high percentages of the votes in polling districts where the
turnout was high, while the other parties obtained relatively many votes in the neigh-
borhoods with a low turnout. The negative correlation with the turnout is strong espe-
cially for the PvdA. At first sight, this seems to contradict the widespread idea that the
PvdA benefits from a high turnout. However, this contradiction is illusive. The PvdA ob-
tains its votes mainly in low-income areas. The inhabitants of these areas often have lit-
tle interest in politics or have lost faith in politics. This is why they only modestly par-
ticipate in politics, and in elections often do not cast their votes. Had the turnout been
high in these neighborhoods, the PvdA would have had a much higher percentage of
the total vote.
We have already seen that the absence of compulsory voting leads to differences in
turnout in the Netherlands. In Almere, for example, a larger part of the electorate goes
to the polls than in Amsterdam. We have interpreted that as an expression of the capi-
tal’s higher degree of urbanity. However, there are also considerable differences be-
tween the individual polling districts in Amsterdam and Almere with regard to the
turnout. This section examines the spatial distribution of the turnout. Information
about the turnout per polling district came from the municipalities of Almere and
Amsterdam.
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First we will examine the distribution of the turnout across polling districts, using
the 1998 parliamentary elections as an example. Figure 2 shows this distribution for
Amsterdam. The turnout varies greatly, namely from 22 percent to 87 percent. There is
an obvious spatial pattern. Particularly in the center of Amsterdam and the connected,
so-called South Axis, which runs at a slight angle towards the south of Amsterdam, the
turnout is high. By Amsterdam standards, these are quite prosperous areas, dominat-
ed by native Dutch residents and immigrants from industrialized countries. A lower
turnout was noted in less prosperous areas, such as in parts of the western and north-
ern periphery of Amsterdam. These parts of Amsterdam have considerable concentra-
tions of Turkish and Moroccan residents. But the lowest turnout was noted in South-
east Amsterdam, which is somewhat isolated from the rest of the city and houses large
concentrations of Surinamese and Antillean residents, and residents from other non-
industrialized countries.
Referring to this map, the following remark is made by Schyns and colleagues (2001,
64): “At first sight it seems to be a question of a relation with income. In areas with a
higher than average income level the turnout is high and reversely the turnout is low
in areas with low-income level. The relation with income is not universal, though … Ev-
idently turnout is related rather to education than to income.”
Figure 3 shows the distribution of the turnout across Almere. The turnout varies
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from 53 to 79 percent. The spatial pattern is not quite as clear as in Amsterdam. There is
no manifestation of a clear systematic difference in the turnout between the three dif-
ferent parts that make up Almere: 1) Almere Haven, the oldest (1976) and almost com-
pleted part of Almere in the south, bordering the Gooimeer; 2) the centrally located
and largest part, Almere Stad (construction was begun in 1980 and is still under devel-
opment), and 3) Almere Buiten, which was planned to look more like a village and is lo-
cated to the northeast of Almere in a more rural location; this part has been inhabited
only since 1984 and it, too, is still under construction. At first sight it seems that also
within each of these three parts, the polling districts with a high and a low turnout are
jumbled together. Yet a vague pattern does emerge, according to which the oldest,
most centrally located neighborhoods in each district have a lower turnout. In Almere
Town, these were large parts of two neighborhoods with small, single-family houses.
The turnout was also low in “low-status” neighborhoods. These are pretty monoto-
nous, very densely built-up areas, with many cheaply built council flats dating back to
the early days of Almere. In Almere Haven it includes an area with lots of terraced
houses and a considerable number of medium-height blocks of flats, which were
mainly built in the 1970s. The large majority of these buildings are rented houses, in-
cluding low-rise buildings as well as flats. The district is characterized by a strong de-
cline in social status between 1991 and 1998 (SCP 2001). Drug dealers and groups of
youngsters hanging around on the streets make some inhabitants and shopkeepers
feel insecure (Almere’s Green Weekly, 29 August 2001). We assume (but could not verify
with certainty) that these areas are mainly inhabited by large numbers of former resi-
dents of Amsterdam.
As far as Almere Stad is concerned, the area we are particularly concerned with is
Stedenwijk:
Stedenwijk, one of the oldest neighborhoods in Almere, wants to get rid of its neg-
ative reputation. A difficult task in an area where the involvement of the inhabi-
tants is small and the diversity of people great … It is the well-known story of so
many Almere people. From a working-class quarter in Amsterdam, where it was
getting more and more difficult to understand the neighbors, the Kok couple
moved to Almere 20 years ago. Compared with the little house in Amsterdam the
new dwelling in Stedenwijk Midden was a “real villa” and the neighborhood in
one word was fantastic. Now, 20 years later, their Almere living environment
seems to have changed into the Amsterdam quarter they had left behind. Mem-
bers of the citizen committee of Stedenwijk Midden can only be surprised at the
illegal refuse dumping, the inconvenience caused by youths, and the general de-
terioration of their neighborhood. “Those neighbors over there came to live here
six months ago and then immediately hung a few rags over their windows. And
they are still hanging there.” … “The houses are much too tightly-packed and
can’t be reached from the front or back by car. Who in the world builds some-
thing like this? I once mentioned it to the city council. They responded by saying
that the district had purposely been built in this manner to make it resemble an
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Amsterdam neighborhood a bit, like the Jordaan. What on earth put that into
their heads?” According to the members of the citizen committee, the pauper-
ization of the area is mainly due to the large diversity of inhabitants and their low
degree of involvement with the social climate of the neighborhood. The com-
plaints about the area have been recorded in the Stedenwijk Social Climate Con-
venant, which has also been signed by the city council and the police and has
been concluded for the period 2001-2005 (Almere’s Green Weekly, 5 May 2001).
In the newer, more expensive neighborhoods on the edges of the three parts of Almere,
the turnout is higher. These are neighborhoods that are presumably less dominated by
former Amsterdammers (although this assumption could not be verified with certain-
ty either). It may well be that the political involvement in Almere (i.e. whether or not
people cast their vote) remains the same after people have moved to the new town: for-
mer Amsterdammers may display their “Amsterdam” non-voting behavior and people
from elsewhere may display their old voting behavior, as well. 
Instead of getting lost in further speculations, we had better ask ourselves whether
the turnout is systematically and in a comprehensible way related to population char-
acteristics that we can indeed determine. This can be done, not by polling districts but
on the neighborhood level, as all kinds of related population data from the Wijk- en
Buurtregister (District and Neighbourhood Register) of the CBS (Centraal Bureau voor
de Statistiek; Central Statistics Agency) can be used. For this purpose, election data from
the polling districts are gathered at neighborhood level. The analyses of all elections in
both towns produce the same picture: a high turnout in prosperous areas, and a low
turnout in working-class neighborhoods with high unemployment and many people
on disability benefits, and a high percentage of foreign immigrants (i.e. “underprivi-
leged” areas), where people demonstrate a lack of interest and trust in politics. These
results completely correspond with what was expected. The respective correlations
for both towns in the 1998 parliamentary elections are shown as examples in Table 2.




Percentage of high incomes -0.63
Percentage of unemployed + disabled -0.68
Percentage of foreign immigrants -0.76
———————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————
Almere
Percentage of high incomes -0.63
Percentage of unemployed + disabled -0.51
Percentage of foreign immigrants -0.74
———————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————
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How is the support for the extreme right distributed across the various sections of Am-
sterdam and Almere, and what are the related population characteristics? The data for
each polling district comes once more from the municipalities of Amsterdam and
Almere; the population characteristics data are again provided by the District and
Neighborhood Register of the CBS. 
Figure 4 shows the distribution of support for the extreme right across the polling dis-
tricts in the 1994 municipal council elections in Amsterdam (the election in which the
extreme right had the largest number of supporters). This support varies from 1 to al-
most 26 percent. High percentages of extreme right support occurred primarily in the
western and northern peripheral neighborhoods. Not surprisingly, these neighbor-
hoods are inhabited by many Turkish and Moroccan people. In Amsterdam Southeast,
which has a large number of Surinamese and Antillean people, no exceptionally high
levels of support for the extreme right were found. Earlier, thoroughly conducted
analyses on the polling district level in Amsterdam already revealed that support for
the extreme right among Dutch citizens was especially high in areas with high con-
centrations of Turkish and Moroccan inhabitants; in other words, in areas with popu-
lation groups that have an Islamic background and a language barrier. The presence of
Surinamese and Antillean people, however, did not generate many votes for right-wing
264 RINUS DEURLOO, SJOERD DE VOS AND HERMAN VAN DER WUSTEN
Percentage of extreme right votes
<7   (161)
7  - 14  (192)







Adam.HumanCapital  06-03-2003  16:50  Pagina 264
parties. Presumably the fear of the Islamic backgrounds of the Turkish and Moroccan
immigrants in close proximity and the language barrier encourages votes for the ex-
treme right (De Vos and Deurloo 1999). Low scores are observed in the center and the
connected South Axis, the more prosperous areas, where we have also found high
turnouts.
Figure 5 shows the spatial distribution in the same elections in Almere. Here the sup-
port varies from 2 to almost 16 percent. Like the turnout results, there are no clear sys-
tematic differences between the three areas of Almere. The picture within each part is
much more unstructured than what was encountered regarding the turnout. In
Almere Buiten there seems to be a relationship with the age of the apartments: in old-
er areas, where people have been residing for longer, the extreme right generally had
greater support than in the newer areas, where people took up residence more recent-
ly. However, there is no such relationship in Almere Stad or Almere Haven.
In the same way as turnout was examined, research was carried out with respect to
all elections in both towns on the neighborhood level concerning the relationship be-
tween the support for the extreme right and some socio-economic population charac-
teristics listed in the District and Neighborhood Register of the CBS. The 1998 munici-
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pal council elections in Almere are not included here because no extreme right parties
participated in them. The other elections all reveal the same picture: the extreme right
has few supporters in prosperous areas, but lots in areas with high unemployment and
many disabled workers, and in areas with many foreign immigrants – a result that cor-
responds with the expectations. As an example, the respective correlations for the 1994
municipal council elections for both cities are provided in Table 3. Incidentally, in
1998, when the support for the extreme right had dwindled considerably, the correla-
tions with the percentage of immigrants were lower than in 1994. It is a pity that the in-
formation in the District and Neighborhood Register about immigrants has not been
categorized into different ethnic groups. It is therefore impossible – with the present
data on hand – to carry out a separate analysis of the relationship between the support
for the extreme right and the presence of Turks and Moroccans on the one hand, and
Surinamese and Antillean people on the other hand. To explain why people vote for the
extreme right, it is crucial, in our opinion, to make that difference along ethnic lines.
Table 3. Correlation with the percentages of votes for the extreme right at the 1994 council elections
———————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————
Percentages of votes for the extreme right
Amsterdam
Percentage of high incomes -0.36
Percentage of unemployed and disabled -0.41
Percentage of foreign immigrants -0.23
———————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————
Almere
Percentage of high incomes -0.32
Percentage of unemployed and disabled -0.67
Percentage of foreign immigrants -0.47
———————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————
7. Conclusions
In this contribution, we have analyzed the voting behavior of the inhabitants of the old
town of Amsterdam and the new town of Almere. The question was whether voting be-
havior would correspond because of the urban character of the two towns, or differ as a
result of the difference in age and thus in urbanity level. Furthermore, many residents
of Almere originally lived in Amsterdam, and many still work or spend their spare time
there. The question was whether this connection would also affect their political
choices.
Amsterdam and Almere share the profile of the “urban electorate voter,” which con-
sists of little support for the CDA, much attraction to new or marginal parties, and a
rather limited turnout. The relationships on the neighborhood level with respect to
these points are also comparable in both municipalities.
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Amsterdam and Almere differ in the relative preferences for parties that recruit a
different type of socio-economic support. In Almere, there is more support for the
VVD, and in Amsterdam there is more support for the PvdA. This is where the relatively
new character of Almere and presumably also the selective migration from Amster-
dam is expressed. The orientation towards Amsterdam has probably also led to the fact
that in Almere the support for the extreme right – as a result of previous experiences in
the “old town” – has always been greater than might have been thought based on the
percentage of the local foreign population. Thus, the old ties with Amsterdam – albeit
in a negative sense – still exist. However, the extreme right as it developed in the 1970s
and 1980s has meanwhile practically vanished from both towns. The spatial patterns
of voting preferences show once again that the categories of inhabitants in an old town
are arranged in a different way than is the case in a newly constructed town like
Almere.
Finally, from the analysis it appears that Amsterdam, as expected, has the most “po-
litical marginality” (or urbanity) in terms of turnout and support for marginal parties.
However, this is less evident in the case of the parties for the elderly, it is not in line with
Almere’s one time extra enthusiasm for the extreme right in 1983 and it is contradict-
ed by the support for the List Pim Fortuyn in 2002 (higher than the national average in
Almere, hardly at the national average in Amsterdam). Amsterdam is a real city,
Almere is on its way.
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3.10 • Spatial Detachment and New
Challenges of Metropolitan Governance
Willem Salet and Martin de Jong
The Lost Empire of the Territorial City
In recent decades much has been written about the different manifestations of the
“unfolded” city, where the boundaries no longer coincide with the historical territori-
al confines. In his recent work about the post-metropolis Los Angeles, Edward Soja styl-
izes the dominant discourses about the contemporary dilemmas facing major cities
(Soja 1996 and 2000). He presents the following metaphors:
– the Cosmopolis: a major city that relies on international networks and connections;
– the Exopolis: an inner city abandoned by the white middle-class;
– the Carceral Archipelago: a city fragmented by the privatization of space and inac-
cessible to large segments of the population;
– the Simcity: a metropolis that has lost its identity and has become unrecognizable
by emulating alien and non-historical examples.
American metropolises are not the only ones affected by this type of spatial disengage-
ment; the problem exists in many parts of the world, albeit continuously in other,
path-dependent and culturally dependent ways (Oncu and Weyland 1997; Marcuse
and Van Kempen 2000).
Amsterdam’s position keeps changing as well. Here, the notion of urbanity is no longer
exclusively associated with the adjacent territorial area of the original city. The nature
and the activities of the different segments of the regional spatial subsystem no longer
consist of concentric hierarchical relations between the city and the countryside. In
fact, the city’s main economic functions – including financial trading and other serv-
ices – regularly operate along main roads in or near Haarlemmermeer, Hoofddorp,
Aalsmeer and the like, and often close to the economic magnet of Schiphol. While they
remain in the Amsterdam region and its surroundings, they have avoided the major
city itself. Housing markets, job markets and transportation markets have become re-
gionalized as well. In the Netherlands urbanity has also disengaged itself from the origi-
nal territory of the central city (Salet 1996). The same holds true for the domestic and
international functional networks that outline their own spatial patterns. The trend
has two major repercussions for the spatial strategic issues affecting the capital city.
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For the first time, after nearly a century of explosive urban development, Amsterdam
is not facing another round of expansion, with the elaboration of the new spatial struc-
ture plan until 2030. The City of Amsterdam evidently no longer represents the re-
gions’ epicenter. Instead, the main question is which particular qualities in Amster-
dam’s urban area need to be developed to remain optimally connected with the regional
networks, where the new economic centers of gravity have emerged. The inside-out per-
spective that used to characterize the self awareness in Amsterdam politics will need to
make way for an outside-in strategy in the period ahead (Bertolini and Salet 2002).   
The borders of the new territorial and functional networks are capricious and dynam-
ic. Establishing a new, territorially based urban identity at the regional level in the
fragmented spatial context will be quite a challenge. After all, the process is far more
complex than merely expanding the scale of the traditional city. On the one hand, the
embryonic contours of possible new territorial entities are appearing at different ter-
ritorial levels of scale, such as the “district,” the “region,” the “north wing of the Rand-
stad,” or the “Randstad” itself. Moreover, the new scale has yet to crystallize in a con-
vincing format, and public and private coalitions at the scales described above tend to
compete with each other. On the other hand, the functional use of space has given rise
to highly selective patterns that transect the rudimentary territorial demarcations.
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The sub-markets for rental and owner-occupied housing, for example, are entirely dif-
ferent spatial arrangements within the region. Rental housing is concentrated inside
the city and owner-occupied homes outside. In 1990, 92% of the housing stock in Am-
sterdam was still being rented, since then it has decreased to 86% in 2000 which is still
extremely high. Most of the rented dwellings belong to the social sector. At the city-re-
gion level (ROA without Amsterdam) only 58% were rentals in 2000. In both territorial
and functional respects, the use of space has therefore led to very irregular patterns.
This context raises the question of how the public and private activities that deter-
mine use of space may be coordinated. The government – with its relatively independ-
ent municipalities and provinces – is highly fragmented. Almere’s population, for ex-
ample, remains heavily focused on Amsterdam for work and cultural activities. But
“new town” Almere is located in a different province (Flevoland) from Amsterdam
(North-Holland) and it also is not represented at the district-level in the inter-munici-
pal association, the so-called Regionaal Orgaan Amsterdam (ROA), which aims to coor-
dinate the policy for activities in and around Amsterdam. The fragmentation of the
government into separate territorial and functional associations has been described
from many different perspectives. This article explores the possible ways to govern the
trend of spatial detachment in the Amsterdam metropolitan region. Should the pub-
lic administration be regrouped regionally, for example as new regional administra-
tive bodies or inter-community collaborative projects, or should the future adminis-
tration of the Amsterdam region be based on functional arrangements for individual
activities? Or should the efforts into territorial reform be dropped by focusing on new
strategies of connecting different spheres of action (strategies of “governance” rather
than “government”)? The changing distribution of responsibilities between the public
and private sectors that has resulted from the liberalization of the supply of public
services and the high hopes on private financing, and the acceptance of creative input
from the private sector will figure in the process as well.
Nature and Causes of Spatial Disengagement
The urban landscape reflects progressive spatial disengagement. Until two decades ago,
urban and rural areas were clearly distinctive with respect to the spatial and cultural
aspects of the activities in the two types of areas and the perceptual values associated
with them. At the beginning of the 21st century the spatial attributes of the city in the
Netherlands have become increasingly intertwined with those of the metropolitan ar-
eas surrounding them. The radius of action of its people and organizations has ex-
panded enormously; their spatial deportment is no longer as bound to the familiar
spatial demarcations, such as neighborhoods, cities, city districts, or distinctive agrar-
ian areas. Territorial boundaries are therefore fading. Moreover, traditional activities
in rural areas are becoming far more “urban” especially the state-of-the-art, export-ori-
ented methods in current market gardening, agriculture, and greenhouse cultivation.
Because the same urban-style activities are taking place beyond the city limits (brain
parks, housing developments, regional shopping centers, auctions) and are identical
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to those in the previous central city in form and content, these borders are increasing-
ly perceived as artificial. After all, they no longer enclose unique activities. No longer
can urbanity be interpreted as what happens within the original city limits. Sites that
are highly urban in terms of their nature and measure of interaction are also wide-
spread beyond these boundaries. In Amsterdam’s immediate surroundings, for exam-
ple, international industries are growing around international airport Schiphol, the
flower auction complex is expanding in Aalsmeer and Uithoorn, and media compa-
nies and quality housing developments thrive in the Gooi area (Hilversum, Naarden,
Bussum) and Almere.
Since the 1970s, the dispersion of urban activities has been driven by the increase in
spatial consumption among affluent households and other urban space users. This
pattern is now complemented by the mergers and scale expansions in the markets for
offices, retail outlets and services, such as education and health care. The growing spa-
tial needs and the corresponding access requirements have become ever more difficult
to accommodate within the traditional city centers. Amsterdam was fortunate that in
the first stage of urban expansion the ring road proved to be an attractive location for
offices (due in part to its convenient access to Schiphol). Clearly, the combination of ur-
ban push and pull factors – especially accessibility, space, and the price and quality of
public facilities – has altered spatial organisation considerably.
Other new trends – at least with respect to the intensity of their onset in the past
decade – concern the rise in physical and social mobility. In addition to longer dis-
tances being bridged faster both through physical displacement and through the in-
crease in electronic message transmissions, the social composition of households, la-
bor markets, and housing markets is becoming more mobile as well. The traditional
family structure no longer dominates the inner cities (Amsterdam exemplifies this
pattern) and has undergone dramatic changes as well. The labor markets have become
increasingly flexible and dynamic. Households now comprise multiple breadwinners,
who change jobs more often in the current flexible labor market than in the past. The
result is that displacements within urban regions have become more diversified and
dispersed. The new crisscross patterns resemble the ones perceived in the United
States in the 1960s (Friedman and Miller 1965). The difference is that in the Nether-
lands most commutes are less than 45 minutes (i.e. within the city region; displace-
ments between different city regions, such as across the North and the South wings of
the Randstad, are growing but are not yet very substantial). The final but by no means
least significant explanation for the spatial detachment is that globalization of eco-
nomic and cultural relationships has led to ever less locally determined margins for
these activities that now depend on their position in national and international net-
works. Remarkably, the same dynamics occur with privatized and/or liberalized utili-
ties and services, as soon as they appear in the international arena of take-overs and
mergers and enter the foreign markets. Striking cases have taken place in sectors such
as telecommunications, electricity, and international railways.
The trends described above have led space users to alter their conduct. They have be-
come less attached to circumscribed territorial spaces, the spatial structure of areas
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and their boundaries have changed, and identification of space users with spatial
qualities has shifted from identification with complete areas to qualities of specific lo-
cations that become meaningful in far more spacious and largely functional net-
works. More has happened than simply a spatial scale expansion of the original city to
the current urban region, which might evolve into a new city at a higher scale. The
transformation of urbanity conceals processes that change the very nature of urbanity
and stop this perception from overlapping perfectly with the perception of a certain
territorial area. In other words, people’s ties with the city of Amsterdam have weak-
ened especially among those who have indeed turned their back on the city but they
have not been replaced with identification with a district, a region, a province, a wing
of the Randstad or even the Randstad. While opportunities are available for establish-
ing a new regional urban identity, it will probably be far less comprehensive than the
metaphorical identification of the citizens with their city in the past. Nor will possible
new spatial identities emerge overnight. The respective progress of the regions in
achieving new regional identification differs substantially between countries (Guali-
ni 2001). The new metropolitan regions in the Netherlands do not appear to be very co-
hesive with respect to culture at the moment. In fact, the state of regional identifica-
tion is currently in a vacuous state. The emergence of metropolitan regions in other
countries where the spatial disengagement is more long-standing and more intense,
as in Soja’s United States, reveals that the new territorial entities and close attach-
ments of the inhabitants need not result from the current transition process (Garreau
1992; Soja 1996). In these cases spatial disengagement does not appear to indicate the
beginning of a transition process but seems to introduce another condition of urbani-
ty.
Regional Forms of Government and their Dilemmas
Strategies of Governance
The question arises of which new forms of regional government coordination will op-
erate effectively in this fragmented context. Many European countries are reinforcing
their regional governments (the rise of “meso-government”), which are structured dif-
ferently in each of the respective countries. Two-tier local governments are also quite
common in metropolitan regions (Mény 1982 and 1990; Humes 1991; Sharpe 1993).
Even the Dutch with their longstanding tradition of provinces and municipalities
have long been interested in modernizing their urban and regional relationships. In
recent decades, committees have issued many reports and recommendations, al-
though no fundamental changes in the system have occurred yet. The longevity of the
foundations established in the nineteenth century under the influence of the French
occupation and German inspiration suggests at times that the modern Dutch govern-
ment is unable to reorganize on its own merits, despite concerted efforts to this effect
(De Jong 1998).
The new metropolitan spatial reality accommodates a wealth of different adminis-
trative demarcations (such as in the territorial respect, the municipality and provin-
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cial boundaries) or the various city-regional demarcations of functional forms of or-
ganization (such as the regional organization of the police) or of social organizations
(such as the areas served by the Chambers of Commerce). They comprise a multiplicity
of non-contiguous demarcations at local, supra-local, and regional scales. In most of
these associations, the scale of organization no longer corresponds with the practical
manifestations of the relevant changes, which usually take place at a higher scale than
the one at which the administrative associations are organized. These divergences
have become more likely over the past fifteen years because of the social-economic
trends and their spatial dynamics, as indicated above. Sometimes these boundaries
are perceived as residues reminiscent of a period in which they had a functional signif-
icance. In other cases these borders convey balances of power that have emerged over
time and – though possibly no longer functional – are difficult to change.
The demand for redrawing administrative boundaries will need to be adjusted ac-
cording to the complexity of relationships from the outset by investigating the oppor-
tunities for coordinated regional action from the reality of fragmented associations that
operate in a dynamic environment. Governments will need to operate in networks to
coordinate the actions of public and private agents. The objective is to determine the
basic positions for organizing networks of metropolitan government. Barlow has iden-
tified six strategies for dealing with fragmentation of regional government (Barlow
1991).
1. A unitary form of government for local and regional administrations with universal au-
thority. In this case, municipalities would lose their autonomy or become subordi-
nate to the metropolis. This option allows provinces to cede their authority to the
new metropolitan government.
2. Transfer of functions to higher authorities. In this case the provinces and the State assume
all government responsibilities that transcend the jurisdiction of the municipali-
ties.
3. Transfer of revenues from wealthier to poorer municipalities. This may involve both direct
transfers between municipalities and redistribution by the higher government level.
4. Functional authorities with specific responsibilities. These institutions may perform their
sectoral tasks directly at the regional level. This functional administration may be
delegated and established from various levels of government.
5. Intermunicipal cooperation. Municipalities may voluntarily establish regional institu-
tions and assign them specific areas of authority or revoke them if necessary.
6. Two-tier governments. These are usually two-tier municipal governments (which are
commonplace, for example, in Germany or France).
This distinction is based on the following four known principles of government organ-
ization:
1. hierarchy (unitary government (1))
2. delegation (rearrangement of authority (2) and (3) or of organisation (4))
3. cooperation (5) in being central
4. autonomy (ranking of administration with separate areas of authority (6)).
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In some cases combinations of these principles will appear, as happens to be the case in
regional Amsterdam. No ideal form of government exists that meets all of the commu-
nity requirements and demands with respect to different sets of responsibilities
(Smith 1987). Equally remarkably, Barlow’s categorization locates all of the solutions
within the scope of public administration. We will also need to consider private sector
options (“private-led” metropolitan coordination), as well as possible associations be-
tween private and public sectors. The options described above will be covered consecu-
tively in our analysis of the administrative dilemmas facing the Amsterdam metropo-
lis.
The Hierarchical Course: Unitary Metropolitan Government
While the legal democratic arguments of “legitimation” and “effective support for the
public cause” are important in issues concerning administrative organization, the
game of political power is based on “realistic” considerations as well. After all, reor-
ganization is not a politically neutral exercise but is mainly a struggle in which parties
champion various or diverging interests. Such is the case with the most ambitious
kind of government reform: the establishment of a unitary metropolitan government.
This option sometimes arises in international theoretical debates and is frequently in-
stigated by social movements or corporate industry which favor an unambiguous gov-
ernment stand. In Western metropolitan practices, however, the unitary system can
only very rarely be sustained over the long term. “Gross Berlin” and “Communidad
Madrid” are the historic examples in Europe (Salet, Thornley, and Kreukels 2002). Usu-
ally, municipalities and existing regional governments are unlikely to consent to a
new form of metropolitan government at a higher level. Few organizations disband of
their own accord, and whether checks and balances render an integrated regional
mega-government desirable and effective is questionable. Such an option does not do
justice to the interests and considerations within the regional metropolis. Even in the
Netherlands, where the metropolitan regions surrounding Amsterdam and Rotter-
dam are relatively small compared with other countries, the option of “unitary gov-
ernment” is less than realistic.
The less ambitious subsystem of unitary government has proven more successful in
practice. This includes small expansions through local boundary reform and the an-
nexation of adjacent communities. In the 1970s, the United Kingdom enacted a mu-
nicipal redivision that resulted in approximately 200 urban districts, while in Germany
the number of Gemeinden dwindled from 24,000 to 8,000 over 25 years. In the Nether-
lands, too, the original number of 1,000 municipalities decreased by about half during
this period (Salet 1994). Merging municipalities is therefore a realistic option. In Am-
sterdam, the strategy of small annexations has been fruitful on several occasions as
well (Sloterdijk, Bijlmer) (Van der Veer 1997). Nonetheless, cross-metropolitan area gov-
ernments were not formed in Amsterdam either. Another problem with the hierarchi-
cal annexation strategy (generally as a coalition between large cities and higher gov-
ernment) is that the politics of power in large cities polarizes the relationship with
small adjacent municipalities for extended periods. The city of The Hague is presently
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suffering these consequences. Following extended collaboration with the adjacent
municipalities in the first stage, this city later proceeded with annexation. In doing so,
the city has acquired additional land but has forfeited the credit painfully acquired in
the region. The urban annexation strategy increases the asymmetric relationship be-
tween a major city and the smaller neighboring municipalities.
In the 1950s, metropolitan Toronto proved that other options were available. There,
municipal convergences were supported by a strategy of annexation outside the
boundaries of the core city. Instead of expanding the central city, the authorities com-
bined suburbs. This foundation paved the way toward a balance between the central
city and five extended suburbs that enabled cooperation with central Toronto in devel-
opment policies (Barlow 1991; Bourne 1997). In this way the course of municipal redi-
vision led to more intelligent solutions than merely expanding the central city.
Delegation: Transfer of Policy Responsibilities and Organization
Barlow also describes a few opportunities for coordinated action in the metropolis
through policy-based rearrangements or delegation, for example by centralizing poli-
cy to benefit poor municipalities or municipalities with special problems. These solu-
tions are widely applied in the Netherlands. By establishing the national welfare state,
the Netherlands has become one of the most centralized states in Europe. The distribu-
tion pattern was crucial in the process. Especially in a small country, vast differences
between municipalities with respect to social redistribution policies are not tolerated.
The major cities, which had serious problems from the 1960s through the 1980s,
claimed state support. Faced with deepening social problems, the cities increased
their claims. Throughout the expansion of the welfare state, the lobby for the major
cities (with Amsterdam and Rotterdam at the vanguard) was extremely effective with
respect to all public facilities (social policy, education, health care, urban renewal and
social housing developments, public transport). However, this political strategy be-
came counterproductive when the central government started to cut spending in the
1980s. The “strands of gold,” as the state subsidies were known, suddenly turned into
“strangulation wires.” Suddenly, the cities proved to have become excessively depend-
ent on higher government and were insufficiently accountable because of the very
minimal portion of their “own municipal revenues” (local taxes and other local in-
come amounted to only about 7% of the total municipal revenues; the rest trickled
down to the municipalities from higher government levels!) (Netherlands Scientific
Council for Government Policy 1992). The strategy of redistribution through higher
government has still not been fully abandoned but has encountered serious obstacles
since the early 1990s. In the meantime, the cities have regained their accountability
and resilience: their own tax area has doubled in size in the past decade, and the eco-
nomic position of Amsterdam and the other cities has improved significantly.
Establishing functional organization forms at regional levels is another way to delegate
government. Internationally, this strategy is applied extensively in metropolitan areas
in functional systems, such as in the United Kingdom and the United States, this
method is dominant, while in other government systems functional government is
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used successfully in regions, in particular with respect to public transport, for in-
stance in Germany and France. This system of government entrusts implementation of
public policy to relatively independent organisations under certain conditions. The
policy activities concerned are largely sectoral and corporate. The lack of democracy in
functional government and the question as to how functionally fragmented policy can
be integrated are the frequent subjects of debate. On the other hand, functional gov-
ernment is virtually devoid of red tape (provided the right incentives are available),
and this government is known for being relatively efficient. In the Netherlands as a
whole, the use of functional forms of governance is quite common but in the Amster-
dam region, this form of organization is relatively underused. State and local authori-
ties rarely set up governments that operate at the regional level. Provinces have few
steering tasks to delegate to separate functional organizations. Some private utility
companies are presently being considered for privatization. Significant functional or-
ganizations include provincial district water boards, recreation boards, and nature
boards. The province of North Holland is very active in these fields (see the chapter by
Marijke van Schendelen in this volume).
Finally, the municipalities are authorized to implement municipal policy via func-
tional organizations. In some cases this measure serves to solve strategically sensitive
issues. Municipalities may establish a functional organization for joint management
of an office park or industrial site. This procedure will avert pointless competition be-
tween municipalities about company sites. Due in part to the growing dependence on
tax revenues from municipalities (and the resulting imminent competition), such
trans-community partnerships are becoming more important. Regional land policy is
another area where both the province and the collaborating municipalities are likely
to launch several initiatives. Although public transportation does well internationally
in terms of regional functional organisation, the conditions in and around Amster-
dam are less than ideal. Fragmentation principles prevail here.
Separate Government Strata with Autonomous Powers: Assessing the City Province
The main effort to innovate regional government in the 1990s concerned the draft bill
to introduce city provinces. In the Netherlands, this was the third major attempt to re-
organize public government in the urban regions during the previous century. Again
the exercise was unsuccessful. Still, the proposal for the intended city province came
closer to being realized than all previous ones. The draft bill introduced a general
framework for seven city regions in The Netherlands, that on the one hand allowed the
municipalities to remain in existence in the city regions – Amsterdam even decided to in-
troduce 16 new neighborhoods within its boundaries – and on the other hand created
the opportunity to introduce a new city province. The idea was to have a metropolitan
government in two layers with distinctive areas of authority: the city province and the
municipalities. The authority of the original provinces was to be moved to the new city
provinces in these urban areas. The new city provinces would also have to assume sev-
eral strategic responsibilities from the municipalities. The incentives to introduce city
provinces included state subsidies and the obligation to the municipalities to work to-
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gether within that framework. Following bad experiences with previous structural
government operations, the legislature decided against a blueprint involving the allo-
cation of authority between city provinces and the concerned municipalities. Instead,
the concerned institutions were invited to achieve a process of mutual consensus. But
the interests were highly divergent. The cities wanted as much steering authority as
possible at the city province level, with regard to both strategic projects and redistrib-
ution (between the poor city and the affluent suburban communities). The surround-
ing municipalities, however, wanted to reduce the city province’s authority as far as
possible and to increase autonomy for the municipalities.
The progress of the reform continued and for a long time appeared to be headed for
success, in part as a result of the vast state subsidies to the nascent city province under
the national urbanization policy. The downside of the procedural approach, however,
was that governments had to reach so many compromises that no party was willing to
support the outcome of the negotiations without reservation. Ironically, when Am-
sterdam’s worried residents finally received an opportunity to share their views in a
referendum in 1996, no true supporters of the political concept of the city province re-
mained. Even the city government, which was among the project’s originators, was
unwilling to champion a city province that would have virtually no authority over
strategic projects such as Schiphol or over regional redistribution policy. Amsterdam’s
population was faced with the prospect of small subcommunities on the one hand
(Amsterdam would cease to exist as a municipality!), and a city province with no real
steering authority on the other hand. The people of Amsterdam patently rejected the
bill.
Thus, the spectacular operation never truly got off the ground. A complex situation
has resulted. The city is now divided into 16 neighborhoods (to which the city center
has been added recently as number 17). These semi-communities have an elected gov-
ernment but lack the power of independent municipalities. The Amsterdam city gov-
ernment does, however, have the authority to distribute funds among the neighbor-
hoods and is competent to take on strategic projects of neighborhoods. In many
respects, however, it relies on cooperation from the neighborhoods. Regionally, coop-
eration between municipalities is the foundation for municipal government. The city
district government body (Regionaal Overleg Amsterdam) of the municipalities con-
tinues to operate as a residue of a “city province under development,” albeit with the
knowledge that the city province will no longer be established. In the meantime, the
state subsidies have continued, although the municipalities work together far less
closely. The provinces have resumed their former role as government intermediaries.
While they have little power in the front yards of the major cities, the provinces have
emerged from the abortive operation as the moral victors, as they were in danger of be-
ing torn apart when the city provinces were introduced.
The dynamics of urban planning have continued, and the new spatial policy in-
volves government coordination in urban networks throughout the west of the
Netherlands (a new initiative is aimed at reviving the Randstad, it is now called “Delta
Metropolis”). The state has adopted this course in the recent plan of the Fifth Memo-
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randum on Spatial Planning. While a corresponding government strategy has yet to
emerge, this new policy will clearly cause additional complications for the metropoli-
tan government.
The account indicates that the government in regional Amsterdam has become con-
siderably more complex in the past decade. The government is more fragmented than
before the beginning of the governance operation, while interest in new structural op-
erations has disappeared for the time being. In retrospect, the government operation
was based mainly on shared political power between the governments of the major
cities and the central ministries of spatial planning and home affairs. Throughout the
process, the other municipalities in the urban region feared that the major cities
would try to use the city province for regional steering and redistribution at the ex-
pense of their own interests. The chief lesson to be learned from the failure of the gov-
ernment operation is that the cities have regarded themselves too much as pivots. The
dominant policy perspective on the compact city district and the corresponding opera-
tion of city provinces was overly dedicated to a city-centered policy to make the munici-
palities in the surrounding region enthusiastic participants. The outside world flatly
rejected all negotiations within the government. The second lesson arising from the
abortive government reform is that the two central motives of cooperation and redis-
tribution are difficult to combine. Cooperation in development policies is a voluntary
measure by municipalities, whereas redistribution requires hierarchical decision-
making. These two central regulatory principles continuously conflict with each oth-
er. Selecting one and accepting the consequences for the government seems more pru-
dent.
Conclusion: Deliberate Strategies of Regional Governance
The sections above clearly indicate that all government solutions will need to accom-
modate the vibrant dynamics of social-economic processes and their spatial ramifica-
tions in the regional Amsterdam metropolis, which is no longer circumscribed by
fixed territorial boundaries. The city province idea was doomed for this reason alone.
The social dynamics are fairly intense as well. We have already determined that the
gravity of urban activities has expanded beyond the scale at which the city province
was depicted barely five years ago. In the policy discussions preceding the Fifth Memo-
randum on Spatial Planning, two scales dominated that were intended to introduce
cohesion to urban activities (initial memorandum for Spatial Planning 1999). One is
the “network city” scale, which is expected to encompass most commutes in the com-
ing period and to contain the strongest cohesion between residential and labor mar-
kets. This scale already extends beyond the one of the city province planned until re-
cently. The second scale prevailing in most policy documents applies throughout the
Randstad and comprises the four metropolitan regions in the west of the country. The
four major cities have concentrated their lobby for new infrastructure investments on
this scale (via the Delta Metropolis association). In addition to the two scales presented,
spatial planning trends reflect a remarkable concentration of urban activities along
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the international development axes that situate the Netherlands in Europe. The ab-
sence of elected government bodies along these constantly changing scales is no coin-
cidence. Dynamic social processes do not conform to the government structures of
municipalities and provinces established in the nineteenth century.
How do government systems cope with these dynamics? In a report on this issue,
the Netherlands Scientific Council for Governmental Policy has concluded that efforts
to have the government structure always match the changing social dynamics, are
doomed. Adaptations to government organization will lag behind the societal trends,
while the established government bodies forfeit their identity (Netherlands Scientific
Council for Governmental Policy 1996). Forging municipalities and provinces into
half-baked constellations is therefore unwise, as was the case with the city provinces fig-
ure. Nor has a firm stand been taken with respect to the introduction of the Amster-
dam neighborhoods. While these subcommunities have a directly elected government,
they are not true universal government bodies (no taxation authority, no right to es-
tablish partnership associations with other municipalities, no say in crucial projects
that the central city takes on, etc.). The universal government bodies – the municipali-
ties, the provinces, and the State – therefore deserve to be taken seriously and should
not lose their authority in experimental innovation drives. Traditional government al-
so needs to become more flexible to accommodate the dramatically stronger dynam-
ics. The most prudent approach appears to involve regarding the institutional pillars
of domestic government (the institutionalized municipalities and provinces) as a prin-
ciple and reinforcing them to use their foundation to organize flexible responses to so-
cietal dynamics. Durable municipalities and provinces thus need to be reinforced to
ensure a solid base that may be used to organize flexible responses across time and
space. In this way, this same institutional structure can provide new responses in a
decade if societal dynamics take a new turn.
According to this view, no new structural reform of the government order is under
development, although several procedural requirements are being adapted. The size
of the area of the municipalities and provinces can be adapted (adaptation of scale). Fur-
ther, policy competencies of these bodies may be rearranged as well. Finally, municipali-
ties and provinces can cope with societal dynamics by forming f lexible coalitions (e.g.
intergovernmental collaborative associations, the establishment of functional gov-
ernment forms, etc.). Institutional bodies adjust their responses to accommodate
changing societal needs. Finally, f lexible networks of governance can be combined with
social initiatives. These strategic choices are substantiated below.
Adaptation of Scale
The historical scale of the municipalities and provinces has been under pressure for
some time because virtually all societal trends occur at a higher scale. Moreover, the
new international constellation in Europe requires upward adjustments. Such scale
adjustments, which entail the merger or redivision of municipalities or provinces,
may benefit both local and provincial governments. First the provinces. At present, the
Netherlands comprises 12 provinces, which are somewhat small for European regions
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and almost all of them have serious problems with their internal government. While
the rural Dutch provinces are functioning adequately, the more urban ones are unable
to overcome the frontal power of the major cities and the city districts. The most prob-
lematic relationship is the one between the tiny province of Utrecht and the city of
Utrecht, which in turn maintains close city-district ties with the adjacent municipali-
ties. The province and the city district are so closely intertwined that the burden out-
weighs the mutual benefit. The new province of Flevoland, which is primarily agrarian
and contains rapidly growing Almere as its only medium-sized city (the dynamics of
this urban expansion are closely connected to Amsterdam), has not achieved a strong
internal balance. Next, the two traditional provinces of North Holland and South Hol-
land both comprise spacious green areas, pressure from urbanization, as well as the
two largest city districts of the Netherlands, where the provinces have difficulty inter-
vening from their current position. The option of redrawing the boundaries of these
four provinces, yielding perhaps only two provinces in the end (e.g. a province for the
North Wing of the Randstad and one for the South Wing of the Randstad), offers such
wonderful prospects that the failure to explore this simple alternative thus far is as-
tonishing (Interproviciaal Overleg Committee Geelhoed 2002; Gualini and Salet 2002).
Debates about the reorganization of domestic government keep becoming stuck in the
much-trodden paths of the major cities. The political vanguard has hardly considered
the role of the provinces, which perform mainly intermediary tasks and for this reason
alone are not easily politicized. Still, this strategic choice is a prime option, consider-
ing the nature of the urban dynamics.
Elevating the scale is a realistic option for local government as well and has gradually
been taking shape at this level for three decades. Nonetheless, municipal redivision
faces a major dilemma that has been insufficiently considered thus far. The problem is
whether to reinforce the asymmetric relationship between the central city and the
municipalities in the urban surroundings through continuous additions to the city or
to merge the municipalities adjacent to the central city to increase the distribution of
power in the urban region. The current asymmetric relationship between municipalities
in urban regions therefore requires additional reflection.
There are many grounds that justify expanding the scale of local government, but
the measure of responsibility that a unitary government can handle reasonably is sub-
ject to an explicit upper limit as well. Excessive expansion of the scale of the munici-
pality complicates retaining an awareness of popular sentiment and taking decisions
that do justice to various local conditions. Larger cities therefore tend to entrust cer-
tain responsibilities within their area to offices inside the community (in the neigh-
borhoods). With 740,000 inhabitants, Amsterdam might not yet have reached a size
that would require the formal institution of an entirely new tier of government with
17 subcommunities. After all, Amsterdam is not that huge and difficult to govern (the
municipal government justified the structural establishment of neighborhoods pri-
marily for strategic and economic reasons; the step has yet to be elaborated as a system
of government). Nonetheless, city size is a critical factor and needs to be taken serious-
ly in expanding the scale of municipality boundaries. Around Amsterdam the markets
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for labor, traffic and transportation, and housing have become more regionalized. The
main issues that arise need to be handled forcefully by regional or inter-local govern-
ment. At present, this steering involves coordinating the unambiguously dominant
Amsterdam and several surrounding municipalities. The mere fact that this relation-
ship is asymmetric has already made government coordination an ongoing source of
conflict, armed peace, and continuous stalemates.
Instead, perhaps we should explore a strategy of municipal redivision that pre-
sumes that the relationships in the region – and thus the foundation for solid collabo-
ration between municipalities – would benefit from merging and redistributing mu-
nicipalities in the urban region to improve the balance between the city and the new
power centers instead of constantly adding sections to the central city. Redrawing city
limits to reduce the asymmetry between municipalities in the urban region and pro-
ducing new, spread-out centers of local power establishes a sound foundation for mu-
nicipalities to work together. Eventually, this inter-municipal cooperation might give
rise to a second level of local government (like the ones that have proven successful in
metropolitan regions in other countries, such as the communautées urbaines in France or
the old Metro Toronto Region in Canada). More importantly, conditions need to be es-
tablished that make municipal government feasible. These conditions are targeted by
the inside-out strategy that has been applied repeatedly in the past and will be re-
placed by an outside-in strategy amid the current conditions of spatial disengagement.
The familiar concepts for policy and government that surround the perspective of the
central city appear more anachronistic than ever.
Rearrangement of Policy Competencies
Coordination in the context of the fragmented metropolis may also benefit from en-
trusting certain areas of policy authority to the current governments. Provincial adap-
tation of policy authority should be considered according to the structure of the pres-
ent system of government, where the measure of regional coordination depends
largely on cooperation between municipalities and/or provinces. This cooperation princi-
ple enables customized solutions according to content, space, and time. The con-
stituent municipalities, provinces, or state bodies have the power to determine
whether joint solutions are pursued, at which places, and for how long. Societal de-
mands for new answers are easily accommodated by the cooperation principle, which
respects the autonomy of constituent bodies and is sufficiently flexible to conform to
the societal dynamics.
The disadvantage of this model is that cooperation can be a very costly transaction.
This model often entails separate organizations that operate at a distance from the
democratically elected bodies. The municipalities and provinces set the procedural
conditions themselves and can compensate for the lack of democracy in various ways.
Finally, the cooperation model requires a basic willingness to cooperate. Policy issues
that cannot be resolved this way are then quickly transferred to higher government for
decisions. The government cooperation model is not always adequate with Nimby-
type issues and redistribution issues.
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The provinces should have sufficient policy competencies to offset these shortcom-
ings in the cooperative model.
Finally, the provinces need to be better equipped than they have been in the past
to take part in regional development projects. First, this requires adequate decision-
making procedures for projects where the provinces run the interactive process.
Provinces will also need their own arsenal of development instruments to catalyze
decision-making about regional projects. The provinces are ideally situated for defin-
ing communication with European regional policy regarding the regions. Remark-
ably, the Dutch provinces with their long-standing tradition in this area now lag
behind the zealous approach manifested by the new meso-governments elsewhere in
Europe (France, Italy, and Spain).
Societal Networks
In addition to public-public collaborative arrangements, many private and public-pri-
vate associations and coalitions arrange their own version of regional coordination.
They are most common with individual projects, largely property projects. Here, the
strategic collaborative arrangement between public and private institutions like the
ones in urban regions in many countries exists neither at the urban nor at the regional
level. In the Netherlands, there are a few generic platforms, such as the “mayor’s con-
versations with economic and social groups” in Amsterdam. Most platforms however
tend to be informal and ad hoc. Nonetheless, public-private initiatives for projects
abound.
In addition, various policy sectors, such as public housing policy or policy for social
services (e.g. education and health care or the provision of radio and television broad-
casting associations) are traditionally based on mixed responsibilities. Social services
are generally provided by private organizations supported by the central authorities
in performing their public tasks. In this respect, the Dutch polder model of compro-
mise has become internationally renowned. Within the respective policy sectors, gov-
ernment organizations and suppliers engage in extensive institutionalized consulta-
tion with the public sectors concerned. Lately the user organisations have become
more involved in the different sectors. In the Netherlands, this “tripartite” model has
emerged primarily at the central level and provides the basis for coordination by the
regions in most policy sectors. The prevailing opinion is that the individual regional
dimension of such associations needs to be reinforced in several areas, and that new
grassroots initiatives will provide welcome innovation.
Finally, the potency of regional coordination that arises purely from private initia-
tive merits investigation. In a period of changing government policy in which the au-
thorities are inclined to replace their role of severe interventions in the past with con-
ditioning or enabling activities, this dimension should not be underestimated.
Regional emergence of new, obvious spatial contexts depends largely on spontaneous
identities and the concentration of social interactions at the regional level. Govern-
ment organizations can accommodate this trend but cannot manage the cultural
transition of the old cities and villages into a new metropolitan configuration. At what
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scale do housing associations operate to facilitate the turnover of households within
their ranks? At what scale do the local or regional radio and television companies op-
erate? And what about the local or regional daily press? And the chambers of com-
merce? At what scale do the office markets operate effectively? At what scale do cultur-
al symbols and regional points of recognition and landmarks arise? Perhaps the
government is not exclusively and not primarily decisive in determining the extent
that actions between parties can be coordinated regionally (Putnam 2000). The cultur-
al transition of cities and villages into regional metropolises will proceed in a coordi-
nated manner only when given sufficient logical coherence and cohesion of social in-
teractions, for which the government will need to devise appropriate responsive
strategies.
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4. PROSPECTS OF URBANITY:
NEW CULTURAL IDENTITIES?
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4.1• Landscapes of Power in Amsterdam?
Rob van Engelsdorp Gastelaars
The Theme
There has recently been much debate in the Netherlands, about the future “spatial de-
sign” of the country. These discussions have in part been stimulated by the national
government, which for the fifth time since the end of the 1950s is preparing a policy
document outlining the future shape of land use in the country. But they have also
been fostered by the increasing media coverage in recent years of the new North Amer-
ican metropolitan landscape. This landscape is characterized by (1) an increasing
deconcentration of urban residents and businesses into the hinterland of the old core
cities; (2) an increasing differentiation between amenity clusters, leisure districts and
employment zones, both within and outside the old core cities; (3) an increasing eco-
nomic and geographical polarization within these expanding “urban fields,” between
flourishing office centers and luxury residential areas at one end of the scale and de-
cayed industrial areas and slums at the other; (4) an increasing tendency toward the
formation of “enclaves” in the form of protected, socially-profiled local residential
communities and amenity clusters and; (5) the increasing importance of design in the
configuration of new residential areas and centers (Zukin 1991, 1995; Knox 1992; Soja
2000). In this respect, Zukin talks about a trend towards a polarized configuration of
“landscapes of power,” characterized by increasing disparities in economic capacity
and a matching cultural “packaging” between winning and losing clusters of land use
(Zukin 1991). For the majority of Dutch observers, this trend presents such a frighten-
ing picture that government intervention is being demanded to prevent something of
a similar nature occurring here. A minority, however, does believe that there are at-
tractive aspects to this development – for example, a greater geographical diversity
which has been sadly lacking in Dutch planning in the past.
The above in essence describes the theme of this paper. Amsterdam, or rather the Am-
sterdam region, is part of the Netherlands. To what extent is it conceivable that over
the next few decades – for example, between now and 2030 – this region will evolve in-
to a constellation of “landscapes of power,” both at the macro level through the cre-
ation of a polarized and internally economically powerful urban region and at the mi-
cro level through the formation of fortified, socially-profiled neighborhoods and
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amenity centers within that region? In answering this question, two matters will be
addressed in turn:
1. First, there will be a brief examination of the types of landscape found in the Am-
sterdam region in 2000, with specific comparisons between them and the North
American landscapes of power. Although until recently it almost went without say-
ing that differences in land-use structures between countries could be ascribed to
the differences in their economic structures (Pred 1977), today it no longer seems
useful to primarily attribute the singularity of the metropolitan land-use structure
in the United States – when compared with the Netherlands, for example – to its par-
ticular domestic economic relationships. Over the past 30 years, the nature of eco-
nomic developments in the post-industrial world has been far too international,
and even global, at that. As a consequence, there are no longer that many real differ-
ences in economic structure between the Netherlands and the United States. On the
other hand, political and administrative relationships – and with them such mat-
ters as the readiness of the government to intervene in strategic urban planning
matters – until now have been fundamentally different in the United States com-
pared to, for example, the Netherlands. Because of this, the specific characteristics
of landscape-relevant relationships in the Amsterdam region as of 2000 will in this
paper first and foremost be associated with the features of the political administra-
tive system which is particular to Amsterdam and the Netherlands.
2. This will be followed by an appraisal of the likely types of land use to be found in the
Amsterdam region in the future. The appraisal will take the form of a policy-cen-
tered projection (WRR 1980, 1983) and shall thus be based upon a recognizable con-
nection between the future land-use relationships within the region and the struc-
tures of relevant political administrative systems – that is, those of the Municipality
of Amsterdam and of the Netherlands as a whole.
The concept of the “political administrative system” plays a major role in both parts of
the discussion. Here, this concept is defined as the specific set of temporally and geo-
graphically applicable rules which regulate the production of social and material real-
ity (Terhorst et al 1997). In developing the concept, this paper will of course concen-
trate upon those rules which pertain to land use in the region concerned.
A Typology of Political Administrative Systems
In order to understand the role of the Dutch political administrative system, at both
the national level and the municipal one – in this case, specifically the City of Amster-
dam – as far as land use and planning in the city and its surrounding region are con-
cerned, reference is made to a series of studies conducted some years ago to explore
possible policy influences over the future social and geographical structure of the
Netherlands (WRR, 1980, 1983; Van Engelsdorp Gastelaars et al 1987). Carried out by or
under the auspices of the Nederlandse Wetenschappelijke Raad voor het Regeringsbeleid
(Netherlands Scientific Council for Government Policy), these studies made use of a
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classification of types of political administrative systems, which is based on two fac-
tors. The first is the so-called “three currents” structure which dominated Dutch poli-
tics throughout the 20th century. Those currents were: the “liberal,” in the economic
sense with “the market” as key player; the “confessional,” a Christian-led school of
thought in which organizations and groups in the “social midfield” play a leading
part; and the “socialist,” with “the state” as the main actor. The second dimension is
based on different views of the most desirable institutional and organizational struc-
ture for the system. This identifies two such positions, which often cut right across the
currents just described: the “technocratic” view, with a strong emphasis on the state’s
responsibilities, and the “sociocratic,” which prioritizes the citizen’s own responsibil-
ities. 
As far as the issues of land use in the Dutch metropolitan regions that are covered by
this paper are concerned, these two dimensions can be profiled as follows.
From the “liberal” perspective, the region is primarily viewed as a field within which
people and companies can conduct their producing and consuming activities. Mobili-
ty, both in the form of daily movements and of relocation and changes of destination,
is an entirely accepted phenomenon. This dynamic is regarded as a natural conse-
quence of free-market forces. This is certainly true when it comes to planning strategy,
and so the government should act with great caution. And if it does intervene, the
main reason should be to support market forces.
From this point of view, there is little objection to the differentiation of land use by
socio-economic level. A great emphasis is placed on the freedom of individual compa-
nies and households to act in accordance with their own needs and abilities when ac-
quiring and using land and premises. As long as the market is respected, the evolution
of specific business zones and amenity centers is quite acceptable. This means that
even in rural areas it is relatively easy for new nodes of urban activity to appear. The
same applies to the development of new residential environments, both in high-densi-
ty urban form and more suburban in nature. A continuing increase in the use of land
for urban purposes is therefore inevitable. After all, there is an ever-increasing demand
for specific living, working, and recreation space for each resident, customer, or pro-
fessional. Moreover, the continued growth in room for mobility must be assumed, due
in part to the increased use of personal modes of transport.
Finally, in this vision there is little objection to the growing tendency by residents
and entrepreneurs to create their own “domains” at the local level – that is, in the indi-
vidual neighborhood, retail cluster, or leisure complex. This involves the social profil-
ing of resident or visitor categories by such means as buyer screening, security meas-
ures to regulate physical access, and specific aspects of design. For example, the
number of government-imposed rules concerning building methods and techniques
are kept to a minimum.
The “confessional” viewpoint regards the region first and foremost as the geographi-
cal framework for organizing the daily existence of the Dutch population. In this re-
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spect, it has a reasonable amount of confidence in market mechanisms, viewing them
in principle as an efficient means of allocating resources. But because households and
businesses find it difficult to calculate the full repercussions of their actions, there re-
mains a significant role for mediating bodies. Nevertheless, supporters of this vision
see little benefit in a government with dirigiste tendencies. Instead, the tensions be-
tween economic market interests and protecting types of land use deemed valuable for
cultural and social purposes are primarily addressed by a wide range of consultative
bodies established specifically to deal with them.
In this view, differentiation at the socio-economic level has both benefits and draw-
backs. Naturally, unbridled intervention is not desired in matters which are primarily
the responsibility of the various parties directly involved in the land, property, and
housing markets. But at the same time those entities, communities, and networks
which have long proven so culturally and socially beneficial in Dutch life – the church,
the family, the small business, the agrarian class, the old class of tradespeople, the
deep-rooted local community, and so on – must be protected against pressures upon
their physical space. This means that the market as a system of distribution has to be
“corrected.” One example of this is the protection of rural land against an “invasion” of
urban categories of land use. Maintaining the social, cultural and, more recently, eco-
logical, qualities of the countryside takes precedence. This respectively means preserv-
ing family farming as a way of life, the rural landscape as a thing of cultural value and
nature as a gift of God managed by the farmer. A second example is keeping suburbani-
zation under control, both to protect the small craft-based and service-providing fami-
ly businesses in the city and to preserve the abundance of monuments in the old city
centers.
In this perspective there are strong objections to the growing pressure to transform
residential neighborhoods or amenity clusters into protected and socially-profiled do-
mains. Such clustering could lead to individualization, a concentration upon the in-
terest of one’s own group, a disregard for others, and an unwillingness to achieve bal-
anced political decisions through dialogue. This means that a preference exists for
balanced local communities in respect to socio-economic level, lifestyle and function,
and for amenity centers which are attractive and accessible to all.
In the “socialist” vision, as well, the region is primarily regarded as a framework with-
in which actual social relationships are played out at the level of everyday life. Within
this regional framework, the fundamental equality of all participants in the social net-
work must be advanced. This requires political intervention in order to obtain public
control over crucial factors such as land, housing, public transport, educational facili-
ties, and so on, at the expense of ownership rights.
From this perspective, spatial differentiation at the socio-economic level is out of
place. In particular, free-market mechanisms have no part to play in the allocation and
geographical distribution of homes and associated provisions. Intervention comes
first through the even distribution of all day-to-day facilities across neighborhoods
and in local residential nuclei. Secondly comes the concentration of workplaces and
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various specialist, non-everyday facilities in centers which are easily reachable by and
accessible to all. And a third essential strategy is the organization of residential areas
in compact, densely-populated concentrations so that there is sufficient demand for
all the facilities provided and those using them have to travel the shortest possible dis-
tance. As a corollary to this, the rural land around the cities must be kept as intact as
possible, both to provide outdoor recreational areas which are accessible to all and to
preserve scarce nature and protect the cultural landscape of the countryside.
Finally, in this view there is little or no scope for transforming residential neighbor-
hoods, retail clusters or leisure complexes into protected or socially-profiled domains.
This would inevitably lead to the exclusion of underprivileged residents and low-capi-
tal businesses – something which must be avoided at any cost. Neighborhoods with a
balanced composition in terms of the social and economic position of their residents
are, in this view, a precondition for an acceptable “spatial order.” Otherwise, equality
in the sense of availability and access to basic amenities and contacts cannot be
achieved (WRR 1980, 1983; Van Engelsdorp Gastelaars et al 1987).
The second distinction, that of the one between a “technocratic” and a “sociocratic” po-
sition with regard to the institutional design of the political administrative system,
can be specified as follows in respect of land-use structures in the Netherlands.
The “technocratic” position is based on the notion that the government should play
a directive role in social relationships. The political and economic vision is that of an
active state positioned at the heart of society. Administrative tasks should be carried
out as ably, as rationally, and as systematically as possible. The managerial and opera-
tional functions of the state are the center of attention. Its executive power comes first,
complete with an extensive civil-service apparatus – particularly at the national level.
Local authorities are primarily concerned with the implementation of national policy.
Taxes are for the most part collected at the national level and then distributed to lower
levels of government, such as local authorities, through specific grants and subsidies.
In this technocratic vision, the creation of new local authorities by splitting off is vir-
tually unthinkable. On the other hand, local-authority mergers designed to create
more efficient executive bodies for state instructions are a frequent phenomenon.
By contrast, the “sociocratic” position is not based primarily upon planned man-
agement and emphatic action by the government. Instead, its role is seen more as a
mediating one than a directing one. When problems need to be solved, trust is placed
first and foremost in the self-regulating abilities of society itself. The government is ex-
pected to foster relationships which give full voice to all interests and outlooks, even
minority ones. Consequently, this position is far more sympathetic than the techno-
cratic to both the privatization of social tasks and the devolution of state duties to low-
er levels of government like the local authority. This kind of decentralization is also
seen in the tax system, making local autonomy much greater than in the technocratic
model. And the creation of new local authorities is quite conceivable, whereas merg-
ers are highly unlikely (WRR 1983; Van Engelsdorp Gastelaars et al 1987; Terhorst
et al 1997).
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Combining all the options under each dimension – the three main currents in Dutch
politics and the two contrasting positions with regard to the institutional design of
the political administrative system – produces a total of six potential classifications for
the political administrative systems in place in the Netherlands, both at the national
level and at the subordinate municipal level in Amsterdam. Considering the typologi-
cal sketch just drawn, two immediate observations can be made. First, the current po-
litical system in the United States – at both the national and municipal level and in
terms of both its vision and its organization – best corresponds by far with what in
Dutch terms would be defined as the “liberal-sociocratic” model. And, following on di-
rectly from that, it can be suggested that the question posed in the introduction to this
paper about the potential evolution of Amsterdam’s “landscapes of power” – complete
with protected and socially-profiled residential and amenity domains – in the Nether-
lands of 2030 could equally be interpreted as asking what the chances are of a liberal-
sociocratic political and administrative system existing in Amsterdam and nationally
by the year 2030.
The Current Amsterdam Landscape: Characteristics and History
The period 1865-1914 was the first since the Golden Age of the 17th century in which
the Netherlands and Amsterdam experienced systematic growth, both economic and
demographic. Apart from the belated development of Dutch industry, this growth
resulted in the revival of the West Netherlands delta as a seaport region. During this
period, both the City of Amsterdam and the country as a whole were predominantly
governed by economic liberals. Moreover, the political administrative system could be
characterized as sociocratic. This was due both to the generally extremely detached
attitude adopted by governments of the time regarding central management and to
the still high degree of autonomy enjoyed by local authorities in raising and spending
their own revenues. This was therefore a liberal-sociocratic period as far as the political
system was concerned.
However, the years before 1900 can be described as much more liberal-sociocratic
than the latter part of this period. Towards the end of the 19th century, even economic
liberals began to call for local and national governments to play a more active role.
Moreover, as a result of electoral reform, from 1900 onward they had to respond more
than ever before to the demands of new political movements. At the national level, the
most important of these was the confessionalist current. At the municipal level it was
the socialists who set the tone. At both levels this shift was marked by a series of “so-
cial” laws and measures. Particularly worthy of mention nationally is the 1901 Woning-
wet (Housing Act), which introduced state-subsidized public housing. In Amsterdam,
there were also such measures as the introduction of the municipal leasehold system
in 1896, which was designed to tighten public control over the market for land, and the
transformation between 1895 and 1900 of the city’s privately-owned gas, water, tele-
phone and tram companies into municipal corporations. Nevertheless, even in Am-
sterdam the political administrative system remained essentially liberal during the
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early years of the 20th century. For example, although the leasehold system would lat-
er be used mainly to stimulate the construction of social housing, at this stage it was
employed solely as a means of “safeguarding development gains for the local treasury”
(Terhorst et al 1997: 258; see also Van der Valk et al 1985; Van der Valk 1989; Wagenaar
1990).
How did this liberal-sociocratic system influence the shape of Amsterdam between
1875 and 1914? Were landscapes of power created during this period? The literature
shows that the formation of such landscapes around 1900 would mainly result from (a)
intensified central business district (CBD) formation, mainly at the expense of old
mixed residential-workshop neighborhoods; and, (b) intensive processes of congrega-
tion and segregation in housing construction, resulting in sharp socio-spatial polar-
ization by district with extremes of “goldcoasts” and slums. Both of these processes did
indeed seem to occur in Amsterdam, albeit only to a moderate extent. For example, a
CBD did form in the old inner city. But the intensity of this transformation was limited.
For example, the old luxury houses along the city’s famous central canals continued to
be used as homes by a section of the old Amsterdam mercantile patrician class. And
even where CBD formation did occur, the demand for office space was clearly so limit-
ed that the old, pre-industrial low-rise skyline dominated by churchtowers virtually
was not changed anywhere in the inner city. The small scale of the existing building
stock was also largely maintained. This calm in development seems striking. After all,
Amsterdam has traditionally been the financial and commercial center of the Nether-
lands. But a cause can be identified for this weak tendency towards CBD formation. Ac-
cording to the literature, it is mainly attributable to the low rate of industrialization in
the Netherlands (Wagenaar 1990; Terhorst et al 1997).
A comparable development occurred in housing. Of the three luxury housing proj-
ects organized as private initiatives during this period – the Plantage development on
the eastern edge of the inner city, the Sarphati Plan on its southeastern side and con-
struction around the Vondelpark to its southwest – the first two failed almost com-
pletely due to a lack of demand. Only the third succeeded, but merely in reduced form.
The demand for housing in the city during this period amongst the haute bourgeoisie
appears to have been not strong enough. This resulted in most of the luxury houses
originally planned for each project never actually being built. It is generally assumed
that this lack of demand for luxury homes in the city was due in part to the fact that
similar estates were being built in the sandy-soiled, wooded countryside around Am-
sterdam at the same time as these three projects, at much more reasonable prices and
in considerably more attractive liberal-sociocratic conditions – in terms of both lower
local taxation levels and the absence of nuisances like nearby stinking factories. It may
also have been significant that, compared with some earlier cities, Amsterdam was not
booming in economic terms and so did not have to accommodate a powerful and grow-
ing elite. Be that as it may, whilst Amsterdam did – like comparable, liberally governed
cities elsewhere in Western Europe and in North America – develop a luxury-to-slum
housing curve reflecting market conditions (Wagenaar 1990), because there was no
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large-scale construction of new luxury mansions or villas, the contrasts in wealth visi-
ble on that curve in terms of landscapes of power remained relatively limited. Geo-
graphically, though, there is a recognizable landscape pattern. The luxury homes
were virtually all concentrated in the southern part of the city, from the “Golden
Bend” in the canal belt just to the south of the old inner city – and far removed from the
stinking port – to the new villa neighborhoods around the Vondelpark. On the other
hand, the city’s poorer residents were almost all concentrated in districts directly ad-
joining port and industrial zones – that is, those parts of East, West, and North Amster-
dam on either side of the city docklands. Apart from the Vondelpark project, though,
the really imposing luxury landscapes of power in the Amsterdam region were located
at some distance from the city itself in the wealthy satellite suburbs, in the form of
leafy neighborhoods of substantial houses. And, like the Vondelpark project, many of
these already appeared to feature the characteristics typical of protected residential
“domains”: private developers, screened and socially-profiled residents, partial physi-
cal protection of the neighborhood and its adjacent parkland, and regulations govern-
ing acceptable building methods and architecture (Van Engelsdorp Gastelaars 1980;
Wagenaar 1990, 1998).
After the First World War (1914-1918), the political administrative system in the
Netherlands was fundamentally changed. Due in part to the introduction of universal
suffrage, the economic liberals entirely lost their political power. New political cur-
rents, some confessional in their outlook, others with a socialist viewpoint, assumed
power. At the national level, it was the confessional tendency which had the upper
hand. Every Dutch government between 1918 and 1995 included ministers represent-
ing Catholic or Protestant political parties. At the municipal level, it was the socialists
who largely held the reins after 1918. Ever since then, virtually every City Executive in
Amsterdam has been dominated by the Left, albeit always in coalition with others.
This transition was accompanied by a gradual process of technocratization, in terms of
both the growing range of activities brought into the public sector by administrations
at both levels and the increasing centralization of the whole system of government.
For example, strategic planning policy with regard to the major Dutch cities and their
surrounding regions has been explicitly subject to national government guidance and
coordination since the late 1950s. In short, the period between 1918 and 1995 – when
the confessional parties found themselves unrepresented in a Dutch government for
the first time since the end of the First World War, making way for the novelty of a so-
cialist-liberal coalition and so also providing a convenient end date for this historical
review – was one which can be characterized as increasingly “technocratic-confession-
al” at the national level and “technocratic-socialist” in Amsterdam. That period can al-
so be subdivided into three phases, which are examined in turn below.
1. 1918-1940: municipal housing policy; implementation of Berlage’s “Plan for South
Amsterdam.”
2. 1945-1970: postwar reconstruction; implementation of the “General Expansion
Plan” (AUP).
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3. 1970-1995: national “compact metropolis” policy; implementation of a policy of
building new towns combined with urban renewal and, later, regeneration in the
city itself.
During the first two of these phases, land-use planning in the city largely remained an
autonomous local-authority task. From the 1960s onward, however, this was no longer
the case and municipal responsibility was increasingly confined to implementing na-
tional policy.
In urban-planning terms, the years 1918-1940 represented an entirely new beginning.
Not only was it a period of rent control and tenant protection against eviction, it was al-
so one in which the city government started to exert strong control over virtually every
aspect of town planning – technical, functional, and aesthetic alike. But there was only
very intermittent attention to the economic aspects of land-use developments, such as
the growing number of offices in Amsterdam. Councillors did on several occasions dis-
cuss the increasing number of conflicts in the city center between the slow but steady
process of CBD formation – accompanied by rapidly growing traffic flows to, from, and
within the area – and the vulnerable historic monuments there. But this was not a sys-
tematic or fundamental debate. The problem was viewed largely as one of traffic bot-
tlenecks, and a solution was sought by filling in a number of canals (Nouwens et al
1985). Vastly greater was the amount of attention given in words and in deeds to hous-
ing in the city. As a result, the residential “1920-1940 Belt” features a number of char-
acteristics which were given little or no consideration in earlier development. Firstly,
the buildings have been kept deliberately compact. One of the reasons for this is to en-
sure a solid demand base for public transport. A system of enclosed blocks of flats is ad-
hered to virtually throughout, with very few individual houses being built. Secondly,
the belt is designed entirely on the principal that amenities should be located as near-
by as possible for the residents. In other words, they are distributed evenly across all its
neighborhoods rather than concentrated in one or more city centers. Thirdly, the zone
is a good example of what is meant by a “socially-balanced” living environment. Right
down to the level of individual neighborhoods, an attempt has been made to achieve as
thorough a social integration as possible. A varied population is encouraged by alter-
nating cheaper and more expensive rented housing complexes. Finally, the 1920-1940
Belt is an outstanding example of what design at the district level is capable of.
In this respect, one plan deserves particular mention – and indeed enjoys interna-
tional fame. It is the “Plan for South Amsterdam” designed by Hendrik Petrus Berlage,
which is also known as the “Berlage Plan” or “Plan Zuid.” This, in fact, originally dates
from the time of the earlier, more liberal system. However, it was worked on over many
years. An initial version was discussed and eventually rejected in 1906. It was followed
by a period of intense discussion between politicians, town planners, architects, and
other proponents of better living conditions in the city. But it was not until 1915 that a
second Berlage Plan was tabled, and only in 1917 was it finally adopted. Evidently, the
political climate had only now become ripe for the acceptance of such a plan so suited
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to the aims of the Housing Act (Van der Valk et al 1985; Van der Valk 1989; Wagenaar
1990; Terhorst et al 1997). The Plan Zuid was implemented during the 1920s and 1930s,
albeit in modified form here and there. All the practical characteristics of the resulting
1920-1940 Belt mentioned above can be found in the original plans. But on top of that it
is an exceptionally fine design. The Amsterdam South developed during this period re-
mains a superb architectural and planning whole, monumental in its overall execu-
tion and expressive in its detail. Moreover, it gives the district another important qual-
ity. Right from the earliest planning stages, and even more so in the version finally
built, the Plan Zuid acknowledged the existing luxury housing in the southern part of
the city. This district was in effect extended even further southwards. It was no longer
in the same exact form, with villas surrounded by park-like grounds, but with residen-
tial blocks which – although not dissimilar architecturally to the blocks of cheaper
rented flats built elsewhere under Plan Zuid – nevertheless contained more spacious
homes. In short, whilst the existing “landscapes of power” from around the turn of the
century are not actually enlarged, one specific aspect of them is copied with loving
care in part from the more democratically-tinged corporatist urban landscape formed
between 1918 and 1940: the living conditions of the wealthy South Amsterdam bour-
geoisie. One reason for this was the local authority’s constant fear that prosperous
townspeople would depart for the suburbs (Wagenaar 1990; Terhorst et al 1997).
Apart from restoring the damage caused by the Second World War to buildings and in-
frastructure in and around the city, the planning agenda was dominated by two issues
between 1945 and 1970: (a) preparing Amsterdam for a new future as a center of indus-
trial and service activity; and (b) implementing the Algemeen Uitbreidingsplan Amster-
dam (General Expansion Plan for Amsterdam) in order to satisfy the growing need for
new housing in the city, caused partly by the increased consumption of space per resi-
dent. Both objectives still seemed to be achievable within Amsterdam’s existing geo-
graphical boundaries, yet the local authority’s need for more space did begin to in-
crease.
The first need arose out of a necessity which many experts thought applied to the
Netherlands as a whole: that the nation would refocus itself economically. The two tra-
ditional pillars of the Dutch economy, agriculture and trade, could no longer prevent
the country from sliding into impending stagnation. To overcome this, there were rap-
idly intensifying calls for Amsterdam to reorient itself around its seaport, as a focal
point for capital-intensive industries with a connection to maritime commerce. By the
end of the 1960s it was being claimed that an area of 40 square kilometers would be re-
quired to accommodate all the region’s port-based activities. (De Hen 1986; Terhorst et
al 1997). In other words, for the first time in many years there appeared to be a clear ur-
ban-planning need based primarily upon economic factors. It must be remembered,
though, that this was first and foremost a political need formulated by the govern-
ment and largely derived from national economic forecasts formulated by state insti-
tutions. The first physical manifestation of this policy was the rapidly-constructed
Western Docklands to the south of the North Sea Canal. Due to an almost total lack of
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demand for land from port-based industries, however, in 1970 much of this area re-
mained a vast wasteland.
In the same period, several specific planning reports covering the inner city and its
developing CBD (Gemeenteblad Amsterdam 1955; Gemeenteblad Amsterdam 1968) were fi-
nally published. The gist of their analysis is much the same as that expressed, albeit in
a more perfunctory way, in City Council meetings during the 1930s: that there was a
growing clash between the inner city’s expanding role as a CBD, including the conse-
quent growth in traffic, and the historical quality of its existing buildings. The differ-
ence now was that the balance of power had shifted. During the 1960s a powerful citi-
zens’ lobby developed to protect the historic inner city. At the same time a movement
of young students and artists, known as Provo, emerged with a strong political objec-
tion to the creation of a CBD and to the reduced quality of life in the inner city being
caused by motor traffic. Very soon the viewpoints adopted by these new participants in
the debate were now seldom if ever being contradicted in the press, and in the city a
general mood developed which made it impossible to carry out any large-scale devel-
opment in the old core (Nouwens et al 1985; Wagenaar 1990; Mamadouh 1992; Ter-
horst et al 1997; Rooijendijk 2000). The provisional compromise reached in this con-
flict had already become clear by the end of the 1960s. The inner city would remain
more or less untouched, with new CBD functions being concentrated in new “central
districts” just outside it – for example, to the southeast along the Wibautstraat. Unre-
strained city development in the old inner city seems to have been definitively struck
from the agenda at this time. There has been hardly any there since the late 1960s
(Nouwens et al 1985; Rooijendijk 2000).
During the same period, however, implementation of the General Expansion Plan –
which had been drawn up and approved in the late 1930s but then was delayed by the
Second World War – continued apace. The characteristics of this construction project,
concentrating mainly on urban expansion zones on the western, northern, and south-
ern edges of the city, are in general terms much the same as those of the Plan Zuid: (a) as
compact an urbanization as possible, albeit less dense than found in the Plan Zuid as a
response to the increased need for space per person; (b) distribution of amenities and
employment zones throughout the new districts and neighborhoods; (c) creation of a
social mix in each district and neighborhood, in terms of both the socio-economic lev-
el and household composition; and (d) a clear attempt at harmonized design at district
and neighborhood level, but this time in a functional and modernist style. In another
respect, too, this belt of 1950s and 1960s development is the same as those from earlier
periods. Once again the new housing and commercial districts to the south of the city
are more spacious and luxurious than those to the west and north. And, as before, this
echo of the landscapes of power created in around 1900 was defended by pointing to
the need of providing homes in the city for the well-off in order to prevent suburban-
ization (AUP 1934a, 1934b).
Between 1970 and 1995, the State largely took over responsibility for coordinating the
design of the metropolitan regions in the Netherlands. Its regional urban policy was
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increasingly concentrated around four objectives. Economically, efforts were made to
stimulate growth – particularly in the form of job creation – even in places where this
would not occur naturally. Socially, planning efforts concentrated upon avoiding the
creation of deprived residential areas characterized by poor living conditions, a lack of
amenities and low social participation. Ecologically, the ideal was to keep built-up ar-
eas as compact as possible so as to protect nature and biodiversity in the surrounding
areas and to promote the use of public transport. And culturally the aim was to main-
tain landscapes of cultural and historic value, be these city monuments or country-
side, so as to preserve the identity of the region. In short, Dutch land-use planning at
the regional level has been dominated for more than 30 years by efforts to achieve both
“balance” in the distribution of population groups and activities across different parts
of the environment and “modesty,” particularly in respect of restricting urban en-
croachment into rural areas. These values have become so embedded in Dutch plan-
ning culture that they are regarded by some researchers as symbolizing the existence
of a “planning doctrine” here (Faludi et al 1990, 1994; Dieleman et al 1992).
The motivation behind the State’s regional approach is easily summarized. Little by
little, urban land use was tending towards deconcentration to such an extent that a
policy was required which encompassed both the cities themselves and their hinter-
lands. This both responded to the fact that those regions were gradually beginning to
interact as a single metropolitan system and provided an effective way to try to draw a
line between urban and rural land use where necessary. Largely outlined in the second
and third Nota over de Ruimtelijke Ordening (Reports on Land Use in the Netherlands) (Tweede
Nota 1966; Derde Nota 1976, 1977, 1978), during the 1970s and 1980s the resulting policy
focused on channelling an unstoppable exodus of city dwellers and city-based compa-
nies into officially-designated “new towns.” Six of these were identified around Am-
sterdam, all about 20 to 30 kilometers from the city. For this reason, the policy of the
time has been called “clustered deconcentration” (Tweede Nota 1966; Faludi et al 1990;
Dieleman et al 1992). In the 1990s, a Fourth Report (Vierde Nota 1988, 1989, 1990) intro-
duced an even stricter version of the same policy. This envisaged the relocation of ur-
ban households and businesses seeking more space to new developments either adja-
cent to the city proper or in any case to new towns no more than 10 to 15 kilometers
from it. This strategy is therefore known nowadays as the “compact cities” policy. In
the Amsterdam region there were no “detached” developments at all: the new zones
were all located on the edge of the city. During both periods described above, the prin-
cipal policy objective was to prevent fragmented deconcentration of metropolitan
land use encroaching upon the surrounding countryside (Van Engelsdorp Gastelaars
et al 1996).
The regional new towns strategy of the past 30 years has been accompanied within
the cities themselves by a policy of regeneration. In the 1970s and 1980s, this was
known as “urban renewal policy” and featured programs focusing mainly upon reno-
vating the building stock in “downgraded” neighborhoods. These were mainly cheap-
ly-built late 19th-century districts constructed during the liberal-sociocratic period. As
far as their populations were concerned, the objective was to keep them in situ. “Build-
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ing for the community” was therefore a widely-used slogan for renewal operations
(Yap 1981; Schuiling 1985). But at the end of the 1980s, another policy made its en-
trance. Under the slogan “urban revitalisation,” the aim now became to introduce
more expensive new owner-occupier housing into downgraded districts – this time
neighborhoods in the more recent residential belts as well – so as to attract wealthier
residents and thus achieve a better local social mix. Amsterdam participated exten-
sively in both strategies (Van der Cammen et al 1996; Ministerie van VROM 1997;
VROMraad 1999).
What sort of landscape do we encounter in and around Amsterdam today as a result of
all these strategies implemented since the end of the 19th century? Four characteris-
tics can be defined.
1. Bearing in mind the physical and morphological differentiation between its resi-
dential and commercial areas – the variations between areas in terms of building
density, of housing and construction quality and of architecture, as well as those be-
tween the form of ownership and pricing level of the built environment – there ac-
tually are no real “landscapes of power” in the Amsterdam region, and certainly not
in the city itself. That is to say, the parties involved in building housing and com-
mercial premises were not allowed to achieve differentiation between them –
which inevitably means economic polarization – based upon market relationships:
the physical separation of well-located, spacious, attractively-designed and hence
pricey property clusters from poorly-situated, more cramped, badly-designed and
thus cheap ones. The cultural, ecological and above all social principles followed by
the government since 1918 have had much too far-reaching an effect upon land-use
planning in the region for that. Only a few leading economic institutions regarded
by the government as essential to the city and the region – the Bank of the Nether-
lands, the head office of the ABN/AMRO Bank – have in recent decades managed to
use that economic power to force their way into a prestigious Amsterdam location.
In the 1960s, for example, the Bank of the Netherlands succeeded in establishing a
high-rise banking complex on an attractive square in the inner city – the only office
tower in the area. From a morphological point of view, the region can thus be de-
scribed more as having a modest, balanced corporatist landscape derived from a
mix of economic, social, ecological and cultural priorities than being a constella-
tion of “landscapes of power” which vary widely in terms of prices, building quality,
and architectural richness. 
2. But as far as the actual functional and social use made of the homes and other build-
ings in the region is concerned, this – arguably “democratic” – order is far less evi-
dent. Despite all the good intentions of their providers, the majority of those who
actually use the property constructed for them have long succeeded very ably in
magnifying the differences in quality which do exist into a “league table” of desir-
able versus undesirable areas and hence creating more or less deprived districts.
Variations in distance from the city, in dwelling type – flats or houses – and in the ac-
cessibility of city centers have led to recent new towns like Lelystad, urban expan-
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sion zones like Bijlmermeer and urban renewal areas like the Indische Buurt being
transformed, despite a large proportion of new development for the region, into
“cumulative problem zones” complete with the high percentages of unemploy-
ment, ethnic minority residents with language problems, and unwaged house-
holds which that definition entails. In other words, despite the lack of any clear
physical-morphological differentiation in architectural quality, a socio-economic
curve can be observed within the region separating more and less successful neigh-
borhoods in terms of the careers, prosperity, and status of their populations. Since
this differentiation is unintended, however, it seems unjust to use the term “land-
scapes of power” to define it.
3. All this does not mean, though, that there are no deliberately-created “landscapes
of power” at all to be found in the region. There most certainly are, albeit fragmen-
tary ones. To begin with, for example, there are several “relics” from earlier periods
which can quite unreservedly be called landscapes of power. Good examples are the
luxury residential areas mentioned earlier, those built in and around the city in
about 1900. Both the villas and mansions erected around the Vondelpark and the
suburban parkland estates in places like Bloemendaal and Blaricum, some distance
from Amsterdam, remain to this day extremely prestigious places to live and work,
and are protected by public and private law as true “power-full” residential enclaves
(Ostendorf 1988; De Haan 1990). Their residents and users thus seem to have suc-
ceeded consistently for a century now in resisting encroachment by other forms of
land use and intervention by the government.
4. A second phenomenon which could be defined as a “landscape of power” should be
regarded as a product of Dutch legislative loopholes. Luxurious environments again
provide the best examples. In the city these are found in a number of centrally-situ-
ated, small-scale and until recently entirely run-down inner-city neighborhoods
which have now been taken over by individual “gentrifiers” who themselves take on
the physical renovation and improvement of their own homes and living environ-
ment. The exact equivalent in the rural hinterland is a series of what were until re-
cently small poor villages lying in the peat-bog area between the main agglomera-
tions of the western Dutch “Randstad” but have now been taken over by wealthy
newcomers, most of them city dwellers in search of a romantic dream home in the
countryside. Again, they have themselves restored or replaced their newly-acquired
ruin and “gentrified” the locality. In both cases, entirely against original expecta-
tions and often in defiance of government intentions, these developments have re-
sulted in attractive new living environments with clear “enclave” traits. They can
thus be classified as new “landscapes of power” (De Wijs-Mulkens 1999).
Amsterdam’s Future Landscape: Opportunities and Threats
Down through the years, only one trend has consistently been regarded in Dutch land-
use planning circles as a threat to the quality of life in the cities: the exodus of urban res-
idents and activities to the suburban hinterland, in search of more room than the city
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has to offer. Until recently this urge to deconcentration in urban land use was the only
question planners needed to address. Recently, however, attention has also turned to a
second development with potential consequences for the metropolitan relationships
in the Netherlands: there has been a growing realization amongst Dutch planners that
fundamental processes of urban concentration and sprawl are taking place, particu-
larly at the international level. These are resulting in some countries and regions evolv-
ing into international concentration zones for urban land uses, whilst others decline
in this respect. Not that such processes are anything new. They occurred in the Europe
of the 15th, 16th and 17th centuries as a repercussion of the increasing scale of long-dis-
tance international commerce. Northern Italy and the coastal regions of the Low Coun-
tries increasingly began to function as international trading hubs during that period,
and as a result became urban concentration zones at the European level. And this in-
ternational interaction has certainly not ended since. On the contrary, in the long run
it is only expanding. Nevertheless, it was not until well into the 1980s that Dutch state
planners began to look at these processes of urbanization on an international scale. It
was only in the Fourth Report on Land Use in the Netherlands that a policy was introduced
to reinforce the position of the western Dutch “mainports” – the Port of Rotterdam and
Schiphol Airport – in the international distribution system for goods and people. In
subsequent years, the globalization of economic traffic became a prominent topic in
international literature, mainly because of the major impact of this development upon
the chances of individual cities “upgrading” or “downgrading.” For this reason, the
rest of this section will examine the opportunities and threats facing the future land-
scape of Amsterdam based upon two themes: (a) the increasing international integra-
tion of economic traffic and its potential consequences for the character and structure
of the Amsterdam landscape; and (b) the ongoing deconcentration of urban land use
and the possible repercussions for that same landscape.
The global exchange of goods, services, knowledge and capital is being deregulated at a
rapid pace. Partly as a result of various technological developments in, for example,
telecommunications and partly in the wake of a series of far-reaching institutional
transformations – such as the continuing evolution of the common market within the
European Union – the organizational scale of business activity is growing rapidly. In
this context, the “footloose” nature of all kinds of economic activity is constantly in-
creasing, international commerce is swelling dramatically, and the division of labor
between nations and continents is growing. As a result, the competition between ur-
ban regions to attract new economic activity is more and more being conducted on the
international stage. And there is an increasing use of international “league tables” to
assess those regions on their quality as a location, based on everything from educa-
tional facilities to cultural provision.
Almost all recent studies into the potential of and opportunities facing different
metropolitan regions on the international playing field home in on concepts like “ur-
ban network” or “metropolitan development zone.” Such phrases refer to the exis-
tence of collections of cities, with their surrounding regions, characterized by a specif-
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ic economic-activity profile and a particular degree of success as measured using such
criteria as employment growth rates. Such development zones are usually broken
down into so-called “hubs,” “nodes” or “centers”, denoting the traditionally important
cores cities, and “corridors” along the routes connecting them. This is often where new
forms of economic activity develop. The geographical extent of these development
zones is certainly not unlimited. Places which are beyond easy reach of the core cities
and their connecting corridors generally play little or no part in a zone’s dynamic. It is
important for the purposes of this paper that plenty of studies have now appeared
which, in attempting to classify the metropolitan regions within Europe in terms of
their membership of and position within certain development zones, enable a reason-
ably reliable picture of where the Dutch metropolitan regions stand in Europe to be
given here.
So what is their position? A large number of studies have concluded that a series of
urban regions in the Netherlands, some in the “Randstad” and some in the east and
south of the country, form part of Europe’s leading metropolitan core zone in terms of
economic importance and growth: the so-called “Central Megalopolis,” also known as
the “Blue Banana.” This stretches from southeast England through the Benelux and
along the Rhine into Switzerland and then northern Italy. It contains both important
decision-making and service centers, so-called “brainports” – including London, Am-
sterdam, Brussels, Cologne, Frankfurt, Munich, Zurich, and Milan – and major hubs in
the distribution of goods and people, “mainports”: London and Frankfurt again, plus
Rotterdam, Antwerp, and others. Characteristic of this core zone are the large number
of multinational company and bank headquarters, the extent of ICT activity, the pro-
liferation of universities and research institutes, the range of cultural and communi-
cations amenities and the number of international airports (Musterd et al 1992;
Boomkens et al 1992).
What opportunities and threats does this situation present for the Amsterdam re-
gion over the coming decades? Two possible developments merit particular considera-
tion. First, there is a constant danger of the Amsterdam cluster being spatially margin-
alized as a “mainport” region as a result of shifts in the flows of goods and people – for
example, because a faster-growing economy elsewhere in Europe brings more traffic to
airports other than Schiphol. Secondly, globalization is likely to be a growing threat to
Amsterdam as a “brainport.” This development tends to encourage top-level central ac-
tivities to congregate in fewer and fewer “supercenters” or “global cities,” with their
concomitant decline in smaller cities.
Considering the position of the large cities, the creation in both Europe and North
America of urban networks based on daily interaction and with a constantly expand-
ing regional coverage represents the result of a process of deconcentration from the
cities into the surrounding countryside which has been growing steadily in intensity
for the past 100 years. Influenced particularly by constantly increasing prosperity
since the 1950s and 1960s, the needs of residents for their own space keeps growing. At
the same time, their dependence upon external facilities located close to home has
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gradually fallen as they have become more and more mobile. As a result, the not-yet ful-
ly built-up rural hinterland of the cities has become more attractive as a living envi-
ronment, particularly for families: there they find or can create the spacious home
and garden they crave, whilst the potentially greater distances from work and the loss
of certain amenities caused by a move out of the city are not regarded as an obstacle.
This deconcentration meant that by 1970 the Netherlands could already be regarded
as being divided into “daily urban systems,” supralocal in size, with work and ameni-
ties primarily concentrated in the core of the central cities and with the population in-
creasingly settling outside those urban cores or even outside the cities themselves.
In hindsight, however, the formation of these monocentrically-structured urban re-
gions during the 1960s simply seems to have been a “snapshot” in an ongoing process
of deconcentration regarding the location of all types of urban land use in relation to
the old city cores, and in the physical rearrangement of the increasing numbers of
household and business types relative to one another. The deconcentration processes –
which, after 1970, increasingly involved businesses and amenities as well as people –
brought about the current evolution of employment nodes and amenity centers both
at the edge of the city and in its suburban hinterland, whilst at the same time the old
city cores are beginning to lose part of their scope and function. Meanwhile, “sorting”
processes have resulted in this deconcentration being accompanied more and more by
geographical congregation and segregation. The displacement systems in the areas
concerned have also become less monocentrically organized and more complex. More-
over, the rise of new centers and nodes on the edges of cities or in their surrounding ar-
eas have meant that such movements are by no means any longer confined to clear re-
gional boundaries. To put it another way, the monocentrically-structured regional
daily urban systems which could be identified in various European countries as well as
in North America during the late 1960s since appear to have become more and more in-
tertwined into “urban fields” – that is, metropolitan agglomerations organized
around many nodes, both old city centers and new focal points at city edges and in the
suburbs, and many times greater in size than the former monocentric daily urban sys-
tems. In the Netherlands, these processes have thus far been fought fiercely by the gov-
ernment. Nevertheless, a tendency towards urban-field formation can be seen in many
parts of the country. This is particularly the case in and around Amsterdam. It is par-
ticularly symptomized by the growing number of centers and hubs in the region (Mus-
terd et al 1992; Boomkens et al 1997).
All this has presented planners in the Netherlands with a difficult choice. The ma-
jority believe that unconditional acceptance of the trend towards urban-field forma-
tion is fraught with danger. Objections to it are therefore coming from many angles.
First, there is the threatening impact upon various forms of rural land use, with all the
ecological and cultural objections that raises. Secondly, unchecked deconcentration
of metropolitan land use would seem to undermine the ability to maintain a public-
transport system. And thirdly, uncontrolled deconcentration of land users away from
the big cities can lead to social decline within them – in part because it reduces the de-
mand for all kinds of urban amenities which eventually would decrease, and in part,
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because the deconcentration mainly involves the wealthier users of land and hence
leads to urban impoverishment. Many believe that warding off the dangers of decline,
in particular, requires the development of a creative land-use policy at the urban level
over the coming years.
The purpose of this paper is to answer the question of whether it is conceivable that by
about the year 2030 the Amsterdam region will have evolved into a constellation of
“landscapes of power.” It is fair to say that the city authorities are faced with a tough
choice in this respect. After all, the socialist- and confessionalist-led technocratic met-
ropolitan land-use policy in place in the Netherlands since the 1920s has resulted in
the almost total disappearance of landscapes of power in and around Amsterdam, at
least in terms of their physical manifestation in the urban landscape. Only a few frag-
ments of such landscapes remain, remnants of an earlier period and mainly outside
the city in the “leafy suburbs.” In fact, the current urban landscape in the Netherlands
is better described as modest, balanced and corporatist, one in which the continual en-
forcement of social, cultural, and ecological quality standards has very effectively
checked the physical expression of economic power.
On the other hand, the developments which will shape the Dutch city in the near fu-
ture are primarily economic in nature. The spatial marginalization of that city will
have to be avoided by improving airports and building high-speed rail links. Leading
global economic organizations will only be retained or attracted by the development
within or around these cities of top locations, for them and their employees, and by the
creation of high-quality education and cultural provision. Impoverishment and de-
cline in the cities are combated by making their living and business climate more at-
tractive. In other words, it seems virtually inevitable that any policy designed to over-
come the impending economic threats to quality of life in the cities will be
accompanied by the development of landscapes of power. That is the dilemma facing
the Dutch state and, in particular, the Municipality of Amsterdam.
In fact, there will hardly be any question of a choice on this matter in the Nether-
lands. The country’s current technocratic land-use policy, which very much considers
social, cultural, and ecological quality criteria as well as economic factors, is broadly
supported by a majority of the politicians, officials, and land-use planning profession-
als involved in it. The course of the debate thus far on the latest Fifth Report on Land Use
clearly demonstrates that. Even with the Report still in production, the vast majority of
Dutch parliamentarians – socialists, confessionalists, and social liberals alike – have
made it clear that they believe physical compactness and sociospatial balance
achieved by central government management should characterize the future organi-
zation of land use in this country. It is therefore assumed in this paper that the urban
landscape of the Netherlands will, over the next few decades, continue to be shaped
first and foremost by partly by socialists and partly by confessionalists inspired gov-
ernment-led technocratic policy, based to a large extent on social, cultural, and ecolog-
ical principles.
Seen in the right, this study into the likelihood of landscapes of power existing in
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and around the Amsterdam of 2030 can only conclude by presenting variants of the
current Dutch government vision of urban and regional planning as forecasts for the
Amsterdam regional landscape in 30 years time. Two such variants have been chosen.
One is based on a “precise” version of the planning doctrine currently prevalent – that
is, a corporatist landscape shaped entirely by compactness and by functional and so-
cial balance. The other envisages a more “pliable” version of that doctrine. This model
varies from the first one in two significant ways. Firstly, as well as compact districts it
also features the development of urban living and working districts with suburban
densities, albeit as far as possible adjacent to existing settlements and only “clustered”
within specified corridor-like metropolitan development zones in order to facilitate
an effective public-transport system. The other difference in the second model is that it
accepts the appearance of socio-economically and culturally profiled living and work-
ing environments, subject to the strict condition that no ghetto-like neighborhoods or
clusters can be created. In both cases, these modifications to the “precise” model are in-
tended to protect the competitive position of the Dutch metropolitan regions, and in
particular that of Amsterdam, as locations for top-level activities within an ever more
integrating European Union, both political and economic. As far as the scope of this
paper is concerned, the most important point is that these two distinct models clearly
differ in how conceivable they make the existence of landscapes of power in and
around the Amsterdam of 2030, and what form those landscapes take. There is a
greater likelihood of more or less “protected” living and amenity enclaves being creat-
ed for specific groups of residents, companies or visitors under the “pliable” model
than there is under the “precise” model. That compact, balanced vision allows hardly
any opportunity for selective migration. This means that, considering both the physi-
cal form taken by urbanization and the socio-functional use to which the land is put,
expressions of power differences – an accepted, moderate version of landscapes of pow-
er – are to be expected if the “pliable” model is implemented. The current plans for Am-
sterdam’s “Southern Axis” can be regarded as a harbinger of such a moderate power
landscape. Things would be different under the “precise” model. It would simply not
tolerate any landscapes of power. But even if that model were to be applied, especially
at the two extremes of the wealth-poverty spectrum there would occur “avoidance be-
havior” towards the range of accommodation opportunities offered by the govern-
ment. At the “rich” end of that spectrum, one example of such behavior might be con-
stant invasions by wealthy homebuyers of physically and socially impoverished
villages or city neighborhoods and their transformation by those private owner-occu-
piers into wealthy enclaves. At the other end of the scale, potential manifestations in-
clude the appearance of concentrations of houseboats in or around the city or the con-
version of allotment sheds into housing.
To put it another way, even under this “precise” scenario unofficial, informal and
fragmentary landscapes of power will appear – like a sort of frayed edge. And this is all
the more likely given that, despite all the policies of the welfare state to encourage
compactness, balance, and equalization, socio-economic and cultural differentiation
in the Netherlands continues to grow.
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4.2 • Mixed Embeddedness and 
Post-Industrial Opportunity Structures




The ubiquitous process of globalization involves not just the cross-border integration
of markets (products, inputs, capital, etc.), but also the long-distance movements of
people. International migration is very much part and parcel of the emerging global
mosaic of regional economies. Highly-skilled immigrants from developed economies
move to places abroad where they can make the most of their specialized skills. Mi-
grants from less-developed countries, many of them relatively lacking in educational
qualifications, also flock to the advanced metropolitan areas that make up these re-
gional economies. They have an impact on labor, housing, and product markets in
these advanced urban economies. But they also affect these metropolitan areas in a
more direct way by initiating economic activities as entrepreneurs. Last year, the
American magazine, Business Week, devoted the cover article “Unsung Heroes” to the
contribution these immigrant entrepreneurs from less-developed countries make to
Western European economies by “creating thriving businesses and thousands of jobs”
(Business Week 2000). Two of these unsung heroes in Business Week are based in Amster-
dam: Rahma El Mouden, a Moroccan immigrant who started working as a housekeep-
er and now owns her own thriving firm, Multicultural Amsterdam Cleaners, which
employs 75 workers, and Michael Frackers, the son of Indonesian immigrants who has
started a software firm in Amsterdam.
Below, I take a closer look at these unsung heroes and others who have migrated
from less-developed countries to the Netherlands and started businesses in Amster-
dam. I will examine the relationship between immigrant entrepreneurship and tra-
jectories of incorporation in the Dutch capital. To put it bluntly, is starting a business a
viable step on the road towards upward social mobility for these immigrants from, for
instance, Turkey, Surinam, and Morocco? This fairly straightforward question entails
a whole series of other queries that highlight all kinds of aspects related to the re-
sources and preferences of the immigrant entrepreneurs, and also necessitates com-
plex investigations into the wider context where these entrepreneurs have to operate.
The creation of firms is – as Patricia Thornton (1999, 20) has argued – “a context-de-
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pendent, social and economic process.” Context obviously matters, not just the re-
sources the nascent immigrant entrepreneurs have at their disposal (Razin and Light
1998).
The concept “mixed embeddedness” was specifically devised to deal with both sides
of the equation – the supply side consisting of the would-be entrepreneurs and the de-
mand side or the set of opportunities for starting a business – and their subsequent
matching (Kloosterman, Van der Leun and Rath 1999). On the supply side, it is clearly
relevant to explore how actors are embedded in all kinds of largely “ethnic” social net-
works. By exploring this relational embeddedness (Portes and Sensenbrenner 1993),
one can get a grip on how these entrepreneurs can use social capital to add significant-
ly to their other resources. Moreover, one can also investigate how their particular em-
beddedness helps shape their preferences and hence influence their careers as entre-
preneurs. There is, however, a world beyond that of these primary social relations.
Entrepreneurs and their firms operate in markets. Immigrant entrepreneurs as actors
have to deal with the time- and place-specific logic of these markets.
These markets themselves are neither self-evident nor suspended in a vacuum, but
are created, shaped, and continually remolded by the wider politico-institutional and
socio-economic framework (Rath 2000a; Kloosterman and Rath 2001). Concrete (“real”)
markets are also embedded, albeit in a much more abstract sense than the relational
embeddedness of the individual entrepreneurs (Engelen 2001; Kloosterman and Rath
2001). Trajectories of incorporation through entrepreneurship are, we contend, linked
to the specific mixes of embeddedness on the relational and the market level. There-
fore, it will not suffice to only look at the relational embeddedness, or to put it differ-
ently, to only focus on the actors that make up the supply side of the entrepreneurial
market. We have to include the demand side or opportunity structure as well. Especial-
ly if one engages in comparative research, differences in opportunity structure have to
be brought to the fore.
In this contribution – which is an integral part of the Mixed Embeddedness project –
I focus on the opportunity structure in Amsterdam and how this local context affects
immigrant entrepreneurs. In other words, this chapter deals with the more abstract
part of mixed embeddedness: the opportunity structure and the openings in markets
in Amsterdam. My aim is to show what the landscape of opportunities the actors face in
the largest Dutch city looks like, how it is generated and how this affects their choices
on the aggregate level of Amsterdam. Here, an attempt is made to come to grips with
“macro-processes that are presumed to have an impact over and above the effects of any
individual-level variables that are operating” (Blalock, quoted in Thornton 1999: 36)
in a city.2 As such, this contribution is part of an ongoing, ambitious research project.
The very general question about the impact of the opportunity structure is made
more specific here by linking it to the rise of a post-industrial economy in Amsterdam,
an urban economy clearly dominated by producer and consumer services.3 The secular
downward trend of non-agricultural self-employment in the advanced economies
came to an end in 1970 (cf. Piore and Sabel 1984; Light and Rosenstein 1995). Changes
on the demand side (e.g. fragmenting consumer markets, emphasis on innovation),
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supply side (e.g. the rapid decreasing costs of computing power, trends of individual-
ization, and entrepreneurship as self-expression) and changes in the regulatory frame-
work (the ambitious program of deregulation) evidently favored small, flexible firms.
Therefore, the main question here is: to what extent has this general shift also con-
tributed to the rise in immigrant entrepreneurship in Amsterdam? Or are these immi-
grant entrepreneurs more dependent on opportunities created by other processes?
I start with a concise analytical framework of how opportunities may arise for im-
migrant entrepreneurs (Section 2). This is followed in Section 3 by a more general
quantitative overview of immigrant entrepreneurship in the Netherlands and more
specifically in Amsterdam since 1985. To put the case of Amsterdam into perspective, I
also present data on the three other relatively large Randstad cities, namely Rotter-
dam, The Hague, and Utrecht. In Section 4, I give a more detailed analysis of the trends
in four selected sectors – two representing the expanding post-industrial part of the ur-
ban economy, and two representing activities where immigrant entrepreneurs tradi-
tionally have set up shop. I conclude with some implications of the findings for the
near future of immigrant entrepreneurship in Amsterdam (Section 6).
How Opportunities Arise for Immigrant Entrepreneurs
To explore the question how openings for immigrant entrepreneurs come about from
an analytical point of view, I will make two assumptions regarding the supply side of
the immigrant entrepreneurs from less-developed countries. The first is that these
nascent entrepreneurs will have only limited access to financial resources (even more
limited than the indigenous population). They are, hence, dependent on openings in
markets that require relatively little seed money. Secondly, I expect that, generally
speaking, entrepreneurs from less-developed economies will also be lacking (or
deemed to be lacking) in educational qualifications. This latter assumption is becom-
ing less tenable with, firstly, the increases in the number of years of schooling of immi-
grants who were born outside the Netherlands and came with their parents at a young
age to this country (the “one-and-a-half generation”). Secondly, the last two decades of
the twentieth century saw a significant increase in the number of highly educated im-
migrants (asylum seekers) from such countries as Iran, Iraq and Afghanistan. The as-
sumption of, on average, a modest level of educational qualifications will be relaxed at
a later stage. However, generally speaking, it still applies and many immigrant entre-
preneurs cannot get access to opportunities for businesses that require substantial ed-
ucational qualifications (e.g. accountancy or consultancy). Given these assumptions, I
can theorize on how opportunities for immigrants who want to start a small firm may
arise.
The first way is through structural changes in the economy. These changes can be
captured under the general heading of the emergence of post-industrial societies
(Sassen 1991; Scott 1998; Esping-Andersen 1999). This trajectory of the creation of
openings is, of course, not limited to immigrant entrepreneurs but affects, in princi-
ple, all entrepreneurs and can be seen as the main force behind the end of the secular
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decline of self-employment in advanced economies (OECD 2000). The continuing rise
of the service sector – partly driven by processes of outsourcing by both firms and con-
sumers – has created more openings for small businesses. Furthermore, shifts in ad-
vanced modes of production have contributed significantly to increasing the number
of openings for small firms. These shifts in the direction of more flexible, network
ways of production to cope with increasingly volatile markets are interrelated with a
whole array of other changes.4 Technological changes (e.g. the rapid decline in the
costs of computing power), trends towards fragmentation of consumer markets and
neo-liberal changes to the regulatory framework (especially deregulation and privati-
zation regarding business start-ups) have also enhanced the opportunities for small
firms.
This increase in the number of such openings is also related to the increasing im-
portance of innovation. With intensifying competition, it is becoming very attractive
for firms to position themselves in the first phase of the product life cycle. Innovation
thus becomes crucial and small firms tend to be better at this. Combined, these inter-
related changes in advanced economies have helped to erode the importance of
economies of scale in specific economic activities. The demand sides of the entrepre-
neurial markets of these economic activities segments have, accordingly, become
more accessible to nascent entrepreneurs who can command only limited financial re-
sources (Kloosterman and Rath 2001). The opportunity structure in advanced
economies, in other words, became more open to the self-employed and their small
firms in the closing decades of the twentieth century in a very general sense.
The second way in which opportunities for immigrant entrepreneurs may arise is
not, analytically, directly linked to the post-industrial transition and the general re-
vival of self-employment, and affects more specifically immigrant entrepreneurs or
nascent immigrant entrepreneurs. One important, more specific way in which oppor-
tunities may arise for immigrant entrepreneurs is the emergence of “ethnic markets.”
Demand in these markets is for specific ethnic products that are in one way or another
linked to the region of origin (foodstuffs and perfumes, and also videotapes and audio
cassettes from that area). These markets mostly arise from the articulation of “ethnic
demand” as a consequence of the migration of sufficiently large numbers of specific
groups of immigrants. The formation of spatially concentrated settlement of (mainly
first-generation) immigrants in urban areas strongly contributes to the articulation of
this demand. Immigrant entrepreneurs are usually much better positioned to benefit
from these opportunities as they tend to have the required knowledge of products, sup-
pliers and consumers. They have, moreover, the credibility to cater to these niche mar-
kets of co-ethnics. The selling of roti (a kind of unleavened bread) to a discerning Suri-
namese clientele in Amsterdam simply requires a Surinamese entrepreneur, as other
people just cannot be trusted to make this delicate Surinamese staple food.
If these local ethnic markets dominated by a specific group (as entrepreneurs, em-
ployees and customers) become intertwined and cover more sectors (including parts of
supply chains and the supporting services), an ethnic economy may emerge (cf. Light
and Gould 2000). In this particular case, a wider set of opportunities for nascent entre-
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preneurs belonging to this specific group is created. They are, however, also con-
strained as in the case of any “ethnic market.” These markets are captive markets, but
captivity here is a double-edged sword. It attaches customers to the firms of their co-
ethnics and helps in the difficult first phase. However, at a later stage, these same en-
trepreneurs may run up against the limits of these very markets (Ram et al 2000).
The third way in which opportunities for immigrant entrepreneurs can emerge is
also more specifically related to immigrant entrepreneurs, albeit less directly than
through the trajectory of ethnic markets. I am referring to vacancy chain mechanisms
whereby indigenous entrepreneurs (or already more established immigrant groups)
exit from existing, neither very promising nor very profitable markets and are re-
placed by newcomers from abroad. This process is analogous to the invasion-and-suc-
cession models devised by the Chicago School to describe the changes in residential
neighborhoods around the central business district. The vacancy chain trajectory, in
contrast to both the post-industrial and the ethnic market trajectory, does not neces-
sarily imply an expanding market. It can even happen within contracting markets as
long as the number of those indigenous entrepreneurs who exit exceeds the decline of
the number of openings in this specific market.5
These different trajectories of creation of opportunities for immigrant entrepre-
neurs require different sets of resources and different strategies. They also imply
rather distinct trajectories of incorporation and chances of upward social mobility.
The first trajectory – the post-industrial one – relies more on heterogeneous social cap-
ital that enables the immigrant entrepreneur to link up with social networks of in-
digenous entrepreneurs (when starting a business in producer services) or with a
broad clientele (e.g. in personal services). Surviving in these markets depends on both
weak and strong ties with actors outside the entrepreneur’s own group. Strategies
have to be aimed at this heterogeneity in terms of product range, employees, market-
ing, etc. This in itself also presupposes a certain amount of human capital. The other
side of the coin is that these post-industrial markets are – by definition – structurally
expanding and – again by definition – linked to more customized products (both serv-
ices and goods). This implies that price competition can be relatively weak, because of
the expansion and because of the ease of niche formation. These markets are, hence,
very promising in terms of profits and chances to expand. Incorporation through en-
trepreneurship in these markets should, hence, be relatively attractive, but demand-
ing in the sense of being contingent on a strong embeddedness in indigenous social
networks.
Ethnic markets may also expand as a result of a continuous influx of these immi-
grants in combination with sticking to a distinct group identity that underpins these
markets. They are, however, in principle more bounded than openings that emerge un-
der the post-industrial trajectory. They also require a much more homogeneous social
capital and this will, in the long run, impact on their particular path of incorporation.
The entrepreneurs are, however, to some extent sheltered from competition, as other
groups cannot easily enter these specific markets or niches.
The third trajectory – that of vacancy chains – requires not so much human or fi-
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nancial as physical capital to be able to survive these highly price-competitive markets
where almost anyone can enter and niches are hard to carve out. To survive the cut-
throat competition that characterizes these low-threshold markets, they can apply so-
cial capital to deploy informal economic strategies, such as employing informal labor
or evading taxes (e.g. undocumented workers). As long as entrepreneurs stay in these
stagnating markets, their chances of upward mobility are very limited and they may
become part of a lumpen bourgeoisie.
However, the boundaries between the different trajectories, though analytically
clearly distinct, are certainly not watertight and not always easily distinguishable in
concrete cases. They are evidently permeable and strategies for breaking out to new
markets as described by Trevor Jones and colleagues (2000) and Ewald Engelen (2001)
involve just that: switching from one, apparently less-promising trajectory to another.
A Turkish baker in Amsterdam, for instance, may have bought his shop from a retiring
indigenous baker (vacancy chain). At first, he will probably sell to mainly Turkish cus-
tomers (ethnic niche). If, however, he is able to attract a wider clientele by broadening
his range of bread and pastries (while maintaining his “exotic” outlook), he is attuning
more to an expanding, typically post-industrial fragmented consumer market. Break-
ing-out in our view implies moving from one type of mixed embeddedness to another,
including not just entering other markets but also a related shift to different forms of
relational embeddedness.
The leading question here is to what extent each of these three trajectories of the
creation opportunities have affected immigrant entrepreneurs in Amsterdam. More
specifically, are they benefiting from the structural shift to a post-industrial society
and, if so, how? Below, only a very preliminary answer can be given, as this question it-
self involves a multilevel analysis and this contribution is focused on data gathered on
a national and one-digit sectoral level.
General Trends in Self-Employment in the Netherlands and in the Four
Largest Cities 
By the late nineteenth century, the minimum efficient scale of firms had already start-
ed to increase, especially in the United States. Economies of scale (and scope) benefited
ever-larger firms. This trend continued throughout much of the twentieth century
and the number (and the share) of small firms and, concomitantly, self-employment
declined in advanced economies. This secular downward trend in self-employment
was, however, punctuated by brief rises when the economy went into a recession and
workers could not find jobs and chose to set up their own firms. Self-employment, con-
sequently, served as a kind of last-resort option, only chosen if one could not get a
“proper” job. Self-employment and unemployment thus became positively related:
when unemployment went up, so did self-employment. From this economic perspec-
tive, immigrant entrepreneurs could be seen as a special case of this relationship, as
immigrants faced more or less permanent obstacles on the labor market because of
their relatively limited formal education, because they lacked links with indigenous
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social networks, and because they were the victims of outright discrimination. They
were, in this view, strongly pushed towards self-employment.
Self-employment is, evidently, not just a matter of a push in a narrow economic
sense (cf. Light and Rosenstein 1995). Specific immigrant groups – such as the Chinese
and the Jews – have a particularly strong proclivity towards entrepreneurship and are
highly likely to start a business anyway. If the composition of the immigrant popula-
tion – the supply side – stays the same and the economic context did not matter, immi-
grant entrepreneurship would stay at the same level. If the opportunity structure at a
specific place and time almost only presents openings for marginal, dead-end busi-
nesses, not many immigrants with a somewhat lower proclivity towards self-employ-
ment will be tempted unless the alternatives get even worse. If, however, better open-
ings arise because of changes in the opportunity structure, then other immigrants
will be encouraged to start a business as well. The proclivity towards entrepreneurship
can certainly not be used to explain the changes in the level of self-employment of that
particular group. The demand side of the entrepreneurial market should not be seen
as the sole explanation for immigrant entrepreneurship, although shifts in the oppor-
tunity structure may certainly account for changes in both its level and its sectoral dis-
tribution. As Froschauer (2001) has shown, Chinese immigrant entrepreneurs who
owned manufacturing businesses in Taiwan and moved to Canada intending to con-
tinue in this line of business, discovered that the actual opportunity structure in their
country of settlement did not offer much scope for manufacturing. They stuck to their
self-employment strategies but moved to the greener pastures of new lines of business.
In the last quarter of the twentieth century, the secular downward trend came to an
end when economies of scale lost some of their clout in particular activities and gave
way to economies of scope. Flexible, innovative small firms proved to be quite success-
ful in, for instance, high-value added small-batch production as in the case of designer
goods or such services as Internet publishing. In many advanced economies, the share
of non-agricultural self-employed workers stabilized and in some countries (e.g. the UK
and the Netherlands) it even rose. In the UK, it rose from 10.6 percent of the civilian
employment in 1985 to 12.4 in 1994, and in the Netherlands from 8.4 percent in 1985
to 9.4 in 1994 (OECD 2000: 45).
The emergence of post-industrial ways of production has affected the opportunity
structure with respect to two important dimensions, for indigenous and immigrant
entrepreneurs alike. First, it has increased small firms’ access to markets. Secondly, it
has increased the growth potential. The erosion of the importance of economies of
scale has opened up opportunities for an entire array of small businesses catering to
expanding volatile, fragmented markets. This structural change in the opportunity
structure implies that the general inverse – counter-cyclical – relationship between en-
trepreneurship and the economic cycle has come to an end. Instead of being a road one
would only take if one could not get a job, self-employment has, in principle, become
an attractive option in itself. On an aggregate level, we can nowadays observe a rise of
both employment and self-employment. Not only has self-employment in a post-indus-
trial era become more accessible, but – thanks to its increasing growth potential – it al-
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so offers the promise of higher rewards than being employed, and setting up one’s own
business has become more attractive (cf. Piore and Sabel 1984; Scott 1998; Odake and
Sawai 1999). In other words, the importance of the push towards self-employment be-
cause of unemployment has on an aggregate level significantly declined. Nowadays,
the pull of self-employment has, generally speaking, become more important as nas-
cent entrepreneurs can easily get a job and they will only opt for self-employment if
this offers a promise of at least reasonable (and growing) profits.
Below, I will explore the relationship between self-employment, unemployment,
and employment on a national level also, more specifically, for each of the four indi-
vidual cities of the Mixed Embeddedness project. Before going into this investigation, I
have to make some caveats with respect to the data. In the real world, data are never
perfect, and the case presented below is certainly no exception to this. We have to con-
fine ourselves to a breakdown on a one-digit level. In addition, we still lack data that
combine specific immigrant groups and sectoral distribution. Furthermore, we do not
have these quantitative data on second-generation immigrants as these are data pro-
vided by the chambers of commerce and they only register the country of birth.6 This
also implies that the fit between the data on entrepreneurs with those on the relevant
labor force in the cities concerned is not completely correct. The latter include second-
generation immigrants and, consequently, the share of immigrant entrepreneurs of
the relevant labor force (e.g. Moroccans) is an underestimation, as second-generation
entrepreneurs are not included. Moreover, consistent time series are in many cases not
feasible as the data are incomplete or the way specific data are collected has changed.
Still, the data presented below offer useful information on the trends and patterns of
immigrant entrepreneurship in the four largest cities.
Table 1 presents data on both unemployment – the indicator of the economic push
– and on self-employment, broken down for the four largest groups of immigrants
from less-developed countries.7 The “Dutch miracle” really did deliver in the 1990s.
Without a serious dismantling of the Dutch welfare state, the Netherlands entered a
phase of high rates of economic growth combined with strong job growth. This job
growth even brought down the unemployment rates among the immigrant popula-
tion. In a corporatist welfare state, as Esping-Andersen (1999) has argued, the crucial
social divide is between those in the formal labor market and those outside it. Among
these outsiders, immigrants from less-developed countries are clearly prominent.
Their rates of unemployment in the second half of the 1980s were staggering (see Table
1). In 1997, the rates of unemployment among the four largest immigrant groups from
less-developed countries were still considerably higher than those among the indig-
enous population, but – apart from the Antilleans – they had halved in about a decade.
Although they were still way above that of the indigenous population, the decline was
very significant. The Dutch miracle certainly affected the outsider population.
At the same time, the share of entrepreneurship rose among the indigenous and
among the four largest groups of immigrants from less-developed countries. This rise
in self-employment across the board coincided, therefore, with the substantial fall in
unemployment. In other words, at a time when the main economic push to opt for self-
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employment clearly subsided, many immigrants (and indigenous persons) started a
business.
Table 1. Self-employment and unemployment by population group in the Netherlands,1986/7,1992,
and 1997 as a percentage of the relevant labor force *
———————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————
1986/7 1992 1997
Moroccans Unemployed 42 31 21
Self-employed 03.3 05 05.9
Turks Unemployed 44 33 22
Self-employed 04.4 07.8 12.2
Surinamese Unemployed 27 15 14
Self-employed 02 04.5 05.4
Antilleans Unemployed 23 20 21
Self-employed 02.9 04.6 06.3
Indigenous Unemployed 13 04 05
Self-employed ** 08 8.9 10.1
———————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————
*  The data on the self-employment of migrants are based on country of birth and, therefore, ex-
clude those with immigrant parent(s) who were born here but who are nonetheless part of the
minority groups as defined in official social policies. 
* *  These data on self-employment do not distinguish between immigrants and the indigenous
population. As the impact of including immigrant self-employed on the total self-employment is,
although rising, still quite small, I have opted for the total figure. 
Source: Unemployment figures 1987: WRR (1989), Allochtonenbeleid. Den Haag: SDU: 105; unem-
ployment 1992: CBS (1996), Allochtonen in Nederland 1996. Voorburg: CBS: 95; unemployment 1992:
CBS (2000), Allochtonen in Nederland 2000. Voorburg: CBS: 81; self-employment 1986, 1992 and 1997:
H. van den Tillaart en E. Poutsma (1998), Een factor van betekenis. Zelfstandig ondernemerschap van al-
lochtonen in Nederland. Nijmegen Instituut voor Toegepaste Sociale Wetenschappen: 40. 
The data presented above refer to the national level. We also have data on Amsterdam
and the three other large cities. Figure 1 shows the trends in the self-employment of
immigrants in Amsterdam, Rotterdam, The Hague, and Utrecht. These numbers refer
to all immigrants from less-developed countries, that is, not just Turks, Moroccans,
Surinamese, and Antilleans, but also for instance Chinese, Africans, Eastern Euro-
peans, and Latin Americans. They also include self-employed from Italy, Greece, Spain,
Portugal, and the former Yugoslavia. This inclusion is a legacy from the times when
these people from the western part of the Mediterranean came to the Netherlands as
guest workers. Each of the four cities shows a near doubling of the absolute number of
immigrant entrepreneurs between 1989 and 1997, the years when unemployment
among immigrants sharply decreased. Amsterdam clearly stands out with a compara-
tively high number of self-employed immigrants. In 1997, the number of self-employed
immigrants in Amsterdam was almost twice as high as in Rotterdam, whereas the total
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labor force of immigrants from less-developed countries was only about 50 percent
larger (CBS 2001).8
Figure 1.  Source: H. van den Tillaart en E. Poutsma (1998) Een factor van betekenis. Zelfstandig on-
dernemerschap van allochtonen in Nederland. Nijmegen Instituut voor Toegepaste Sociale Weten-
schappen: 186.
We still lack the data for longer time series that show the trends in self-employment
and labor force by city by group. In Table 2, however, we have calculated a first, brief
overview of the trends in self-employment, unemployment and net participation rates
for immigrants from less-developed countries. We also do not at this time possess data
on each of the four specific groups. Table 2 shows that the trends at the individual city
level suggest a more refined view of the relationship between self-employment and the
urban labor market for immigrants. Self-employment clearly rose in these years. Am-
sterdam, again, clearly leads in terms of the share of self-employed compared to the
other three cities, and almost one in ten of the total immigrant population of Amster-
dam is self-employed.
The trends in unemployment are somewhat ambiguous as they peaked in 1994,
right after the brief recession of 1993. The decline in unemployment after that, howev-
er, was quite strong, but nonetheless there was no continuous decline in unemploy-
ment in this short period. The rate of net labor participation for immigrants from less-
developed countries increased in this period (except for Rotterdam and Utrecht
between 1992 and 1994). The fact that the rise in self-employment between 1992 and
1994, when unemployment rose, was stronger than in the following two years, seems
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to indicate that the push factor of unemployment even reared its head in the 1990s.
This may apply more to some groups than to others. Data on unemployment among
the Surinamese in Amsterdam show a strong decline throughout the 1990s, while at
the same time the number of self-employed strongly increased (cf. Kloosterman
2000b). For Turks and Moroccans, who face much higher barriers on the Dutch labor
market, the push factor may still be important in driving them towards self-employ-
ment. These differences should eventually show up in diverging forms of mixed em-
beddedness.
Notwithstanding these important caveats, the long-term national trends clearly
indicate the diminishing overall importance of the lack of employment opportunities.
The general trends in the unemployment rates and in the net participation rates
Table 2. Self-employment,unemployment,and the net participation rate for immigrants from 
less-developed countries in Amsterdam,Rotterdam,The Hague and Utrecht,1992,1994 




Share of self-employed 07.7 08.8 09.3
Rate of unemployment 28.9 30.4 27.5
Net rate of labor participation 41 43 45
Rotterdam
Share of self-employed 06.6 07.9 08.3
Rate of unemployment 35.7 39.6 32.2
Net rate of labor participation 35 34 38
The Hague 
Share of self-employed 06.1 06.5 07.1
Rate of unemployment 20.5 22.4 20.4
Net rate of labor participation 41 45 46
Utrecht 
Share of self-employed 05.9 07.2 07.3
Rate of unemployment 25.4 30.5 19.3
Net rate of labor participation 41 39 45
———————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————
* The data on self-employment refer to the years as indicated, the data on unemployment and the
net participation rates refer to 1991/1993, 1993/1995, and 1995/1997.
Source: Unemployment and net labor participation figures, CBS, Statline; self-employment: H.
van den Tillaart and E. Poutsma (1998), Een factor van betekenis. Zelfstandig ondernemerschap van al-
lochtonen in Nederland. Nijmegen Instituut voor Toegepaste Sociale Wetenschappen, 188-191.
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obviously fall short of accounting for the observed continued rises in self-employment
on both a national and a city level. In addition, each of the four largest groups of immi-
grants from less-developed countries showed marked increases in the number of the
self-employed and they are responsible for the largest part of the general rise in self-em-
ployment among immigrants.9 The increase, hence, cannot be traced back to the ar-
rival on the scene of groups who showed a strong proclivity towards self-employment.
These observations shift the focus from push factors to pull factors. In the next section,
we will have a closer look at the shifts on the demand side of the entrepreneurial mar-
ket.
A Closer Look at Four Sectors
If immigrant entrepreneurs are not so much pushed as pulled towards self-employ-
ment, we would expect them to set up shop in markets that are characterized not only
by low thresholds but also by a strong growth potential. In addition, we can expect that
these immigrant entrepreneurs are less inclined to start businesses in stagnating mar-
kets where vacancy chain openings occur, given the fact that setting up shop there re-
quires long hours of hard labor with the prospect of only meager profits, if any. Our da-
ta – as yet – do not allow a breakdown below the one-digit level, nor do they provide
information on the sectoral distribution of the specific groups. So, what I can offer
here is no more than a first indication of the extent to which the sectoral distribution
has indeed shifted towards sectors with an obvious growth potential. This preliminary
analysis will at a later stage be augmented with in-depth research on relevant trends in
markets at a much finer level of aggregation. These market templates will bridge the
gap between this more general overview and the actor-centered research of the Mixed
Embeddedness project (cf. Van der Leun and Rusinovic 2001).
At this one-digit level of aggregation, two sectors stand out for their strong expan-
sion in the Netherlands. These sectors are clearly linked to the more structural
changes that constitute defining components of the emerging post-industrial profile
in advanced economies: producer services and personal services. They are, moreover,
very prominent in Amsterdam’s economy (Van de Vegt et al 2001). The two more tradi-
tional sectors that we will take a look at are retailing, and restaurants and catering.
The first expanding sector is that of producer services. Outsourcing by firms is grow-
ing for various reasons. The process of production itself has become more complex and
firms are increasingly relying on producer services in uncertain and highly competi-
tive environments. These producer services can be found at the higher end of the mar-
ket (in terms of added value) – e.g. consultancy and marketing – as well as at the lower
end, for instance, catering and cleaning. Economies of scale are important but oppor-
tunities for small firms may arise at both ends of the distribution in young, innovative
markets and in specific niche markets. Employment in this sector rose rapidly in ad-
vanced economies in the last two decades of the twentieth century, and here the
Netherlands is certainly no exception.
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Figure 2 shows the trends in absolute numbers of the self-employed from less-devel-
oped economies. In each of the four cities a strong, steady rise has occured. Again Am-
sterdam clearly leads the pack in absolute numbers. Immigrants have obviously seized
the opportunities this particular urban economy offered them when this sector was
expanding at a rapid pace in the 1990s. Here we should expect either the post-industri-
al trajectory or, in the case of an emerging ethnic economy, specific ethnic niches
where firms cater to the needs of other firms of co-ethnics. This latter trajectory is less
likely than the former, as full-blown ethnic economies are hard to find in the Nether-
lands (although the Turks may constitute an exception). However, we should be aware
that the rise of immigrant entrepreneurship may also generate a demand for specific
producer services from co-ethnics.
Figure 3 shows the trends in another quintessential post-industrial sector, namely that
of personal services. Not only firms but also households have increasingly opted for
outsourcing. Two-earner households – which are now the rule rather than the excep-
tion in the Netherlands – have relatively little time and, given their financial re-
sources, tend to commodify their social reproduction. In other words, they “buy” time
by hiring cleaners, dog walkers, gardeners, and handy-persons. This sector is booming
and, again, immigrants from less-developed countries are clearly benefiting from the
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Wetenschappen: 186.
Absolute numbers of immigrants self-employed in producer services in Amsterdam, Rotterdam,
The Hague and Utrecht, 1989-1997
Adam.HumanCapital  06-03-2003  16:50  Pagina 323
opportunities offered there. The growth potential of markets in this sector attracts
them and the generally low thresholds of these markets make it possible for nascent
entrepreneurs to start a business. Amsterdam  particularly shows a strong growth in
personal services. The explanation for this probably lies in the relatively high share of
two-earner households in Amsterdam.
Immigrants are, hence, clearly becoming prominent in expanding sectors that can
be linked to the emerging new urban economy in Amsterdam. However, immigrant
businesses are traditionally found in such sectors as retailing, wholesaling, and restau-
rants and catering. The first of these sectors – retailing – has not undergone as strong
an strong expansion as the two post-industrial services. Figure 4 shows the trends for
self-employed immigrants, in retailing. In this sector, overall employment has stagnat-
ed in each of the four cities. This is where we would expect vacancy chain openings to
occur at the lower end of the markets. In times of strong push, these openings will be
tempting to those who cannot find proper employment. If jobs become much easier to
get, then these kinds of markets will not exert much pull. Figure 4 seems to confirm
these general expectations. The development of the number of immigrant self-em-
ployed in retailing in Amsterdam is a case in point: it rises until 1994, when unemploy-
ment really starts to go down among immigrants, and then falls. The other cities do
not show such a clear pattern, although we do find a gradual deceleration of the
growth in numbers of immigrant self-employed in retailing.
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Figure 3.  Source: H. van den Tillaart en E. Poutsma (1998) Een factor van betekenis. Zelfstandig on-
dernemerschap van allochtonen in Nederland. Nijmegen Instituut voor Toegepaste Sociale Weten-
schappen: 186.
Absolute numbers of self-employed immigrants from less-developed  countries in personal services in
Amsterdam, Rotterdam, The Hague and Utrecht, 1989-1997
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Restaurants and catering is another sector often known for its high share of immigrant
entrepreneurs. In this sense, restaurants and catering comprise – just like retailing – a
kind of  “gateway sector” where immigrants can easily set up shop, partly by catering to
co-ethnic customers. In this case, we are notably hampered by the limits of the one-dig-
it breakdown. Part of this sector is very post-industrial in the sense that it serves the in-
creasing demand of both firms and private households – in some cases at the very high
end of the market. Part of this sector, however, is at the opposite end and consists of ei-
ther vacancy chain businesses (e.g. snack bars and pizzerias) or confined ethnic niches
(e.g. Turkish coffee houses). Data at this level do not allow us to distinguish between
these two rather different kinds of markets. It is, however, safe to assume that most of
the businesses of immigrant entrepreneurs from less-developed countries do not fall
under the heading of the most luxurious businesses. Figure 5 shows the developments
in this sector in the four largest cities.
Although the restaurant sector as a whole has been expanding, certain segments
have been shrinking. This applies especially at the lower end where immigrants are
prominent. The trends here indicate saturated markets. The growth – which was not
very spectacular in the first place – has been stagnant in the four cities since 1994 when
the pace of economic growth (especially in Amsterdam) strongly accelerated. It resem-
bles, hence, the other traditional immigrant sector retailing in this respect. Just like re-
tailing, openings in this sector seem to have been generated by vacancy chain processes.
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Figure 4.  Source: H. van den Tillaart en E. Poutsma (1998) Een factor van betekenis. Zelfstandig on-
dernemerschap van allochtonen in Nederland. Nijmegen Instituut voor Toegepaste Sociale Weten-
schappen: 186.
Absolute numbers of self-employed immigrants from less-developed  countries in retailing in 
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This more general quantitative investigation of the complex terrain of immigrant en-
trepreneurship has brought some salient patterns to the fore with significant differ-
ences between sectors and, moreover, also between cities. I will now turn to the wider
implications of these findings.
Conclusion
Advanced urban economies around the world are becoming more global in the sense
of an intensification of economic and financial links, in the sense of the range of prod-
ucts hailing from almost anywhere, and also in their demographic make-up. This as-
pect of globalization concerns immigrants from other developed economies as well as
newcomers from Third World countries looking for a better life. Amsterdam is no ex-
ception to this rule – as a tram ride or a walk down one of its shopping streets will
demonstrate. Notwithstanding this obvious change with respect to only two decades
ago, immigration is anything but a new phenomenon, especially in Amsterdam.
As in earlier centuries, many immigrants in Amsterdam try to take control of their
own destiny by becoming entrepreneurs. In the 1980s, when unemployment rose rap-
idly among erstwhile guest workers and immigrants from former Dutch colonies, an
increasing number of immigrants set up shop. The prolonged recession and its after-
math hit newcomers comparatively hard. The urban economy of Amsterdam, more-
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Figure 5.  Source: H. van den Tillaart en E. Poutsma (1998) Een factor van betekenis. Zelfstandig on-
dernemerschap van allochtonen in Nederland. Nijmegen Instituut voor Toegepaste Sociale Weten-
schappen: 186.
Absolute numbers of self-employed immigrants from less-developed  countries in restaurants and
catering in Amsterdam, Rotterdam, The Hague and Utrecht, 1989-1997
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over, was doing particularly badly (Kloosterman 1994). Immigrants were to a large ex-
tent pushed towards self-employment as they lacked access to jobs. The emphasis of the
explanation fell on the supply side of the entrepreneurial market.
The “Dutch miracle” with its combination of strong economic and employment
growth and the preservation of the welfare state changed this picture rather drastical-
ly. Amsterdam, with its historic orientation towards services, especially benefited
from this resurgence, and its economy grew faster than the national average. At long
last, the number of unemployed immigrants began to decrease. This diminished the
push towards self-employment. Rates of self-employment among immigrants from
less-developed countries, however, continually rose in the 1990s. This notable rise has
to be explained by taking into account the shifts in the opportunity structure or de-
mand side of the entrepreneurial market in Amsterdam and, to a lesser extent, also in
Rotterdam, The Hague, and Utrecht.
The recent growth of immigrant entrepreneurship in Amsterdam and the three
other large cities is strongly concentrated in the post-industrial sectors of producer
and personal services. The traditional mainstays of immigrant entrepreneurship –
restaurants and retailing, where both vacancy chain openings and ethnic niches are
the predominant drivers – are lagging behind. Since 1994, growth in these sectors has
stagnated or even reversed at a time when the Dutch economy (including the four
cities) was growing at a very rapid pace and labor shortages started to creep up every-
where. In other words, when the economic push of unemployment dwindled, these
traditional sectors seemed to lose much of their attractiveness and nascent immi-
grants entrepreneurs were lured by the growth potential of the expanding services.
These kinds of post-industrial markets, however, differ not just in their growth poten-
tial but also, I hypothesize, in their requirements with respect to their relational em-
beddedness – i.e. the kind of necessary social capital (more heterogeneous) and the
strategies vis-à-vis suppliers and customers. This still has to be investigated at a much
lower level than this quantitative overview.
The observed shift in the sectoral composition of immigrant entrepreneurs sug-
gests that they are becoming more integrated into the urban economies and also that
they are increasingly making a significant contribution with respect to employment
and economic growth in Amsterdam and other Dutch cities. With, on the one hand,
new groups of immigrants coming in, and, on the other, the continuing creation of
openings for small-scale businesses in post-industrial Amsterdam it is perhaps only
fair to begin to sing some praise for these unsung heroes.
NOTES
1. This article is based on research undertaken in the framework of the research proj-
ect Mixed Embeddedness. This multidisciplinary project is a collaboration between
the University of Amsterdam (Department of Geography and Planning and the
IMES) and the Erasmus University Rotterdam (Department of Sociology). I should
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like to express my thanks to Tom Elfring, Ewald Engelen, Joanne van der Leun, Jan
Rath and Katja Rusinovic, all of whom are members of the Mixed Embeddedness re-
search team. I especially owe thanks to Harry Kloosterman and Michiel Wolf for
their help in gathering the data. 
This research project is partly funded by the Dutch Foundation for Scientific Re-
search (NWO).
2. Another study, which is also part of the Mixed Embeddedness project, explores how
these choices are made on the level of the individual actors themselves. In this
study, Joanne van der Leun and Katja Rusinovic examined immigrant entrepre-
neurs in the producer services or B2B sector in Rotterdam and Utrecht focusing on
the actors themselves in a specific sector based on extensive interviews.
3. In 2001, only 18 percent of the jobs were found in “goods-handling” sectors (con-
struction, manufacturing, wholesale, and transport) and no less than 52 percent
were found in producer and consumer services (Van de Vegt et al 2001, 69). 
4. Cf. Manuel Castells (1996: 221): “… as networking and flexibility become character-
istic of the new industrial organization, and as new technologies make it possible
for small businesses to find market niches, we are witnessing a resurgence of self-
employment and mixed employment status.”
5. See also Kloosterman 1996; Kloosterman and Van der Leun 1999 (forthcoming) and
Kloosterman and Rath, 2001 for disentangling these trajectories.
6. The data on immigrant entrepreneurs were compiled by H. van den Tillaart, and E.
Poutsma (1998) in their report to the Ministry of Economic Affairs and the Ministry
of Interior Affairs, Een factor van betekenis; Zelfstandig ondernemerschap van allochtonen in
Nederland. The calculations presented here were undertaken on the basis of the data
published in their report.
7. Because of a lack of data, more complete time series are not feasible. 
8. These inter-urban differences will be investigated at a later stage in the Mixed Em-
beddedness project.
9. With one exception: the number of Turkish entrepreneurs in Amsterdam declined
between 1992 and 1996 as a result of stricter controls on garment industry sweat-
shops. See Raes 2000 and Raes et al 2001. 
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4.3 • Identity and Legitimacy in the
Amsterdam Region
Gertjan Dijkink and  Virginie Mamadouh
Introduction
In the 1990s, certain critical voices on the relation between citizen and government
started to sound alarmed. Taking low turnouts for the elections as their main starting
point, they insisted on either “reinventing” government, decentralizing government,
revitalizing political parties, changing the subject or system of elections, or simply
“educating” the citizen. Although the problem concerns all administrative levels and
divisions, the alarm is particularly prompted by the condition of the big cities, which
indeed show lower levels of electoral participation than smaller cities or rural areas.
One of the arguments was that some cities are too large for the provision of proper serv-
ice standards and for the effective identification of the citizenry. This argument ig-
nores the great social and ethnic variety in urban society and the special conditions
leading to social exclusion. With respect to identification, Amsterdam nevertheless
has put on some singular displays of attachment. In a referendum held in 1995 on a
new metropolitan administrative structure, Amsterdam’s citizens voted vehemently
against the idea of “their” city being broken up into a number of boroughs. Despite of-
ficial reassurance, the proposed structure was perceived as an unacceptable loss of
identity.
In this paper we will address the question of how important the city (the municipal-
ity) or any alternative territory is for the identity of local citizens and the legitimacy of
diverse public authorities. One of the obvious instruments is assessment of turnouts at
the elections for different administrative levels in the course of time. Elections, howev-
er, are not the only events that get people involved in public decision making in an
area. Belief in the relevance of political parties for future decision making is dwin-
dling, whereas interest in or anxiety about urban change remains undiminished or is
even increasing. Action groups, schools, sports clubs, housing corporations, and
neighborhood centers urge the citizen to participate, and the significance of the ur-
ban territory for various forms of recreation (boating, angling, fun shopping, allot-
ments) integrate the citizen in varying ways with his/her environment. The ownership
of cars has increased the range of action, but daunting traffic jams in the region (out-
side the city proper) also stimulate the interest in local resources. New meanings of the
urban environment and possibilities for participation are constantly emerging.
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What we emphasized above is primarily an action perspective on identification. It
assumes that physical experiences and social contacts in a bounded area produce iden-
tification with that area. However, this approach overlooks two other important as-
pects: the symbolic and the institutional setting. Symbolic questions concern how eas-
ily we meet the city in language and images. Is Amsterdam a name that is threatened by
a host of competitive linguistic distinctions appealing to the people? Are the images
transmitted by the media meaningfully related to a recognizable spatial entity called
Amsterdam? Are its citizens proud to use the name in presenting themselves to the
world outside? Symbolic environments narrowly fit institutional environments. The
Finnish geographer Anssi Paasi has stated that “territory-building” is essentially a
matter of “institutionalization of regions.” Power-holding actors representing the ter-
ritory (or similar units outside the territory) define and symbolize the spatial and so-
cial limits of membership, and create discourses and practices for inclusion and exclu-
sion (Paasi 1997: 42-43). The presence of a discourse on the city and the coverage of a
certain area in pictures will be substantially aided by the existence of a local TV station
and press. But institutions also have a distinctive influence of their own in that they
represent a certain authority or something that (in spite of the fashionable habit to de-
note them as “services”) produces obligations for the citizen. One needs a local author-
ity to get married; one cannot live without the provision of such utilities as gas, water,
and electricity; one has to pay local taxes, etc. Many of these institutions regularly
write letters to citizens and in doing so they articulate a certain territorial authority
and construct their identity.
Activity spaces, symbolic environments and institutions constitute a territorial
unit and give it an emotional and political significance. Their change or lack of mutu-
al reinforcement may create a legitimacy problem for local government (Meyer and
Scott 1985) but their confluence does not necessarily warrant political legitimacy. On
the other hand, we should not relapse into the historical fallacy of assuming that all
current change implies disengagement from a previously sacred unity. In former cen-
turies, the activity space of the wealthy Amsterdam merchants already encompassed
the regional (second homes) and global scales (trade). They left the legacy of a cosmo-
politan symbolic ambience, which, together with local patriotism, survived their de-
cay. At the same time local communities challenged higher authorities particularly in
the seventeenth-century working-class area, the Jordaan. This area – which is famous
for its former passionate, almost Italian public life – experienced violent riots in 1886
and 1934. The neighborhood is now populated (gentrified) by many exponents of the
young generation that in the 1960s rallied to the call of anarchist resistance against
the state. Although it would be far-fetched to postulate a mechanism reproducing re-
bellion in Amsterdam through the ages, the absence of national government offices
and consequently the absence of a large group of civil “servants” may have caused
some overrepresentation in this city of those mildly skeptical about “the state.” The
presence of many students and teachers at centers for higher education is of course an-
other factor. Perhaps this all helped to stir up resistance in 1995 against “them” play-
ing a trick on “us” by abolishing “our” city.
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Of course it is impossible to put all of citizens’ opinions in one box. Big cities are so-
cially heterogeneous and it is quite probable that feelings of legitimacy and identifica-
tion with a wider territory vary among neighborhoods or ethnic groups. In this chap-
ter, however, we will not dwell extensively on differences between neighborhoods, but
look at the conditions and institutions that are supposed to express and reinforce the
citizen’s involvement with the city. First, we will discuss turnouts at elections in Am-
sterdam for different government levels during the past decades. Do they reveal any
special local problems with political legitimacy or deficiencies in involvement? We
will then see what kind of new representative mechanisms have been introduced in
Amsterdam (new administrative units and opinion polling instruments). Did they
solve any of the problems found in answering the previous question? Thirdly, we will
explore other aspects of civil society that maintain the political health of communities
without them necessarily converging with the formal political organization of society.
There is a leitmotiv in this account: the question of a new regional level of govern-
ment. Tampering with the structure of government, as advocates of metropolitan gov-
ernment do, may be quite defensible from the point of view of new functional econom-
ic relations in society, but does not necessarily reflect social experiences and needs for
identification. Space as defined by the institutions, activities and symbols that pen-
etrate the lifeworld of the citizen may be quite at variance with the more functional
conception of space as used by planners, politicians and bureaucrats. This is what the
rejection of the administrative reform of Amsterdam by its citizens revealed in such an
embarrassing way.
The Legitimacy Crisis of Representative Democracy
Since the abolition of compulsory voting in 1970, electoral participation has been on
the decrease in the Netherlands. This applies especially to urban voters, like those in
Amsterdam. Figures 1a and 1b present the turnout for the four main types of elections,
measured as valid votes as a percentage of the registered electors.1 The erosion of inter-
est in the political system is observable for all directly elected bodies.
The immediate decrease in participation after the abolition of compulsory voting
was followed by a stable period during the 1970s, but since 1989, turnout has dropped
continuously (see Figure 1a). Participation depends on the type of elections: it is the
highest for national elections (73-88 percent), and the lowest for European elections
(30-58 percent). However, the ranking of the provincial and the municipal elections
changes over time. Provincial elections had a higher turnout than local ones up to
1982, but since the mid-1980s municipal elections have had a higher turnout. Another
difference between types of elections is that the decrease of participation in the Euro-
pean and the provincial elections has been continuous since the end of the 1970s,
whereas participation in national and municipal elections fluctuates, with 1986 and
1994, respectively, scoring better than the preceding election. Finally the differences
in turnout between the different types of elections are increasing over time, even if Eu-
ropean elections and their dramatically low participation (less than 30 percent in
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1999) are disregarded. The time graph of electoral participation in Amsterdam (Figure
1b) is very similar, with the noticeable distinction that the turnout is lower in Amster-
dam than the national average and that the decrease is sharper, especially for the
provincial elections.
Figure 1a. Turnout for elections on four levels of governance in the Netherlands
Figure 1b. Turnout for elections on four levels of governance in Amsterdam
Another indicator of the erosion of representative democracy is the diminishing in-
volvement of citizens in political parties. Only a very limited number of Dutch citizens
(less than 2 percent of the population) hold a party membership. Party membership in-
creased in the 1950s (from 635,000 in 1950 to 731,000 in 1960), halved during the 1960s
(to 393,000 in 1970), and has gone up and down ever since (430,000 in 1980, 343,000 in
1990, and 294,000 now) (NRC Handelsblad 27 January 2000, Themabijlage Politieke Partijen).
Politicians and political scientists alike have perceived the decrease of political partic-
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ipation as an indicator of the political system’s loss of legitimacy. The waning interest
in electoral politics is, however, better explained as an ideological turn away from the
grand ideologies of the beginning of the twentieth century and their ambitious pro-
gram to control and design society. It coexists with a rise in grassroots mobilizations in
new social movements, suggesting that citizens have not lost interest in politics but
that the heyday of mass party politics is over.
Whether or not decreasing turnout is justly perceived as an expression of a lack of le-
gitimacy and representativeness of the existing political institutions, it has led to in-
stitutional reforms aimed at restoring higher levels of political participation. In Am-
sterdam, several administrative and political reforms have been proposed and partly
carried out for that purpose. We want to discuss three types of “innovation.” First, ad-
ministrative reforms creating new political entities above and below the municipal
level (e.g. devolution and metropolitan government); secondly, referenda; and thirdly,
new procedures to enhance the participation of citizens in the decision-making
process. We will then turn to other channels of participation and identification.
Institutional Answers: New Political and Administrative Entities 
Sub-Municipal Government
Devolution was carried out throughout the 1980s. The municipality was divided into
boroughs (stadsdelen, literally “city portions”) initially with two large, clearly identifi-
able areas, Noord and Osdorp, in 1981. In 1990, 18 districts were established (see Figure
2). Sixteen of these were boroughs. The other two are governed directly by the city
council: the inner city (Binnenstad) and the hardly populated harbor area (first known
as het havengebied, now Westpoort). In April 2002, the inner city will become an au-
tonomous borough with its own elected body.
Figure 2. Devolution in Amsterdam, 1990
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The devolution was both political and administrative: departments were decentral-
ized and each borough is now governed by a directly elected borough council (stadsdeel-
raad). As such, the Amsterdam choice differs from the situation in the other large cities
in the Netherlands: in Rotterdam there are borough councils but the administrative
agencies remain centralized, and in The Hague administrative decentralization has
been introduced without political devolution.
Boroughs are not equally identifiable as meaningful entities. Some of them clearly
correspond to portions of the city with their own identity: Amsterdam-Noord encom-
passes the part of the city north of the IJ river, and Zuidoost the enclave in the south-
east of the municipality separated from the rest of its territory by the municipalities of
Ouder-Amstel and Diemen. This exclave was annexed in the 1960s and consists almost
entirely of recent land developments. Other entities are clearly identified in the urban
structure, such as the Binnenstad, or planned neighborhoods, such as Osdorp (the
post-war extension to the west) and Buitenveldert (ditto to the south). Yet most of the
other boroughs are much less clearly defined in terms of either their identity or their
territory.
The naming of the city boroughs generally followed the existing usage by the popu-
lation and urban services (such as the research and statistics department). Sometimes
a borough did not get a proper name but was just labeled by the combination of two
neighborhoods, for example Indische Buurt/Havengebied, which has since been re-
named Zeeburg, a new denomination also created to underline the redevelopment of
the former harbor into a residential area. Following the mergers of 1998, each consist-
ing of the merger of two boroughs, three new boroughs emerged. One combined the
names of the disappearing boroughs (Oost/Watergraafsmeer) while the other two
chose a new name. For the merger of Zuid and De Pijp, the name Amsterdam Oud Zuid
was chosen, while the merged Buitenveldert and Rivierenbuurt boroughs was called
Zuideramstel, a new name with connotations of the former municipality annexed by
Amsterdam in 1921, Nieuwer Amstel (compare also with the existing neighboring mu-
nicipality Ouder-Amstel).
It is difficult to assess the importance of boroughs as political entities for the identi-
ty of Amsterdammers. Boroughs have different ways of promoting their identity. Apart
from names, logos are very important. Most boroughs distribute a newsletter and have
their own website.2 Each of these websites has its own style, and some also put a strong
emphasis on the borough as entity. Typically their URL is <www.boroughxxx.amster-
dam.nl>, but two have their own domain name: <www.zeeburg.nl> and <www.oost-wa-
tergraafsmeer.nl>.
Another way of assessing the importance of boroughs is to look at the participation
in borough elections. Do electors turn out to elect borough councilors? Borough elec-
tions were held in 1990 in most boroughs on the same day as the municipal elections,
except for three boroughs (Watergraafsmeer, Buitenveldert, and Zuidoost) where they
were held in 1991 together with the provincial elections. Subsequent elections were
held together with the municipal elections in 1994 and in 1998.
Differences in turnout for borough elections cannot easily be interpreted as differ-
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ences in legitimacy, because other factors influence electoral participation on this lev-
el. Nevertheless, the relative turnout, when compared to that at municipal elections
on the same day, can give us some indication of the importance of the borough to its
inhabitants, as compared to the municipality. The turnout for borough elections was
higher than 90 percent of the turnout for municipal elections in each borough, except
for the three borough elections held separately from the municipal elections.3 In 1998
this percentage was the highest: 98 percent in Westerpark and Oud-West, 99 percent in
most other boroughs, 100 percent in Zeeburg, and even slightly higher for the borough
elections than for the municipal elections in Bos en Lommer and Amsterdam-Noord.
The evolution of electoral participation in borough elections suggests that this new
form of local government is firmly institutionalized. However, the future of certain
boroughs, especially the smaller ones in the western part of the city (Westerpark, Oud-
West, De Baarsjes and Bos en Lommer) is still uncertain, and further mergers are antici-
pated. Also, the establishment of a borough for the inner city was for a long time a
much-debated topic. At the beginning of 2000, the municipality started an institution-
alized public debate.4 Proponents argued for the autonomy of the district by pointing
to the need for providing the inhabitants of the inner city with an equal opportunity to
participate politically, while opponents referred to the specific functions and mean-
ing of the inner city for the whole city to justify the direct control of the municipal
council. The municipal council finally decided to establish a borough, a decision un-
successfully challenged in a referendum in April 2001 and finally implemented in
April 2002.
Regional Government
Another important reform of the political and administrative make-up of the Amster-
dam region was the attempt in the mid-1990s to establish a metropolitan government.
Although it failed (or perhaps because it failed), it is an important episode in the history
of the city. The debate about metropolitan government discloses key aspects of the im-
portance of the city for its inhabitants.
Over the last century, the municipality of Amsterdam has incorporated parts of the
urbanized region into the central municipality, and therefore considerably increased
its area through a series of much disputed annexations (Van der Veer 1997). The last
one was the annexation of the Bijlmermeer polder for new housing estates in 1966 (the
enclave now known as Amsterdam Zuidoost). Because further annexations were
deemed unacceptable to the adjacent municipalities, alternatives had to be sought to
agglomeration government. In 1982, a memo for a city province was published, fol-
lowed by a long process of negotiation in the 1980s both with the municipalities in the
region and the state, which has to pass a law to make a city province possible. The cen-
tral government was also considering other cases especially in the Rotterdam region
and was a driving force in that regard (see the white papers Bestuur op niveau, BON 1,
BON 2 and BON 3) (see Dijkink 1995).
In 1986, an instrument for regional consultation was established: the Regionaal
Overleg Amsterdam. The participating municipalities agreed in 1991 to devolve more
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tasks to the Regionaal Overleg Amsterdam (the so-called Almere Agreement) and on 30
June 1992, the platform was given a new name – Regionaal Orgaan Amsterdam (ROA) –
to emphasize its institutionalization. In July 1994, the municipal council of Amster-
dam agreed to divide the municipality into new municipalities and to form a city
province. The new province was expected to be established at the beginning of 1998.
In administrative terms, the core idea of the project was the establishment of a new
kind of agglomeration government under the label of regiobestuur (regional gover-
nance) or stadsprovincie (city province). It had three major consequences. The first was
the radical shift of competencies between municipalities and province; the new ag-
glomeration government was meant to be more powerful than the existing province.
The new province would deal with transportation issues, regional economic interests,
environmental policy, and housing. Consequently, the participating municipalities
would become much weaker than the existing municipalities. Second, as a result of
the establishment of the new city province, the existing province of North Holland
would lose its economic and demographic heart.5 Third, to avoid extremely skewed re-
lations between the core city and the suburban municipalities within the new city
province, the municipality of Amsterdam would be split into 11 small municipalities.
These municipalities were intended to correspond with boroughs (stadsdelen) or merg-
ers of such boroughs if they were considered too small to be a “vital” municipality. The
dismantling of Amsterdam was seen as an expiatory sacrifice to reassure the other par-
ticipating municipalities (15 in the autumn of 1994) that the new province would not
be dominated by the municipality of Amsterdam and, in effect, a kind of clandestine
annexation.
All of a sudden, the rather obscure and dull discussion about administrative reform
became much livelier as Amsterdammers realized that their municipality was going
to disappear. In the autumn of 1994, members of the section of the left wing party D66
(Democrats ’66) in borough Zuid, including one municipal civil servant working at the
PR department of City Hall (Bureau Bestuurscontact) took the initiative to organize a
corrective referendum.6 The Committee “Should Amsterdam remain Amsterdam???”
(Comité “Moet Amsterdam Amsterdam blijven???”) was then established to collect the signa-
tures required to hold a referendum. Eventually, the outcome of the referendum –
which was held in May 1995 was unambiguous and is frequently referred to as an “Al-
banian victory”7 since 93 percent of the voters voted against the council’s decision.
The public debate related to the referendum campaign revealed the relation be-
tween city and identity.8 What is striking is the importance of the name as compared to
the territorial dimension proper.9
“To begin with, the name doesn’t fit.”10 “Change the name to Great Amsterdam,” was
the advice of Amsterdam historian Richter Roegholt. ROA could be a soap, a football as-
sociation or a soda, not a place one can identify with. Naming is a specific problem, be-
cause there is no name for the Amsterdam region. The few region names that are avail-
able are not suitable. The IJ river is a divide in that matter. The region called Waterland
(presently a municipality) could include the part of the city north of the IJ,11 while the
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region called Amstelland could include the part of city south of the IJ. IJmond (IJ
Mouth) would be suitable to include the whole region, but it generally stands for IJ-
muiden and Beverwijk (which are on the North Sea). On the other hand, the Amster-
dam region (regio Amsterdam, gewest Amsterdam) is not an established expression in
Dutch. At the same time, the provincial identity is very weak. The province Noord-Hol-
land adopted a provincial anthem at the end of February 2000, because all of the other
provinces already had one. But the provincial feeling is non-existent in Amsterdam, al-
though it may be more significant in the rural parts of the province (but then again not
in the Gooi or on the island of Texel). Obviously the historical province of Holland, the
Dutch core area, has a rich history but it is Dutch national history, not regional.
Amsterdam is primarily a feeling – Amsterdam is its inhabitants and they have ties
with its name but also with its identity as a city. If the whole province were to be called
Amsterdam, all the inhabitants of the province would become Amsterdammers and
that would undermine the identification of the city dwellers. One would create differ-
ent shades of Amsterdammer: full Amsterdammer in the inner city, half Amster-
dammers in the former city, and provincial Amsterdammers (a contradiction in
terms?). This brings us to another issue: which entity would be the successor to the Mu-
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Illustration 1.
“Say no to the dissolution of
Amsterdam” – Poster by Opland
for the 1995 referendum
campaign against the city
province ROA. Opland (Rob
Wout) is a political cartoonist
that drew for many protest
campaigns in the 1980s, such as
those of the peace movement. 
(Source: Bles 1996)
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nicipality of Amsterdam – the new province, or the new municipality in the inner city?
Which would become the capital city of the Netherlands? Which would become the
owner of Rembrandt’s Nachtwacht?
Most contributors to the public debate agreed that partition would mean the end of
a 700-year-old city (journalist Geert Mak), thereby losing the soul of a city (Wibaut; see
also Van Duijn 1996). This was vigorously opposed by means of lampooning the various
features of partition, such as “dwarfing,” the balkanization of Amsterdam (political
scientist Hans Daudt and human geographer Willem Heinemeijer in Het Parool 22 April
1995) or the de-suburbanization of Amsterdam (Geert Mak in NRC Handelsblad, 20 April
1995). The dismantlement of the city would deprive people of their identification with
the place (sociologist Leon Deben). That the integrity of the city should be protected
was also the main message of less influential contributors: “Amsterdam should stay,”
“Just keep Amsterdam a city,” “I want to be and stay an Amsterdammer: I don’t want to
live in a village!”, “Keep Amsterdam intact, dammit! When asked where I live, I don’t
want to answer ‘in De Baarsjes’ or something similar!”12
Interestingly enough, borough borders were also defended with the prospect that
they were going to be affected by the partition project. The planned transfer of Hoofd-
dorppleinbuurt13 from Zuid to De Baarsjes was attacked, while the Wijkopbouwor-
gaan Spaarndammer- en Zeeheldenbuurt agitated against the abolition of Stadsdeel-
raad Westerpark and its merger into a new municipality Oud-West and demanded a
borough referendum about this.14 De Baarsjes also mobilized its inhabitants against
the merger with Slotervaart/Overtoomse Veld.
In conclusion, the establishment of the city province was prevented because of the
strong identification of Amsterdammers with their city and their municipality.
Because the legitimacy of the reform was put to the vote in a referendum in Amster-
dam, the new administrative layer did not get the opportunity to foster legitimacy and
identification among Amsterdammers and other inhabitants of the region, so that we
cannot assess whether it would have succeeded. Today the region still lacks political
institutions able to do so. The ROA still exists as a regional body governed by the repre-
sentatives of the 16 participating municipalities, but issues of legitimacy and identifi-
cation remain unresolved (Kromhout 2001).
Institutional Answers: New Political Institutions 
Other institutional answers to the legitimacy crisis consist of the introduction of new
political institutions such as the referendum and the indirect election of the mayor.15
The referendum is an instrument quite foreign to the Dutch political culture. Its in-
troduction was one of the major institutional reforms the Democrats ’66 (D66) party
had been demanding since the party’s creation in 1966. A law proposal to make refer-
enda possible was rejected by the Senate, almost causing the fall of the government
coalition of the Labor Party (PvdA), the rightwing liberals (VVD) and the leftwing liber-
als (D66). At the local level, local regulations allowing for referenda were adopted dur-
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ing the past decade in several municipalities. In Amsterdam, this innovation was a re-
action of Amsterdam politicians to the dramatically low turnout for the 1990 munici-
pal elections (just above 50 percent; see Figure 1b). A commission formed by the mayor
and the leaders of the local parties thought of it as a tool to bring citizens closer to poli-
tics (or vice versa).
The first referendum was held in March 1992, allowing the electorate to choose be-
tween two policy orientations regarding the traffic policy for the inner city. Two op-
tions were put to the vote: option A consisted of limiting car traffic in the way agreed
upon by the municipal government, and option B was a proposal to more radically lim-
it car traffic in that part of the city. A slight majority voted for option B.
In January 1994, the municipal council adopted a new regulation introducing an-
other type of referendum: the corrective one. According to the new referendum regu-
lation, citizens of Amsterdam were to be empowered to initiate a referendum to reject
a decision made by the municipal council under certain conditions.16 Two referenda
were held in May 1995, two more in the spring of 1997 and one in the spring of 2001.17
Oddly enough, the first one was about something that would eventually be decided at
the national level, as the establishment of city provinces in Amsterdam and Rotterdam
necessitated the adoption of a special national law.
Table 1. Turnout for and results of Amsterdam referenda
———————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————
Year Referendum Turnout Outcome
———————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————
1992 Verkeersbeleid binnenstad (traffic policy for the inner city) 27.7% option B
———————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————
1995 Stadsprovincie (city province) 39.8% decision rejected
1995 Weilandje De Vrije Geer (housing project in a meadow) 38.2% decision rejected
1997 IJburg (neighborhood to be built on reclaimed land) 40.1% decision maintained
1997 Noord Zuid lijn (underground metro line) 22.0% decision maintained
2001 Stadsdeel Binnenstad (the inner city as a borough) 22.5% decision maintained
———————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————
Source: Slot 1999 and O+S Amsterdam (<http://www.onstat.amsterdam.nl/>)
The turnout for the referenda has been much lower than for municipal elections (see
Table 1). Referenda do not bring back the high level of electoral participation, but they
certainly instigate a lively political debate about the issue put to the vote, as we have
seen with the Stadsprovincie in the previous section, at least among the Amster-
dammers who want to enter such a debate.
But the turnout differs greatly between the referenda, varying from 22 to 40 percent
(see Table 1), which suggests that the issue put to the vote matters. Indeed the issues
vary in terms of their locational relevance. Nonetheless, the turnout for a referendum
about a small meadow in the west was high (probably because it was held on the same
day as the one about the city province) while the one about the new underground
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metro line (an issue of regional significance) was the lowest.
Turnout results are available for the boroughs. But for a valid comparison, we need
to disregard the influence of other factors on participation. To do so we can compare
the observed turnout for a referendum with the one expected on the basis of the
turnout for the 1994 municipal elections. Turnouts for the four main referenda and
the 1994 municipal elections strongly correlate with each other; this is especially true
for the city province referendum and the 1994 municipal elections (with a correlation
coefficient of .943).18
Simple regression analyses reveal in which boroughs turnout is higher or lower
than expected. Each time, voter turnout was higher than expected in the inner city
and Oud-West, while lower than expected in Bos en Lommer, Zuidoost and Buiten-
veldert (later Zuideramstel).19 Figures 2a-e show standardized residuals for the five
main referenda.20 The issue at stake matters a lot. Turnout was much higher than ex-
pected in the inner city and the adjacent boroughs for the traffic policy for the inner
city; in Osdorp and Slotervaart/Overtoomse Veld and De Baarsjes21 for the city
province; in boroughs adjoining the location of the planned neighborhood, especially
in Amsterdam-Noord, Zeeburg, Watergraafsmeer, and the inner city, for IJburg; in bor-
oughs affected by the construction of the new metro line (especially De Pijp, Amster-
dam-Noord, Rivierenbuurt, and Zuid) for the metro; and in the inner city and Wester-
park for the inner city borough.
The lengthy discussion about electing mayors (another point that has been raised
by D66 since the mid-1960s) has not yet led to reform, but the idea remains high on the
agenda, for example, in Amsterdam at the time of the nomination of a new mayor for
2001. In 2000, the research department of the municipality of Amsterdam commis-
sioned an opinion poll to survey citizens’ wishes concerning their new mayor. For most
respondents, gender, ethnic background, and even party membership were not im-
portant. However, 56 percent of the respondents stated that the ideal candidate should
be a “real” Amsterdammer. But this is still less important than looking great on TV (66
percent) and being an experienced politician or manager (82 percent).22
A Brief Outline of Civil Society (Alternative Democracy) in Amsterdam 
A Para-Political Framework of Interest Mediation 
Elections and referenda are not the only politically meaningful moments in the life of
a citizen. There are different and perhaps even more satisfactory ways of experiencing
one’s membership of a community and contributing to a system of governance: sup-
porting an interest or action group, writing a letter to the local newspaper, being a
member of a school board, representing an ethnic minority on a municipal advisory
council, etc. The definition of political participation can include such activities and
one can judge communities according to the opportunities they offer their members
to contribute in this way to governance. How rich is a community in terms of organiza-
tions and institutions that in some way influence its life and welfare? Does a local soci-
ety facilitate the acquisition of the cognitive maps of the problems and issues at hand?
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In conclusion, we can say that the readability of an environment, the possibility of
recognizing oneself in the discourses generated by an environment, is one way to
assess the quality of democratic representation.
Let us see to what degree this framework can be applied to the city and region of Am-
sterdam and what it discloses about its representational qualities. In order to develop
an idea of the people and organizations involved in the production of discourse, we
could start with a comparative study of urban renewal programs in Amsterdam and
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The Hague (Ter Borg and Dijkink 1992, 1995). In this study, producers of discourse were
identified on the basis of articles and arguments about Amsterdam’s waterfront proj-
ect on the “IJ boards” published in the daily Het Parool (“Amsterdam’s” newspaper) be-
tween 1982 and 1990. The study revealed seven main groups in terms of number of ar-
guments: representatives of political parties, action or interest groups, members of
the municipal executive, business persons, experts, municipal advisory boards, and
technical departments of the municipality. The analysis did not cover letters from
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readers, so that most authors (or voices) are associated with some kind of professional
function as is usual when people appear in newspapers as the author of an article or
are quoted. Of course, this does not rule out that many of them (e.g. action groups or
experts) were also involved with Amsterdam as citizens. The almost complete absence
of voices from the region (province) and the central government is one remarkable
fact, even if we account for the local distribution of Het Parool. Another interesting fact
(particularly in comparison with The Hague) is the large proportion of authors repre-
senting either action groups or some field of specialized knowledge. This suggests an
important production of knowledge and concepts that cannot be easily connected
with views from established political ideologies (or parties). Finally one can detect the
presence of voices from the municipal offices in this discussion, which testifies to the
relative openness of opinion production around an important city project where civil
servants are not politically censored (somewhat in contrast to the anxious ways in
which politicians themselves handled the subject; see Ter Borg and Dijkink 1995).
These discussions occurred in the pre-Internet era and one can easily imagine what
positive effects the availability of a digital medium would have had in this space of rep-
resentation. In the light of the abundance of civil voices that tend to rise in order to in-
terfere with political decisions (particularly since the 1960s), it is no surprise that Am-
sterdam was the cradle (1994) of Europe’s first digital city, De Digitale Stad.
Levels of Corporatist Interest Mediation
If a local issue arouses a varied set of voices, the next question is how much this set can
be explained as the product of a typical local infrastructure. To what extent is a bound-
ed civil society or local political system capable of generating a rich variety of discours-
es? In the landscape of organizations that represent the citizen’s concern about the
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world, some of the most penetrating actions and voices focus on environmental quali-
ty or conservation. The Amsterdam Center for the Environment (Amsterdams Milieucen-
trum), a kind of umbrella organization for such groups, lists hundreds of them. As
shown in Figure 2, more than half (57 percent) owe their existence to the fight for a par-
ticular local object like a park, neighborhood, or water area, 22 percent identify with
some city-wide problem (e.g. pedestrians or birds) and the majority of the remaining
groups are national organizations or local branches of such organizations. Only three
percent can be identified with a regional goal or issue. This emphasizes the impor-
tance of the local level – particularly the sub-municipal level – for the commitment to
policy issues. The national function of Amsterdam as capital has further advanced the
growth and establishment of social movements with nationwide or international
goals (e.g. Greenpeace, Amnesty International, the gay movement, etc.). Amsterdam
has more offices of “new” social movements than any other large city in the Nether-
lands (183 compared to 100 in Utrecht – the city ranking second – and 72 in The Hague,
the seat of national government; Albregts 2001). The flourishing of these movements
seems unmistakably related to the kind of ambience produced by the presence of stu-
dents and workers in institutes of higher education, although the quoted research also
suggests that such people are not the key figures in smoothly running social move-
ments. This means that the countercultural features of local social and political life
can no longer be identified with specific classes, but is a politicization that may mani-
fest itself in the most diverse types of people (Kriesi 1988).
Figure 4. Environmental action groups (level of target)
All the more striking is the absence of a regional level of identification in these actions.
This is again confirmed if we turn to the general list of organizations. The digital tele-
phone directory lists more than 200 associations, firms, and organizations whose title
includes the Dutch adjective “Amsterdams(e).”23 Unfortunately there is no single
name to denote the region to which Amsterdam belongs; one might venture the opin-
ion that this region therefore does not exist. Each of the only available options for ter-
ritorial names – Amstelland and Waterland – occurs 20-odd times. The latter is partic-
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ularly favored in Amsterdam-Noord because it emphasizes local identity. Obviously
Amstel (a river) is the most popular surrogate for a regional name in the rest of the city.
Including its derivatives (e.g. Amstelkring, Amstelland, Amstelzicht, but excluding
Amstelveen – a suburban town – and surnames) it occurs about 180 times. The number
of hits for the name IJ (also a river) is only 19. Local initiatives in Amsterdam or its sur-
roundings rarely end up in something that is called “regional.” The adjective “region-
al” is applied to such “arranged” things as the employment office, the police, the ROA,
psychiatric services, and broadcasting organizations. It is no accident that these are
services or offices organized from the outside or resulting from nationwide arrange-
ments. If we compare this to the toponymical scene of Rotterdam, we find that the
availability of the label Rijnmond (Rhine Mouth), which was first used for an adminis-
trative body, is a godsend (more than 90 records in the telephone directory).24
Figure 5. Territory of the ROA (left) and the Amsterdam Chamber of Commerce and Industry
A somewhat different picture emerges, however, if we look at local business associa-
tions. The Chamber of Commerce of Amsterdam covers the major part of the northern
wing of the Randstad: Amsterdam, its southern neighbors (including airport
Schiphol) and all municipalities along the North Sea Canal to the coast (including
Haarlem and IJmuiden) (see Map 3). So the adjective “regional” is appropriate here.
This awareness of a regional interest among business people sharply diverges from the
interest mediation and articulation among other citizen groupings of Amsterdam.
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Advisory Boards and Participatory Democracy
The municipal government has established a wide variety of advisory councils (17 of
them) comprised of elected representatives of social groups and experts from outside
the local government. Some councils with a broad representative function are the Ur-
ban Planning Advisory Board (50 members from different disciplines connected with
design and the control of public space), the Advisory Board for the Elderly (18 repre-
sentatives of different organizations of the elderly and health care), the Sport Council
(representatives of different sports), the Emancipation Advisory Board (eight women
from different sectors of local society) and four advisory boards with representatives
from particular ethnic groups. Although the members of these boards are not ac-
countable to the community, they constitute a continuously changing group of about
150 persons with an independent position and attitude vis-à-vis the government.
Apart from the standard procedures by which people can lodge complaints against
projects and new rules (usually enacted at the administrative level of the boroughs),
the city has experimented with Future Prospects (Toekomstverkenningen Amsterdam) in
which an attempt was made to start a public debate about particular urban problems
that should be solved in order to achieve certain Utopian goals. It was concluded in
1999 by a congress attended by 2,000 people. Similar procedures were used to generate
ideas for the renewal of the derelict shipyard areas along the IJ in Amsterdam North
(Roobeek and Mandersloot 1999). Apparently, utopian and aesthetic images have been
discovered as appealing charms that stimulate the participation of larger and varied
groups of people in these new forms of democracy.
The Media and Digital Cities
Amsterdam has the good fortune of being served by a quality daily newspaper (Het Pa-
rool, since 1943) and by a local TV station (AT5, the leading local TV station in the
Netherlands, since 1992); although the latter is commercial, it pays much attention to
news as well as to political opinion in Amsterdam. For example, AT5 broadcasts a bi-
weekly interview with the mayor of Amsterdam and special reports and debates about
local politics. It aims at a regional audience (as far as inhabitants of the region are con-
nected to the Amsterdam cable network) but its newsflashes and discussions mainly
cover the city. Further, a local public broadcasting organization (SALTO, with five radio
channels and two TV channels) offers broadcasting time to organizations that have a
message for the public (e.g. action groups, artists, migrants, etc.).
De Digitale Stad (<www.dds.nl>) (DDS), originally strongly inspired by events in and
about Amsterdam, gradually lost its place-boundedness and developed into an infor-
mation and discussion site about a range of political and cultural subjects on the local
and the international level. For a while, its logo was similar to the coat of arms of Am-
sterdam, the three crosses being substituted by the letters DDS. Different subjects were
identified with “city squares,” and there were 30-odd sections about books, health, mu-
sic, politics, elections and even the subject of death. A Freudian slip of the pen, which
betrayed the origin of the site makers was “Governmental Square Regional,” which
contained information on political issues in Amsterdam. DDS was obviously ge-
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ographically located. But even apart from this fact, one could conclude – as our discus-
sion about the referendum already revealed – that there is a natural resonance be-
tween local and national political issues in Amsterdam. DDS was therefore closely re-
lated to the city’s political identity. Recently, the site was sold to an Internet service
provider who eliminated the last traces of the political ideals of the olden days. On the
neighborhood level, one may find the DDS flavor in the private initiative <www.buurt-
online.nl> that covers more than 600 neighborhood webpages all over the country, in-
cluding almost 70 from Amsterdam.
In 1998 the municipality initiated The Glass City, a project involving spending
s 2,500,000 in the period 1998-2002 (including a newly established structural budget
of s 227,000 per year) in order to improve and integrate electronic information ser-
vices, most of them accessible via <www.amsterdam.nl>. It involves an information
system for the public with addresses, names of municipal organizations and the texts
of local regulations (PIGA), a system with information on policymaking like minutes of
the councils and decisions (BISA) and a digital city (the actual website) that offers links
to other important organizations and allows the distribution of news, political de-
bates, and the collection of public opinion. An example of collecting public opinion
was the discussion regarding a municipal white paper on drugs policy in 1997 (Flos
1998). The alderwoman, Jikkie van der Giessen, wrote personal introductions accom-
panied by her picture for each of the main subjects for debate inviting the visitors to
complete a questionnaire. Over the course of three weeks, 1,750 persons visited the site
and 232 questionnaires were completed. Many of the visitors had first-hand knowl-
edge about the use of drugs, as a user, social worker, or someone facing the conse-
quences. The information received was deemed quite useful. One may agree that such
cases of interactive policymaking have the potential to make the implementation of in-
tended policy quite concrete for city managers and politicians.
As for the administrative level covered by these systems, we must say that they fit,
and even reinforce, the municipality and the borough as relevant units of action. www.
Amsterdam.nl has incorporated the websites of all the boroughs but we cannot (Febru-
ary 2002) find any link to regional organizations25 or the province of North Holland.
Conclusion: The Unbounded Community 
The identity of Amsterdam is in one way or another important to a lot of people. One
has to accept this in order to understand why Amsterdammers voted so vehemently
against the idea of breaking “their” city up into a number of boroughs. Yet, this identi-
fication with the city is not expressed in a high level of involvement with policy issues
that concern the entire city or with the elections for the municipal council. Such im-
portant issues as the development of a new residential area in IJburg, the construction
of a new north-south metro line or traffic policy in the inner city arouse significantly
greater interest in boroughs directly affected by such developments than in other
parts of the city. One is inclined to conclude that it is identification with the local
neighborhood or special project rather than the territory of the city as a whole that is
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at stake in Amsterdam. A similar conclusion could be drawn about the range of envi-
ronmental organizations (new social movements) operating in Amsterdam, most of
which focus on problems occurring at a level lower than the municipal one.
This is not to say that there are no strong feelings about the city as a social and cul-
tural sphere. Such feelings can even be provoked by local geography. An actress once ex-
pressed her feelings about crossing the municipal boundary in these words: “When I
cross the Utrecht bridge [by car] and enter the Rijnstraat, I get that feeling of freedom.”
(She certainly did not mean the Rijnstraat itself, a street so unassuming that it is hard
to believe that it was ever designed as an access road to a national capital!) For many
people, particularly those working in the artistic and intellectual fields, this quality of
the city as a field of alternatives – or in the words of French psychiatrist Minkowski
(1933), its ampleur de la vie (wideness of life) – is the most important characteristic of the
city. For many groups, like immigrants from Surinam, Morocco and Turkey, the city
provides the critical mass necessary to guarantee a viable subcultural way of life (pro-
vision of ethnic food, markets and cultural facilities). Since intellectuals, artists, im-
migrants, and those working in the financial sector strongly represent characteristics
of the “unbounded community” (Scherzer 1992), the municipal government faces the
challenge of facilitating ways of life that are significantly connected with the national
and the transnational. It is the reality of Amsterdam as a location in a national and
transnational space (a name in a network) that is more important in this perspective
than the nature of the territory itself, although parts of it may have a strong symbolic
value (inner city, Vondelpark, harbor area).
Activities are focused on the neighborhood level, but symbolic experiences seem to
strengthen the image of the city as a whole. This is also the impression one is left with
after “visiting” governments in the virtual world. On the Internet, Amsterdam
emerges as a strong reality that seems to exist in a space that excludes all other admin-
istrative units. Only the boroughs are conspicuously present as extensions or limbs of
the municipal body. Such symbolic encounters with the city are somewhat akin to in-
stitutional encounters in the real world. The main difference is that institutions have
the power to impose themselves on the citizens either in reply to their requests or un-
invited. In the twentieth century, one of the most penetrating institutional manifesta-
tions of the city of Amsterdam occurred via the urban planning office. Public housing
projects sponsored by the city began to displace large groups of people from decaying
inner-city areas (e.g. the Jordaan) to Betondorp (“Concrete village” in the newly ac-
quired southeastern extensions) in the 1920s, from the decaying nineteenth-century
working class areas to Slotermeer and Slotervaart (the new visionary extensions to the
west of the city) in the 1950s, and from Amsterdam North to Osdorp (even more to the
west) in the 1960s. Such movements extended the activity space of citizens and helped
to psychologically appropriate new territory. But the large-scale activities of urban
planners and housing corporations played their part by making the city very tangible
as an institutional environment. This was perhaps one of the keys to the strong identi-
fication with the city during the first post-war decades.
Nowadays, letters received by Amsterdammers come from various, more ambigu-
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ous levels. The municipality imposes itself by demanding a property tax. The borough
issues letters about public works and regulations concerning public space. The provi-
sion of public utilities is a matter of private firms (NUON in Amsterdam) that have lost
their former local identity altogether although the citizen can apply to a local office.
The ROA (the proposed metropolitan authority) does not yet have any significant insti-
tution addressing the citizen. An exception may be the regional housing distribution
system, which has been run since 2001 by the housing corporations in the ROA area
and Almere.26 However, this development hardly alleviates the housing problems of
the Amsterdam citizen although it might contribute to a stronger regional feeling in
the other municipalities. So, it is no surprise after all, that the launching of a regional
authority as a new political arena, did not immediately result in a love affair.
A simple summary of our statement about activities, institutions, and symbols and
their relation with space is presented in Table 2. It shows the different levels of political
organization (national, regional, municipal, borough) and the degree to which the ter-
ritorial units become a reality for the citizen (low, medium, high) and trends via the
mechanisms of activity, institutionalization, and symbolization.
Table 2. Sources of identification in Amsterdam
———————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————
Activity Symbolic Institutional
Europe L+ L= M+
National L+ H= H-
Regional M+ L= L-
Municipal M+ H+ H-
Borough H= L= M+
———————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————
Level: Low, Medium, High
Trend: + increase, = no change, - decrease
Only an average value can be given for boroughs because (as for the symbolic dimen-
sion) some boroughs can claim a clear territorial identity (e.g. Amsterdam North)
whereas others are a product of administrative demarcation. As regression data on the
referendum turnouts suggest, living in some neighborhoods (e.g. the inner city) in-
duces a greater sensibility to changes elsewhere in the city than living in more periph-
eral boroughs (e.g. Buitenveldert) does. This may be connected with the inevitable im-
pact of changes from almost anywhere in the city on inner city life (the impossibility of
activity closure) or with the symbolic identification of the inner city with the entire
city (lack of symbolic closure).
A final conclusion regarding Table 2 is that in the local state (all levels below the cen-
tral government), the municipal level dominates the symbolic dimension. This is the
background for all the protests against the planned abolition of the city of Amsterdam.
People can accept diverse territorial scales as possible sources for identification, but
not the evaporation of the only unit that offers them a suitable name. Addresses are
important, especially in the ways of life that today constitute what has been called a
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“space of flows.” This does not eliminate the willingness of urban dwellers to identify
with a wider regional scale – the area associated with the names Amstel and Waterland
– if it could be clearly perceived as the operational environment of a visionary agency
aiming at the enhancement of the quality of life and the creation of a metropolitan
identity for all inhabitants of the region (somewhat reminiscent of the planning for ur-
ban extensions in twentieth-century Amsterdam). Democratic control of such an
agency would continue to be felt as a problem, particularly by suburbanites fearing the
dominance of the central city. However, maintaining local identities does not neces-
sarily interfere with regional visions. Moreover, firms in the region are eager to adopt
or maintain an Amsterdam identity. The current low-profile ROA should therefore be
transformed into an agency that is better able to evoke challenging metropolitan fu-
tures, preferably by accounting for or unleashing local processes of identity construc-
tion.
NOTES
1. In the Netherlands, everyone entitled to vote is automatically registered as an elec-
tor.
2. At the beginning of the year 2000, this was true of only four of them: Amsterdam-
Noord, Amsterdam Oud Zuid, Oud-West, and Osdorp.
3. Watergraafsmeer, Buitenveldert, and Zuidoost in 1991.
4. See the website maintained by the municipality for this public hearing at
<http://www.stadsgesprek.amsterdam.nl>. 
5. Note that the capital city of the province is Haarlem, not Amsterdam.
6. For a diary of the campaign, see Bles 1996.
7. Notwithstanding that the Albanian type of election always “re-elected” the incum-
bent rulers!
8. One event coordinated by Beurs TV involved exchanges on the Internet and debates
on the local television channel. Most contributions were still accessible in the
spring of 2000 on the website De Digitale Stad (at <http://www.dds.nl/>) including
chronicles and selections of articles published in Het Parool and other newspapers,
as well as speeches and a questions-and-answer section in which politicians (alder-
men and councilors) and civil servants answered questions asked by the public.
Unless otherwise mentioned, the contributions quoted below were found on this
website. The website of the original De Digitale Stad has been erased by its com-
mercial offshoot (same name, same URL).
9. Additional critiques dealt with the dysfunctioning of the agglomeration govern-
ment, especially the increasing distance between citizen and government, the
disenfranchisement of foreign residents, who have voting rights for municipal
elections but not for provincial elections, and the competition between new mu-
nicipalities.
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10. Quotes refer to contributions to the debate on De Digitale Stad (see note 8) unless
stated otherwise.
11. Indeed, inhabitants of Amsterdam-Noord are traditionally more oriented towards
Purmerend and Zaandam than to the inner city (Donkers 1996).
12. Several contributions (see note 8).
13. The neighborhood is being upgraded. Zuid includes the most expensive resi-
dential locations in the city (the old Concertgebouwbuurt), while De Baarsjes is a
decaying neighborhood with a high proportion of foreign residents.
14. See press release dated 10 November 1994 (section 5 at <http://www.dds.nl/
~beursth/roa/nieuws.htm> available in the spring 2000).
15. The mayor is a civil servant installed by the Crown, although the position is politi-
cal, and the municipal council is consulted during the nomination procedure.
16. Conditions pertain to the number of signatures necessary to hold a referendum as
well as to the outcome of the referendum. Originally, the threshold was defined in
terms of turnout (at least 60 percent of the valid votes at the previous municipal
elections); in 1996, however, it was defined in terms of voters (a decision can be re-
jected if the number of voters against it amounts to at least 50 percent + 1 of the
number of valid votes at the previous municipal elections).
17. Several initiatives to organize a referendum were unsuccessful for various reasons.
These included referenda on the location of the tippelzone (an area where prosti-
tutes meet their clients) on the Theemsweg, the privatization of the municipal
cable network KTA, the traffic situation on Zeeburgerdijk in 1995, Ruigoord in
1996 and 1997, and parking policy in 2001. 
18. The correlation coefficients between the turnout in the 17 boroughs (including
the inner city) for the 1994 municipal elections and the other three referenda were
.791 for IJburg, .744 for the underground metro line and .608 for the inner city traf-
fic policy. The turnout for transport referenda correlates more with each other
than with municipal elections (.746). The correlation coefficient between the
turnout in the 14 boroughs (including the inner city) for the 1998 municipal elec-
tions and the 2001 referendum was .713.
19. The first two are the boroughs with very low turnout for municipal elections,
while the third one has the highest participation rate in Amsterdam.
20. The class limits for the thematic maps are –.75, .75 and 1.
21. This is remarkable because the electorate of these boroughs has participated much
less than expected in the other referenda.
22. Het Parool, special webpage at <http://www.parool.nl/ps/burgemeesters> (available
in the spring of 2000).
23. The proper name “Amsterdam” occurs more than 1,500 times but is often used as
an appendix to the name of an organization in order to indicate its Amsterdam
branch and consequently is a sign of identification that differs from what we are
aiming for in this context. However, a substantial number of these 1,500 records in-
deed represent the use of Amsterdam to indicate singularity (e.g. “Café Amster-
dam”). 
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24. The score for the adjective “Rotterdams(e)” is 121 and for the proper name Rotter-
dam 1,080; see also the preceding footnote.
25. The ROA does not have a website yet. With some perseverance one may discover,
hidden amidst information on housing in the city proper, that there is a regional
housing distribution system (run by regionally cooperating housing corporations
of the ROA area and Almere) about which information can be accessed on a site
called woningnet. It is perhaps significant that (February 2002) the link on the Am-
sterdam website is to <www.woningnet.nl> (covering a much wider area, including
Utrecht) rather than <roa.woningnet.nl>. 
26. See the preceding note.
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5.1 • Strategic Dilemmas Facing the
Amsterdam Region
Sako Musterd and Willem Salet
Looking back at this book’s numerous contributions, by way of an epilogue, we would
like to examine some of the major challenges highlighted by the current debate about
the future of the Amsterdam region. The book reflects the overall spatial impact of eco-
nomic, social, cultural, and institutional trends, extrapolating the line of history into
the future. The material analyzed is highly complex and dynamic, by no means com-
plete, and in many cases remaining open-ended. Even the contours of the “region to
be” are in many respects uncertain. There are no solid definitions of the new metro-
politan configuration which is taking shape at the regional level, nor of the scale of the
regional city and the institutional framework. We shall attempt first to delineate the
contours of the emergent region, including the uncertainties which exist about them,
and then highlight a number of strategic dilemmas as a contribution to the metropol-
itan debate.
The New Contours
The historical “spatial configuration” of the Amsterdam region is a textbook example of a
radial city in which the regional links to the hierarchical urban center spread out like
the spokes of a wheel. Urban expansion during much of the past century has followed
the pattern of the “finger city” with new urban development concentrated along axes
defined by the principal infrastructure and separated by “wedges” of green. This stereo-
typical geographical development has been influenced by a number of specific circum-
stances. Amsterdam is bounded to the north by an area of high natural value, Waterland,
which is protected as green-belt land, and by the waters of the IJsselmeer. The partial
reclamation of this body of water has comparatively recently provided a new natural di-
rection for urban expansion, creating the towns of Almere and Lelystad. There are also a
number of important nature reserves to the east and the south, whilst the noise of
Schiphol Airport’s flight paths also restricts potential expansion. This means that the
rapid urban development in the direction of the airport is concentrated within a clearly
defined area. Finally, to the west, development is limited in specific ways by protected
dune landscapes. These conditions have contributed to the retention of a number of fea-
tures of the morphological finger-city pattern, even in the current regional metropolis.
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It is difficult, however, for radial models to absorb the pressure for urban expansion.
Sooner or later links to the center become congested, open space – the green wedges –
comes under pressure and the new urban nodes on the periphery of the city require
new tangential links. As in other radial regions, this physical transition is now appear-
ing in greater Amsterdam. Urban pressure and mobility have shifted to regional links
which bypass the central city, such as Schiphol-Almere and Schiphol-Zaanstad. A wide
range of new urban concentration is emerging along highways and around transport
nodes, and the former green wedges are gradually being transformed from open agri-
cultural areas into enclosed urban “islands” of greenery.
Due in part to the specific natural conditions mentioned above, the process of sub-
urbanization during the past century has been relatively concentrated. The original
exclusive residential communities have grown into prosperous middle-sized towns. Of
the ten most prosperous municipalities in the Netherlands, nine are found in a broad
sweep around Amsterdam – mainly in the Gooi and behind the coastal dunes. The
more mass forms of suburbanization which began in the late 1960s were concentrated
to a large extent in growth hubs, such as Almere and Haarlemmermeer, and there has
also been a striking amount of construction in the compact original city itself. There
are fewer opportunities for unbridled urban sprawl in this region than in many others.
Nevertheless, regional development during the past 20 years has been much less tight-
ly managed since the economic expansion on the city periphery and in the region has
taken on a more scattered pattern. The traditional hierarchical structures have not
evolved into a straightforward network of new multi-centered hierarchies. The region-
al networks are fairly disorganized and there exists a growing rivalry between a whole
range of fragmented centers of regional urban growth.
The scale of the regional city varies considerably, depending on which aspects one
considers. The National Planning Agency has recently started using the so-called
“three-layer model” in its strategic plans. This draws a distinction between ecological
aspects, flows of infrastructure and urban occupation patterns (residential and work-
ing districts, and so on). Against this background, attention in the current strategic
planning debate has turned to issues at the scale of the entire “Delta” – the area de-
fined by the Dutch coast and by the estuaries and courses of the great rivers, and which
in fact embraces all of the western Netherlands. The country’s four largest cities were
the original instigators of this new thinking about a “Delta metropolis.”
From an ecological perspective, the first “layer,” includes a number of important is-
sues that are at stake: integrated coastal management, managing river flows, the eco-
logical quality of and links between areas of natural importance, the arrangement of
open landscapes, and so on. But in other respects, flows of infrastructure and urban oc-
cupation patterns, the Delta still seems far too ambitious a level to be working at. As far
as the infrastructure is concerned, there are many unresolved strategic issues with re-
spect to links between regional infrastructure and supraregional or international ar-
teries. These are very strategic because hierarchical networks are forming, in the new
knowledge infrastructure as well as in public transport and the road system, which are
all decisive in the external positioning of metropolitan regions. The construction of a
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high-speed rail link with a limited number of stations is a good example of this. Such
developments are being played out at the national, international and urban regional
levels. It is of course relevant to consider these strategic issues at the Delta level, but
this does not mean that a unity at this level should be the decisive factor in determin-
ing priorities for new infrastructure. In this respect, it seems far more important to ex-
amine how the links between regional and supraregional infrastructures relate to the
third “layer” mentioned above: the development of urban occupation patterns. In oth-
er words, the real question is how infrastructure development – including that at the
national and international level – relates to the true centers of gravity in urban devel-
opment, particularly the new geographical concentrations of residential areas and of-
fice locations and the mobility they generate. This strategic spatial dynamic remains
concentrated for the time being at a lower level, that of relatively compact metropoli-
tan regions. The scale of the “Delta metropolis” or “Randstad” is much too broad to or-
ganize cohesive metropolitan development.
As far as economic relationships and movements in the labor and housing markets
– and hence the main axes of displacement – are concerned, the intensity of contacts
between the northern part of the Randstad (Amsterdam and Utrecht) and its southern
part (Rotterdam and The Hague) is surprisingly low. Nor is it by any means certain that
they will become more intense, since expansion of the northern Randstad to the east
and of the southern Randstad to the southeast is at least as plausible as an increasing
integration of the two parts. In short, in terms of the development of urban occupation
patterns the Randstad is “oversized” and its scale does not seem properly tailored to
primary considerations in strategic land-use policy.
Even within the northern part of the Randstad, further differences can be identi-
fied. Regional urban development is concentrating within the relatively compact ag-
glomerative tangent connecting Haarlem, Schiphol, Almere, and the Zaanstreek and
in the fairly compact agglomeration around Utrecht. These delineations are fluid,
though; there are a number of overlaps – in Almere and the Gooi, for example, which
look to both Amsterdam and Utrecht – and new dynamics are appearing at various
points around the periphery. Consequently, the agglomerative urban district as the
defining regional factor, which since the 1970s has reflected dominant planning and
administrative policy concepts, seems less and less appropriate for organizing region-
al urbanization. Finally, it is also necessary to mention the selections of geographical
patterns which make it essential that the contours of the metropolitan region not be
defined too narrowly. Economic development is sprawling across the region, as a re-
sult of which the original city is in fact increasingly specializing in the cultural econo-
my whilst the commercial economy is regrouping in a series of new clusters outside it.
The housing and labor markets, too, are differentiated regionally. The important
strategic policy dilemmas in the development of regional urbanization are directly as-
sociated with such selective processes as geographical specialization. The conclusion,
therefore, is that it is not at all easy to define the metropolitan region at one straight-
forward level because different activities are conducted at different levels. When con-
sidering strategic planning policy, however, a scale encompassing the whole northern
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wing of the Randstad would seem to be the most practical.
Given the dynamic in regional geographical development described above, it will
come as no surprise that the contours of the institutional framework are also very much
open-ended. People’s cultural association and identification with activities in the re-
gion have many aspects which manifest themselves in very different ways. These are
largely dependent on which groups and which activities are being studied. But what is
striking is that people’s “mental maps” do not yet feature any strong identification
with the metropolitan region. One might expect a greater attachment to the bound-
aries of traditional local and provincial administrative bodies, but even here there are
new differentiations and the problem arises that territorial delineations such as the
boundaries of administrative districts and provinces do not correspond with the shifts
in the geographical dynamic which have been described above. It is therefore striking
that public administrations, social organizations and business alike have joined to-
gether in a range of coalitions at various levels. Cooperation between local authorities
resulted in the establishment of a Regional Consultative Body for greater Amsterdam.
The province of Noord-Holland has also organized an influential consultative forum
together with the provinces of Flevoland and Utrecht, plus a large number of local au-
thorities and community organizations, and encompassing the entire northern part
of the Randstad. Yet another example is the Delta Metropolis initiative, which unites
many local authorities, provinces, the national government and community institu-
tions in lobbies at the level of the Randstad as a whole. In addition, there exists a whole
series of ad-hoc forums and coalitions made up of government bodies, non-govern-
mental organizations or a combination of the two. As a result of this, a complex pat-
tern of multi-level and multi-actor governance has taken over policy areas which were
previously administered directly by territorially defined local authorities, provinces
and national government. Such formal and informal relationships tend to exert enor-
mous influence.
In this way, local authorities, provinces, and other actors in society are playing a part
in every aspect of the emerging metropolitan region. Local authorities often play dual
roles in different coalitions, where for obvious reasons they do not always have the
same perspectives, do not set the same priorities, and do not represent the same posi-
tions. The City of Amsterdam, for example, has promoted major infrastructure proj-
ects at the city level (improvement of the metro network), the regional level (public
transport in the agglomerative tangent) and the Randstad level (regional rail links).
But these are very different policy lobbies which certainly do not automatically dove-
tail with one another and cannot be achieved simultaneously and with equal policy
priority. The same problem arises with the development of new office locations, hous-
ing districts, strategic urban nodes and hierarchical public-transport nodes. On paper,
all of the government’s plans fit together seamlessly, but in practice there exists a
whole range of conflicting coalitions in which the traditional territorial administra-
tions themselves play different roles. The fragmented metropolis therefore has to
wrestle with a coordination problem of gigantic proportions, with the question being
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whether spatial perspectives are adequately tailored to the evolution of the new re-
gion. Falling back on the certainty of territorial administrative planning does not au-
tomatically deliver the desired results, either, as current developments in land-use
planning show. The City of Amsterdam has drawn up a new structural plan – at more or
less the same time as the province of North-Holland was producing its new regional
plan and the national government its Fifth Memorandum on Land Use. There was
plenty of coordination between all three, but when the final decisions were taken re-
garding the Fifth Memorandum, it turned out that the broad informal consultations
which had been organized in respect to the northern Randstad had changed the
thrust of the way strategic planning policy would be decided, whereas the equally in-
formal Delta Metropolis lobby had exerted considerable influence over transport poli-
cy. In any case, with the fall of the Kok government (in 2002) decisions about these pol-
icy areas have been postponed and new twists cannot be ruled out in the next round of
decision-making. For a growing metropolitan region which is already manifesting it-
self in countless fragmented and conflicting fora, yet is not fully accepted psychologi-
cally by either its citizens or politicians and has not crystallized into administrative
frameworks, the development and implementation of a visionary policy strategy is no
sinecure.
Strategic Policy Dilemmas
The fragmentary context within which the growing Amsterdam region has to exist is
not a flaw but a characteristic of the contemporary metropolitan framework. It would
be a mistake to think that a unitary administrative hierarchy would achieve consisten-
cy in social and geographical development. If the past experiences of a large number of
other metropolitan areas are taken seriously, then it must be recognized that a multi-
dimensional context featuring many different actors with different interests and stan-
dards, and with a wide variety of collaborating or coordinating coalitions between
them at various levels, is quite simply a fact of life within which urban regional devel-
opment treads its path as if in a sort of experimental laboratory. The fact is that this in-
volves much “jostling for position”, overlapping, and competition, which not only has
its detrimental effects but also creates beneficial conditions for innovation. The fact,
too, that certain urban features are no longer developing exclusively in the core city
but also to a greater extent outside it, is stimulating the regeneration of traditional
central locations. In order for them to continue to draw both investment and cus-
tomers, their economic and cultural environment, their shopping centers and their
urban amenities need to be made as attractive as possible. This makes it equally clear
that the core cities can no longer dominate the new regional urban developments
from an exclusive position of power because the new urban nodes outside the centers
are demanding their own role. It is extremely difficult for the traditional city to com-
pete with the new nodes in terms of accessibility, space, and functionality. On the oth-
er hand, the new locations do not feature the variety and historic qualities which give
city life its particular verve. The mutual rivalry between places in a fragmented metro-
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politan environment can result in individual local qualities within the region being
magnified to create a fascinating geographical contrast.
Having noted this, it is nevertheless clear that proper coordination in decision-mak-
ing should be striven for in various matters of a strategic nature. This can be done
through a hierarchy or through cooperation, and can be stimulated by the public or
the private sector, but regional coordination is essential concerning a number of is-
sues, especially if the detrimental effects which inevitably arise in a fragmented frame-
work are to be avoided. The challenge is to create the common economic, social, cul-
tural, and ecological conditions for achieving this. We shall now examine each of these
sets of conditions in turn.
Economic Conditions
The strong profile of the Amsterdam regional economy within the international net-
work economy is being achieved through the combination of three economic com-
plexes. The first is business services, with the notable concentration of financial serv-
ices and international head offices in the region. The second is economic services
related to aviation – both the distribution economy and international services. And
the third is the cultural economy, which is particularly strong in the center of Amster-
dam. Actually, greater Amsterdam’s hinterland is really too small for the concentra-
tions of international air traffic and high-end financial and business services which it
has historically attracted. Nevertheless, these sectors have grown remarkably over the
past decade. The secret of the region’s economic success lies in the many subtle links
between the three economic complexes (as explained in greater detail in Tordoir’s con-
tribution to this book).
However, the past decade has also shown just how much an increase in economic
growth can endanger the very geographical conditions that have led to this success.
The center of the city was originally also the center for its specialist financial and busi-
ness services as well as the heart of its cultural economy. The services have now moved
to the edge of the city, but even more striking is that the pressures of ten years of eco-
nomic growth and increasing prosperity are now also gnawing at the conditions that
nurtured a creative economy in this central hub of the region. The city center is begin-
ning to lose its appeal for economic start-ups, alternative cultures, and young artists:
there is just too little old industrial space available and not enough marginal residual
land which can provide a “breeding ground” for creative and economic innovation
anymore. The central city is “finished,” and being handed over to arrivées. At the other
end of the scale, the new functional economic environments along and beyond the
capital’s ring road have developed into rather monolithic business parks which are
not functioning as new centers of wide-ranging urban activity. The traditional mono-
centric pattern of greater Amsterdam has thus gone forever. But the new development
is evolving in an extremely uncoordinated way. No new “multi-centered hierarchy” has
appeared spontaneously to replace what has been lost. Every new economic sub-center
along an expressway or major public transport link has the ambitions of becoming a
new urban node. But it is in fact only possible for a few of these new nodes to grow into
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urban hubs that will feature the right mix of spatial qualities to be established at the
regional level. Regionally coordinated efforts are needed both to develop new nodes in
the right places – particularly at multidimensional infrastructure interchanges – and
to prevent their development in the wrong ones, particularly spread out along ex-
pressways. Properly organizing the new pattern of major urban nodes in the Amster-
dam region is too important to be left to the chance outcome of fragmented forces.
Cultural Conditions
The previous section already referred to the problem of increasing uniformity in the
economic development of the core city. Amsterdam’s historic city center is gradually
losing its varied urban character because it is beginning to be dominated by the com-
mercial cultural economy and because the conditions needed for producing creativity
are being squeezed out. The core center is thus developing an increasingly uniform
profile, one of predominantly prosperous residents and of activities devoted to com-
mercial entertainment. At the same time, new functional economic centers with a
very uniform profile are developing along the Amsterdam ring road. New commercial
and cultural centers such as the ArenA, the Southern Axis, Sloterdijk and, more re-
cently, Watergraafsmeer are designed more as centers of functional containment than
as new and varied expressions of urban culture. A truly varied urban culture will only
develop in the long term once successive forms of land use have each left their mark
and given greater depth to current activity – which is why, despite the current tenden-
cy towards uniformity, the historic city center still remains an oasis of cultural ingenu-
ity and diversity. Nevertheless, new areas could be structured from the outset to enable
more varied use of the space within them. And, of course, this need for cultural diver-
sity applies not only to the new locations along the Amsterdam ring road but also to
the many extensive new residential and working districts being developed through-
out the region, a lot of which are decidedly one-sided in their design.
Finally, the many subcultures which are so important to Amsterdam also need
enough “unregulated” open space in existing neighborhoods and run-down industri-
al and port areas to establish their alternative lifestyles. It is important to ensure that
not all so-called “marginal areas” – such as the former docks in Amsterdam-North and
the many old industrial zones along the River Zaan – are reallocated for new housing
or offices. If the region shuts out subcultures, it loses the key to creativity and urban di-
versity.
Social Conditions
One strategic issue which has been in the picture for several decades is the selective dis-
tribution of the population across the region. The city of Amsterdam itself is relatively
mixed in terms of incomes and ethnic backgrounds. In terms of educational levels, too,
with its combination of specialized courses at one end of the scale and large numbers
of poorly educated immigrants at the other, Amsterdam is very diverse. During the
past ten years, the scale of its urban problems has significantly diminished due to the
general rise in prosperity. However, it is clear that the regional concentrations of such
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problems as long-term unemployment, poor education, and major social troubles are
found in the central city, in a number of post-war districts and certain sections of the
early 20th-century belt. The demographic selections are also striking, with one and
two-person households – amongst them a large proportion of young and elderly peo-
ple – dominating the city and families with children the region. It has often been asked
in recent decades whether a certain degree of redistribution would not be desirable,
and housing policy adjusted accordingly. With social and commercial rented housing
representing more than 80 percent of the stock in Amsterdam, and less than 20 per-
cent of homes being owner-occupied – proportions which are almost reversed in the
surrounding region – the city should perhaps opt more for higher segments of the
housing market. After 80 years of being dominated by social politics – and not just in
the field of housing – should the city not more generally choose to invest in a refined
urban culture? (See the recollections of the historic change in trends in the 1920s, in
the contributions by Wagenaar and Van Engelsdorp Gastelaars.)
There are many sides to this question. If the housing market in the central city were
not dominated by the social-rented sector, it is probable that the entire area would
have become inaccessible for households with an average or below-average income
and the historic city center would have developed into an urban monument catering
solely to visitors, as has long been the case in Venice and has happened to Prague dur-
ing the past ten years. Amsterdam’s city center has long had a mixed population, with
access to the district not primarily being determined by income. On the other hand,
the residential districts surrounding it – particularly the post-war ones – are some-
times extremely uniform. The strategic dilemma with regard to the social structure of
the city and the region, and to the selections which have evolved within them, has
been recognized since the 1970s. Politically, however, it is highly sensitive and for that
reason has not resulted in rapid and explicit policy responses. With the expansion of
the past ten years, this social dilemma increasingly needs to be defined at the regional
level. Moreover, it is becoming ever more clear that the many frictions in the markets
for both rented and owner-occupied homes mean that this issue cannot be left to frag-
mented, contradictory local interests and to the partial deregulation of the rented
housing sector. Here again, regional coordination to achieve collective action is essen-
tial. The guiding hand of higher levels of government – regional and national – is prob-
ably essential here, because policy distribution is unlikely to appear spontaneously in
a context of cooperation.
Ecological Conditions
Finally, it is important to look at the strategic issues with respect to the ecological
structure of the Amsterdam region – and, indeed, the wider area. The increasingly re-
gional configuration of geographical and urban developments has largely made the
traditional clear distinction between urban and rural area a thing of the past. At one
time, the city and the countryside were distinguished by a clear difference in geo-
graphical profile. Nowadays, urban activities are encroaching into areas which were
once regarded as rural – not only because of the pressure of expansion that comes from
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the cities themselves but also because of the changing, and increasingly urbanized,
nature of autonomous activities in the countryside. This now often makes it difficult
to distinguish between urban and rural areas in urbanized regions. It may be possible,
at a higher level, to see a contrast between urbanized and unurbanized regions, but
within the former this is not practical any more: the use of green areas can no longer be
viewed separately from urban activities. This development was originally regarded
mainly as a threat, with the rise of urban functions likely to damage the quality of the
rural landscape. But the debate has now become considerably more complex. The view
has gained ground that urban activities and ecological values could actually be better
allies than the traditional association of the “green” sector with the uniformly com-
mercial agricultural sector. In any event, the picture has become much more varied
and the landscaping of urban and park environments has risen to the top of the agen-
da in regional urban politics.
One important point requiring consideration is the significance of water as a condi-
tioning factor. The many recent floods in the Netherlands have brought the issue of
water management back into the limelight. Controlling water levels and flows is
bound up in all sorts of ways with the uses which can be made of it. Water has been re-
discovered by strategic land-use planning. New urban and recreational uses for it have
been discovered, and it is now an essential element in landscaping the city. The disap-
pearance of the traditional dividing line between city and countryside has made it
necessary to set new collective priorities at the regional level in respect of the develop-
ment and reorganization of green areas and the bodies and flows of water within
them. Here again, the interests involved are powerful and the chances of an irre-
versible loss of quality are too great to allow the results to depend upon the au-
tonomous play of fragmented metropolitan forces.
In Conclusion
We can conclude that the relatively autonomous economic, cultural, social, and eco-
logical developments in the Amsterdam region necessitate strategic choices for a col-
lective policy based on the joint consideration of the key values which underlie a bal-
anced land-use planning policy. The question of whether regional coordination in
such strategic matters is being achieved successfully still has not yet been answered de-
finitively in this region. Whilst many other regions in Europe did succeed in achieving
coordination during the 1990s, usually with a view toward the global economy and
competition with other regions in Europe, this has so far eluded the Amsterdam re-
gion. As it happens, this region was so favorably positioned within the networks of the
new global economy that it was able to benefit as a whole from the economic growth of
the past decade without having to make any coordinated effort. But economic condi-
tions will not always remain so positive and, as we have shown above, one-sided trends
in the geographical development of the region make collective action on a number of
strategic issues urgently necessary.
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